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Emotion dysregulation is a common phenomenon after brain injury, often compromising socio-
emotional adjustment and participation. Nevertheless, there has been little research exploring the 
mechanisms by which brain damage impacts emotion regulation [ER]. In contrast, outside the field of 
neuropsychology, the study of ER has matured during the last decade, generating a robust body of 
evidence on the strategies that people use to modulate their feelings. The main goal of this thesis is to 
bring together, for the first time, these two fields of knowledge. Chapter two presents three articles 
touching key conceptual issues, such as the description of self-regulation and self-other regulation 
problems after brain injury, the relationship between neuropsychological profiles of impairment and 
ER strategies deficits, and the impact of concrete behaviour on emotional experience. Chapter three 
explore the problem of emotion elicitation and emotional reactivity. In two articles, the efficacy of 
internal and external forms of elicitation is explored on a student sample [n = 40], as well as compared 
between people with right hemisphere [RH] damage and matched healthy controls [RH: n = 10, HC: n 
= 15]. The main finding of both studies is that internal elicitation procedures generate higher levels of 
subjective reported emotion across populations of different age. In addition, patients with RH damage 
present similar levels of emotional reactivity compared to controls. Chapter four explores how 
specific ER strategies are compromised by focal brain injury. In the first study, people with RH 
frontal lesions [n = 10] were compared to healthy control [n = 15] on a response modulation task. It 
was found that RH patients were impaired voluntarily manipulating emotional facial expressions, and 
that a subgroup of RH patients was unable to inhibit emotional displays. The second study explored 
the impact of unilateral lesions in the capacity to reappraise [RH: n = 8, LH: n = 8, HC: n = 14]. 
Individuals with RH and LH lesions were equally slow, compared to controls, generating reappraisals. 
However, when time was not considered, both groups were equally productive. Finally, Chapter five 
uses a single case study methodology to explore the mechanism by which ER, and particularly 
reappraisal, is disrupted after left prefrontal lesions. Here, two articles offer important insight into 
how concreteness and executive impairment are associated to emotion dysregulation, and the 
mechanisms by which such dysregulation can be externally compensated.   
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In the last decade the field of neuropsychological rehabilitation has notably turned towards 
models that emphasize socio-emotional adjustment and participation (Bowen, Yeates, & 
Palmer, 2010; Wilson, 2008; Wilson, Gracey, Evans, & Bateman, 2010). This paradigm shift 
appears to respond to the increased awarenHVVRIWKHOLPLWVRIµFRJQLWLYH¶ rehabilitation (e.g. 
Wilson, 1997), a greater understanding of the relevance of emotion in rehabilitation (e.g. 
Mateer, Sira, & O`Connell, 2005), a better comprehension of how positive activities shape 
identity reconstruction (e.g. Ylvisaker & Feeney, 1998, 2000), and the recognition that family 
environment modulates cognitive impairment (e.g. Yeates, Henwood, Gracey, & Evans, 
2007) and can be key to emotional well-being (e.g. Bowen et al., 2009; Hammond, Davis, 
Cook, Philbrick, & Hirsch, 2012). 
In this context, the study of how brain injury compromises socio-emotional capacities 
has acquired greater relevance, focusing on changes to emotional perception and expression  
(e.g. Borod, Bloom, Brickman, Nakhutina, & Curko, 2010), as well as deficits in emotional 
reactivity and empathy (e.g. Bramham, Morris, Hornak, Bullock, & Polkey, 2009; Shamay-
Tsoory, Tomer, Goldsher, Berger, & Aharon-Peretz, 2004; Sousa, Mcdonald, & Rushby, 
2012). In addition, an important literature on the neuropsychiatric effects of brain injury has 
developed, describing how lesions to diverse brain areas may generate a wide range of 
psychiatric syndromes (e.g. Chemerinski & Levine, 2006; Robinson, 2006). 
It is interesting that, in this scenario, research on ER has been so sparse1. Particularly, 
considering that ER problems have been widely reported as a common impairment after focal 
and diffuse brain damage (e.g. Abreu et al., 2009; Bechara, 2004; McDonald, Hunt, Henry, 
                                                 
1 $ 3V\F,1)2 µDOO WLPH¶ VHDUFK RI SXEOLFDWLRQV ZLWK WKH WHUPV HPRtion regulation + brain injury/brain 
damage/traumatic brain injury [in abstract], showed only three scientific articles. 
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Dimoska, & Bornhofen, 2010; Obonsawin et al., 2007; Wilson, Alderman, Burguess, Emslic, 
& Evans, 1996). Such state of the art appears to be the consequence of two problems. The 
first one is the absence of a comprehensive theoretical framework on ER to explore changes 
after brain injury. There is only one publication, a book chapter (Beer & Lombardo, 2007), 
which considers well known ER models -used in experimental psychology- to explain 
emotion dysregulation after brain damage. The second problem is the predominance of a 
neuropsychiatric perspective in understanding emotion dysregulation (e.g. Cattran, Oddy, & 
Wood, 2011). The limitation of such a perspective is that it tends to reduce emotion 
dysregulation to the presence of psychiatric symptoms. This, as it will be discussed in chapter 
5, is not always the case. Emotion dysregulation events may occur in people with acquired 
brain injury, even when they do not meet any psychiatric criteria. A key proposition of this 
thesis is that a better comprehension of the psychological mechanisms that underlie emotion 
dysregulation, and how they are related to neuropsychological impairment, is a more useful 
way to understand ER change after brain damage.  
Outside the field of neuropsychological and neuropsychological rehabilitation, the 
concept of ER has acquired vast popularity [see Fig 1], mostly because of a robust set of 
evidence linking it to psychopathology (e.g. Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; 
Werner & Gross, 2010) and well-being (e.g. Nyklícek, Vingerhoets, & Zeelenberg, 2011).  
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Fig. 1 Number of publications containing the exact phrase emotion regulation in Google Scholar, from 
1990-2012 (Gross, 2013). 
 
In this context, ER has been defined as the set of processes by which individuals can 
influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and 
express those emotions (Gross, 1998). This definition refers mainly to the intrapersonal 
processes [intrinsic ER] that people use to modulate how they feel [see Fig 2]. However, a set 
of interpersonal processes [extrinsic ER], that individuals use to mutually regulate their 
emotional states has also been described (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Niven, Totterdell, & 
Holman, 2009). Both forms of ER [intrinsic and extrinsic] appear to be highly relevant when 
exploring emotion dysregulation after brain injury (Salas, 2011). Nevertheless, the literature 
XVLQJ*URVV¶PRGHORI(5LQSDWLHQWVZLWKDFTXLUHGEUDLQLQMXU\is almost non-existent (Beer 
& Lombardo, 2007; Gillihan et al., 2010; McDonald et al., 2010; Salas, Gross, Rafal, Viñas-
Guasch, & Turnbull, 2013). 
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Fig 2. -DPHV*URVV¶models of Emotion Regulation. The five emotion regulation strategies proposed by the 
model are presented at the top of the figure. The first four ER strategies [from left to right] are often called 
antecedent focused, for they are implemented before the emotional response is triggered. The last ER, response 
modulation, is considered as response focused, for its main goal is to modulate an already triggered emotional 
reaction.  
 
The main goal of this thesis is to bridge the conceptual and experimental gap between 
the fields of neuropsychology [particularly neuropsychological rehabilitation] and ER. This 
task is complex, and presents important challenges, for these two fields have never been 
systematically integrated. The structure of this thesis reflects such complexity, and constitutes 
an attempt to capture the problem from different perspectives.  
As a main strategy, this thesis has adopted a multilevel approach [see Fig 2], where 
theory development, group studies, and single case studies, are equally important and inform 
each other. Such an approach has been a characteristic feature of neuropsychological 
research, particularly when charting new psychological processes (Shallice, 1988). Theorico-
clinical studies, and case studies, allow the formulation of hypotheses on how ER and brain 
injury may relate. Theorico-clinical studies draw such hypotheses from clinical observations 
of brain injured patients, and also from a robust body of evidence on the neuropsychological 
consequences of focal brain damage. Single case studies, on the other hand, generate 
hypotheses based on the detailed report of how ER is disrupted in one single subject, together 
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with the description of the neuropsychological mechanisms that appear to underlie such 
impairment. The design of group studies is influenced by these two sources of information. 
The main goal of the group approach is to test whether theoretical predictions, and case 
observations, are replicated and generalized to the brain injury population. A final dimension 
of this multilevel approach are the methodological studies, which explore how the tools used 
to elicit and measure emotion may be influenced by brain injury. This is particularly relevant 
in order to understand the relationship between emotion reactivity and emotion regulation. 
 
Fig 2. Multilevel approach to the study of ER after acquired brain injury.  
 
The structure of this thesis reflects the complexity of a multilevel approach. There are 
four chapters, each of them corresponding to a different methodology to address the problem 
of ER and brain injury [Review Articles, Groups Studies, Single Case Studies and 
Methodological Articles]. In addition, each chapter consists of a set of related articles. Most 
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of the articles in this thesis have already been published in scientific journals, while others are 
under review or in preparation.  
Chapter 2 [Review Articles] addresses several theorico-clinical issues of the brain 
injury/ER interface. The first paper of this section (Salas, 2012) describes how intrinsic and 
extrinsic regulatory processes are intimately related in brain injury, specifically in the 
modulation of the well-known catastrophic reaction (Goldstein, 1995). Another theoretical 
problem addressed in this chapter is whether specific subgroups of patients with focal lesions 
[e.g. ventromedial PFC damage] may be selectively impaired in a particular ER strategy [e.g. 
situation selection] (Salas, Gross, & Turnbull, submitted). Finally, the third paper (Salas, 
Vaughan, Shanker, & Turnbull, 2013) describes the often neglected problem of concrete 
behaviour, and the challenges that it poses to neuropsychological rehabilitation and the use of 
psychological therapies. This article offers a conceptual background for a case study on 
concrete behaviour and emotion regulation impairment (see section 5, Salas et al., 2013) 
Chapter 3 [Methodological articles] addresses a key problem for ER research: 
emotion elicitation (Coan & Allen, 2007). The first article (Salas et al., 2011) compares the 
effectiveness of two mood induction procedures [MIPs]: film clips and autobiographical 
recall, in a student sample. The effectiveness of such MIPs is crucial to ER research, for ER 
can only be measured when there is an emotional response that has been triggered, and 
requires modulation. A related methodological problem is treated in the second article of this 
chapter. It explores whether people with unilateral right hemisphere lesions experience lower 
levels of positive and negative emotion [as measured by self-reports], when using two types 
of MIPs [film clips and autobiographical recall]. This issue is relevant because a decrease in 
emotional reactivity would impact emotion regulation, for lower levels of emotional intensity 
would require less regulatory effort.  
1. Introduction 
 
17 
 
Chapter 4 [Group studies] focuses on the neuroanatomical and neuropsychological 
basis of two emotion regulation strategies: response modulation and reappraisal. By doing 
this, two hypotheses proposed in the Review Articles section [chapter 4] and in the Single 
Case studies section [chapter 5] are tested. The first article explores the role of the right 
prefrontal cortex in ER, specifically in relation to one well known ER strategy: response 
modulation. This article is the first to compare the performance of a group of patients with 
right prefrontal lesions with a group of matched healthy controls on a response modulation 
task. In addition, the relationship between response modulation performance and 
neuropsychological measures of inhibition is examined. The second article addresses a 
related issue, which is the role of laterality in reappraisal generation capacity. This article 
explores this issue by comparing reappraisal generation capacity in participants with 
unilateral damage to the left and right hemisphere, and healthy controls. The relationship 
between reappraisal generation and specific cognitive control abilities is also described here. 
Chapter 5 [Single case studies] expands upon the theory developed in chapter 2, and 
the group studies presented in chapter 4, particularly in relation to the use of reappraisal. 
However, each of the case studies addresses the problem from a different perspective. The 
first article (Salas et al., 2013) analyses in detail the performance of a participant with a left 
frontal stroke [Mrs M], who presented with a remarkable inability to generate reappraisals 
[and was one participant in a group study, chapter 4]. This case is especially interesting 
because it discusses the potential impact of concreteness, or the inability to disengage from 
immediate experience, in the use of reappraisal. The second case (Salas, Radovic, Yuen & 
Turnbull, in preparation) offers a different viewpoint of the problem. It describes how 
executive impairment [particularly the difficulty to generate thoughts] modifies emotional 
reactivity and emotion regulation, this in a man who suffered a left fronto-parietal stroke 
[Professor F]. An interesting feature of this case study is that it uses a mixed methodology to 
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assess changes in several emotional processes. This article also describes, and discusses, the 
interpersonal mechanisms used by Professor F to modulate his negative emotional states. 
The final section of the thesis [Discussion] will bring together the diverse 
contributions of each article, synthesising the major themes and strands of evidence. By 
doing this, it is expected to offer a more comprehensive view of how emotion regulation and 
brain injury are related. The theoretical and practical implications of this research will also be 
discussed. 
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2.1. Surviving Catastrophic Reaction after brain 
injury: the use of Self-regulation and Self-Other 
regulation2. 
 
 
2.1.1. Abstract 
Catastrophic reactions are usually observed after brain injury. Although Kurt 
Goldstein described this concept more than fifty years ago, it has not been adequately 
incorporated in the theoretical and clinical field of neuropsychological rehabilitation. In the 
following paper a number of cases where patients experience catastrophic reactions are 
illustrated, as well as the intrapersonal and interpersonal mechanisms that facilitate the 
regulation and reorganization of the self. It is proposed that catastrophic reaction activates 
attachment mechanisms by default, mobilizing the patient to look for a significant other to 
regulate himself from outside. This paper also describes how high levels of arousal, triggered 
by a catastrophic reaction during interpersonal conflict, impact on mentalizing, which is a 
self-UHJXODWRU\IXQFWLRQWKDWJHQHUDWHVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIRXURZQDQGRWKHU¶VPHQWDOstates. 
Finally, it is suggested that lesions to different brain areas might impair specific Self-
regulatory and Self-Other regulatory components, requiring the adaptation of 
psychotherapeutic technique to these particular profiles. Examples of the modification of 
psychotherapeutic technique with the patient and the family are provided.  
                                                 
2 Salas, C. E. (2012). Surviving Catastrophic Reaction after Brain Injury: The use of Self -Regulation and Self-
Other Regulation. Neuropsychoanalysis, 14(1): 77-92 
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³7KHPRVWGHYDVWDWLQJORVVRIDOOEHFRPHVDORVVRIDPHHWLQJRIWKHPLQGV´ 
 
Paula Freed 
 
2.1.2. A peculiar early memory 
Two years after his stroke, Professor F, a 70-year-old renowned academic, arrived for his 
weekly psychotherapy session. He sat on the couch and said he wanted to read something he 
had written. His occupational therapist had suggested that he train his right hand (affected by 
two large left frontal-SDULHWDO VWURNHV E\ZULWLQJ VWRULHV ³$W ILUVW , WKRXJKW DERXW ZULWLQJ
stories -he said- so my sons could tell my stories to their sons, as I did by telling them stories 
about my father. But I have dHFLGHG WRZULWH WKH VWRU\RIP\ DFFLGHQW DQG ,¶G OLNH \RX WR
listen about the first memory I had. When I opened my eyes I found myself in a room. Now I 
NQRZLWZDVDKRVSLWDO¶VURRP1RZ,NQRZ,ZDVWKHUHEHFDXVHVRPHWKLQJLQP\KHDGZDV
broken, but at tKDWWLPH,FRXOGQ¶WWKLQNDERXWLW,FRXOGQ¶WWKLQNDERXWDQ\WKLQJDWDOO. It is 
almost impossible to describe that experience; I just can say that my mind was in silence, like 
D µSDS¶´ $W WKDW PRPHQW , DVNHG 3URIHVVRU )whether WKDW µSDS¶ PHDQW IHHOLQJ his mind 
HPSW\³1R±he replied- neither I could say it was a void, it was just a sensation in my head, a 
µSDS¶,I,VD\LWZDVDVLOHQFH,DPQRWVXUHWKHZRUGµVLOHQFH¶LVULJKWRULIWKHVHQVDWLRQ,
had then is related to something known. My second memory is seeing my whole family 
standing beside my bed; my kids, my wife. That calmed me down and I felt a great serenity. 
(YHU\WKLQJZDVJRLQJWREHDOOULJKW´ 
Accessing so clearly to the early experience of a brain injury survivor is something 
unusual. Cognitive deficits frequently impede remembering or reconstructing the initial 
HYHQWV*URWWD	%UDWLQD7KLVPDNHV3URIHVVRU)¶VUHSRUWYHU\LQWHUHVWLQJ0RUHRYHU
his testimony is relevant because it illustrates the interaction between the insufficiency of 
cognitive resources to deal with environmental demands ±I could not think about anything at 
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all- DQGWKHVSRQWDQHRXVVHDUFKIRURWKHUV¶VXSSRUW±seeing my family calmed me down and I 
felt a great serenity.  
Brain injury survivors usually describe the experience of cognitive deficits as having a 
³GLVRUGHUHG´PLQG3ULJDWDQRDVLWXDWLRQ WKDW LVHPRWLRQDOO\ OLYHGDVDGLVRUJDQL]HG
inner state or a psychological catastrophe (Goldstein, 1995 [1965]). A further consequence of 
KDYLQJ D ³GLVRUGHUHG PLQG´ LV WKDW WKH PHFKDQLVPV WKDW DOORZ UHFRYHU\ IURP LQWHQVHO\
negative emotional states, in other words, self-regulatory mechanisms, are compromised 
(Freed, 2002). In more tragic circumstances, brain damage may also impair the capacity to 
use others as a source of external regulation, for example by compromising the ability to 
emotionally connect to others (Bowen, Yeates & Palmer, 2010). The aim of this article is to 
draw a preliminary theory of these regulatory processes after brain injury, thus informing the 
assessment and design of interventions in rehabilitation settings. 
 
2.1.3. Catastrophic Reaction  
/HW¶V FRQVLGHU WKH IROORZLQJ VLWXDWLRQV IUHTXHQWO\ REVHUYHG LQ DFTXLUHG EUDLQ LQMXU\ $%,
survivors. When I ask Mrs. N, a vascular dementia patient, to tell me where she is now, and 
what the date is, she becomes restless. Her body starts shaking on the couch and her face is 
distorted as she tries to organize her thoughts among confabulations and disperse ideas. A 
couple of minutes later the agitation increases and she desperately asks to leave the room, 
mumbling that she has something to do or that she needs to go to the toilet. Mr. C, a young 
man with large  strokes in the middle cerebral and left anterior arteries, cannot 
transform his thoughts into words. Mr. C gets agitated; his face is deformed by the anxiety 
caused by my questions and he constantly turns his head toward his wife looking for help. He 
VD\V ³, GRQ¶W« , GRQ¶W NQRZ«,KDYH LW RQ WKH WLS RIP\ WRQJXH«QR«QR«, FDQ¶W´2U
consider Professor F and how he writes down his ideas before attending to a work meeting, 
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saying that by doing so he will avoid forgetting what he has to say and becoming confused. 
These are stories of patients with widespread localized brain injuries and heterogeneous 
cognitive deficits. However, they share a common factor, the kind of emotional reaction they 
experience when they fail to respond to environmental demands. In the first two cases 
confusion and anguish take over. In the last one, anticipatory anxiety and preparation 
predominate, as a way of avoiding confusion and anguish.  
Kurt Goldstein (1995 [1965]) called these anguish and confusion responses to 
environmental demands as catastrophic reactions:  
 
³,Q FDWDVWURSKLF UHDFWLRQ WKH LQGLYLGXDO HQWHUV LQWR D disorganized inner state, 
experiencing a physical and mental shock, feeling unfree, buffeted and 
vacillating.  But this shock does not just impact his own person; it also provokes a 
collapse in his experience of the surrounding world. The state of anxiety caused 
E\WKHFDWDVWURSKLFUHDFWLRQLPSDFWV WKHVXUYLYRU¶VIXQFWLRQLQJIRUD ORQJSHULRG
of time, also affecting tasks that he/she could accomplish easily under other 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV 2Q WKH FRQWUDU\ XQGHU DQ RUJDQL]HG VLWXDWLRQ WKH RUJDQLVP¶V
responses are constant, correct, and adequate to the organism to which they 
belong, as well to its specific circumstances. The individual himself experiences 
them with a feeling of smooth functioning, unconstraint, well-being, adjustment 
to the world and satisfaction. In other words, behavior has a clear order, a global 
SDWWHUQ WKDW DOLJQV DOO WKH RUJDQLVP¶V FRPSRQHQWV ±somatic and psychic- in a 
SDUWLFXODUWDVN´>SS-49].  
 
*ROGVWHLQ¶V FRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ RI FDWDVWURSKLF UHDFWLRQ LV URRWHG LQ WKH SURIRXQG
understanding of how brain injury may shatter the coherence and continuity of the Self.  
According to Goldstein, coherence UHIHUVWRWKHSURSHUDOLJQPHQWRIWKHRUJDQLVP¶VVRPDWLF
and psychological components during a task. Coherence may be disrupted after brain injury, 
compromising the integration of different levels of functioning, as in patients with prefrontal 
lesions, who VWUXJJOH WR ³GR´ ZKDW WKH\ ³NQRZ´ Stuss et al., 2002; Stuss & Alexander, 
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2007). On the other hand, continuity denotes the uninterrupted [and fluid] updating of 
representations over time (Modell, 1993; see also Edelman, 1992, 2006). This property may 
DOVR EH GLVUXSWHG DIWHU EUDLQ LQMXU\ JHQHUDWLQJ ³GHOD\V´ DQG ³ILVVXUHV´ LQ WKH FRXSOLQJ
between subject and environment.  
Contemporaneous authors, such as Ben-Yishay (2000), have approached the 
FDWDVWURSKLF UHDFWLRQ LQ D VLPLODU IDVKLRQ WR *ROGVWHLQ GHILQLQJ LW DV WKH ³EHKDYLRUDO
PDQLIHVWDWLRQ RI D WKUHDW WR WKH SHUVRQ¶V YHU\ H[LVWHQFH´ S  2Q WKH FRQWUDU\ WKH
neuropsychiatric literature has tended to use the term in a much-reduced way, narrowing it to 
inadequate outbursts of frustration, depression or anger (Carota et al., 2001; Chemerinski & 
Robinson, 2000; Starkstein et al., 1993). This trend to understand the catastrophic reaction as 
a psychopathological syndrome appears to disregard the original meaning of the concept. 
Goldstein approach to the catastrophic reaction is not neuropsychiatric, but highly 
phenomenological, describing how survivors experience themselves and the world when their 
whole organism is under a disorganized functioning (Goldstein, 1959). This emphasis on 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHSDWLHQW¶VH[SHULHQFHYHUVXVSODFLQJLWRQDVSHFLILFQRVRORJ\LVDIDPLOLDU
point of view for rehabilitation clinicians, who try to comprehend patients from inside as the 
first step of the rehabilitation process (Prigatano, 1999). Such clinical approach has led many 
psychotherapists to adopt a Self-Psychology perspective, rather than a neuropsychiatric one, 
preserving catastrophic reaction original meaning as a disruption (loss of coherence and 
continuity) in the sense of self (Klonoff, Lage & Chiapello, 1993; Klonoff, 2010; Prigatano, 
1999; Salas & Turnbull, 2010). 
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2.1.4 Self-regulation strategies used to deal with catastrophic reaction after 
brain injury. 
 
But how does a survivor deal with the persistent threat of entering into a disorganized state?  
,Q0UV1¶VFDVHVKHVHHPVWRIHHOVDIHRQO\ZKHQVKHLVFORVHWRKHUVLVWHUZKRPVKHLVDEOH
to recognize and look for actively. Her sister comments that the only place where Mrs. N 
feels calmed is in her bedroom, reading the same magazines and doing the same routine over 
and over. Professor F, who still possesses numerous capacities despite his moderate executive 
dysfunction, exhibits more complex behaviors, although the goal remains identical. Each visit 
to an unknown place is carefully prepared and supported by his family. And after several 
repetitions, without many variations, a sense of control and calmness is finally conquered. 
However, there is a persistent look of alarm in his face, an expression of the difficulty he has 
reacting flexibly to environmental variations.  
In light of these clinical observations it would not seem strange to suggest that 
VXUYLYRUV GHDO ZLWK FDWDVWURSKLF UHDFWLRQ¶V WKUHDW WKURXJh modification of environmental 
GHPDQGV7KHVHPRGLILFDWLRQVDUHPDGHXVLQJ WZRPDLQVWUDWHJLHVFKDQJHV LQ WKHSDWLHQW¶V
behavior and the search for cognitive/emotional support from significant others. Regarding 
the first strategy, Goldstein (1995 [1965]) states that the survivor will try to stay away from 
situations that could generate catastrophic reactions (see Riley et al., 2004 for a list of these 
situations in Traumatic Brain Injury), passively isolating himself from the world, or actively 
avoiding it, according to certain basic criterion extracted from successive exposure to the 
HQYLURQPHQW ,Q VRPH VLWXDWLRQV WKH SDWLHQW PD\ HVFDSH H[KLELWLQJ µGHIHQVLYH¶ EHKDYLRUV
which would be nothing more than a way of keeping the situation under control. Although 
these behaviors (watching TV for hours, staying away from other people, compulsively 
asking to be taken to the toilet) might look stereotyped, or rigid to an external observer, they 
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always play a crucial role in keeping environmental demands under control, and thus 
SUHVHUYLQJDEDVLFVHQVHRIPDVWHU\$V*ROGVWHLQKLPVHOIKDVDIILUPHG³DWDFHUWDLQVWDJHRI
disintegration these substitute actions are the last resource, the only means by which 
existence can be maintained. In this sense they are meaningful; they enable the organism to 
FRPHWRWHUPVZLWKWKHHQYLURQPHQWDWOHDVWLQVRPHZD\´>S@ 
Another behavioral strategy brain injury survivors use to avoid catastrophic reactions 
is the tendency toward orderliness. Disorder demands choice of alternatives, change of 
attitude, and rapid transition from one behavior to another, exactly what is difficult or 
impossible for survivors to do (Goldstein, 1995 [1965]). Thus, a conversation among three or 
more people becomes a hard and frustrating task for Professor F; sudden topic changes, 
unexpected interruptions and jumps between present, past and future scenarios are 
experienced as a confusing and exhausting chaos. However, when you are alone with 
Professor F he manages to communicate in a smart and sensible way. This especially takes 
place when he feels calm and knows that people will wait until his ideas emerge. He tries 
very hard to keep his discourse ordered and linear, as a way of preserving the words that may 
allow him to describe how he feels. To an external observer his careful and detailed narrative 
would reflect nothing more than concreteness and lack of flexibility. But the truth is that his 
evident order is also a way of protecting his valued, but scarce thoughts, which occasionally 
refuse to emerge, or when they do, rapidly fade away. Goldstein points out that in order to 
avoid the anguish caused by disorganized situations, patients hold tenaciously to orderliness 
LQDVHHPLQJO\SULPLWLYHULJLGDQGFRPSXOVLYHIDVKLRQ7KLVLV3URIHVVRU)¶VRUGHUDn order 
that stands as the only way of preserving the possibility of looking at himself. An order that 
when lost generates a rather visceral and non-represented type of experience (e.g. somatic 
pain, heightened arousal), as well as mental states described by himself as turbid and 
perplexing. In those disorganizing moments Professor F refers to feeling paralyzed, 
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experiencing something he does not understand, something that is so intense that it even 
blocks the ability to comprehend what is going on. Catastrophic reaction ultimately means a 
disruption in the continuity of existence, a falling, a displacement from the center.  
 
2.1.5. Self-Other regulation: Attachment system activation as the search 
IRULQQHUZRUOG¶VRUGHU 
So far, I have suggested that ABI survivors organize their external environment to avoid 
experiencing the internal disorganization that the catastrophic reaction entails. It seems 
necessary to elaborate further on what the subjective experience of disorganization is and 
may mean. Goldstein himself associates the catastrophic reaction with severe anxiety 
(Goldstein, 1959), an observation that has been supported by more contemporaneous authors. 
For example, Freed (2002) has pointed out that the anxiety experienced by survivors is not 
the kind of anxiety that emerges as a signal of danger or conflict (signal anxiety according to 
Freud, 1926 [1959]), but a more primitive one, referred in the psychoanalytical literature as 
fragmentation anxiety (Klonoff, Lage & Chiapello, 1993; Kohut & Wolf, 1978; Winnicott, 
1996 [1962]).  Here, mental states, which are sustained by global patterns of brain activation 
that XQGHUOLHWKHEUDLQ¶VFRKHVLYHIXQFWLRQLQJ6LHJHODUHGLVUXSWHG,QVRPHSDWLHQWV
the emergence of this primitive anxiety can be observed as a loss of reality testing capacity 
(Mr. D in Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2002). In others, who have more residual resources, it may 
be experienced as boundless panic (e.g. patient V.O. in Dewar & Gracey, 2007; patient P. in 
Gracey et al., 2007). 
Defining catastrophic reaction as the absence of a unifying mental state which allows 
VPRRWK WUDQVDFWLRQVEHWZHHQRUJDQLVPDQGZRUOGRU WKHGLVUXSWLRQRI WKH VHOI¶V FRKHUHQFH
and continuity, forces us to consider the regulatory mechanisms by which the organism 
recovers its homeostasis. I have described above how survivors manage to regulate 
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themselves by ordering their behavior and environment, now I will illustrate the interpersonal 
mechanisms that allow the same goal.  
In adult human beings, the self-regulatory function of psychosomatic states is a 
consequence of early interpersonal exchanges (Self-Other regulation) that are later 
internalized as regulatory affective-cognitive schemas (Calkins & Hill, 2007; Schore, 2003; 
Thompson & Meyer, 2007). At these early stages, it is another human being who initially 
regulates us through his/her attunement with our own inner states, -which reflects needs and 
emotions (Bion, 2007 [1962]; Fonagy et al., 2004). If we also keep in mind that this self-
regulatory capacity appears to be related to the normal functioning of the frontal lobes 
(Quirk, 2007; Quirk & Beer, 2006; Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Schore, 2003) it would not seem 
surprising that acquired brain injury survivors may show deficits in self-regulation (Abreau et 
al., 2009; Beer & Lombardo, 2007; Bramham et al., 2008; Robertson & Knight, 2008) 
requiring that caregivers, or significant others, play an auxiliary role in regulating their inner 
states from outside. This type of regulation has been usually referred in the developmental 
literature as external or extrinsic regulation (Fox & Calkins, 2003; Gross & Thompson, 2007) 
Although there is a limited literature regarding attachment and emotional adjustment 
in ABI, authors such as Prigatano (2008) have recognized its relevance to the development of 
a working alliance between patients and rehabilitation teams. A substantial literature has 
described the attachment system as innate (Bowlby, 1969; Panksepp, 1998), organizing 
physiological and brain regulation (Schore, 2003; Fonagy, 2008) and playing a key role in the 
search for proximity (Bowlby, 1973), as a mean for reestablishing safety and reducing 
previous states of tension (Fonagy, 2008). In children the search for proximity allows 
protection in the face of danger (hunger, adverse temperature changes, attacks from others 
and predators, separation) and modulation of disorganizing mental states. In adults, especially 
in moments of stress, attachment system activation is observed in the search for availability 
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of specific attachment figures (parents, partners), as a source of comfort, advice and support 
(Siegel, 1999). To Mary Main (cited in Siegel 1999) the inner experience of an activated 
attachment system is associated with feelings of anxiety and fear and can be triggered by 
diverse situations. Consequently, it is possible to suggest that ABI survivors, when 
experiencing catastrophic reactions, will attempt to regulate their inner states from outside, 
WKURXJKWKHXVHRIRWKHUV¶PLQGV-brains (Salas, 2008). Due to the disorganization produced by 
the insufficiency of cognitive resources to cope with environmental demands (which tend to 
be cortically localized and highly vulnerable to brain injury), the organism functionally 
returns to early patterns of behavior (predominantly subcortical and automated). From here it 
is possible to understand Mrs. N¶VSHUVLVWHQWVHDUFKIRUSUR[LPLW\WRZDUGVKHUVLVWHURU0U&
ORRNLQJDWKLVZLIHZKHQKHFDQ¶WILQGZRUGVRUHYHQ3URIHVVRU)¶VVHUHQLW\DIWHUVHHLQJKLV
family by his side. The relevant point here, under the light of attachment theory, is that the 
search for the external environmental order referred by Goldstein is finally an effort to 
reestablish the inner ZRUOG¶s order.  
 
2.1.6. $UHJUHVVLRQRILQWHUSHUVRQDOSURFHVVHV7KHXVHRIRWKHU¶VPLQGV 
According to Paula Freed (2002), deficits in memory, perception, problem solving, reasoning 
and abstraction cause a regression in affective and interpersonal processes. In this context, 
regression means a temporary return to evolutionary previous ways of functioning, when the 
organism does not yet have adequate resources to deal by itself with inner and outer demands, 
UHTXLULQJ WKH XVH RI RWKHUV¶ SV\FKRORJLFDO DSSDUDWXV WR UHJXODWH LWV VRPDWLF VWDWHV LH
extrinsic regulation). Such regression of emotional processes usually implies a reduction in 
WKHFDSDFLW\WRGLUHFWDWWHQWLRQWRWKHRUJDQLVP¶VVRPDWLFVWDWHVLQWHJUDWHVRPDWLFVWDWHVZLWK
symbolic ±and verbal representations, relate affective states to complex environmental 
situations, down-regulate emotional responses by using reappraisal or taking into account 
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RWKHUSHRSOH¶VLQWHQWLRQVRUHPRWLRQV$FRQVHTXHQFHRIWKLVUHJUHVVLRQLVWKHSHUVLVWHQFHRI
basic and primitive emotional states during moments of disorganization, which appraise 
stimuli simply as positive (proximity) or negative (avoidance) (Davidson, 1990). Another 
implication is the supremacy of automatic anxiety over signal anxiety, where the survivor 
cannot mobilize coping, or defensive resources, to prepare himself (Freud, 1926 [1959]). A 
regression in interpersonal processes implies also a temporary return to asymmetric patterns 
of interpersonal exchange and reciprocity, because certain mental functions that sustain 
mutuality, such as mentalizing and empathy, are damaged or abolished. SurviYRUV¶
dependency on their caregivers will also elicit the activation of their own early interaction 
patterns related to care and safety. Consequently, an old scene is re-interpreted, where an 
RUJDQLVP UHTXLUHV WKH XVH RI D VLJQLILFDQW RWKHU¶VPHQWDO IXQFWLons to be regulated. This is 
something that caregivers know, and usually complaint about, when they say that ³LW is like 
KDYLQJ D QHZ FKLOG´ 6RPH FDUHJLYHUV DUH FDSDEOH RI SURYLGLQJ WKH HQYLURQPHQWDO DQG
interpersonal order needed to avoid and modulate catastrophic reaction, perhaps because they 
have internalized positive affective regulation experiences early in their own childhood. 
However, not all caregivers are able to do this and in such cases, there is the potential for 
having one catastrophe on top of another; the loss of the meeting of the minds, the worst loss 
of all.  
  
2.1.7. A Disencounter of Minds 
Mr. L is a kind and well-mannered man who fell off a roof whilst supervising a building 
construction. As a consequence he had a severe traumatic brain injury affecting most of his 
right frontal and right parietal cortices. When I met him he was in his wheelchair, hemiplegic 
and drowsy. He also had a significant difficulty perceiving stimuli from his left side and 
evaluating realistically his physical and cognitive problems. It was a classic case of 
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anosognosia or impaired self-awareness. In addition, he had a disruptive delusional jealousy, 
which usually appeared as a perseverative topic at the beginning of each session: 
 
C.S: How is everything going Mr. L? 
Mr/7KLQJVDUHZURQJLQP\OLIH,¶PWKLQNLQJDERXWPRYLQJRXW 
C.S: Why? (I wonder also how he would manage to do so considering his motor impairment) 
0U/0\ZLIH6KHNHHSVUHFHLYLQJFDOOVIURPDPDQ7KH\GRQ¶WWHOOPHZKRKHLVEXW,NQRZVKHLV
after something. I know it (He remain silent for a while and then becomes drowsy).  
C.S: How are you so certain that she is cheating on you?  
0U/6KHXVXDOO\JRHVRXW«DQGVKHGRHVQRWZDQWWRKDYHVH[ZLWKPHDQ\PRUH,NQRZLW 
 
  Mr. L was able to create an infinite number of stories regarding how his wife cheated 
on him, which usually were hooked to a real stimulus from the environment. For example, a 
FDUGZKHUHKLVGDXJKWHUZURWH³,ORYH\RX´WRKHUPRWKHUZDVFRQYLQFLQJSURRIRIKLVZLIH¶V
unfaithfulness. A call from the taxi driver, telling them that he was about to pick them up, and 
take them to the rehabilitation center, was also another piece of evidence that confirmed his 
suspicions. Absolutely every event that he experienced could be used as evidence to confirm 
his conviction; a TV advert, something that was said on the news, a line from a soap-opera. 
Anything! Even I was considered (for a long period of time) as a possible accomplice.  
 
Mr. L: Can I ask you something? Did my wife ask you to convince me that nothing is going on? 
Are you covering her up?  
&61RVKHKDVQ¶W%XWLI,VD\QRZRXOG\RXEHOLHYHPH" 
Mr. L: I would like to believe you. You have been nice to me and helped me. 
C.S: But I imagine you are not FRPSOHWHO\VXUH,¶PWHOOLQJWKHWUXWK 
Mr. L: yes.  
 
2EYLRXVO\VRPHWKLQJLQ0U/¶VUHDOLW\WHVWLQJZDVZURQJEXWFXULRXVO\LWZDVXVXDOO\
restricted to his wife faithfulness (like an encapsulated delusion). Far away from that topic 
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Mr. L was a reasonable, good humored and peaceful man. However, his wife, a woman that 
loved him deeply, had numerous complaints: 
 
0UV/ZLWKWHDUVLQKHUH\HV,GRQ¶WNQRZLI,FDQWDNHLWDQ\ORQJHU$FRXSOHRIGD\VDJRKH
was watching TV and suddenly he started yelling µ\RX GRQ¶W ORYH PH¶ DQG VD\LQJ RWKHU YHU\
hurtful things.  
C.S: do you have any idea why he started saying that? 
0UV/,GRQ¶WNQRZ:HZHUHZDWFKLQJDVRDSRSHUDDQGSHUKDSVKHSLFNHGXSVRPHWKLQJIURP
the show. Sometimes it starts out of nothing. I reDOO\GRQ¶WNQRZ 
C.S: so what did you do? 
0UV/,WULHGWRWDONWRKLP7RWHOOKLPWKDW,GRUHDOO\ORYHKLPWKDWWKLVLVWKHUHDVRQZK\,¶P
WDNLQJFDUHRIKLP<RXNQRZ,GRQ¶WFDUHLIKHGRHVQRWUHFRYHUFRPSOHWHO\,NQRZKHZRQ¶W,
just want him to love me as he used to. I can take care of the house and get the money, but this 
«,GRQ¶WNQRZLI,FDQOLYHOLNHWKLV 
C.S: so trying to reason with him did not work at all? 
Mrs. L: no. Finally I ended up crying and feeling very anxious. He kept accusing me and I became 
DQJULHUDVLIKHUHDOO\KDWHGPH,GRQ¶WXQGHUVWDQGZK\WKLVKDSSHQV6R,MXVWOHIW%XW,KDGWR
come back, and go to bed later with him. I hate that. 
 
 Mr. L insulted her when he believed he had found some proof of her infidelity, and 
such hostility could last for several hours, impenetrable to any argument. At nights he insisted 
in having sexual intercourse, as a way of testing her love. And she accepted this on many 
RFFDVLRQVEXWKLVGDLO\DFFXVDWLRQVH[KDXVWHGKHU7R0U/¶VZife he was not the same man 
anymore. He had become a violent and selfish person, who no longer cared about her 
feelings; the sadness and anger he caused by his insults. But to Mr. L none of that was 
evident. For him, certainty existed only in what he was able to see, and understand in a 
concrete fashion, for example, whether or not his wife agreed to have sexual intercourse. 
When emotionally aroused by his jealousy, 0U/ZDVEOLQGWRKLVEHORYHG¶VLQQHUVWDWHVD
dimension too abstract or subtle. Although Mr. L and his wife loved each other, their 
situation was an example of what Paula Freed has described as the disencounter of the minds, 
the worst loss of all.  
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Interpersonal relationships are probably the most complex situations human beings 
must face, partly because their core element is unpredictability (Goldberg, 2001). Human 
relationships demand flexibility and continuous adaptation. If catastrophic reactions are 
triggered by situations that require choosing between alternatives and switching from one set 
of behavior to another (Goldstein, 1995 [1965]), it is not a surprise that interpersonal conflict 
EHFRPH D VRXUFH RI VHYHUH DQ[LHW\ DQG FRQIXVLRQ WR $%, VXUYLYRUV 0U /¶V IHDU RI
abandonment (as he abandoned his first wife to move in with his current wife, his infidelity) 
was a feeling of such intensity that it caused huge failures in his reality testing. But he had no 
choice. To get out of those delusions, by himself, was impossible. 
 3HUKDSV VRPHRQH FRXOG VD\ WKDW0U /¶V FDVH LV D UDWKHU H[WUHPH H[DPSOH RI KRZ
brain injury can generate a disencounter of minds. So OHW¶V consider something more ordinary, 
VXFKDV0UV$¶V DUJXPHQWVZLWKKHUKXVEDQG0UV$ LVD \HDUVROGKRXVHZLIHZLth a 
severe dysexecutive syndrome caused by a large left frontal-parietal stroke. She is upset 
because her son has invited some friends over to swim at the pool at night. She thinks (later 
on) this is a sign of lack of respect, because no one asked her permission. So she impulsively 
goes to the backyard and throws them out of the house. Her husband gets angry with her and 
asks why she is behaving so selfishly. She does not have a clue, at that moment she just feels 
perplexed without even knowing how she got into the fight. However, she is able to perceive 
that her husband is annoyed, which causes her to become even more anxious. Her mind gets 
disorganized because of the anxiety and negative arousal, and she is not capable of finding 
reasons to justify her beKDYLRU+HUPLQGVKXWVGRZQDQGVKHFDQMXVW\HOO³EHFDXVH,GRQ¶W
ZDQWWR«EHFDXVH,GRQ¶WZDQWWR´)LQDOO\KHZDONVDZD\ZKLOHVKHVWD\VVWLOOFDSWXUHGE\
a mixture of indecipherable sensations, which are turbid and somatically painful. She does 
not understand what has just happened, neither what she feels, or why. Only after a couple of 
sessions we are able to come up with an explanation. She feels anger, guilt, helplessness and 
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DEDQGRQPHQW$WKRPHVKHKDVDOZD\VµFDOOHGWKHVKRWV¶DQGIHHOLQJWKDW she is not able to 
decide or control anything anymore fills her with frustration. She feels she is not herself any 
longer, that she has changed and nobody cares about what she thinks or comprehends what 
VKHH[SHULHQFHV0UV$¶VILJKWZLWKKHUKXVEDQGLVanother example of the disencounter of 
the minds caused by catastrophic reaction, where a patient is unable to represent, and 
communicate, her feelings and intentions. To her husband, her childish and impulsive 
behavior is equally incomprehensible, a sad confirmation that Mrs. A is not the same 
anymore.  
According to Freed (2002), in order to sustain interpersonal relationships ABI survivors 
must regain certain cognitive reintegration. They instinctively search for others, with whom 
they have had relationships with in the past, to provide this integrative function. However, 
because of feelings of discontinuity with the survivor, some relatives fail to provide this aid. 
The reasons of this experience of discontinuity have been illustrated by Feigelson (1993), 
ZKRVXJJHVWVWKDWUHODWLYHVRIWHQIHHOWKHQHXURORJLFDOLQVXOWDVD³SHUVRQDOLW\GHDWK´DVWKH
HPHUJHQFH RI D ³GRXEOH´ D ³JKRVW´ VRPHRQH SK\VLFDOO\ IDPLOLDU EXW HPLWWLQJ D FRQWLQXDO
sense of unreality. Relatives also experience intense anxieties when oEVHUYLQJ WKHSDWLHQW¶V
struggle to tolerate catastrophic reaction. Consequently, relatives usually respond in a 
QHJDWLYHIDVKLRQWRWKHVHQHHGVZKLFKLQWHQVLI\WKHVXUYLYRU¶VLQWHUQDOGLVRUJDQL]DWLRQHYHQ
more, activating feelings of loss, rejection, abandonment, and reinforcing his/hers already 
diminished capacity to relate to others (Freed, 2002; p. 62). As a result, in response to the 
instinctive search for coherence through the use of others, the survivor finds an abyss; the 
impossibility of using otheU¶V PLQGV DV D VRXUFH RI SV\FKLF FRPSHQVDWLRQ DQG LQQHU
UHJXODWLRQ $FWLYDWLRQ RI WKH DWWDFKPHQW V\VWHP LV QRW HQRXJK WR PRGXODWH VXUYLYRUV¶
FDWDVWURSKLFUHDFWLRQVLIWKHUHLVQRRQHFDSDEOHRIPHQWDOL]LQJWKHVXUYLYRU¶VLQQHUVWDWHVRU
of tolerating and symbolizing the anxiety produced by their emotional demand. 
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2.1.8. %H\RQGWKLQNLQJDERXWRWKHUSHRSOH¶VPLQGVWKHVHOI-regulatory 
role of Mentalizing. 
Usually referred to in the cognitive literature as Theory of Mind (Gallagher et al., 2002; 
Gallagher & Frith, 2003), mentalizing refers mostly to a preconscious imaginative mental 
activity (Fonagy, 2008), where we generate a representation, or mental scenario, about what 
other people, and ourselves, could be thinking and feeling. In the last decade several studies 
have tried to explore mentalizing deficits in people with acquired brain injury (Martín-
Rodríguez & Leon-Carrión, 2010, for a review) and traumatic brain injury (Bibby & 
McDonald, 2005; Henry et al., 2006; Muller et al., 2009), using a traditional Theory of Mind 
(ToM) paradigm.  
One of the main limitations of this line of research appears to be that it overlooks 
emotion as a core component of mentalizing, a tendency that has slowly changed with the 
incorporation of concepts such as affective ToM (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007) or 
cognitive and affective empathy (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2004; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). 
Perhaps, the difficulty of addressing the emotion-cognition link is related to the obvious 
restrictions of using laboratory procedures (TOM-like tasks), which often involve simplified 
repetitive tasks that do not reflect the experience of spontaneous mentalizing in everyday life 
(Spiers & Maguire, 2006). On the contrary, in natural settings (observing patient-relative or 
patient-psychotherapist interactions), the impact of emotion on cognition is striking (for a 
detailed description of these interactions see Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2002). Patients who 
perform quite well on neuropsychological batteries during experimental testing may struggle 
with handling a simple interpersonal argument, understanding what they feel, imagining other 
SHRSOH¶VVWDQFHRUGRZQ-regulating emotions by finding alternative interpretations of negative 
events.  
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What appears to be missing in ToM-like tasks is the regulatory role of mentalizing, 
which is its core function according to psychoanalytic theory. From this background, 
mentalizing is understood as an internalized interpersonal process (Fonagy & Target, 1997), 
which allows the adjustment of affective states (Fonagy & Target, 2006; Fonagy et al., 2004) 
and the regulation of the self (Fonagy, 2008; Fonagy et al., 2004), by means of tolerating and 
containing negative emotion through the generation of representations (Fonagy et al., 2004). 
This interpersonal aspect of mentalizing is of the upmost importance when working with 
brain injury survivors, because a catastrophic reaction (and the primitive anxieties it 
generates) dampens mentalizing (Fonagy, 2008), which then impairs the regulation of 
catastrophic reaction. In consequence, as I have suggested, patients will instinctively look for 
significant others to regulate themselves from outside (Self-Other regulation). However, this 
search for others may imply a further weakening of mentalizing abilities, because the 
activation of a system that moves us towards the establishment of a bond with another human 
being appears to demand that we do not think about (evaluate or doubt) his/her inner states 
(Bartels & Zeki, 2004). 
 
2.1.9. Dynamic localization approach to Self-regulation and Self-Other 
regulation deficits 
A question that needs to be addressed is how diverse localized lesions may generate rather 
VSHFLILFµVLJQDWXUHV¶RI6HOI-regulation and Self-2WKHUUHJXODWLRQGHILFLWV/HW¶VFRQVLGHUWKH
following clinical examples to illustrate how mentalizing (a Self and Self-Other regulatory 
ability) may be differently impaired, mobilizing patients to recruit different mentalizing 
FRPSRQHQWVIURPRWKHUSHRSOH¶VPLQGV 
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Because of the negative arousal generated by the discussion with her husband, Mrs. A 
is not able to represent the reasons behind her outburst, as a way of sharing her feelings of 
frustration and worthlessness. Mr. /¶V case is quite different. It seems that the failures in 
mentalizing are not produced by the disorganizing impact of negative arousal on an already 
FRPSURPLVHG FRJQLWLRQ EXW E\ WKH GRPLQDQFH RI LQQHU UHDOLW\ ZKHQ LPDJLQLQJ KLV ZLIH¶V
intentions. When arguiQJZLWKKHUKXVEDQG0UV$¶VFDSDFLW\WR³WKLQN´RUUHSUHVHQWLQWHUQDO
VWDWHV LV LPSDLUHG2Q WKHFRQWUDU\ZKHQDFFXVLQJKLVZLIH0U/¶V UHDVRQLQJDSSHDUV WRR
sharp, too well articulated, but lacking common sense and judgment.  
Another striking difference between these two cases is related to how they use other 
SHRSOH¶VPLQGVDQGKRZSHUPHDEOHWKH\DUHWRWKHUHJXODWRU\LQIOXHQFHRIRWKHUV7KLVLVVXH
is crucial to design psychotherapeutic interventions. Mrs. A is eager to understand what 
happened during the argument with her husband and makes huge efforts to explain the 
events, correcting herself when she feels I do not understand. In her mind, the use of my mind 
(my advice) could be of some help. In her mind my mind exists, and has contents that might 
differ from hers. And when I help her building a cognitive-emotional representation, from her 
VFDWWHUHG LPSUHVVLRQV HJ ³VR ZKDW \RX WHOO PH VRXQGV DV LI \RX IHOW IUXVWUDWHG´ VKH
DPD]LQJO\ UHJDLQVFRKHUHQFH HJ³7KDW¶V WKHZRUG WKDW LVKRZ , IHOW´) and anxiety fades 
away. The most impressive finding here is that, the temporary use of my capacity to link a 
somatic experience to a language representation seems enough to regain some sense of 
coherence. Even more, when such a cognitive-affective schema is generated, and elaborated 
RYHUDQGRYHUVKHLVDEOHWRLQWHJUDWHLWDQGXVHLWODWHUHJ³7KHRWKHUGD\WKLVKDSSHQHG«
DQG,IHOW ,IHOWOLNH\RXVDLGRQFH«UHPHPEHUWKDWZRUG\RXXVHG"´LQWHUQDOL]LQJVRPH
sort of self-regulation.   
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The interpersonal exchanges with Mr. L were quite different. I always felt that he was 
distant, lost in the mist of his drowsiness, and emerging from time to time only when 
something powerful enough was able to pull him back into the world (as his jealousy). To 
him, I existed only when I presented myself concretely in front of him, or when someone at 
home recalled something we had agreed to do (e.g. some behavioral strategy we had decided 
to implement). He never asked for help spontaneously, and he showed signs of psychic 
conflict only when I confronted him. Although we developed a very solid working alliance, 
and he trusted me by the end of our work, he could not proactively use my mind as a source 
of permanent compensation. In other words, to him, my mind existed only when I was able to 
hold it in front of him, generating enough noise to attract his attention outside. However, 
when we were able to tune ourselves, true emotional contact used to appear allowing 
addressing his fears or worries. However, any symbolic intervention regarding his emotional 
GLIILFXOWLHV HJ³SHUKDSV\RXU IHDUDERXW \RXUZLIHFKHDWLQJRQ \RX LV UHODWHG WRKRZ\RX
FKHDWHG RQ \RXU ILUVW ZLIH´ ZDV XVHOHVV 7KHVH LQWHUYHQWLRQV PDGH VHQVH WR KLP DW WKRVH
moments, but he could not internalize them, and use them later to regulate himself.  
I hope these clinical reports help to portray how lesions to diverse areas of the brain 
may generate very different profiles of mentalizing deficits. This working hypothesis follows 
/XULD¶V SURSRVDO WKDW FRPSOH[ psychological functions (here, mentalizing) depend on the 
concerted work of different, and sometimes distant, neurological components (1966; 1973). A 
similar claim has been raised by neuroimaging findings on ToM (Carrington & Bailey, 2009) 
and also by the psychoanalytic literature on mentalizing (Fonagy, 2008). A working 
K\SRWKHVLVOLNHWKLVRQHPD\RIIHUYDOXDEOHJXLGHOLQHVLQWKHDVVHVVPHQWRISDWLHQWV¶FDSDFLW\
to Self-regulate, and use Self-Other regulation strategies, by detecting which mentalizing 
components are impaired. This may allow also designing individually tailored interventions 
to address such deficits.  
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If we consider the clinical cases described above (Mrs. A, Professor F, and Mr. L) a 
question regarding the lateralization of mentalizing components arises. With no doubt, Mr. 
L¶V inability to Self-UHJXODWHDQGXVHRWKHUVDVDVRXUFHRIUHJXODWLRQLVJUHDWHUWKDQ0UV$¶V
RU3URIHVVRU)¶VVXJJHVWLQJDSUHGRPLQDQWUROHRIULJKWKHPLVSKHUHVWUXFWXUHVLQPHQWDOL]LQJ
Although there is a large body of literature that associates right-sided lesions (Griffin et al., 
2006; Happe et al., 1999; Siegal et al., 1996; Surian & Siegal, 2001; Wimmer et al., 1998), 
and particularly right frontal lesions (Stuss et al., 2001), with deficits in ToM-like tasks, there 
is no general consensus yet regarding the specific roles of right and left components.  
Although the role of right-sided structures seems relevant to comprehend the dynamic 
QDWXUHRIPHQWDOL]LQJLWZRXOGEHRYHUO\VLPSOLVWLFWRUHGXFHDOORI0U/¶VGLIILFXOWLHVWRD
laterality effect. In consequence a more detailed consideration of his neuropsychological 
deficits is needed. A behavioral observation that seemed appropriate to start with is the fact 
WKDWKHLVFRQVWDQWO\³VHOI-DEVRUEHG´DQGRWKHUSHRSOH¶VPLQGVVHHPWRH[LVWRQO\ZKHQWKH\
PDNHHQRXJK³QRLVH´ WRJHQHUDWHPRPHQWVRIVKDUHGDWWention, transactions that need to be 
constantly supported from outside. This failure in joint attention, the capacity to coordinate 
attention with a social partner (Mundy & Newell, 2007), might be related to the damage of 
the so-called Reorienting System (Corbetta et al., 2008), a right ventral fronto-parietal 
network that allows switching between internally and externally directed activities. Another 
possible explanation is that Mr. /¶V ULJKW-sided lesion compromised the processing of eye 
gaze, a basic capDFLW\IRUWKHDVVHVVPHQWRIRWKHU¶VSHRSOHPHQWDOVWDWHV%DURQ-Cohen 1995), 
that has been associated to right posterior (Superior Temporal Sulcus) activation (Haxby et 
al., 2000; Pelphrey et al., 2005; Wicker et al., 2003). Consequently, it is possible to suggest 
that components that allow flexible transitions between internal and external mental activity, 
and social engagement of attention, are impaired. 
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'DPDJH WR 0U /¶V ULJKW VRPDWR-sensory cortex may have also contributed to the 
³EOLQGQHVV´ WRZDUGKLVZLIH¶V LQQHUVWDWHV7KLVK\SRWKHVLVVHHPVVXSSRUWHGE\VWXGLHV WKDW
have associated lesions to the right somato-sensory cortex with impairment in the perception 
of emotions from faces (Adolphs et al., 2000). These findings have led some authors to 
suggest WKDWLQRUGHUWRDFFHVVRWKHUSHRSOH¶VPLQGVZHPXVWILUVWinternally simulate what it 
would feel like to be the other person (Adolphs, 2001; Gallese, 2003; Gallese et al., 2004). In 
RWKHU ZRUGV 0U /¶V OHVLRQ PD\ KDYH LPSDLUHG D FRUH PHQWDOL]LQJ FRPSRnent, which 
generates a direct (non-explicit) bodily-form of experiential understanding of others, known 
also as intentional attunement (Gallese, 2006). 
$QRWKHU UHOHYDQW EHKDYLRU WKDW QHHGV WR EH H[SODLQHG KHUH LV 0U /¶V GHOXVLRQ RI
infidelity, also known as Othello Syndrome (Todd & Dewhurst, 1955). The neurological 
literature has related this type of delusion to right frontal lesions (Nakamura et al., 2006; 
Richardson et al., 1991), although there is no clarity regarding the underlying 
pathophysiological or psychological mechanisms. The co- occurrence of other delusional 
syndromes ±e.g. somatoparaphrenia- after right frontal lesions (Feinberg et al., 2005; 
Feinberg et al., 2010; Feinberg & Keenan, 2005) have led some authors to suggest that the 
right frontal lobe is not associated specifically with one type of delusion, but with a more 
general role in preserving the equilibrium between internal and external reality (Feinberg, 
2010). Salas & Turnbull (2010) have suggested a possible role for the right frontal lobe in the 
regulation of negative autonomic arousal, proposing that when this process fails, automatic 
cognitive-affective operations (primitive defense mechanisms) are generated to deal rapidly 
with disorganizing anxiety, evacuating completely any trace of negative arousal. In other 
ZRUGV 0U /¶V XVH RI PDVVLYH SURMHFWLRQ 2WKHOOR 6\QGURPH PD\ EH XQGHUVWRRG DV WKH
consequence of a failure in the down-regulation of autonomic arousal, thus impeding the use 
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of mature defenses, which require tolerating a minimum level of distress to generate psychic 
conflict.  
,KDYHVXJJHVWHGWKDW0U/¶VGHILFLWVPD\EHEHWWHUXQGHUVWRRGE\FRQVLGHULQJZKLFK
mentalizing components appear to be impaired (Reorienting System, social engagement, 
simulation and arousal regulation). What about the left-sided patients I have described? 
:KLFKPHQWDOL]LQJFRPSRQHQWVDUHFRPSURPLVHGKHUH",Q0UV$DQG3URIHVVRU)¶VFDVHVWKH
most evident difficulty is the presence of a vicious cycle where high levels of anxiety impair 
mentalizing, and mentalizing deficits hamper the regulation of anxiety. During moments of 
KLJK QHJDWLYH DURXVDO WKH\ FDQ¶W PDNH VHQVH RI ZKDW WKH\ H[SHULHQFH IHHOLQJ SHUSOH[HG
paralyzed and turbid. They seem unable to describe what they feel; think about it or even 
understand its causes. A consequence of this Self-regulatory failure appears to be a tendency 
WR µJHW WUDSSHG¶ LQQHJDWLYHDIIHFWZKLFK LVH[SHULHQFHGIRUH[WHQGHGSHULRGVRI WLPH7KLV
tendency may underlie the reported higher frequency of neuropsychiatrLF µFDWDVWURSKLF
UHDFWLRQV¶ 6WDUNVWHLQ HW DO  DQG GHSUHVVLYH V\PSWRPV 1DUXVKLPD HW DO 
Robinson, 2006; Robinson et al., 1984) after left-sided lesions. This emotional persistence 
(Thompson, 1990), or emotional inflexibility (Bonanno et al., 2003; Coifman & Bonanno, 
2010), may be associated with the impact of negative affect on cognitive flexibility (Davis & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) and problem solving (Gasper, 2003), cognitive abilities that are 
necessary for the overt reasoning that mentalizing entails (Damasio et al., 2003). In sum, 
mentalizing deficits after frontal left-sided lesions appear to be characterized by a failure of 
an executive component that allows the generation and flexible manipulation of verbal 
representations, which are crucial to regulating behavior (Luria, 1966; 1973; Winsler, 
)HUQ\KRXJK	0RQWHUR³EXIIHULQJ´)HOGPDQHWDODQG³GLJHVWLQJ´HPRWLRQDO
experience (see concept of Mentalized Affectivity in Fonagy et al., 2004).  
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Cases of agrammatic aphasic patients, after left hemisphere damage, where ToM 
abilities are preserved despite language difficulties (Varley & Siegal, 2000; Varley et al., 
2001) are of extreme interest when drawing a possible role of left frontal structures in self-
regulation and self-other regulation. In Mrs. A case, although she struggles to find the words 
that denominate what she feels, and has great difficulties in reasoning about her own 
LQWHQWLRQVVKHLVFDSDEOHRISHUFHLYLQJDQGVRPHKRZXQGHUVWDQGLQJKHUKXVEDQG¶VHPRWLRQV
She knows he is mad at her, although she cannot figure out why. In other words, even though 
she is not able to verbally represent her experience, and reflect upon it, she can emotionally 
DWWXQH WR KHU KXVEDQG¶V DQJHU 3HUKDSV WKLV LV SRVVLEOH EHFDXVH WKH simulation component 
(right somato-sensory cortex) remains undamaged. 
$ILQDOGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ0UV$DQG0U/QHHGV WREHGLVFXVVHGKHUH0UV$¶V
right frontal lobe is intact. However, she experiences persistent levels of negative affect. 
Salas & Turnbull (2010) have addressed the issue of defense mechanisms and laterality, 
suggesting that in patients with right frontal lesions the inability to tolerate negative arousal 
may triggers the protective, but primitive, recruitment of language and reasoning (e.g. 
delusional confabulation). By using these primitive mechanisms patients appear to 
³HYDFXDWH´QHJDWLYHHPRWLRQDOVWDWHVTXLFNO\GDPSHQLQJDQ\WUDFHRIQHJDWLYHDURXVDODQG
in some cases, even placing themselves in positive scenarios instead (e.g. Fotopoulou et al., 
2004; Turnbull et al., 2004).  
In contrast, patients with left frontal lesions are more able to tolerate negative 
autonomic arousal, hence, primitive defenses are not activated and negative emotion is still 
experienced. In consequence, left-sided patients are trapped in the concreteness of negative 
HPRWLRQ DUHXQDEOH WR ³HYDFXDWH´ WKURXJKSULPLWLYHGHIHQVHPHFKDQLVPVRUGRZQ-regulate 
emotion by using symbolic and reasoning functions (e.g. rationalization), which are 
compromised by left frontal injury. This impairment in the use of language to regulate 
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behavior seems supported by evidence that relates reappraisal (a self-regulation strategy 
based on generating alternative meanings to emotional events) with left frontal activation 
(Goldin et al., 2008). Another source of evidence that appears to support this hypothesis 
comes from the so-called gateway hypothesis (Burguess, Dumontheil & Gilbert, 2007, 
Burguess, Gilbert, Okuda & Simons, 2006), which proposes that the rostral prefrontal cortex, 
BA 10, is crucial for the self-generation and maintenance of thoughts and representation 
(stimulus-independent cognition). It is possible to suggest that the higher frequency of 
catastrophic reaction found after lesions to the left polar frontal cortex ±BA 10- (Robinson, 
2006; Starkstein et al., 1993), might be associated to some extent to a difficulty regulating 
emotions through the use of thinking. 
These cases are intended to illustrate how diverse brain lesions may impair 
mentalizing (a Self and Self-Other regulatory ability) differently. By describing how these 
deficits unfold during patient-relative and patient-therapist interactions, I wish to emphasize 
WKHLQWHUSHUVRQDORUµUHODWLRQDO¶QDWXUHRIWKHVHSURFHVVHV,WLVP\SURSRVLWLRQWKDWWKHVDPH
µUHODWLRQDO¶GRPDLQWKDWLVGDPDJHGPD\EHDOVRDVRXUFHRISV\FKRORJLFDOFRPSHQVDWLRQDQG
emotional encounter. 
 
2.1.10. Addressing Self and Self-Other regulatory deficits in     
psychotherapeutic settings.    
One of the main issues in the use of psychotherapy with brain injury patients is how to adapt 
the available tools to the specific cognitive and emotional peculiarities of this population. 
Although this idea has been explored in relation to cognitive deficits (Judd & Wilson, 2005), 
the emotional and regulatory difficulties remain largely unattended. The theoretical 
background presented in this paper follows the efforts of several authors to integrate 
cognitive, emotional (Freed, 2002; Gracey et al., 2007; Mateer et al., 2005; Prigatano, 1991) 
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and interpersonal (Bowen et al., 2010; Feigelson, 1993; Freed, 2002; Lewis, 1999; Yeates, 
2009; Yeates et al., 2008) domains in the design of therapeutic interventions. However, this 
paper develops and works on this work by exploring in detail how patients might use other 
SHRSOH¶VPLQds to regulate themselves from outside.  
If we consider the clinical cases presented, several differences appear regarding how 
diverse lesions impact on Self and Self-Other regulation. It seems that patients with right-
sided lesions will display difficulties in more basic components of social cognition, such as 
joint attention and intentional attunement. If the lesion is large, and also includes the right 
frontal lobe, even reality testing might be impaired. In cases like this (Mr. L) a classic 
psychotherapeutic approach is not the first choice. However, the external scaffolding of the 
impaired interpersonal function is a potential intervention. An example of this is the 
LQWHUYHQWLRQGHVLJQHGLQFROODERUDWLRQZLWK0U/¶VZLIH7KHDLPRIWKLVLQWHUYHQWLRQZas to 
bypass these difficulties, allowing some kind of re-connection between them, at least 
temporarily. Clinically speaking, this was extremely relevant because she wanted to take care 
RIKLPEXWDW WKHVDPHWLPHVKHIHOW WKDWKHZDVXQJUDWHIXODQGGLGQ¶t care about what she 
was feeling. For her, the most painful change caused by his brain damage was not physical, 
or economical, but the loss of intimacy and connection (for a detailed description of intimacy 
and connection problems after brain injury see Bowen, Yeates and Palmer, 2010). In other 
words, the interpersonal conflicts were eroding the same emotional bond that was a source of 
motivation to take care of him.  
7KH ILUVW JRDO RI WKH LQWHUYHQWLRQZDV WRPRGLI\ KHU H[SHFWDWLRQV UHJDUGLQJ0U /¶V
spontaneous consideration for her inner states. This goal was very hard to attain, and we had 
to spend quite a long time talking about it, explaining to her the neurological reasons why he 
FRXOGQ¶WGRVRDQGVXSSRUWLQJWKHPRXUQLQJSURFHVVWKLVORVVLPSOLHG7KLVVWUDWHJ\DOVRKDG
an implicit intention: to avoid a negative circuit of frustration and disappointment caused by 
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unfulfilled expectations. Secondly, an intervention was designed whereby every time he 
started showing disrespectful behaviors (accusing her of cheating or telling her that he will 
abandon her because of this) she was instructed not to enter into an argument. Instead, she 
had to describe in simple words what she was feeling, face-to-face, as a way of capturing his 
DWWHQWLRQDQGFRQFUHWHO\LQIRUPLQJKLPDERXWKHULQQHUH[SHULHQFHµZKHQ\RXDFFXVHPHRI
WKDW«,IHHOVDG¶µZKDW\RXVD\UHDOO\KXUWVPH¶µ,IHHO\RXGRQ¶WORYHPHDQ\PRUH¶:KHQ
0U/¶VZLIHZDVDEOHWRGHOLYHUWKLVNLQGRIHPRWLRQDOIHHGEDFN0U/¶VEHKDYLRUFKDQJHG,W
ZDV DV LI E\ VHHLQJ KLV ZLIH¶V SDLQ FRQFUHWHO\ KHU LQQHU VWDWHV PRPHQWDULO\ DFTXLUHG DQ
emotional salience and clarity. She reported: 
 
Mrs. L: it has worked. Not always, but generally. It is very difficult, because my first reaction is 
anger and disappointment. But then I think of what we have talked about, that his brain injury 
does not allow him to think clearly. So I try, I try to stay calm. 
C.S: can you describe how it was the last time? 
Mrs. L: I think everything exploded because I received a phone call or maybe because I had to go 
RXW+HKDWHVLWZKHQ,JRRXW+HWKLQNV,¶PJRLQJRXWWRVHHVRPHRQH6RKHVWDUWHGVD\LQJ,ZDV
going out to meet someone, a man. And he became so angry about it. So I sat in front of him and 
VDLGµLWUHDOO\PDNHVPHVDGWKDW\RXGRQ¶WWUXVWPH¶µLWPDNHVPHVDGWKDW\RXGHVWUR\RXUIDPLO\
E\GRLQJWKLV¶,ZDVYHU\VDGDWWKDWSRLQW,WKLQNKHZDVFRQIXVHGDWILUVWEXWWKHQKHEHFDPH
less angry. I did not get into denying his accusation, as you suggested. I just described how I felt. 
,WXVXDOO\ZRUNV+RZHYHULWLVHPRWLRQDOO\VRGUDLQLQJ« 
 
Left-sided patients present a very different profile of difficulties, basically because the 
joint attention and intentional attunement components appear to be spared, preserving an 
implicit capacity to connect to others. In consequences, when experiencing a catastrophic 
reaction they will spontaneously look for others as a source of compensation. The problem 
with these patients is more related to the adaptation of psychotherapeutic tools according to 
their language and executive deficits. In these cases the use of concrete materials, like 
drawing (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000), identity maps (Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000) or sand 
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play (Hirao et al., 2008) have proved to be a useful method of bypassing language, working 
memory and abstraction deficits.  
In a previous paper (Salas, 2008), it was suggested that patients with frontal left sided 
lesions tend to use the mind of the therapist to connect ideas with words, connect somatic 
states and affects with mental representations, connect present experience with elements from 
the future and past, thread narratives, generate metaphors from disperse elements and also to 
VFDIIROGIDQWDV\JHQHUDWLRQ,QP\RSLQLRQDOOWKHVHSRVVLEOHXVHVRIWKHWKHUDSLVW¶VPLQGDUH
ways to compensate for deficits in the capacity to generate and manipulate mental 
representations.  
In the case of Professor F, he commonly used my mind to generate a continuous 
narrative that made sense of the disorganizing bodily sensations, which tended to further 
impair his executive functions. For instance, after returning to his job, he started to dislike 
EHLQJDWKLVRIILFHDQGUHSRUWLQJIHHOLQJVRIµUHVWOHVVQHVV¶+HGLGQRWKDYHFODULW\DERXWZKDW
he felt, or understood why he felt that way, but remembered that now he had difficulties 
getting to the first floor of the building (his office was in the ground floor), because the stairs 
did not have a raiO WR OHDQ RQ:KHQ , DVNHG KLP DERXW WKH ILUVW IORRU KH VDLG µHYHU\WKLQJ
happens upstairs, most of the people from the department work there and usually share a cup 
RI FRIIHH GXULQJ WKH EUHDNV¶ 7ZR LGHDV FDPH LQWR PLQG )LUVW , UHPHPEHUHG KRZPXFK
Professor F enjoyed being with other people. Then a football field appeared as an image 
(Professor F was a football fan), and the thought of watching a football game from the 
sideline appeared [fantasy scaffolding]. So I suggested to him that it is like watching a game 
IURPWKHVLGHOLQH¶+HVPLOHGDQGVDLGµ\HVVRPHWKLQJOLNHWKDW¶+RZHYHUDOWKRXJKKHZDV
smiling, I noticed a subtle change in my mood and started to feel melancholic. So I told him 
µQRZZKHQZHDUHWDONLQJDERXWWKLV,IHHODOLWWOHELWVDG I know that you told me you felt 
UHVWOHVVDQGXQFRPIRUWDEOHLQ\RXURIILFHEXW,ZRQGHULILWLVEHFDXVH\RXIHHOVDGLQWKHUH¶
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[connecting somatic states with verbal representations / Linking different emotional states]. 
For a minute or so he tried to oUJDQL]HWKHLGHDVLQKLVPLQGDQGILQDOO\VDLGµ,WKLQNVRQRZ
WKDW \RXPHQWLRQ LW LWPDNHV VHQVH «PD\EH LV WKDW ,PLVV EHLQJ ZLWK RWKHU SHRSOH¶ ,
remembered a previous conversation where he told me that his former colleagues, the ones 
from his generation, were all dead or retired [connecting present and past experience]. While 
I remembered this I felt even more melancholic. A couple of minutes passed and suddenly his 
IDFHFKDQJHGDVLIKHKDVJUDEEHGDSUHFLRXVLGHDµLWLVQRWWKDW,PLVVRWKHUpeople because 
RIWKHZRUN\RXXVXDOO\GRZLWKWKHPWKHSURMHFWV«\RXNQRZ«WREHDFWLYH«WRGRVWXII«
LVOLNH,PLVVSHRSOHEHFDXVH,QHHGWKHP,KDYHQ¶WUHDOL]HGXQWLOQRZKRZLPSRUWDQWSHRSOH
DUHWRPH¶$WWKDWSRLQWWKLQNLQJDERXWZKDWKHKDVMXVWVaid, he felt moved. Then I asked 
KLP µVR KRZ ZDV LW EHIRUH WKH DFFLGHQW"¶ >generating a narrative / connecting past and 
present experience@ +H VPLOHG DJDLQ µ\RX JRW PH WKHUH« EHIRUH WKH DFFLGHQW , ZDV WRR
worried about my duties and I always thought that I care about people only because it was 
SDUWRIP\UROHDVDPDQDJHU¶+HNHSWWU\LQJWRJUDVSVRPHWKLQJLQKLVPLQGIRUDFRXSOHRI
minutes, like searching for an object inside an untidy drawer. A second wave of associations 
FDPH ODWHU µWKH GRRU RIP\Rffice was always closed; now it is always open, as if I were 
H[SHFWLQJ WKHPWRHQWHU¶7KH LPDJHRIDQRSHQHGGRRUUHVRQDWHGVWURQJO\ LQP\PLQGDQG
became a persistent image for several minutes. Then he started to describe different 
interpersonal situations (family, students, and colleagues) where he enjoyed just sharing a 
moment with other people, as if he was more sensitive now, and in more contact with his 
IHHOLQJV  6R , VDLG µ, KDYH EHHQ WKLQNLQJ DERXW WKDW RSHQHG GRRU \RX PHQWLRQHG DQG ,
wonder if it means that now you feel more than before [connecting present and past 
experience]. Maybe because of the accident, or maybe because you also have changed, you 
are not so logical anymore. So you feel more, more often and more intensely. As if you are 
open to others, not closed, as before [generating a metaphor to compact meaning@¶ +H
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VPLOHGDJDLQDQGWKRXJKWIRUDZKLOHµ,OLNHWKDWLPDJHWKHRSHQGRRU«DQGLVWUXH,IHHO
PRUHOLNHDQRSHQGRRUQRZ0D\EHWKDW¶VZK\QRZ,PLVVRWKHUSHRSOHPRUHZK\, feel sad 
VRPHWLPHVZKHQ,¶PDORQH0D\EH,ZDVFORVHGEHIRUHDQGGLGQ¶WIHHODQ\WKLQJRIWKLVDWDOO¶ 
Relatives of patients like Professor F can also be trained in managing catastrophic 
reactions, especially considering that new life events will generate states of disorganization 
WKDWQHHGWREHµGLJHVWHG¶7KHWUDLQLQJXVXDOO\LQYROYHVWZRNH\VWHSV)LUVWZKHQWKHSDWLHQW
IHHOVGLVRUJDQL]HG EHFDXVHRIDQHZHYHQW DFRQIOLFWRUSUREOHPKHGRHVQ¶WXQGHUVWDQGRU
know how to solve it) it is important not to minimize his experience, by saying things like 
µ\RXGRQ¶WKDYH WRZRUU\HYHU\WKLQJZLOOEHDOO ULJKW¶7KLV LV DXVXDOGHIHQVLYHPDQHXYHU
used by relatives to reduce their own anxiety, which also prevent patients from regaining a 
sense of agency over WKHLURZQH[SHULHQFHDQGSUREOHPV3URIHVVRU)UHFRJQL]HVWKLVµWKDWLV
ZK\ , SUHIHU WDONLQJ WR \RX«P\ZLIH JHWV DQ[LRXVZKHQ VKH VHHVPH OLNH WKLV DQG VWDUWV
WHOOLQJPHZKDWWRGR«ZKHQ,GRQ¶WKDYHDFOXHDERXWZKDWLVVJRLQJRQ¶7KHVHFRQGVWHSLV
related to addressing the confusion that catastrophic reaction entails, and is based in the fact 
that is not possible to solve a problem that has not been cognitively and emotionally 
formulated yet. In other words, patients like Professor F need help to generate a sense of 
coherence and continuity by assembling a mental schema that links sensations, feelings and 
thoughts. Once a schema such as this is generated, and all the elements are available, the 
patient may judge by himself the meaning of his experience and later reflect upon his 
problems with a renewed sense of mastery.  
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2.1.11. Concluding remarks 
In the last few decades neuropsychological rehabilitation has moved away from a paradigm 
centered on the remediation of cognitive deficits, towards the consideration of emotion and 
identity reconstruction. This theoretical turn appears to be related to a major emphasis on 
participation problems than deficits or impairments. A consequence of such a holistic, and 
person-centered approach, is to focus on how brain injury survivors may return to meaningful 
activities in spite of cognitive and behavioral difficulties. The main goal of this paper was to 
describe the cognitive and emotional difficulties that brain injury survivors face when they 
try to resume significant interpersonal relationships, and use interpersonal relationships as a 
source of support and psychological compensation.  
3HUKDSVWKHPDLQWKHVLVRIWKLVZRUNLVWKDW$%,VXUYLYRUVXVHRWKHUSHRSOH¶VPLQGVWR
regulate themselves from outside. When experiencing catastrophic reactions, due to the 
LPSRVVLELOLW\RIFRSLQJZLWKHQYLURQPHQWDOGHPDQGVSDWLHQWVLQVWLQFWLYHO\VHDUFKIRURWKHU¶V
VXSSRUW+RZHYHULWDSSHDUVWREHWKDWQRWDOOSDWLHQWVXVHRWKHUSHRSOH¶VPLQGVLQWKHVDPH
way, and that the type and localization of brain lesion might have relevance regarding which 
FRPSRQHQWVRIRWKHUSHRSOH¶VPLQGVWKH\XVH,KDYHSXWIRUZDUGWKHK\SRWKHVLVWKDWOHVLRQWR
the anterior and posterior regions of the right hemisphere impair more basic Self and Self-
Other regulatory components, such as tolerating negative arousal and intentional attunement, 
respectively. Lesions to the left anterior portion of the brain appear to compromise the 
capacity to generate and manipulate mental representations, necessary components for Self-
regulation but not for Self-Other regulation.  
A limitation of this proposal is that it is mainly based on anecdotal evidence, hence 
this ideas need to be tested in more rigorous experimental settings. However, I believe that 
this work is a relevant first step in exploring systematically how brain injury impairs 
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interpersonal processes differentially, and also how we can use the same interpersonal 
relationships as therapeutic tools.  
Finally, it is extremely important to differentiate between Self-regulation and Self-
Other regulation when assessing brain injury patients, because the distinction is relevant to 
the design of individual and family tailored interventions. In the future it might be even 
possible to manualise procedures to address specific regulatory deficits, which might also 
improve the effectiveness and outcome of our rehabilitation programs. In the case of left 
anterior patients the adaptation of psychotherapeutic tools would be a fruitful path. As for the 
right anterior and posterior patients, family interventions and environment modifications 
appear to be promising lines of research. 
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2.2. The Neuropsychology of Emotion Regulation 
Strategies: Insights from Patients with Focal Brain 
Lesions3. 
 
2.2.1. Abstract  
 
In the past decade, there has been a notable increase in the amount of research on the neural 
bases of emotion regulation [ER] strategies. Virtually all of the findings have been in the 
domain of functional imaging, which is surprising given the well-established role in 
neuropsychology of evidence from patients with focal brain lesions. This article attempts to 
build a theoretical bridge between the ER literature and the literature on patients with focal 
lesions. Specifically, this article focuses on the way in which well-known neuropsychological 
deficits might impair one or more ER strategies delineated by the process model of emotion 
regulation, including: situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, 
cognitive change, and response modulation. The evidence reviewed confirms many of the 
neuroimaging findings, suggesting that ER strategies rely on a set of frontal lobe-related 
processes. In addition, this review offers novel insights into the way ER strategies may 
depend on specific and shared neuropsychological components, and suggests novel 
components not usually considered, such as inner speech. This review also discusses the 
importance of these findings for neuropsychological rehabilitation, where issues of ER are of 
great clinical relevance. 
  
                                                 
3Salas, C.E., Gross, J.J., & Turnbull, O.H. (submitted). The Neuropsychology of Emotion Regulation Strategies: 
Insights from Patients with Focal Brain Lesions Neurobehavioral Reviews. This paper has been re-submitted for 
review. 
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2.2.2. Introduction 
 
There is a large neuropsychological literature addressing emotional dysfunction after brain 
injury (Carson et al., 2000; Gainotti, 1997, 2000, 2001; Heilman and Satz, 1983; Heilman, 
Blonder, Bowers and Crucian, 2000; House et al., 1989; Narushima et al., 2003; Robinson, 
2006; Starkstein et al., 1987), especially in relation to both emotional perception (Borod et 
al., 1992; Borod et al., 2002; Borod et al., 1986; Harciarek et al., 2006; Mandal et al., 1993) 
and expression (Blonder et al., 1993; Blonder et al., 2005; Bloom et al., 1992; Borod and 
Madigan, 2000; Borod et al., 2002; Kazandjian et al., 2007; Weddell et al., 1990). This 
literature has been a key source of evidence unpacking the neural basis of a number of 
potentially discrete emotional processes (Adolphs, 2007; Demaree et al., 2005; Gainotti, 
1972). However, a trend in the last decade has been to move beyond these basic emotional 
processes and explore how brain injury may modify more complex aspects of emotional life, 
such as its subjective experience (Gillihan et al., 2010; Hornak et al., 2003), social function 
(e.g. Beer et al., 2006; Bramham et al., 2009; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2008) and regulation 
(Beer and Lombardo, 2007; Hilz et al., 2006; Roberts et al., 2004; Woolley et al., 2004).  
 Emotion regulation  (ER) is usually defined as the set of process by which individuals 
influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and 
express those emotions (Gross, 1998). It has been suggested that five strategies may be used 
to regulate emotion at different points during the emotion generation process [see figure 1]: 
situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and 
response modulation (Gross, 1998). The first four strategies can be considered antecedent-
focused, for they occur before emotional responses are triggered, while response modulation 
may be seen as a response-focused strategy, because it is often implemented after the 
emotional response is generated (Gross and Muñoz, 1995).  
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Fig 1. The Process Model of Emotion Regulation. [from Gross & Thompson, 2007].  
 
 It has been suggested that brain damage may impair ER, influencing coping and 
further socio-emotional adjustment after the injury (Abreau et al., 2009). Unfortunately, the 
available evidence is mostly based on ER problems in neurodegenerative diseases (Goodkind 
et al., 2010; Henry et al., 2009) or after adult traumatic brain injury (McDonald et al., 2010; 
Obonsawin et al., 2007; Rochat et al., 2009, Tate, 1999) and paediatric traumatic brain injury 
(e.g. Ganesalingam et al., 2006, 2007; Tonks et al., 2007), with few studies exploring such 
difficulties in patients with focal brain lesions (e.g. Bechara, 2004; Beer, 2007; Beer et al., 
2003; Mathiesen et al., 2004; Roberts et al., 2004; Woolley, 2004). Furthermore, the existing 
studies on brain injury and ER have tended to address emotion dysregulation from a 
neuropsychiatric point of view (e.g. Cattran et al., 2011; Chemerinski and Levine, 2006; 
Gainotti et al., 1999; Robinson, 2006), ignoring the psychological mechanisms by which 
thoughts and feelings are regulated.  
During the past decade, knowledge about the mechanisms by which people regulate 
their emotions has increased significantly, offering a solid theoretical background (Gross, 
2007). In fact, there is a large literature on the relationship between ER, mental health (Gross 
and Muñoz, 1995; John and Gross, 2004), well-being (i.e. Nyklicek et al., 2011) and 
psychopathology (Aldao and Nolen-Hoesksema, 2010; Aldao et al., 2010; Kring and Sloan, 
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2010; Kring and Werner, 2004; Taylor and Liberzon, 2007). Behavioural studies have begun 
to unpack the psychological components involved in several ER strategies, by investigating 
the relationship between those strategies and discrete cognitive processes (Gyurak, Goodkind, 
Madan, Kramer, Miller and Levenson, 2009; McRae, Ciesielski and Gross, 2011; McRae, 
Jacobs, Ray, John and Gross, 2011).  These studies have suggested that certain psychological 
processes are particularly involved in some ER strategies, as is the case of verbal fluency in 
response modulation (Gyurak, Goodkind, Kramer, Miller and Levenson, 2012), and working 
memory and set shifting in reappraisal (McRae et al., 2011).  Moreover, in a rapidly growing 
literature using neuroimaging, the neural correlates of several ER strategies have been 
described (Goldin et al., 2008; McRae et al., 2010; Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Ochsner et al., 
2004; Ochsner et al., 2002; Wager et al., 2008), allowing the construction of a preliminary 
neural architecture of ER (Green and Malhi, 2006; Ochsner and Gross, 2007).  
 One limitation of exclusively using a neuroimaging approach to disentangle the 
neuropsychological and neural architecture of ER is that it does not allow us to establish 
ZKLFKEUDLQDUHDVDUHµQHFHVVDU\¶IRUDVSHFLILF(5FRPSRQHQW6HYHUDODXWKRUVKDYHPDGHD
similar claim regarding other emotional and cognitive processes (Adolphs, 2007; Price and 
Friston, 2002; Shallice et al., 2008b; Stuss et al., 2002). In consequence, it seems justified to 
study patients with focal lesions from an ER perspective, and explore how damage to a range 
of brain regions might impair specific neuropsychological components that are necessary for 
successfully implementing a particular ER strategy. Such an approach could not only inform 
our knowledge of the neuropsychological basis of these strategies, but also would contribute 
to the assessment and design of interventions in rehabilitation settings (Salas, 2012). 
Two obstacles to this approach must be noted, however. One obstacle is that research 
on some ER strategies, such as situation selection and situation modification, is almost non-
existent; even though both concepts appear to have substantial face validity. As a 
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consequence, compared with attentional control, cognitive change, and response modulation, 
there is little understanding of the basic components involved in situation selection and 
modification, limiting the dialogue with findings from lesion studies. One way to address this 
challenge is to look at under-investigated ER strategies (e.g., situation selection and 
modification) through the novel lens of neuropsychological lesion studies, making it possible 
to unpack the underlying components. This opens numerous possibilities for future research, 
such as improving the design of tasks that might isolate core ER mechanisms, or identifying 
specific groups of neurological patients that can be studied using existing ER paradigms.  
A second major obstacle is that each emotion regulation strategy, from a dynamic 
localization point of view (Luria, 1966), is a complex mental process that relies on several 
neuropsychological components (e.g. memory, language, executive functioning, etc.), which 
obviously depend on a widely distributed network of brain structures (Ochsner and Gross, 
2007). Furthermore, it is likely that the same brain area (e.g. ventrolateral PFC) might be 
relevant for several ER strategies (e.g. envisioning emotional future events, and affective 
shifting). This point is especially relevant because a skeptical reader might suggest that, 
considering the complexity of emotion regulation strategies, damage to any part of the brain 
might compromise their function. However, evidence from neuroimaging (Ochsner and 
Gross, 2007 for a review) and lesion studies (Beer and Lombardo, 2007 for a review) appear 
to suggest that ER strategies are not compromised by damage to all brain areas. As will be 
reviewed in this paper, a survey of the literature suggests that the principal effects are found 
after lesions to various prefrontal structures associated with the regulation of behaviour, and 
damage to subcortical structures related to the generation of emotion. In contrast, there seems 
to be no compelling evidence to suggest that many other brain areas [e.g. temporal-parietal 
junction, occipital cortex] have a critical role in ER. One way to address this challenge is to 
arbitrarily select a single psychological component (e.g. foresight, or the capacity to imagine 
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future scenarios), which is at the core of a specific emotion regulation strategy (e.g. situation 
selection), and from which there is sufficient neuropsychological evidence from studies of 
patients with focal lesions to draw reliable conclusions.  On the basis of the criterion of 
relevance, and sufficient evidence, this review will focus on several neuropsychological 
processes. These are: foresight (situation selection), cognitive and affective flexibility 
(situation modification), sustained attention (attentional deployment), cognitive control and 
language (reappraisal), motor expressive control, response inhibition and interoception 
(response modulation). 
 The aim of this article is to draw a theoretical bridge between the growing field of ER 
and our current understanding of cognitive and emotional processes after focal brain lesions. 
To our knowledge there is only one previous review that has attempted a similar task (Beer 
and Lombardo, 2007), although these authors addressed only a limited number of ER 
strategies. The goal of the present review is to describe how specific neuropsychological 
deficits (e.g. episodic amnesia) may impair the use of one or more regulatory strategies 
defined by the process model.  
  
2.2.3. Situation selection 
Situation selection is, in temporal terms, one of the antecedent-focused ER strategies. It has 
been usually defined as taking actions that make it more (or less) likely that we will end up in 
a situation we expect will produce desirable (or undesirable) emotions (Gross and Thompson, 
S,WKDVDOVREHHQUHIHUUHGWRDVSHRSOH¶VFDSDFLW\WRSUHGLFWWKHWUDMHFWRU\RIWKHLU
emotional experience into the future (Werner and Gross, 2010, p. 21). Situation selection is 
unquestionably a complex psychological process; however research on it is almost non-
existent (for an exception see Rovenpor, Skogsberg and Isaacowitz, 2012). Nevertheless, 
based on the available definitions of situation selection, it is possible to suggest that it 
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depends, at least, on two main components: 1) the capacity to generate an array of 
hypothetical future scenarios; and 2) the ability to decide amongst them based upon their 
potential emotional impact. Two groups of brain injured patients are of interest here, and will 
be described in detail in this section: patients with hippocampal damage exhibit impairment 
in the generation of future scenarios, while patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
lesions present deficits in the selection of possible scenarios, based on their potential 
emotional value. 
 
2.2.3.1. Situation selection and foresight impairment after hippocampal lesions  
The capacity to mentally pre-experience, or imagine, a personal event that may occur in the 
future has been variably labelled as episodic foresight (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007), 
HSLVRGLFIXWXUHWKRXJKW$WDQFHDQG2¶1HLOO6]SXQDUSURMHFWLRQ2NXGDHWDO
2003), prospection (Buckner and Carroll, 2007), or simulation (Schacter and Addis, 2007). 
Interestingly, it has been proposed that the ability to simulate future scenarios depends on 
similar mechanisms than the capacity to recall personal events from the past (Addis et al., 
2007; Suddendorf, 2009 for a review). In other terms, what allows humans to mentally 
project themselves backwards in time to re-live, or forward to pre-live events (Suddendorf 
and Corballis, 1997), appears to depend on a common ability to mentally travel in time 
(Szpunar, 2010). Such mental time travel would allow individuals to endlessly recombine raw 
elements from the past to construct and imagine possible events (Addis et al., 2007; Okuda et 
al., 2003; Schacter and Addis, 2007; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007; Szpunar 2010), thus 
increasing behavioural flexibility in the achievement of long term plans (Suddendorf and 
Corballis, 2007). From this point of view, situation selection would imply the recruitment of 
memory systems that allow humans to predict the emotional trajectory of hypothetical 
situations, based on previous experience.  
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 The neuropsychological basis of episodic future thought, and hence situation 
selection, could productively be investigated in patients with severe episodic amnesia. The 
study of amnesic patients has been an especially relevant piece of evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that episodic future thought depends on some shared mechanisms with episodic 
PHPRU\$WDQFHDQG2¶1HLOO,Q(QGHO7XOYLQJGHVFULEHGWKHFDVHRI11>ODWHU
known as K.C], a patient with severe episodic amnesia after bilateral hippocampal damage, 
who also presented with impairment in his capacity to imagine future events. In the same way 
that N.N. was unable to remember events from the past, when asked about what he might be 
doing tomorrow, he seemed unable to imagine a future scenario. Tulving suggested that N.N. 
suffered from incapability to experience extended subjective time, and depicted him as living 
LQD³SHUPDQHQWSUHVHQW´)URPWKHQRQGDWD IURPVHYHUDO cases on episodic amnesia have 
supported the relationship between episodic memory and episodic future thought (Hassabis et 
al., 2007; Klein et al., 2002; Levine et al., 1998). Further support of this relationship has 
come from neuroimaging studies, where a shared neural architecture of episodic memory 
(medial prefrontal cortex, posteromedial parietal cortex and the medial temporal lobes) is 
recruited when people simulate future personal episodes (Addis et al., 2007; Botzung et al., 
2008; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar et al., 2007; Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Hassabis and 
Maguire, 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007, 2009; Spreng et al., 2009). 
 
2.2.3.2. Situation selection and foresight impairment after vmPFC lesions 
A second element in the situation selection process is related to the motivational components 
that guide it. It has been suggested that the generation and selection of future scenarios 
DSSHDUVWREHGULYHQE\SUHYLRXVHPRWLRQDOH[SHULHQFHV'¶$UJHPEDXDQGVan der Linden, 
2007), perhaps sharing some of the basic mechanisms attributed to emotion-based decision-
making (Loewenstein, 2007). Some authors have stressed this link by proposing that it is the 
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affective state associated to mental simulations of positive and negative outcomes, which is 
consciously represented, which motivates us to engage in some activities and avoid others 
%HFKDUD DQG 'DPDVLR  '¶$UJHPEDX DQG 9DQ GHU /LQGHQ  ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV
situation selection will not only imply the projection of the self into the future, by using 
elements from the past, but also the selection of possible scenarios based on the emotional 
value of potential future events  
 The study of patients with lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) has 
been a further important source of evidence in understanding the neurobiological basis of 
associating affective states with mental simulations of positive and negative outcomes 
'¶$UJHPEDXDQG9DQGHU/LQGHQ7KHDYDLODEOHHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDt patients with 
damage to the vmPFC present a shortened future time perspective (Fellows and Farah, 
2005b) and exhibit difficulties anticipating physiologically the onset of aversive stimuli 
(Bechara et al., 2000 for a review; Bechara et al., 1996; Damasio et al., 1990; Roberts et al., 
2004) and also unlearning reward and punishment association (Fellows and Farah, 2003, 
2005a; Rolls et al., 1994). This impairment in the capacity to generate, and flexibly modify, 
emotional association to future events appears to lead them to take disadvantageous choices 
(Bechara et al., 1997; Bechara et al., 2000) by neglecting future consequences (Bechara et al., 
1994; Bechara et al., 2000). Of relevance to the neurological basis of situation selection, it 
has been suggested that the anterior portion of the vmPFC (BA 10, 11) is recruited to a 
greater extent than posterior areas (BA 25), when envisioning emotional events in the far 
IXWXUHFRPSDUHGWRWKHQHDUIXWXUH'¶$UJHPEDXHWDO 
 Although most of what is known about the relevance of vmPFC to situation selection 
comes from work on emotion-based decision-making, several studies have directly explored 
autobiographical memory and mental time travel capacity in this population. For example, 
Levine (2004) reported that patients with vmPFC lesions recalled fewer internal details 
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(thoughts and feelings) from biographical episodes than patients with dlPFC lesions and 
controls, although the recollection of external details (personal and public facts) did not differ 
from healthy participants. Levine interpreted this reduction in internal episodic specificity as 
µUHIOHFWLQJDVWDWHRIFRQVFLRXVQHVVSDUWLDOO\VWULSSHGRIWKHEHQHILWVRIPHQWDOWLPHWUDYHODQG
UHODWLYHO\FRQVWUDLQHGWRWKHKHUHDQGQRZ¶S7KLVUHSRUWLVHxtremely interesting if we 
consider the available evidence associating episodic memory and episodic future thought 
(Addis, Wong and Schacter, 2007; Suddendorf, 2009 for a review). It suggests the possibility 
that the impairment of patients with vmPFC lesions to travel back in time could extend to 
traveling forward into the future as well. This assumption seems supported by a study from 
Fellows and Farah (2005b) where patients with brain lesions were asked to think about future 
events that may happen in their lives. The main finding was that participants with lesions to 
the vmPFC showed significantly less content, and shorter time perspective, than patients with 
dlPFC lesions and controls.  
 In sum, the available evidence on mental time travel and decision-making suggests 
that lesions to the medial temporal cortex and vmPFC may impair situation selection 
differentially. Damage to the vmPFC appears to impair the capacity to generate, and flexibly 
associate, emotional value to events, thus guiding selection of optimal environments. On the 
other hand, lesions to the medial temporal cortex appear to preserve emotional experience 
(Feinstein et al., 2010), and emotional learning (Turnbull and Evans, 2006), but compromise 
SHRSOH¶V DELOLW\ WR XVH UDZ HOHPHQWV IURP WKH past to spatially construct virtual scenarios 
(Hassabis et al., 2007) and travel forward in time.  
 
 
2.2.4. Situation modification 
 
Situation modification is a second form of antecedent-focused ER, whose main goal is 
typically described as being to modify the external environment in order to make emotional 
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responses more manageable (Gross and Thompson, 2007, p. 12). Theoretically speaking, and 
in contrast to situation selection, which requires individuals to travel forward in time, 
situation modification occurs mostly in the present moment or immediate future, constraining 
individuals to rapidly and flexibly generate alternative actions that may change the course of a 
situation. Commonly cited examples of situation modification are: generating physical 
distaQFHE\WXUQLQJDZD\RQH¶VKHDGRUERG\GLVSOD\LQJDQDIIHFWWRHQJHQGHUDQHPRWLRQDO
LPSDFW RQ DQRWKHU SHUVRQ RU WHOOLQJ D MRNH WR PDQLSXODWH WKH OLVWHQHU¶V HPRWLRQDO VWDWH
(Werner and Gross, 2010, p. 23).  
As these examples make clear, situation modification is a rather non-specific ER 
strategy and, in the same way as situation selection, it has not yet been an object of 
substantial experimental research. Because individuals can modify a situation in an almost 
infinite number of ways, several neuropsychological components might be considered as 
playing a role in this complex psychological process. Situation modification is likely to 
require: 1) the awareness of the potential link between a situation and its emotional impact; 
2) the generation of an alternative version of the situation; and 3) the execution of responses 
(in real time) to change the situation. The available evidence on how brain injury may impair 
the ability to modify behaviour in accordance with environmental contingencies differs 
substantially across lesion site. This section will only focus on two groups of patients that 
present different forms of behavioural inflexibility: affective inflexibility [ventromedial PFC 
damage] and cognitive inflexibility [lateral PFC damage]. Even though it is not the intention 
of this review to reduce the complexity of situation modification solely to this type of 
neuropsychological impairment, we believe that data from these two groups of patients offer 
substantial information to understand a core component of situation modification, which is 
the capacity to flexibly modify behaviour according to environmental demands. 
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2.2.4.1. Situation modification and affective flexibility after lesions to the vmPFC cortex 
As described above, in relation to situation selection, patients with damage to the vmPFC 
exhibit difficulties in personal and social decision-making situations, often taking 
disadvantageous choices (Damasio et al., 1997; Bechara et al., 2000). It has been suggested 
that these difficulties are related to an impaired capacity to use emotions while navigating 
complex situations and events (Damasio et al., 1991; Damasio and Anderson, 1993), where 
reinforcement contingencies change rapidly (Rolls, 2000). A dramatic example of this failure 
in emotional decision making can be observed in the patient Elliot (Damasio, 1994), who 
presented severe personality changes after a meningioma extraction, which caused bilateral 
damage to the vmPFC. Damasio reports that after WKHRSHUDWLRQ(OOLRW¶VOLIHGULIWHGDSDUWDQG
KH µFRXOGQRW VXVWDLQD UHJXODUHPSOR\PHQW «GLGEXVLQHVVZLWKDGLVUHSXWDEOHFKDUDFWHU
despite family warnings and married to a woman nor approved neither by family or friends 
«KLVDELOLW\WRUHDFKGHFLVLons was impaired, as was his ability to make an effective plan 
IRUWKHKRXUVDKHDGRIKLPOHWDORQHWRSODQIRUWKHPRQWKVDQG\HDUVRIKLVIXWXUH¶SS-
37).  
 A number of theories have been proposed to account for these difficulties (for a 
detailed description see Beer, 2007). One of them suggests that lesions to the vmPFC impair 
affective shifting, the ability to adapt associative learning when an initially rewarded stimulus 
is no longer rewarding (extinction), or when the reward and punishment value of two stimuli 
switch (reversal learning) (Fellows and Farah, 2003). Affective shifting seems likely to be a 
key component of situation modification, especially considering that during social situations 
reinforcing stimuli are constantly exchanged, and their value needs to be continually updated 
(Rolls, 2004). 
 Evidence to support the role of vmPFC in affective shifting comes from a range of 
sources. For example, Rolls et al., (1994) studied patients with and without vmPFC lesions on 
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a reversal and extinction task, where participants had to accumulate points by touching 
patterns on a screen, and stop touching them once they were no longer rewarded (extinction), 
or its value was reversed to punishment (reversal learning). The results showed that subjects 
with and without vmPFC lesions were able to learn the initial criteria of the task. However, 
when contingencies where changed, only the vmPFC group tended to perseverate, favouring 
the previously rewarded stimuli. In a related study, Fellows and Farah (2003) compared the 
performance of patients with lesions of the vmPFC with a group with dlPFC damage (and 
controls) on a card gambling reversal learning task. Their findings were similar to those of 
Rolls and colleagues (1994). Neither form of prefrontal damage compromised initial learning 
of the emotional associations, but the ventromedial group was specially impaired in 
modifying their behaviour when the task contingencies where changed.  
 Neuroimaging studies of healthy population have also implicated vmPFC in reward 
processing, especially when circumstances are uncertain or changing (Elliott et al., 2000; 
O'Doherty, et al., 2001; Rogers et al., 1999). Finally, lesion studies with animals have 
supported a similar role of the vmPFC in emotional learning, associating damage to this area 
WR³HPRWLRQDOSHUVHYHUDWLRQ´0RUJDQHWDO,QVXPWKHHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWLQJDUROHIRU
affective shifting, and the vmPFC, in situation modification seems fairly robust. 
 
2.2.4.2. Situation modification and cognitive flexibility after lateral prefrontal lesions 
An important observation from the above mentioned studies is that lesions to the lateral 
portions of the frontal lobes do not appear to impair affective flexibility. However, although 
these patients may be able to flexibly modify emotional associations according to 
environmental changes, they do present with difficulties managing their behaviour, especially 
in complex and ambiguous situations that require choice (Burgess, 2000; Burgess and 
Shallice, 1996; Burgess et al., 2000; Fortin et al., 2003). For example, they typically show 
2.2. Neuropsychology of ER strategies 
 
68 
 
difficulties consciously representing sequences of speech and behaviour, or initiating and 
executing such sequences in an orderly fashion (Anderson and Tranel, 2002; Fuster, 2001; 
Luria 1966). A classic example of this impairment is the reported dissociation between 
µNQRZLQJ¶DQGµGRLQJ¶6WXVVHWDO6WXVVDQG$OH[DQGHUZKHUHSDWLHQWVVHHP
able to know what should be done, but struggle to formulate a plan of action according to 
goals, to select appropriate routines to accomplish those goals, or evaluate the final outcome 
(Luria, 1966). 
 Some authors have interpreted this failure to achieve known goals (Duncan, 1986) as 
an impairment in the use of information to intentionally guide behaviour (Barcelo and 
Knight, 2002; Milner, 1964), or a deficit in the capacity to acquire and use behaviour-guiding 
rules (Miller and Cohen, 2001). A related consequence of this difficulty is that patients may 
become disorganized or inflexible in their behaviour or ideas (Podell, 2009; Sandson and 
Albert, 1984; Stuss and Benson, 1990). This disorganized or inflexible quality of behaviour, a 
form of cognitive inflexibility, may prevent patients from voluntarily modifying their actions, 
and thus altering the course of a situation. In consequence, it seems justified to suggest that 
situation modification can be compromised not only by a deficit in re-learning emotional 
associations (after vmPFC lesions), but also by an impairment in the use of cognition to guide 
and control behaviour (after dlPFC lesions). If situation modification implies the generation 
of alternative behaviour and the execution of new responses, lesions to the dlPFC may 
VHULRXVO\FRPSURPLVHWKLVµFROG¶H[HFXWLYHFRPSRQHQW 
 There is a large literature relating prefrontal cortex (Karnath and Wallesch, 1992; 
Miller and Cohen, 2001), and especially dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Alexander et al., 
2007; Anderson and Tranel, 2002; Derrfuss et al., 2004; Derrfuss et al., 2005; Fletcher and 
Henson, 2001; Petrides, 2005) with cognitive control. Most of the available knowledge about 
the role of the lateral prefrontal cortex on cognitive control comes from studies on cognitive 
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flexibility after brain injury, the ability to shift avenues of thought and action in order to 
perceive, process and respond to situations in different ways (Eslinger and Grattan, 1993).  
 Such cognitive flexibility has been extensively explored in people with acquired brain 
injury, especially using a task-switching paradigm (Shallice et al., 2008). The Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test (Heaton, 1993) is perhaps the most widely used task-switching test, and its 
performance has long been linked to dorsolateral PFC functioning in both neurologically 
lesioned (see Demakis, 2003 for a meta-analysis; Lombardi et al., 1999; Milner, 1963; Stuss 
et al., 2000) and healthy control groups (Berman et al., 1995; Monchi et al., 2001). However, 
the interpretation of findings in task-switching studies is not straightforward, and 
performance seems to depend on different components, which appear to have a diverse neural 
substrate (Aron et al., 2004; Shallice et al., 2008b; Stuss and Alexander, 2007; Stuss et al., 
2000).  
 Several studies have found that lesions to the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(vlPFC), especially BA 44-45, generate impairments in task setting, a specific component of 
task switching (Alexander et al., 2007; Shallice et al., 2008; Stuss and Alexander, 2007). 
Patients with left vlPFC lesions show a greater error rate in the initial stage of switching 
paradigms (Alexander et al., 2005; Stuss and Alexander, 2007), where a new criterion needs 
to be formed, or a new schema generated, in order to complete a task. According to Stuss and 
$OH[DQGHU  GDPDJH WR WKH OHIW 3)& FRPSURPLVHV WKH SDWLHQW¶V DELOLW\ WR XVH WDVN
instructions to direct behaviour (verbal regulation of behaviour) even when there is a 
comprehension of their meaning. From an emotion regulation perspective, it might be 
suggested that patients with left vlPFC lesion might have difficulties in the transition between 
old and new sets of behaviour, impairing the flexibility required for the on-line modification 
of a situation.  
	  
 Lesions to the right lateral PFC (rlPFC) generate a completely different profile of 
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³VZLWFKLQJ GLIILFXOWLHV´ 6WXVV DQG $OH[DQGHU  3DWLHQWV ZLWK GDPDJH LQ WKLV DUHD
present errors of all kinds (Aron et al., 2004), and during the whole task, even when 
instructions are offered to assist performance (Stuss et al., 2000). Stuss and Alexander (2007) 
have interpreted this finding as a failure in monitoring; the process of checking the task for 
quality control and adjustment of behaviour. This interpretation is consistent with other 
authors who have suggested a similar role of the rlPFC in monitoring and checking (Shallice 
2002, Stuss and Alexander, 2000). If situation modification implies flexibly executing a new 
set of behaviours, in order to modify the stimulus that is the source of dysregulation, 
monitoring impairments may seriously hamper the timing of actions, occurrence of errors, or 
awareness of discrepancies between the intended behaviour and its real effect. In other words, 
lesions to the rlPFC may severely compromise the proper adjustment of behaviour according 
to environmental feedback.  
 ,Q VXP OHVLRQV WR ODWHUDO DQG YHQWURPHGLDO 3)&PD\ JHQHUDWH D VSHFLILF µVLJQDWXUH
HIIHFW¶6KDOOLFH et al., 2008b) in situation modification impairments. Perhaps vmPFC lesions 
generate the most pervasive deficits, compromising the capacity of flexibly adjusting learned 
emotional associations, which allow the organism to shift towards more favourable situations. 
Lesions to the lateral PFC appear to spare affective learning, but compromise the ability to 
guide behaviour according to plans (i.e. Bechara et al., 1998) and inhibit the repetition of 
ineffective responses (Anderson and Tranel, 2002). Damage to the left vlPFC may 
specifically impair the initial transition from one situation to another, generating a 
disorganized behaviour that will, however, improve with practice and external support. 
Lesions to the right lateral PFC, on the contrary, may generate a more pervasive difficulty in 
modifying the environment, particularly because the capacity to perceive errors, and used 
them to re-direction behaviour, is impaired.  
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2.2.5. Attentional deployment 
 
Attentional deployment refers to a strategy whereby individuals regulate emotion by 
changing the focus of attention (Gross and Thompson, 2007). It has been suggested that 
attentional deployment might be considered to be an internal version of situation selection, 
where people choose more favourable internal scenarios to focus on (Werner and Gross, 
2010). A paradigmatic example of attention deployment is distraction (Gross and Thompson, 
2007), where the internal focus is moved towards thoughts and memories that are inconsistent 
with the undesirable present emotional state (Watts, 2007), or directed to a non-emotional 
aspect of the situation (Rothbart and Sheese, 2007). A less investigated form of attention 
deployment is concentration, whereby cognitive resources are fully utilized in one activity, so 
that attention is focused on positive objects or thought (Gross, 1998).  
There is a modest literature on attentional deployment describing the psychological 
components of this ER strategy. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that attentional 
deployment recruits: 1) sustained attention, particularly when using concentration, to 
maintain an state of alert and focus in one activity or mental content over time (Sturm, 1996); 
and 2) selective attention, in order to limit (or inhibit) the extent to which the emotionally 
evocative aspect of an event is attended (McRae et al., 2010), by switching the focus of 
attention towards a neutral (Rothbart and Sheese, 2007), or a positively-valenced (Watts, 
2007) object or thought.  
 It is surprising that, although attentional problems are a frequent deficit after brain 
injury, and a common target for rehabilitation (for reviews see Manly, 2003; Michel and 
Mateer, 2006; Park and Ingles, 2001), no study has directly explored attentional deployment 
in this population from an emotion regulation point of view. Nevertheless, there is a large 
literature on the impact of brain injury on attentional systems (for a review see Leclercq and 
Zimmermann, 2002), which can be used to formulate some preliminary hypotheses. This 
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section will mainly focus on the impact of right hemisphere damage on sustained attention, 
ZLWKRXWDGGUHVVLQJLQGHWDLOVHOHFWLYHDWWHQWLRQDIRUPRIµH[HFXWLYHDWWHQWLRQ¶3HWHUVHQDQG
Posner, 2012; Posner and Rothbart, 2007; Posner et al., 2006), which is extensively treated in 
sections 3 (Situation Modification) and 5 (Cognitive Change).  
 
2.2.5.1. Attentional deployment and attentional deficits after right hemisphere lesions 
Attentional deficits (slowness, selectivity, sustained attention and shifting) are reported as 
more frequent and disruptive after right than left-sided lesions (Leclercq et al., 2002). The 
best known attentional impairment after right hemisphere damage is that of hemi-inattention 
or neglect (for a review see Corbetta and Shulman, 2011). However, such type of deficit, 
compared to other non-spatial attentional deficits that arise from right hemisphere lesions, do 
not appear to play a central role in emotion regulation.  
 Deficits in sustained attention tasks have also been widely investigated after right 
hemisphere damage (Anderson et al., 2005; Robertson et al., 1995; Robertson et al., 1997; 
Wilkins et al., 1987), specifically after lesions to right prefrontal cortex (Molenberghs et al., 
2009; Rueckert and Grafman, 1996; Stuss et al., 2002; Picton et al., 2006; Wilkins et al., 
1987; Shallice et al., 2008a). This set of evidence is interesting in view of neuroimaging 
studies suggesting that the voluntary manipulation of attentional focus appear to rely on right 
prefrontal structures (Mayer et al., 2007; McRae et al., 2010). 
 Lesions to the right prefrontal cortex have long been known to produce an increase in 
distractibility (Woods and Knight, 1986), whereas more basic forms of involuntary attention, 
such as orienting responses, appear pathologically enhanced, and more voluntarily ones 
ZHDNHQHG +RPVND\D  JHQHUDWLQJ D IRUPRI ³H[DJJHUDWHG DWWHQWLYHQHVV´ *ROGVWHLQ
1936a, 1936b), where patients passively drift from one stimulus to another. Luria (1973) 
offers an illustrative example of distractibility when describing a patient who performed a 
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task alone with no difficulties, but failed as soon as a stranger entered into the room or the 
person in the next bed whispered something to the nurse. Typically, the patient ceased to 
perform the task, and transferred his gaze to the newcomer, or joined in the conversation with 
his neighbour (p. 275). A similar pattern of difficulties has been also described by Scott 
(2011), who notes that patients with attentional impairment often report problems completing 
projects, because they initiate another project before finishing the current one (p. 149).  
 Inability to sustain attention during a task also appears to compromise divided 
DWWHQWLRQRUSHRSOH¶VFDSDFLW\WRSHUIRUm more than one task at the same time. For example, 
Evans (2009) described the case of a patient [David] with a right internal capsule stroke who 
tended to be easily distracted, and also experienced difficulties doing more than one thing at 
once. He could not watch films for more than 20 minutes, where he would start finding it 
KDUGWRFRQFHQWUDWH$WWKDWVWDJHKHGHVFULEHGKDYLQJWRIRUFHKLPVHOIWRµVWD\ZLWK¶WKHILOP
an internal struggle that added further distraction, and made the activity even harder to 
accomplish (p. 94). David also reported that after the injury he had difficulties resuming a 
hobby of his, painting miniature military figures, while listening to the radio. He felt unable 
to do these two tasks at the same time, often becoming frustrated and thus abandoning the 
activity (p. 93).   
 More recent lesion studies seem to support the role of right PFC in attention, 
VXJJHVWLQJ WKDWGDPDJH WR WKHULJKWGRUVRODWHUDO3)&JHQHUDWHVµPRQLWRULQJ¶GHILFLWVZKHUH
patients are less able to sustain attention to a rule-set, in other words to maintain the selection 
of a determined schema -so that consistent target selections are made, and responses to 
competing targets are inhibited (Picton et al., 2006; Shallice et al., 2008a; Stuss et al., 2002). 
In addition, evidence from neuroimaging studies has supported brain injury data on the role 
of the right PFC in sustained attention (Cohen et al., 1992; Pardo et al., 1991; Lewin et al., 
0DQO\HWDO2¶&RQQRUHWDO 
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 In sum, patients with right hemisphere damage, particularly right frontal lesions, 
appear to be less able to voluntarily sustain (as in concentration) and change (as in 
distraction) the focus of attention, thus probably compromising the capacity to voluntarily 
manipulate attention in order to modulate emotional experience. For example, it is possible 
that patients with right hemisphere damage might find it difficult to concentrate on neutral or 
positive stimuli when facing a negative situation, because their attention is captured by the 
emotional saliency of events. To our knowledge, there is only one case study that has 
proposed a possible interaction between impaired attentional function and the regulation of 
negative arousal after brain injury (Gracey et al., 2007). In that report, the authors suggested 
that attentional deficits play a role in understanding anxiety symptoms, especially regarding 
WKHDEQRUPDOµK\SHUYLJLODQFH¶WRSRWHQWLDOWULJJHUVRISDQLF-like attacks.  
 Another possibility that needs to be considered is that attentional impairment might 
enhance attentional deployment ability. This hypothesis relies on the above mentioned 
³H[DJJHUDWHGDWWHQWLYHQHVV´*ROGVWHLQDEZKLFKGHVFULEHVSDWLHQW¶VWHQGHQF\WR
drift involuntarily from one stimulus to another ,W LV FRQFHLYDEOH WKDW ³H[DJJHUDWHG
DWWHQWLYHQHVV´ KDV WKH XQH[SHFWHG FRQVHTXHQFH RIdistraction, not only from events which 
one would like to attend to (as we commonly understand it) but also from events which one 
might not ZLVKWRDWWHQGWRZDUGV,QRWKHUZRUGV³H[DJJHUDWHGDWWHQWLYHQHVV´PD\HQKDQFH
the ability to resist rumination, because the focus of attention is easily captured by novel 
distractors. As a consequence, attention does not persist on negative mental contents, but is 
involuntarily shifted away, or passively drifts DZD\ IURP WKHP ,Q WKLV VHQVH ³H[DJJHUDWHG
DWWHQWLYHQHVV´DIWHUULJKWKHPLVSKHUHOHVLRQVPLJKWEHFRQVLGHUHGWKHQHXURORJLFDOLQYHUVHRI
phenomena such attentional inflexibility, which is often observed in depressed patients 
(Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Whitmer and Banich, 2007). In passing, we note that 
several other cases where brain damage may not only impair function, but also enhance some 
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psychological processes, appear to offer support for this hypothesis (see the concept of lesion 
facilitation in Kapur, 2011). 
 
 
2.2.6. Cognitive Change 
$IRXUWK(5IDPLO\LVFRJQLWLYHFKDQJHZKLFKLQYROYHVFKDQJLQJRQH¶VWKLQNLQJLQRUGHUWR
FKDQJH RQH¶V HPRWLRQV 2QH SDUWLFXODUO\ ZHOO UHVHDUFKHG IRUP RI cognitive change is 
UHDSSUDLVDOZKLFKUHIHUVWRFKDQJLQJDVLWXDWLRQ¶Vmeaning in a way that alters its emotional 
impact (Gross and Thompson, 2007). It involves modifying the way that we think about a 
situation (hence cognitive change), usually reframing the meaning of an aversive event in less 
negative or more positive terms (McRae et al., 2011; Ochsner and Gross, 2007). 
Reappraisal has been suggested to be a complex multistep process, requiring the 
orchestration of several cognitive abilities. It has been suggested that, in order to reappraise 
we need to: (1) keep the automatic appraisal of a negative situation in mind (working 
memory), (2) decrease the salience of that appraisal (inhibition), (3) generate alternative 
interpretations (working memory manipulation and verbal ability), (4) identify and engage in 
the interpretation that is the most appropriate (set shifting), (5) keep the new appraisal in 
mind  (working memory maintenance), and (6) keep track of the success of the regulation 
process (monitoring) (McRae et al., 2011). This section will focus on patients with lesions to 
the left lateral PFC, whom often present with cognitive control and language impairments. 
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2.2.6.1. Reappraisal and cognitive control impairment after lesions to the left lateral 
prefrontal cortex 
Cognitive control can be broadly considered as the ability to coordinate thoughts or actions in 
relation to internal goals (Koechlin et al., 2003) and environmental contingencies (Stuss et 
al., 1995). It has frequently linked to reappraisal (Banich et al., 2009; Ochsner and Gross, 
2005), mostly because reappraisal appears to recruit core cognitive control processes, such as 
inhibition and set shifting (Miyake et al., 2000). Neuroimaging studies have supported this 
claim by showing that reappraisal ability appears to be closely associated with activation of 
cognitive control and language areas, particularly in the left prefrontal cortex (Goldin et al., 
2008; Green and Mahli, 2006; Kim et al., 2011; Ochsner and Gross, 2005, 2007; Ochsner et 
al., 2002; Kalisch, 2009; Ochsner et al., 2004; Vanderhasselt et al., 2012). 
 Patients with lesions to the left lateral PFC (BA 44, 45) have been described as 
exhibiting cognitive control deficits (Alexander et al., 2007; Goldberg and Bilder, 1987). A 
particular type of cognitive control deficit, widely studied in these patients, is task setting. As 
reviewed before in section 3, task setting is usually conceptualized as a component of task 
switching, which allows disengaging from a previous activity, and the initiation of a new one. 
Prototypically, patients with task setting impairment present with a greater error rate in the 
initial stage of switching paradigms, when they are establishing a new criterion or mental 
schema (Alexander et al., 2005; Shallice et al., 2008; Stuss and Alexander, 2008b). This 
difficulty can often be observed as perseverative thoughts or as an inability to generate new 
thoughts.  
 Although the link between task setting problems and reappraisal ability seems 
theoretically coherent, to the best of our knowledge only one case study has described how 
task setting impairment after brain damage might compromise reappraisal ability (Salas et al., 
submitted). In this paper, a patient (Mrs M) with marked concrete thinking, after a left frontal 
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stroke, was studied in terms of her ability to generate positive reinterpretation from pictures 
that elicited negative emotions (International Affective Picture System). Compared to patients 
with no concrete thinking, and normal controls, Mrs M presented with a virtual inability to 
spontaneously generate positive reappraisals from the pictures. When analysing her 
performance in detail, it was possible to observe that her thinking process was often captured 
by the emotional consequences of the pictures, or by irrelevant details. In other words, and 
from a task setting point of view, Mrs M appeared unable to inhibit the initial [emotional] 
appraisal, in order to generate a new set of cognitions. Instead, and despite being directly 
requested to generate a positive reinterpretation, she presented with frequent perseverative 
thoughts related to the negative aspect of the pictures.  
 
 
2.2.6.2. Reappraisal and language impairment after lesions to the left lateral prefrontal 
cortex 
Language has been proposed as a necessary cognitive ability to reappraise (McRae et al., 
2011). The rationale seems to be that, in order to reappraise, an alternative narrative about 
events has to be generated. Evidence from neuroimaging studies has supported this 
assumption, showing activation of language related areas in the left prefrontal cortex during 
reappraisal tasks (Goldin et al., 2008; Ochsner and Gross, 2005; 2007; Ochsner et al., 2002; 
Ochsner et al., 2004; Vanderhasselt et al., 2012).  
 Lesion studies have offered substantial evidence relating the role of the left PFC in 
different aspects of language (Binder et al., 1997). However, for the purpose of this review, 
we will only focus on two aspects often compromised after damage to this area: cognitive 
control and inner speech. 
 Language has a key role in cognitive control, coordinating sensory and semantic 
processes from posterior areas of the brain, and accommodating moment-by moment shifts in 
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goals and strategies (Binder et al., 1997). It has been described, for example, that subjects 
with language impairment are compromised in task switching because, in order to suppress 
the internal interference from a recently activated task set, verbal representations of the 
upcoming task are necessary (Chiou and Kennedy, 2009; Mecklinger et al., 1999). A review 
of task switching and Stroop paradigms has suggested that the left inferior frontal cortex (BA 
6, 8, 44) may function as a convergence zone, where language information is integrated with 
premotor and working memory information, thus allowing the updating of task 
representations (Derrfuss et al., 2005).  
 The case of Mrs M might also be used to illustrate how language impairment may 
play a role in task switching. After her stroke, the main presenting complaint was a moderate 
expressive language difficulty, which evolved into a simple anomia at the time of testing, 
thirty five months later. Her neuropsychological profile confirmed this language problem, 
emphasizing a marked difficulty in verbal fluency tasks (phonological and semantic), which 
was consistent with her damage to BA 44, a brain area related to the generation of verbal 
representations that guide task switching (Derrfuss et al., 2005). In the reappraisal task this 
language impairment was reflected in responses that were informative (she was able to report 
the main themes of picture), but lacked fluidity and synthesis. She also struggled to name 
objects from pictures, for which she compensated by substitution or circumlocution. In sum, 
it can be argued that Mrs 0¶VGHIicit might be partially accounted for by impairment in using 
language to facilitate the process of shifting from one behaviour to another.   
 A second aspect of language, which has not been a focus in the context of reappraisal, 
is inner speech. This is typically considered to be a form of inner verbal thought, usually 
described as fully internal and silent (Winsler, 2009). We propose that inner speech might 
have a role in reappraisal, firstly because reappraisal is a form of intrinsic emotion regulation, 
where emotion is regulated within the self (Gross and Thompson, 2007). In addition, the 
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process of reappraisal appears to require covertly talking to ourselves, in order to identify or 
engage with alternative interpretations of events (McRae et al., 2011). Furthermore, it has 
been suggested that inner speech is related to a set of abilities necessary to reappraise, such as 
self-observation, problem solving, and self-awareness (Morin, 2005, for a review). 
Unfortunately, although inner speech has long been linked to the development of self-
regulation (Vygotsky, 1934/1987; Sokolov, 1972; Tullet and Inzlicht, 2010) and executive 
control (Emerson and Miyake, 2003; Gruber and Goschke, 2004; Miyake et al., 2004), 
current emotion regulation theory has not yet suggested it as a possible language-related 
ability.  
However, there are good grounds for offering this suggestion. For example, internal 
speech impairment has been long related to left PFC damage (Luria, 1959, 1966, 1973), 
compromising self-talk and language-based thinking (Morin, 2009; Moss, 1972). This 
SHFXOLDUVWDWHRIPLQGKDVEHHQUHIHUUHGWRE\SDWLHQWVDVD³dramatic VLOHQFH´7D\ORU
RUDQ³LPSRVVLELOLW\ WR WKLQN´6DODV In everyday situations this impairment may be 
observed, for example, in SDWLHQWV¶LQDELOLW\WRXVHLQQHUVSHHFKDVDJXLGHWRLQWHUQDOO\NHHS
track of the steps of a home routine (e.g. cooking), forcing them to speak their thoughts aloud 
in order to hear themselves (for an example of this problem in children with traumatic brain 
injury see Rees and Skidmore, 2011). In a recent lesion study by Geva and colleagues (2011) 
it was reported that damage to the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44) was associated with poor 
performance on a conscious inner speech task. This lesion-based evidence is congruent with 
neuroimaging studies that have also pointed to the role of left inferior frontal areas in inner 
speech (see Jones, 2009, for a review).  
 Taken together, evidence from patients with lesions to the left PFC seems to support 
the relevance of cognitive control and language in reappraisal. Patients with damage to this 
area are often impaired initiating new sets of behaviour and using language to internally 
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represent goals or even think covertly. Such types of problems are likely to compromise 
reappraisal, which depends on being able to shift avenues of thought, and which is 
predominantly (as far as we know) a verbal exercise.  
 
2.2.7. Response modulation 
Response modulation is typically defined as the diverse attempts to influence emotion-
response tendencies, once they have already been elicited (Gross, 1998; Gross and 
Thompson, 2007). Two strategies are usually proposed to sub-serve this modulatory function: 
suppression and amplification (or exaggeration). Emotional suppression refers to the 
conscious inhibition RIRQH¶VRZQHPRWLRQDOH[SUHVVLYHbehaviour, while affectively aroused 
(Gross and Levenson, 1997). In contrast, amplification denotes the behavioural augmentation 
of an already initiated emotion (Demaree et al., 2004; Henry et al., 2009).  
 Facial expression is a common target of response modulation (Gross, 1999). In order 
to suppress facial expressions, muscular contraction has to be inhibited, so facial muscles 
remain relaxed. Suppression might also take the form of camouflage of the face, by adding 
facial movements with a different emotional valence [e.g. smiling when you are angry] 
(Ekman and Friesen, 2003). In contrast, amplification requires increasing the number of 
facial areas involved, its intensity and the duration of the expression. When no emotion is 
strongly felt, amplification understood to rely on simulation, which requires remembering the 
sensation of how each emotional expression felt on the face, so it can be voluntarily adjusted 
(Ekman and Friesen, 2003). 
 Response modulation strategies appear to rely on several processes. In order to 
suppress: (1) Motor control is needed to voluntarily manipulate facial expression according to 
contextual demands (e.g. showing sadness when someone else is sad) (Beer and Lombardo, 
2007); and (2) Response inhibition is also required, to withhold the behavioural display 
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triggered by the felt emotion (Gross, 1999; Gross and John, 2003; Gross and Thompson, 
2007; Kühn et al., 2011). The distinction between motor expressive control and response 
inhibition is based on evidence suggesting a dissociation of these two components. For 
example, damage to motor control pathways can generate a dysregulation of emotional 
expression, when no emotional experience is present. In contrast, response inhibition implies 
a felt emotion, which cannot be properly withheld [see sections below for further examples]. 
Finally, in order to modulate emotional responses (3) Interoceptive and Emotional Awareness 
are needed, to monitor and adjust the exterior state of the body, as well as the internal 
emotional experience (Giuliani et al., 2011). Three groups of patients, that present selective 
impairment in different response modulation components, will be described in this section: 
motor control pathway damage, right prefrontal damage and insula damage.  
 
2.2.7.1. Response modulation and impairment of motor control pathways  
An essential aspect of response modulation is the capacity to voluntarily manipulate the 
µPRWRU RXWSXW¶ RI DQ HPRWLRQ IRU H[DPSOH E\ UHOD[LQJ WKH IDFLDO PXVFXODWXUH ZKHQ
suppressing, or increasing the number of facial areas involved when amplifying (Ekman and 
Friesen, 2003). Compared to other emotion regulation strategies, such as attention selection 
or even reappraisal, motor control is a unique feature of response modulation (Beer and 
Lombardo, 2007). Most response modulation experimental paradigms take this capacity for 
JUDQWHGZKHQDVNLQJKHDOWK\FRQWUROVWRµKLGH¶RUµH[DJJHUDWH¶ZKDWWKH\DUHIHHOLQJLQVWHDG
focusing onto the executive abilities involved in the task, such as working memory, inhibition 
or abstraction (Gyurak et al., 2009, 2012). However, evidence from patients with brain injury 
suggests that the motoric control of expressions also needs to be properly considered.  
 It has been noted before (Beer and Lombardo, 2007) that patients with brain injury 
may experience difficulties producing facial expressions, thus compromising response 
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modulation strategies that depend on it. For example, observations of patients with damage to 
the motor control pathways have offered valuable information regarding dissociation between 
volitional and emotional (spontaneous) facial movements (Rinn, 1984). Lesions to the motor 
strip and its corticobulbar projections compromise voluntary movements in the face (hemi-
paralysis), but notably spare spontaneous facial expression [e.g. smiling when something 
amusing occurs]. In contrast, damage to the extrapyramidal motor system (especially the 
basal ganglia) impairs spontaneous emotional movements, preserving voluntary control to 
verbal command.   
 More recent accounts on the role of the motor cortex in the control of facial 
movements have suggested that voluntary movements are mediated by lateral cortical 
structures (primary motor cortex and ventrolateral premotor cortex), both in the vascular 
territory of the middle cerebral artery. Emotional movements, on the contrary, appears to 
depend on midline cortical structures (rostral cingulate motor cortex, caudate cingulate motor 
cortex), both irrigated by the anterior cerebral artery and receiving widespread input from 
limbic areas (Morecraft et al., 2001; Morecraft et al., 2004).   
 This set of lesion studies suggests that damage to midline and lateral cortical 
structures may compromise response modulation strategies differentially. For example, it is 
possible that patients with impaired voluntary expression, although able to emotionally react 
to stimuli, will experience difficulties suppressing, because suppression requires the 
YROXQWDU\PDQLSXODWLRQRIIDFLDOPXVFOHVWKDWDUHXVXDOO\XQGHUVWRRGWRDFWDVµFRQWUROV¶HJ
hiding a smile by rising down the corners of the mouth) (Keltner, 1995; Keltner and Buswell, 
1997).  On the other hand, patients with impaired spontaneous expression might have 
difficulties facially reacting to the stimulus, and perhaps also enhancing or amplifying their 
facial responses when required.   
 A final group of patients with motor control impairment that deserves attention are 
2.2. Neuropsychology of ER strategies 
 
83 
 
subjects with pathological laughing and crying (PLC). PLC has been defined as a 
dysregulation of emotional expression, often characterized by outbursts of emotions which 
are unrelated, or out of proportion, to the underlying feelings of happiness and sadness 
(Parvizi et al., 2009; Poeck, 1985, Wilson, 1923). Patients, for example, may cry in response 
to a joke, or laugh in response to a frustrating test failure (for an example, see patient C.B. in 
Parvizi et al., 2001). This dissociation between emotional experience and expression is 
perhaps best portrayed by one of the many terms coined for the phenomenon: involuntary 
emotional expression disorder (Cummings, 2007).  
 Reviews of the neuroanatomical basis of PLC have suggested that lesions disrupting 
the cerebro-ponto-FHUHEHOODU SDWKZD\V DSSHDU WR FRPSURPLVH WKH FHUHEHOOXP¶V FDSDFLW\ WR
automatically adjust the execution of laughter and crying to the cognitive and situational 
context in which a triggering stimulus appears (Parvizi et al., 2009; Parvizi et al., 2001). In 
other words, PLC can be considered to be a form of affective dysmetria (Miller et al., 2011), 
a discoordination, or pathological dissociation, between the behavioural response and its 
affective and cognitive context (Parvizi, 2012).  
 The study of patients with PLC might contribute to a better understanding of the 
neural basis of response modulation, especially regarding the role of subcortical structures 
mediating suppression or the inhibition of facial displays. The most observable impairment in 
these patients is a lack of voluntary control over the onset of the attacks, and a long latency 
period until some type of control over the expressive behaviour is regained (see patient C.B. 
in Parvizi et al., 2001).  An interesting question that remains open is whether suppression and 
amplification are partially preserved in these patients in other situations when they are not 
µFDSWXUHG¶ E\ WKH DWWDFN 7KLV SRVVLELOLW\ VHHms feasible and deserves further study, 
considering that some patients with PLC appear able to voluntarily express appropriate 
laughter and crying at least in some social contexts (Parvizi, 2012).  
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2.2.7.2. Response modulation, response inhibition, and right prefrontal damage 
A core aspect of response modulation, and especially suppression, is the ability to inhibit a 
behavioural display while affectively aroused (Gross and Levenson, 1997). This capacity has 
been usually labelled in the literature as response inhibition, which encompasses the variety 
of processes aimed at controlling behaviour, particularly the suppression of unwanted, 
prepotent, or reflexive actions (Aron et al., 2004; Dillon and Pizzagalli, 2007).  
 Response inhibition has been largely explored using experimental paradigms where a 
motor response has to be withheld, as in go-no go, or stop-signal tasks. Consistently, 
neuroimaging findings (for reviews see Aron, 2007; Aron et al., 2004; Dillon and Pizzagalli, 
2007; Chambers et al., 2009; Forstmann et al., 2008; Levy and Wagner, 2011; Rubia et al., 
2003) and transcranial magnetic stimulation studies (Chambers et al., 2006, 2007) have 
suggested that response inhibition is mediated by a right hemisphere network, where the 
inferior frontal gyrus is a critical area -although there is some evidence that the dorso-medial 
PFC is also implicated in response inhibition (Floden and Stuss, 2006; Picton et al., 2006).  
 A limitation of the available evidence on response inhibition is that the experimental 
paradigms used have not involved the suppression of emotional behaviour but only motor 
responses. Nevertheless, there is one neuroimaging study (Lee et al., 2008) that has used an 
emotion interference paradigm, assessing the ability to inhibit emotional facial expressions. 
In the task, such facial expressions were evoked by looking at pictures of people showing 
HPRWLRQDOGLVSOD\VDQDXWRPDWLFSKHQRPHQRQRIµFRQWDJLRQ¶ ,n some of the trials subjects 
were instructed to inhibit their spontaneous facial expressions, simulating an emotion of 
opposite valence (e.g. frowning when watching someone smiling). The authors found that 
activation in a set of areas (supplementary motor area, superior temporal sulcus and right 
insula), including the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex area (BA 47), that has been 
previously associated to volitional response inhibition in motor tasks. More importantly, BA 
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47 and superior temporal sulcus activation was positively correlated with suppression scores 
from an Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003). This finding is in line with 
the evidence reviewed above, and suggests that inhibition of the motor response associated 
with emotional behaviour is dependent, amongst other structures, on the right inferior frontal 
cortex. 
 Difficulties inhibiting emotional behaviour have been long reported after brain injury, 
but have not been explored using ER paradigms. Of especial interest are lesions to right 
prefrontal cortex, which has been associated with impairment in several domains of 
emotional life. For example, right frontal lobe damage has been related to greater severity of 
emotional (Tranel et al., 2002) and emotion-based decision making deficits (Manes et al., 
2002; Tranel et al., 2002), difficulties inhibiting self-perspective (Samson et al., 2005), 
disinhibition of sympathetic centres (Hilz, et al., 2006), a higher frequency of delusional 
pathology (Feinberg et al., 2010) and manic disorders (Cumming and Mendez, 1984). This 
set of evidence appears to suggest that the right frontal lobe has a special role in emotion 
modulation, integrating cognition and affect (Stuss and Alexander, 1999, 2000).  
 It is therefore of some interest to see whether the lesion studies literature is consistent 
with data from brain imaging. Three lesion studies have explored the association between 
lesions to the right PFC and response inhibition. In one, the relationship between damage to 
the right inferior frontal gyrus and response inhibition performance was explored (Aron et al., 
2003). The authors compared 18 patients with right frontal lobe lesions to 16 healthy controls 
in a stop-signal inhibition task. They found that, compared to other right frontal regions of 
interest (medial frontal, orbital frontal and superior frontal), the right inferior frontal gyrus 
(especially BA 44, 45) was critical for response inhibition; presenting negative associations 
with stop signal reaction time.  
 An extension of this study explored the impact of unilateral lesions to the PFC on 
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response inhibition, using a task switching paradigm (Aron et al., 2004). The authors reported 
that subjects with right PFC damage, specifically to the pars opercularis of the inferior 
frontal gyrus, were significantly more impaired in suppressing inappropriate responses. 
Finally, a third study investigated the effect of frontal lobe lesions on a response inhibition 
go-no go task (Picton et al., 2006). It was reported that patients with supplementary motor 
area lesions (BA 6) exhibited the largest number of response inhibition errors, and that 
patients with lesions to the right vlPFC (BA, 44, 45, 47) also presented an increase in the 
variability of response. Taken together, these data appear to support the role of the right PFC 
in general, and especially its ventrolateral surface, in motor response inhibition. In relation to 
response modulation, these data seem to suggest that patients with right ventrolateral damage 
might present difficulties withholding emotional expressions (suppression) when situational 
contingencies require it. This is clearly an interesting area for future research.  
 
2.2.7.3. Response modulation, the insula, interoceptive and emotional awareness 
It has been suggested (Giuliani et al., 2011) that, in order to manipulate emotional behaviour, 
interoceptive and emotional awareness are required. This capacity allows us to monitor and 
adjust the external body in relation to emotional internal experience: How much emotion am I 
showing? How am I feeling now? Do I need to keep suppressing or amplifying? Interoceptive 
awareness has been described as a sensory capacity for the on-going status of all the tissues 
and organs of the body, including skin, muscle and viscera (Craig, 2008). It has been 
suggested that these body sensations provide the basic ingredients for what is ultimately 
SHUFHLYHG DV D µIHHOLQJ¶ %HFKDUD DQG 1DTYL  Critchley et al., 2001; Critchley and 
Nagai, 2012; James, 1884) and, in consequence, interoceptive awareness is likely to have a 
crucial role in emotional awareness and the capacity to consciously recognize what we feel 
(Craig, 2010; Barret, Quigley et al., 2004; Wiens, 2005). 
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 During the last decade a number of neuroimaging studies have suggested that the 
insular cortex may be a key neural structure for interoceptive and emotional awareness 
(Craig, 2009, 2010b; Critchley et al., 2004; Simmons et al., 2012; Zaki et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, it has been proposed that, specifically, the anterior insula is essential for the 
subjective awareness of emotion, through the cortical representation of the interoceptive 
LPDJHRIWKHERG\¶VSK\VLRORJLFDOFRQGLWLRQ&RHQHWDO&UDLJ&ULWFKOH\HWDO
2004).  
 In addition to the issue of emotional experience, there is also a growing literature on 
the role of the anterior insula and emotion regulation. For example, it has been suggested that 
the joint activation of ACC and the right anterior insula not only generates a representation of 
emotional awareness (the experiential aspect), but also enables motivation to modulate (the 
regulatory aspect) subjective feelings (Craig, 2008; Medford and Critchley, 2010). This 
regulatory role of the insular cortex has received support from studies with clinical 
populations that exhibit emotion dysregulation problems, such as posttraumatic stress 
disorder (Simmons et al., 2009) or anxiety disorders (Paulus and Stein, 2006). Neuroimaging 
studies using suppression paradigms have also offered valuable data, for example 
demonstrating insula involvement in tasks that require the suppression of natural urges 
[spontaneous blinking] (Lerner et al., 2008), suppression of imitative emotional expressions 
(Lee et al., 2008) and suppression of emotions themselves (Hayes et al., 2010; Goldin et al., 
2008). In addition, anterior insula volume has also been correlated to expressive suppression 
usage (Giuliani et al., 2011).  
 In view of the neuroimaging evidence relating the insula to interoceptive and 
emotional awareness, as well as to ER, it seems reasonable to expect that patients with insular 
damage would be impaired in such capacities. Unfortunately, despite repeated calls to carry 
out in depth studies of patients with focal lesions to the insula (Bechara and Naqvi, 2004; 
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Jones et al., 2010), we still know very little. However, from the available literature on 
neuropsychological deficits after insular damage (for reviews see Ibanez et al., 2010; Jones et 
al., 2010) it seems that lesions to this structure do not compromise emotional perception 
(Couto et al., 2012), but impair to a certain extent interoceptive awareness. Studies have 
reported a decrease in addictive behaviours (Naqvi et al, 2007), bluntness towards risk (Clark 
et al, 2008; Weller et al., 2009) and decision making impairment (Bar-On et al., 2003). 
Lamentably, in relation to emotional awareness and ER, it is not possible to draw firm 
conclusions, given the limited extent of this literature.  
 To our knowledge there is only one case study, recently published (Damasio et al., 
2012), that attempts to explore the link between emotional changes and insular damage. The 
report is quite remarkable in that it summarizes observations for over two decades, from a 
patient (Patient B.) with extensive brain damage as result of encephalitis (bilateral insula, 
bilateral amygdala system, medial and middle sections of the oPFC cortices and polar and 
PHVLDOWHPSRUDOFRUWH[$UHOHYDQWDVSHFWRIWKHSDWLHQW¶VQHXURSV\FKRORJLFDOSUHVHQWDWLRQLV
his dense amnesia, being unable to remember any factual items for more than 45seconds 
(anterograde amnesia), or recall any events from the two decades prior to the neurological 
insult (retrograde amnesia).  
 Based on behavioural observations (from researchers, relatives and blind observers), 
psychological evaluations (Rorschach inkblot test, Thematic Apperception Test), self- 
DZDUHQHVVWDVNVDQGHPRWLRQDOOHDUQLQJWDVNVWKHDXWKRUVFRQFOXGHGWKDWDOODVSHFWVRI%¶V
feelings were intact, though insular cortex had been entirely destroyed bilaterally. B. was able 
WRPDQLIHVW µKLV OLNHVDQGGLVOLNHVFRPIRUWDQGGLVFRPIRUWSOHDVXUHDQGSDLQ¶ 'DPDVLRHW
al., 2012, p. 2). The main proposition of the authors is that the insular cortex does not appear 
to be a necessary brain area for the experience of feelings. Instead, the authors suggest that 
other brain structures, which are preserved in B, such as the somatosensory cortex, the brain 
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VWHP FRPSOH[ DQG WKH EDVDO JDQJOLD FDQ DFFRXQW IRU WKH JHQHUDWLRQ RI  ³IHHOLQJPDSV DQG
feeling states with DQKHGRQLFFRPSRQHQW´S 
 ,IZH FRQVLGHU%¶V FDVH IURP WKH SRLQW RI YLHZRI WKH LQVXOD DQG LWV UHOHYDQFH IRU
interoceptive awareness, the evidence presented by the authors appears to challenge the 
neuroimaging findings. Clearly B. does not present WKH µDEVHQFH RI HPRWLRQDO VDOLHQFH¶
VXJJHVWHGE\&UDLJRUWKHµODFNRIDSSURSULDWHDIIHFWLYHUHVSRQVH¶VXJJHVWHGE\-RQHV
Ward and Critchley (2010), as a consequence of insula damage. On the contrary, B is 
described as able to experience a wide array of interoceptive (e.g. pain, itch, tickle) and 
emotional (e.g. happiness, apprehension, irritation, caring) feelings. Unfortunately the type of 
GDWDRIIHUHGE\WKHDXWKRUVLVODUJHO\EDVHGRQWKHREVHUYDWLRQRI%¶Vbehaviour DQG%¶VVHOI-
report, which makes difficult to link these findings to the experimental paradigms on which 
the interoceptive role of the insula has been forged, such as heart beat detection (Critchley et 
al., 2004), emotional response to pain (for a review of studies see Craig, 2008) or even 
decision making (Clark et al, 2008; Weller et al., 2009).  
 $VHFRQGSRLQWWKDWQHHGVWREHDGGUHVVHGUHIHUVWR%¶VHPRWLRQDO awareness. If we 
use the multilevel operationalization of emotional awareness proposed by Lane and Schwartz 
(1987), it is clear that B. is able to experience physical sensations, that he exhibits action 
tendencies based on them, and that he can recognize and label basic emotions. However, it is 
GLIILFXOWWRLQIHUHLWKHUZD\IURPWKHUHSRUWDERXW%¶Vhigher levels of emotional awareness, 
which require a reflective capacity (Monsen and Monsen, 1999), in order to recognize and 
describe blends of emotions, or even blends of blends of emotional experience (Lane and 
Schwartz, 1987). It is interesting here to note that Damasio et al., (2012) do mention a major 
psychological change on B., but without further elaborating on its relevance for emotional 
OLIH7KLV WKH\GHVFULEHDVDµVKDOORZQHVVRI LQWHOOHFWS¶DQGDOVRDVµVKDOORZQHVVRIKLV
PHQWDO FRQWHQWV S ¶ 8QIRUWXQDWHOy, the authors do not explore this in great detail, or 
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attempt to formally investigate the nature of this change. Two questions arise from this. Is 
WKLV µVKDOORZQHVV RI PHQWDO FRQWHQWV¶ H[FOXVLYHO\ D FRQVHTXHQFH RI WKH DPQHVLD DQG
hippocampal damage, or of the insula lesion, given its proposed integrative function between 
cognition and affect (Craig, 2009; Kurth et al., 2010; Simmons et al., 2012)? Is it possible 
WKDWWKLVµFRJQLWLYHVKDOORZQHVV¶LPSDLUVWKHDFFHVVWRKLJKHUOHYHOVRIHPRWLRQDODZDUHQHVV
which require representational ability to reflect upon feelings? Studies in acquired concrete 
thinking after brain injury (Hanfmann et al., 1944; Salas et al., in press) seem to support this 
point, especially in relation to impairment in the capacity to manipulate ideas and thoughts 
(Goldstein, 1936, 1944; Goldstein and Scheerer, 1941). 
 In conclusion, although Damasio et al., (2012) add extremely important data to debate 
WKH UROH RI WKH LQVXOD LQ LQWHURFHSWLYH DZDUHQHVV %¶V FDVH PD\ QRW FRPSOHWHO\ UHIXWH Whe 
related hypothesis that the insula might have a role in the awareness of emotional feelings, 
especially in higher order levels of awareness. Unfortunately, the presence of dense amnesia 
is a major confounding variable, suggesting that future studies might explore the same 
phenomena in patients with more circumscribed lesions, and more sensitive instruments to 
capture latent differences (see Affect Consciousness Interview, Lech et al., 2008).   
 In relation to ER, although Damasio et al., (2012) do not offer any direct observation 
RQ%V FDSDFLW\ LW LV SRVVLEOH WR LQIHU VRPH FKDQJHV )RU H[DPSOH WKH DXWKRUV GHVFULEH µD
pattern of diminished influence of negative feelings in the elaboration of meaning of complex 
VRFLDO VLWXDWLRQV S ¶ZKLFK DSSHDUV WR EH DVVRFLDWHG WR µD VOLJKW XSZDUG FKDQJH LQ WKH
H[SHULHQFH RI SRVLWLYH HPRWLRQ¶ DQG D µODFN RI FRQFHUQV DERXW WKH IXWXUH S ¶ 2QH
SRVVLELOLW\ WR H[SODLQ VXFK SKHQRPHQD LV WKDW %¶V OHVLRQ JHQHrated changes in emotional 
reactivity, so positive emotions are more promptly experienced and negative emotions are 
lived less intensively. A dampening in reactivity to negative emotions would imply a 
decrease in the frequency of negative situations that require regulation. Nevertheless, it would 
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not be possible to attribute these changes to insular damage, especially considering clinical 
reports describing a decrease of negative emotions and an increase in positive feelings in 
acquired amnesia (Talland, 1968; Tate, 2002; Ogden2¶&RQQRUHWDO&RUNLQHW
al., 1997; Kaushall et al., 1981). 
 In addition, it remains an open question how B. would deal with events that require 
him to modulate (e.g. suppress, amplify) what he is feeling. So far the authors suggest that his 
µDIIHFWLYHOLIHEHFDPHWKHPRVWVDOLHQWDVSHFWRIKLVbehaviour S¶ZKLFKVHHPWRLPSO\
that he became more direct in expressing likes and dislikes. In this sense it is possible to think 
that perhaps B. would present difficulty to suppress or amplify emotional behaviour, because 
response manipulation requires decreasing the salience of spontaneous emotional responses. 
However, this is merely speculative and limited by the confounding effect of deep amnesia 
DQGLWVLPSDFWLQµWLPH WUDYHOOLQJ¶DELOLW\VHHVHFWLRQ 
 In sum, evidence from patients with focal lesions seems to support the relevance of 
motor control and behavioural inhibition in response modulation, particularly for suppression. 
The available data from damage to the insula is less conclusive, although it appears to 
challenge assumptions regarding its role in interoceptive awareness. Future studies exploring 
emotional changes in more restricted insular lesions are urgently needed, as is the use of 
experimental paradigms that allow for a cross talk with the existing evidence from the 
neuroimaging literature. 
 
 
2.2.8. Conclusions  
During the past decade, there has been a growing interest in the neural basis of ER strategies 
but, surprisingly, most of the evidence has been gathered from neuroimaging methods, 
ignoring the possibilities offered by the lesion study approach. The main goal of this article 
has been to link existing neuropsychological knowledge from lesion studies with recent 
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evidence on the core psychological mechanisms underlying different ER strategies. To 
LQFRUSRUDWHOHVLRQVWXGLHVLQWKHILHOGRI(5ZRXOGRIIHUDSRZHUIXOµFRQYHUJHQFHRIPHWKRGV¶
(Gonsalves and Cohen, 2010).  
 This review has described sub-groups of brain injured patients (e.g. right frontal 
damage) that are impaired in particular psychological processes (e.g. sustained attention), 
which have been suggested as key elements of specific ER strategies (e.g. attentional 
deployment). This review is the first [c.f. Beer and Lombardo, 2007] to explicitly adopt a 
process model of ER (Gross and Thompson, 2007), addressing all five proposed ER 
strategies. In addition, this review approaches ER strategies from a dynamic localization 
point of view (Luria, 1966), which holds that complex psychological process, as in the case 
of ER strategies, rely on several neuropsychological components and associated distributed 
neural systems.  
 An important limitation encountered in the task of review has been the remarkably 
unbalanced degree of attention that each ER strategy has received by the scientific 
community. The basic psychological mechanisms of some ER strategies, such as response 
modulation or cognitive change, appear to be far better understood than, for example, 
situation selection or situation modification, where research is almost non-existent (for an 
exception see Rovenpor, Skogsberg and Isaacowitz, 2012). The gap is therefore larger for the 
earlier antecedent-focused ER strategies. As a consequence, the exploration of these under-
investigated strategies is urgently needed, to offer a more complete understanding of ER, and 
indeed to address applied issues such as rehabilitation after brain injury.  
 A further conclusion is that the available data from lesion studies seem to support the 
idea that voluntary ER comprises a set of neuropsychological processes highly dependent on 
frontal lobe functions (Davidson, Fox and Kalin, 2007; Ochsner and Gross, 2005, 2007; 
Ochsner et al., 2004; Quirk, 2007; Quirk and Beer, 2006; Zelazo and Cunningham, 2007). 
2.2. Neuropsychology of ER strategies 
 
93 
 
Even though this link has been suggested by several studies in relation to cognitive change 
(Goldin et al., 2008; Kalisch, 2009; Kim et al., 2011; McRae et al., 2011; Ochsner et al., 
2002) and suppression (Goldin et al., 2008; Gyurak et al., 2009; Kühn et al., 2011; Lee et al., 
2008; Levesque et al., 2003; Ohira et al., 2006; Phan et al., 2005), the data presented here 
offer additional support regarding other, less investigated, strategies, such as situation 
selection, situation modification and attentional deployment.  
In addition, evidence from brain injured patients suggests a number of other non-
frontal brain structures that are necessary to sustain key ER processes. This includes the 
temporal lobes [see section 2.1 on foresight, situation selection and amnesia] and the 
cerebellum [see section 6.1 on response modulation and motor control]. In sum, evidence 
from lesion studies suggests that ER strategies probably depend on a wide network of cortical 
and subcortical brain structures, where prefrontal regions, because of their relevance for the 
behaviour regulation, appear to have a critical role. Nevertheless, this is merely an initial, and 
preliminary, sketch of the neuropsychological processes that may underlie ER, focusing on 
the components that present the most robust current set of evidence. In the future, the 
contribution of other less studied neuropsychological components, and brain areas, will need 
to be considered. 
 An additional observation is that, although some psychological abilities (e.g. time 
travel) appear to be more closely related to one specific ER strategy (e.g. situation selection); 
others seem to be recruited by several [see Table 1]. For example, situation modification and 
cognitive change both rely on task setting; a process commonly impaired after left vlPFC 
lesions (Alexander et al., 2007; Shallice et al., 2008a; Stuss and Alexander, 2007). 
Nevertheless, although task setting appears to have a key role in both strategies, it may well 
be employed in slightly different ways. In situation modification it allows the generation of 
alternative actions, while in cognitive change it facilitates the shifting between alternative 
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interpretations. Another example of overlap in function is inhibition. This has a key role in 
response modulation, where emotional behaviour needs to be withheld (Gross and Levenson, 
1997). However, inhibition seems to also have a role in attention deployment, by limiting the 
extent to which an emotionally evocative aspect of an event is attended (McRae et al., 2009). 
The fact that ER strategies rely, at the same time, on specific and shared neuropsychological 
FRPSRQHQWV LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH LGHD RI D FRPPRQ µIXQFWLRQDO DUFKLWHFWXUH¶ IRU (5
sufficiently flexible to support multiple types of control strategy (Ochsner and Gross, 2005). 
 The complex landscape of these neuropsychological findings can be summarized by 
two principles: a) a single ER strategy may be compromised by damage to different brain 
areas, each lesion impacting the strategy with its particular neuropsychological signature. For 
example, situation selection can be altered by hippocampal damage (episodic future thought 
impairment) and also by vmPFC lesions (emotional learning impairment). In addition, b) 
damage to a specific brain area (e.g. left vlPFC lesions), with its associated signature deficit 
(cognitive control impairment), may compromise more than one ER strategy (e.g. situation 
modification and cognitive change). The consideration of these two principles, when 
exploring ER from a lesion study paradigm [c.f. Luria 1966], is a fundamental guide to 
progressively build a map of the neuropsychological components that underlie different ER 
strategies.  
 A further advantage of the lesion study approach is that it allows the investigation of 
components that have been suggested by psychological models, but that are difficult to 
capture when testing healthy controls, or even when assessing patients with psychiatric 
problems. For example, the study of subjects with concrete behaviour [see section 5] offers a 
unique opportunity to observe how reappraisal might rely on the capacity to disengage from, 
or inhibit, initial emotional appraisals. Even though this component has been suggested in the 
literature on cognitive change (McRae et al., 2011), the assessment of such capacity in a 
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healthy population has not been confirmed when reinterpreting negative events.  
The study of brain injured patients also offers valuable opportunities to enrich the 
psychological models on ER, by proposing new neuropsychological components. Inner 
speech is a case in point. This form of inner verbal thought has been long been associated 
with self-talk (Morin, 2009; Moss, 1972), self-regulation (Vygotsky, 1934/1987; Sokolov, 
1972; Tullet and Inzlicht, 2010) and executive control (Emerson and Miyake, 2003; Gruber 
and Goschke, 2004; Miyake et al., 2004). Lesions to the left inferior frontal gyrus appear to 
compromise the capacity to use inner speech (Geva et al., 2011). It is interesting that 
psychological models of reappraisal have not considered the relevance of inner speech, 
though they acknowledge a general role for verbal ability (McRae et al., 2011). Perhaps a 
reason why inner speech has been overlooked is that experimental designs tend to take this 
capacity for granted, and perhaps because in healthy controls such ability appears to be 
universally present.  
Other examples of neglected psychological components might be episodic future 
thought, envisioning emotional future events, motor control, interoception, etc. The benefits 
RILQYHVWLJDWLQJEUDLQLQMXUHGSRSXODWLRQLVWKHUHIRUHWKDWLQWKHVHµH[WUHPHFDVHV¶VXFKEDVLF
capacities are often compromised, opening an atypical window on behaviour. In future, it 
might be possible to derive further insight from this patient population, refining the 
operationalization of ER strategies and developing more challenging measures of how ER 
components might be tested in healthy controls. This could be especially relevant for the 
comprehension of ER strategies that have been poorly operationalized, as is the case of 
situation selection and situation modification.  
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Table 1. Summary of Emotion Regulation Strategies, neuropsychological components and related neural structures   
Emotion Regulation Strategy Neuropsychological Component Lesion 
Situation Selection Mental travel (episodic memory and episodic future thought) Medial temporal cortex
Emotional learning (envisioning emotional future events) Ventromedial Prefrontal cortex
Situation Modification Affective Shifting Ventromedial Prefrontal cortex
Cognitive Shifting (Task Setting) Left Ventrolateral Prefrontal cortex (BA 44, 45)
Cognitive Shifting (Monitoring) Right Ventrolateral Prefrontal cortex
Attentional Deployment                 Sustained Attention and Selective Attention Right Hemisphere (Prefrontal)
Cognitive Change Cognitive Shifting (Task Setting) Left Ventrolateral Prefrontal cortex(BA 44, 45)
Language (Cognitive Control) Left Inferior Prefrontal cortex (BA 6, 8, 44)
Language (Inner Speech) Left Inferior Prefrontal cortex (BA 44)
Response Modulation Motor Control of Facial Expressions (Voluntary ) Motor Strips and Corticobulbar Projections; Primary Motor Cortex 
and Ventrolateral Motor Cortex
Motor Control of Facial Expressions (Spontaneous) Extrapiramidal Motor System, Basal Ganglia;  Rostral cingulate 
motor cortex, caudate cingulate motor cortex 
Coordination of Facial Expressions with Affective-Cognitive Context Ponto-Cerebellar pathways 
Response Inhibition Right Ventrolateral Prefrontal cortex (BA 44, 45, 47)
Interoceptive Awareness and Emotional Awareness Insula
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This review has focused on the study of patients with focal brain lesions. 
Nevertheless, other populations, with more widespread or non-focal damage, for example 
degenerative disease or traumatic brain injury, might also be sources of valuable insight. An 
obvious limitation, of course, is that such patients have more diffuse lesions, thus limiting the 
inferences that can be drawn about particular brain areas. However, this limitation should not 
overshadow the many possibilities offered by such populations. Emotion dysregulation is a 
key feature of some neurological degenerative conditions (Goodkind et al., 2010; Henry et 
al., 2009; Stocchi and Brusa, 2000; Sturm et al., 2006) and traumatic brain injury (McDonald 
et al., 2010; Obonsawin et al., 2007; Rochat et al., 2009, Tate, 1999). Interestingly, such 
disorders present, as a population, with a reasonably consistent neuropsychological profile 
dominated by impairments to executive abilities (Fork et al., 2005; Huey, 2009; Millis et al., 
2001; Stopford et al., 2012), which are key for the many cognitive control processes required 
in ER (Ochsner and Gross, 2005, 2007; Ochsner et al., 2004; Quirk, 2007; Quirk and Beer, 
2006).  
 A limitation of this review is that it focuses exclusively on ER strategies from a 
process model point of view (Gross, 1998). Even though this model is perhaps the most 
comprehensive framework currently available, it does not consider all the psychological 
mechanisms that have been related to the regulation of negative affective states. For example, 
there is a growing set of evidence suggesting that the acceptance of emotional experience, 
defined as the openness to internal experience and willingness to remain in contact with those 
experiences (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda and Lillis, 2006), may be even more effective 
than classic ER strategies [such as suppression] in reducing negative affect (Campbell-Sills, 
Barlow, Brown and Hofman, 2006). In addition, acceptance-based therapies have been 
suggested as useful tools managing emotional difficulties in patients with acquired brain 
injury, whom often struggle cognitively re-constructing meaning, because of difficulty 
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manipulating thoughts (Coetzer, in press). Future studies might address this ability, exploring 
how it relates to different psychological components, and also how lesions to different brain 
areas may compromise it selectively.  
 A final issue of enormous importance is the applied aspect of these ideas. A better 
understanding of the way in which voluntarily ER breaks down after brain damage is also of 
great relevance for neuropsychological rehabilitation. In recent years the field has 
progressively moved towards an emphasis on socio-emotional functioning and social 
participation (Mateer et al., 2005; McGrath, 2004; Wilson, 1997; 2003; 2008; Wilson et al., 
2010). In this sense, the rehabilitation professionals are well aware of changes in the capacity 
to manage feelings exhibited by their patients. However, they typically lack rigorous 
understanding of the ways in which these can be classified within an emotional regulation 
framework, the ways in which these map into lesion sites and the ways in which such an 
understanding might shape neuro-rehabilitation assessment and intervention. Thus, an 
understanding of the neuropsychology of ER can be of direct clinical importance. 
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2.3. Stuck in a moment: Concreteness and 
Psychotherapy after Acquired Brain Injury4. 
 
 
 
2.3.1. Abstract 
This paper surveys the issue of concrete thinking after brain injury ±a phenomenon which is 
widely recognized clinically, but under-investigated in formal research settings.  Through the 
lens of the classical work of Kurt Goldstein the paper outlines the diverse clinical 
manifestations of concreteness, and the barriers which this might present to the 
psychotherapeutic process. However, the paper also outlines the way in which preserved 
psychological functions in highly concrete patients, especially the capacity to focus on 
immediate reality, and experience emotions in present time, can be used as a lever for 
psychotherapeutic interventions. The paper concludes with a range of practical suggestions 
which may aid the psychotherapist in reaching out to this challenging patient group.   
 
 
 
  
                                                 
4 Salas, C.E., Vaughan, F.L., Shanker, S., & Turnbull, O.H. (2013). Stuck in a moment: concreteness and 
psychotherapy after acquired brain injury. Neuro-Disability & Psychotherapy, 1(1): 1-38. 
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³&ORVHUH[DPLQDWLRQVKRZVWKDWLQRUGHUWRUHDGMXVWLWVHOIWRWKHZRUOG
the injured organism has withdrawn from more or less numerous points 
of contact with it and has thus attained a re-adaptation to a shrunken 
HQYLURQPHQW´ 
Kurt Goldstein, The modification of behaviour consequent 
to cerebral lesions. 
 
2.3.2. Introduction 
Concreteness, sometimes used synonymously with the term impaired abstraction, is a 
common phenomenon after brain injury. It is quite usual to hear, among rehabilitation 
SURIHVVLRQDOVSKUDVHV VXFKDV³WKLV LQWHUYHQWLRQ LVXQOLNHO\ WRZRUNEHFDXVH WKLVSDWLHQW LV
WRRFRQFUHWH´RU³KHFDQQRWFRPSOHWHO\XQGHUVWDQGZKDWKHLVJRLQJWKURXJKEHFDXVHRIKLV
FRQFUHWHQHVV´ ,I ZH OLVWHQ WR WKH ZD\ SURIHVVLRQDOV XVH WKLV Werm, when speaking about 
patients, one might suggest that: a) therapists are able to perceive something characteristic in 
the mode these patients function (an observable fact), which they later label as concreteness; 
b) this mode of functioning is experienced as a challenge to the use of therapeutic tools, and 
the achievement of rehabilitation goals, including eventual generalisation and habituation of 
therapeutic gains. However, when professionals are explicitly asked about how they 
understand concreteness, and how they address it technically, their responses are usually 
imprecise, with a vague use of terminology, and with a rather poor grasp to how concreteness 
maps into specific impaired functions, or particular sites of brain lesions. The purpose of this 
article is to address this conceptual gap, by offering a theoretical account of concreteness, and 
drawing preliminary guidelines on how psychotherapeutic tools could be adapted, to facilitate 
emotional adjustment in this population. 
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2.3.3. What is Concreteness  
Concreteness, or the difficulty to orient our actions by a conceptual point of view (Goldstein, 
1942; Goldstein & Scherer, 1941), is not a popular concept today in neuropsychology. This is 
evident if we consider the remarkably modest amount of research that has been published in 
the last few decades addressing concreteness after brain injury [see Fig. 1]. The principal 
reason may well be that, compared to other neuropsychological processes broadly related to 
frontal lobe function, such as working memory, planning, or set-shifting, concreteness seems 
vague and lacking neuroanatomical specificity.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Number of publications on concreteness and brain injury. An all -time literature search in PubMed was 
performed using the following keywords: concreteness, concrete attitude, concrete thinking and brain injury. 
From a total of 1481 relevant articles, only 12 were related to brain injury. 
  
1391  
12   78  
Healthy  Population
Brain  Injury
Psychiatric  Disorders
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Based on clinical observations, different authors have suggested that concreteness is 
not an homogeneous deficit (Goldstein & Scherer, 1941, Prigatano, 1989) and that it is 
frequently associated with diffuse lesions (Judd, 1999), or with widespread damage to the 
frontal lobes (Judd, 1999; Klonoff, 2010; Ogden, 1996), particularly on the left (Goldstein, 
1942). Given that concreteness [or impaired abstraction] has long been associated with 
diffuse lesions to the frontal lobes (Yang, Fuller, Khodaparast & Krawczyk, 2010), and with 
a growing interest of actual neuropsychology in fractionating frontal lobe functions (Miyake 
et al., 2000; Stuss, 2011; Stuss & Alexander, 2000; 2007), is no surprise that concreteness has 
potentially become a rather archaic concept. Interestingly, a different historical trajectory has 
occurred in the more applied field of neuropsychological rehabilitation, where concreteness 
as a concept which can inform practice, has survived among clinicians that work with people 
who experience a brain injury. This paper will focus, and develop, the clinical value of 
concreteness.  
Authors in neuropsychological rehabilitation have used the concept of concreteness in 
different forms. For example Cicerone and Giacino (1992) refer to the phenomenon as a 
failure appreciating the abstract or symbolic qualities of ideas, comments or things. Ponsford, 
Sloan and Snow (1995) have suggested that concrete patients struggle to generalize from one 
event, or in distilling the essence of a situation, which impairs their capacity to learn from 
experience. Another frequent reported feature of concreteness is a difficulty thinking beyond 
SUHVHQW WKRXJKWV RU VHHLQJ EH\RQG RQH¶V RZQ SHUVSHFWLYH -XGG  ZKLFK PD\ HYHQ
translate into difficulties with empathy (Eslinger, 1998), or self-centeredness (Judd, 1999; 
Obonsawin, Jefferis & Lowe, 2007).  
It is interesting to note that most of the above mentioned definitions are in close 
DOLJQPHQWZLWKWKHHDUO\ZRUNRI.XUW*ROGVWHLQZKRFRLQHGWKHWHUP³FRQFUHWHDWWLWXGH´+H
GHVFULEHG LW DV D ³realistic attitude, where behaviour is confined to the immediate [not 
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reflective] appUHKHQVLRQRIDJLYHQWKLQJRUVLWXDWLRQ´*ROGVWHLQE; Goldstein & 
Scherer, 1941).When addressing concreteness, most authors refer more or less directly to this 
IHDWXUH D EDVLF GLIILFXOW\ LQ WKH RUJDQLVP¶V DELOLW\ WR detach itself from the immediate 
environment, in order to generate a flexible response. Clinically speaking this is usually 
portrayed as a difficulty using abstract thought or discursive reasoning to guide behaviour. As 
a consequence, behaviour may become perseverative or extremely susceptible to the varying 
stimuli in the environment (Goldstein & Scherer, 1941, p. 3).  
However, an important trend in recent accounts is the tendency to reduce concreteness 
to a cognitive impairment, equivalent to other neuropsychological deficits caused by brain 
injury (e.g. aphasia, impulsivity, inattention). This interpretation may be misleading, and 
FHUWDLQO\GRHVQRWUHIOHFW*ROGVWHLQ¶VRULJLQDOLGHD+HH[SOLFLWO\VSHFLILHGWKDWFRQFreteness 
was not equivalent to a cognitive deficit, but rather reflected an attitude of the total 
personality:  
 
³7KHDEVWUDFWDQGWKHFRQFUHWHDWWLWXGHVDUHQRWDFTXLUHGPHQWDOVHWVRUKDELWVRI
an individual, or special isolable aptitudes, such as memory, attention, etc. They 
are rather capacity levels of the total personality. Each furnishes the basis for all 
performances pertaining to a specific plane of activity. In other words, each 
attitude constitutes one definite behavioural range which involves a number of 
performances and responses. These latter, when taken individually at their surface 
value, may appear to be discrete entities of quite a diversified nature (e.g. 
DWWHQWLRQ UHFDOO UHWHQWLRQ UHFRJQLWLRQ V\QWKHVL]LQJ V\PEROL]DWLRQ HWF´
(Goldstein & Scherer, 1941, p.1) 
 
:KDWVHHPVWREHHVVHQWLDOLQ*ROGVWHLQ¶VGHILQLWLRQDQGDEVHQWLQUHFHQWDFFRXQWVLV
that concreteness refers to a radical change in the way that the whole personality, or the Self, 
constructs internal and external experience. When elaborating this point, Goldstein explains 
that, by attitude, he implies a form of readiness for response. In assuming an abstract or 
2.3. Concreteness and Psychotherapy 
 
106 
 
concrete attitude, he claims, the individual as a whole gears himself toward a specific 
direction of activity, a mode of functioning (Goldstein & Scherer, 1941, p. 2). This emphasis 
on the Self, which we believe is crucial for holistic rehabilitation, is difficult to grasp when 
concreteness is considered as a cognitive impairment. The intention of this article is to move 
away from such neuropsychological reductionism, adopting a self-psychology perspective to 
brain injury (Klonoff, Lage & Chiapello, 1993; Prigatano, 1999; Salas & Turnbull, 2010; 
Salas, 2012).  
In this regard it is interesting to note the similarities beWZHHQ*ROGVWHLQ¶VSURSRVLWLRQ
and more recent theoretical accounts of how behaviour may change after frontal lobe damage 
(see Table 1). Mesulam (1986; 2002), for instance, has suggested that large frontal lesions 
may allow the resurgence of a default mode, a realm of neural function where inflexible 
VWLPXOXV UHVSRQVH OLQNDJHV WKH µUHDOLVWLF DWWLWXGH¶ RI *ROGVWHLQ UHPDLQ LPSHUYLRXV WR
modification by context or experience (p. 14- +HUH WKH VKDUHG QRWLRQ RI ³Pode of 
IXQFWLRQLQJ´LVQRWDEOH, because it stUHVVHVWKHLGHDWKDWDOOWKHRUJDQLVP¶VDELOLWLHVDUHDOLJQHG
under one single pattern of functioning (a mode in Mesulam and an attitude in Goldstein).  
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Concrete Attitude  
(Goldstein & Scherer, 1941) 
Default Mode   
(Mesulam, 2002) 
 
Realistic Attitude (unreflective and confined 
to the immediate apprehension of an object, 
idea or situation) 
 
Horizon of consciousness confined to here 
and now and set reflexively in a stimulus-
bound  mode  
 
Thinking and acting are directed by the 
immediate claims made by one particular 
aspect of the object, or the outer world 
situation. 
 
Automatic reactions to salient events and 
immediate gratifications are guided by 
prevailing motivational states 
 
Rigidity and lack of shifting (but also 
abnormal fluidity) 
 
 
Presence of repetitive responses although 
they may not fit with environmental demands 
Impairment in the manipulation and 
operation over ideas and thoughts 
Options for alternative interpretations are not 
encouraged 
 
Cannot assume an attitude towards WKH³PHUH
SRVVLEOH´ DQG WR WKLQN RU SHUIRUP
symbolically 
 
Appearance cannot be differentiated from 
significance 
 
Table 1: &RPSDULVRQEHWZHHQ*ROGVWHLQ¶V&RQFUHWH$WWLWXGHDQG0HVXODP¶V'HIDXOW0RGH 
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A final theoretical comment needs to be made regarding concreteness as a 
neuropsychological deficit. There is no doubt that frontal lesions may impair many cognitive 
capacities that allow an abstract stance (e.g. set shifting, working memory, monitoring, etc.), 
however, this loss of abstract abilities should not be considered as an equivalent of 
concreteness itself. In other words, concreteness cannot be reduced to the absence of an 
DEVWUDFW DWWLWXGH WR VRPH NLQG RI DEVWUDFWLRQ ³EOLQGQHVV´ )ROORZLQJ0HVXODP¶V LGHD RI D
default mode, concreteness may be better explained as a re-surgence of a primary mode of 
functioning, which has been progressively obscured by the development of abstract capacities 
throughout ontogeny, and which is preserved in patients despite extensive frontal lobe 
damage. This view of concreteness, as preservation, not as a deficit, has been described 
previously by Sacks (1986) and has radical consequences to how we approach concrete 
patients, and recognize them as experiencing beings: 
 
³0XFK HDVLHU WR FRPSUHKHQG DQG DOWRJHWKHU PRUH QDWXUDO LV WKH LGHD RI WKH
preservation of the concrete in brain damage ±not regression to it, but preservation 
of it, so that the essential personality and identity and humanity, the being of the 
hurt FUHDWXUHLVSUHVHUYHG´6DFNVS 
 
We have briefly revised the concept of concreteness, hoping that by clarifying it 
theoretically, its practical relevance in rehabilitation and psychotherapy would become 
evident. By moving away from a definition that reduces concreteness to a specific cognitive 
deficit, we have adopted a broader view, highlighting how brain damage modifies the 
RUJDQLVP¶Vrelationship with its outer and inner worlds. This distinction is indispensable to 
understand, for example, how functioning in a concrete mode might transform, but not 
abolish, subjective experience after the injury (see Prigatano, 1991).  
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2.3.4. Why concreteness is relevant to Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 
We believe that the concept of concreteness has survived among rehabilitation professionals 
because of its clinical value. Concreteness is useful because, as a concept, it fits well with 
three main principles that guide rehabilitation practice. Firstly, concreteness underlines how 
brain injury modifies the experiencing Self, a proposition that is in accordance with the first 
SULQFLSOH RI UHKDELOLWDWLRQ WKH FOLQLFLDQ PXVW EHJLQ ZLWK WKH SDWLHQW¶V VXEMHFWLYH RU
phenomenological experience, in order to reduce frustration and confusion as means to 
engage him in thH UHKDELOLWDWLRQ SURFHVV´ 3ULJDWDQR  S  *ROGVWHLQ¶V PRGHO RI
concreteness offers a detailed description on how phenomenological experience may change 
after brain injury, allowing a deeper understanding of these transformations and, in 
consequence, helping clinicians to grasp the disorganized mind and to attune to the wounded 
soul. 
Secondly, we know that neuropsychological rehabilitation has progressively evolved 
from an interest on cognitive deficits, and retraining, to an increased emphasis on socio-
HPRWLRQDO IXQFWLRQLQJ DQGSDUWLFLSDWLRQ 0DWHHU 6LUD	2¶&RQQHOO 0F*UDWK 
Wilson, 1997; 2003; 2008; Wilson, Gracey, Evans & Bateman, 2010). This movement is, for 
example, illustrated by the growing literature on identity change (Carroll & Coetzer, 2011; 
Cloute, Mitchell & Yates, 2008; Gracey et al., 2008; Yeates, Gracey & McGrath, 2008; 
Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000; Segal, 2010) and interpersonal relationships (Bowen, Yeates & 
Palmer, 2010; Bowen et al., 2009; Feigelson, 1993) after brain injury. Concreteness, as we 
have defined it, taps directly into these issues. It usually implies some kind of shrinkage of 
the temporal and representational domains of the Self, which radically transforms the way in 
which the Self relates to itself [Self as an object] and to others [Self-Other]. A deeper 
understanding of concreteness may, therefore, guide the assessment and design of 
rehabilitation interventions addressing these emotional and interpersonal issues. 
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Thirdly, concreteness, often associated with frontal lobe damage, compromises 
elaborated thinking and the use of organising schemas. As a consequence, patients may 
experience difficulties creating new and adequately organised mental models of the self after 
the injury (Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000; Prigatano, 1989; Ylvisaker, Mcpherson, Kayes & 
Pellet, 2008), compromising a central goal for rehabilitation (Biderman, Daniels-Zide, Reyes 
& Marks, 2006; Klinger, 2005; Nochi, 1998). 
 
2.3.5. Why concreteness is relevant to psychotherapeutic approaches to 
brain injury 
The influence of holistic paradigms in neuropsychological rehabilitation has generated 
renewed interest on the use of psychotherapeutic tools to address emotional (Coetzer, 2004; 
2007; Dewar & Gracey, 2006; Freed, 2002; Gracey, Olsham & Kritzinger, 2007; Klonoff, 
2010; 2011; Lewis, 1999; Prigatano, 1986; Psaila & Gracey, 2009; Salas, 2008) and 
interpersonal (Bowen, 2007; Bowen, Yeates & Palmer, 2010; Salas, 2012; Yeates et al., 
2008) difficulties after brain injury. Interestingly, lack of insight and inflexible thinking, two 
features usually associated to concreteness, have been reported by therapists as common 
challenges in their work with people who acquired a brain injury (Judd & Wilson, 2005). 
Unfortunately very few authors have addressed how concreteness may impact the use of 
psychotherapeutic tools, and the necessary technical modifications that working with these 
patients entail (Judd, 1999; Klonoff, 2010; Miller, 1993; Prigatano, 1986, 1994; Salas, 2008b; 
Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000).  
Concreteness is relevant to psychotherapy for several reasons. First, and most 
obvious, because it implies a change in how the subject relates to his internal world, thus 
altering the same territory in which psychotherapy takes place. Second, the realistic attitude 
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may impact different dimensions of the therapeutic process5, setting theoretical and technical 
challenges that therapists must deal with. For example, concreteness might compromise 
SDWLHQWV¶FDSDFLW\WRVSRQWDQHRXVO\UHSRUWSUREOHPVRUFRQIOLFWVWRWKHWKHUDSLst (Therapeutic 
operations), reflect about themselves during personal (Self-relatedness) and interpersonal 
interactions (Therapeutic bond) or link emotions with external events or situations (In-session 
impacts).  
 
2.3.6. Challenges to psychotherapeutic work with concrete patients 
The concrete or realistic attitude, described by Goldstein, can be considered as contraction in 
temporal (presentness) and representational (meaning generation) dimensions of the Self (see 
figure 2). In this section we will describe how these transformations may challenge the use of 
classic psychotherapeutic tools, requiring theoretical and technical adaptations. 
 
2.3.6.1. Concrete attitude as Presentness 
According to Goldstein, the concrete or realistic attitude implies that we are confined to the 
immediate apprehension of a given object or situation, in its particular uniqueness. Thinking 
and acting are thus directed by the immediate claims which one particular aspect of the object 
or of the outer world situation makes (1941, pp. 2-3; 1942, pp. 89-90). At a behavioural level, 
this feature of concreteness can be observed as a difficulty of voluntarily shifting from the 
experience of a present stimulus, or also as a passive drifting from one stimulus to another 
(exaggerated attentiveness). In both cases the object, or situation, acquires an abnormal 
preponderance, and the individual is thus forced by the stimulus (Goldstein, 1936a; 1936b). 
In practice, patienWVPD\FRPHDFURVVDV³LQIOH[LEOH´RU³ULJLG´ 
 
                                                 
5 see Coetzer, 2007, for a description of different dimensions in a generic model of psychotherapy for traumatic 
brain injury 
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Figure 2 
 
Figure 2: Changes generated by concreteness in temporal and reflective dimensions of the Self. The figure 
represents how concreteness contracts the Self (dotted circle line) along these two dimensions. Temporal 
FKDQJHV PRGLI\ WKH 6HOI¶V FDSDFLW\ WR PRYH IRUZDUGV DQG EDFNZDUGV LQ WLPH WLPH WUDYHO ZKLOH Reflective 
FKDQJHV PRGLI\ WKH VHOI¶V FDSDFLW\ WR GHWDFK IURP LPPHGLDWH H[SHULHQFH D EDVLF UHTXLUHPHQW IRU Velf-
observation and self/other-observation. Visceral experience (Bodily Self), or core experience, is largely 
preserved despite representational deficits (Extended Self) 
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The degree to which an individual can be forced by the stimulus may vary. At the 
most extreme end of the continuum, patients may exhibit utilization behaviours (Lhermitte, 
1983; 1986; Lhermitte, Pillon & Serdaru, 1986), where the visuo-tactile presentation of an 
object elicits its use or grasping, even though no instructions are given to do so (Shallice et 
al., 1989). Such patients open doors that are in front of them, get dressed after seeing a shirt 
in the closet, or lie down if their attention is taken by the bed. In milder cases, individuals 
may preserve the capacity to inhibit motoric outputs in relation to objects, but their cognition 
FDQ EH ³FDSWXUHG´ E\ LPPHGLDWH REMHFWVLWXDWLRQ FODLPV DV LQ GLIILFXOWLHV sustaining a 
cognitive set, or shifting to another (Shallice, Stuss, Picton, Alexander & Gillingham, 2008a; 
E)RU H[DPSOHZKHQ LQVWUXFWHG WR VD\ZRUGV WKDWEHJLQZLWK WKH OHWWHU ³V´ZLWK WKH
H[FHSWLRQ RI QDPHV D FRQFUHWH SDWLHQW PD\ VD\ ³WKH RQO\ WKLQJV , FDQ WKLQN RI QRZ DUH
QDPHV´ 
Even though Goldstein primarily described concreteness in behavioural terms, he also 
acknowledged its relevance for subjective experience (see chapter on values in his Lanutti 
case; Hanfmann, Rickers-Ovsiankina & Goldstein, 1944). Thus, if a person is constantly 
forced by stimuli, his/hers capacity to detach from immediate experience is compromised, 
EHFRPLQJVRPHKRZVWXFNLQWKHH[SHULHQFLQJPRPHQW:HZRXOGOLNHWRH[SDQG*ROGVWHLQ¶V
conceptualization by suggesting that concreteness can change the temporal dimension of the 
Self; usually understood as a capacity to move backwards into past experiences (hindsight), 
or forward into possible future scenarios (foresight), an ability typically described in the 
OLWHUDWXUHDVµWLPHWUDYHOLQJµ6XGGHQGRUI	&RUEDOOLV997; 2007).  
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2.3.6.2. Presentness and Therapeutic Operations 
$FFRUGLQJWR2UOLVQN\¶VPRGHORIJHQHULFSV\FKRWKHUDS\VHH7DEOHRQHGLPHQVLRQ
of the psychotherapeutic process relates to the so called therapeutic operations, where 
patients present information or complaints to the therapist, usually related to problematic 
feelings, symptoms or life situations. This is the first step of any psychotherapeutic exchange 
cycle, where patients bring into the session difficulties that they have experienced outside the 
consulting room.  
 
 
 
Psychotherapy 
Dimensions Definition 
Therapeutic contract Mutual understanding between therapist and patient regarding goals 
of the collaboration, methods to be used, modality (e.g. individual, 
couple therapy, etc.) and norms governing participants' behaviour in 
their role as therapist or patient. 
Therapeutic 
operations  
Technical or instrumental aspect of the process. Four cyclic steps can 
be described: a) Presentation of complaints and information about 
problematic feelings, symptoms or life situations; b) Construction by 
the therapist of an "expert" understanding of the real problem 
underlying patient's complaints; c) Offering a therapeutic intervention 
by the therapist; d) The intervention evokes co-operation dynamics 
(collaboration or resistance) that offers further information for a new 
cycle to start. 
Therapeutic bond Interpersonal aspect of the therapy process. It encompasses task-
teamwork and empathic resonance. 
Self-relatedness Intrapersonal aspect of the process, defined as the way in which a 
person perceives and responds to him while interacting with those 
around him. 
In-Session Impacts It refers to positive (insight, emotional relief and sense of hope) and 
negative (confusion, anxiety and discouragement) results attained 
during sessions  
Temporal patterns Different configurations that the five previously mentioned 
dimensions acquire as the therapy process change over time as micro-
events within therapy sessions and macro-events over the course of 
treatment 
 
Table 2: Different dimensions of a psychotherapeutic process according to the Model of Generic Psychotherapy 
(Orlinsky, 2009) 
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&RQFUHWH SDWLHQWV PD\ VWUXJJOH SUHVHQWLQJ ³PDWHULDO´ WR WKH WKHUDSLVW EHFDXVH WKH
emotional noise of a conflictive event may rapidly fade once new HYHQWVIRUFHWKHRUJDQLVP¶V
attention in another direction. As a result, patients may appear indifferent (or even happy!), 
with no visible trace of any distress that might become material to initiate a therapeutic cycle. 
,QPDQ\FDVHV WKLVXQWURXEOHGVWDQFHPD\GLIIHU IURP WKH WKHUDSLVW¶V LQWHUQDOH[SHULHQFHRI
something conflictive that is leIW RXWVLGH RU WKH UHODWLYH¶V GLVWUHVVZKHQ GHVFULELQJ IDPLO\
issues. The therapist might be tempted then to point out events or situations that deserve to be 
attended to by the patient, usually with no success. At best, the patient may rationally 
acknowledge the existence of such events or problems, but without emotional congruence or 
signs of conflict. In more severe cases, the patient may experience the situation interpreted by 
the therapist as something completely alien. Consider the case of Mrs I, a patient seen by one 
of the authors (FV).  
 
Mrs I is a 54 year old woman who sustained a severe traumatic brain injury in a 
road traffic accident. She also has a large right frontal infarction, caused by 
carotid dissection during the same accident. She has a dense left hemiplegia and a 
wide range of cognitive (mainly executive), emotional and behavioral 
impairments. In most sessions, Mrs. I experiences low mood, and expresses a 
great deal of anger and frustration about her circumstances and the difficulties she 
experiences. These usually relate to the control of her finances, the ongoing 
adaptation of her home and arrangements for her care and support. She has a 
strong tendency to blame others for difficulties that arise and she has little insight 
into her impairments and their consequences. In a few other sessions, Mrs. I 
appears to be entirely content and happy. During these sessions and at moment of 
positive affect, it is impossible to engage her in a discussion about her brain 
injury, or any of the difficulties she commonly complains about. On these 
occasions, Mrs. I no longer feels that she has a brain injury. She reports that she is 
content because she will soon be able to move into her new home. Mrs. I is 
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convinced that the move into the new accommodation will be problem-free and 
that life in the new house will be perfect. 
 
The case of Mrs. I illustrates how concreteness can compromise the capacity to use 
events from the past as psychotherapeutic material in the present. In her situation, past 
negative events (e.g. difficulties in the house conversion or managing finances), that usually 
are a source of distress, and appear to not exist when she is captured [in the present] by 
circumstances that elicit positive emotions. In other words, during these moments of positive 
emotion it seems as if she exists entirely within her contentment and could not relate to any 
other emotional experience. She attributes her previous frustration and anger to a relatively 
minor factors HJWKHEXLOGHUVZHUHQ¶WPDNLQJJRRGSURJUHVVDQGKHUFXUUHQWKDSSLQHVVWR
its reversal. When asked about some of the important factors that usually underpin her sense 
of catastrophe, she dismisses them as no longer important because the house will be finished 
soon. She refuses to accept that the difficulties that accompany any move into recently built 
accommodation will occur, and will inevitably be disappointed and enraged when they do.  
,WLVLQWHUHVWLQJWRQRWHWKDW0UV,¶VGLIILFXOWLHVGRQRWH[FOXVLYHO\LQYROYHUHWXUQLQJWRD
past scenario to generate conflict, but also to consider possible future events as potential 
sources of distress. This observation is in agreement with the idea that psychotherapy does 
not exclusively work through the elaboration of material from past events, but also deals with 
WKH HPRWLRQDO LPSDFW RI ³SRVVLEOH´ VFHQDULRV >WKLV LV VWULNLQJ LQ WKH WUHDWPent of anxiety 
GLVRUGHUV IRU H[DPSOH@ 7KLV HYDOXDWLRQ RI ³IXWXUH FRQVHTXHQFHV´ UHOLHV RQ WKH 6HOI¶V
capacity to project into the future, detaching from present moment and its current emotional 
valence. Concrete patients, being forced by present stimulus or situations, can show 
difficulties in the use of future scenarios to activate a manifest conflict.  
A similar observation has been made by Freed (2002) when describing that patients 
with traumatic brain injuries have difficulties using bodily signals of negative value (signal 
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anxiety in psychoanalytic language) to anticipate, and prepare, for negative future events. 
Evidence from the study of frontal lobe and the envisioning of emotional events in the future 
'¶$UJHPEDX ;XH /X 9DQ GHU /LQGHQ 	 %HFKDUD 2008), and data from prospective 
memory deficits after traumatic brain injury (Shum, Fleming & Neulinger, 2002; Shum, 
Valentine & Cutmore, 1999; Potvin, Rouleau, Audy, Charbonneau & Giguere, 2011) and 
frontal lobe lesions (Umeda, Kurosaki, Terasawa, Kato & Miyahara, 2011; Volle, Gonen-
Yaacovi, de Lacy Costello, Gilbert & Burguess, 2011), appears to offer additional support to 
this hypothesis.  
 
2.3.6.3.Concreteness, representational meaning and abstraction 
Changes in the reflexive dimension of the Self are of great relevance for emotional 
adjustment and potential to utilize and gain from psychotherapy. This dimension refers to a 
FDSDFLW\ WRGHWDFK IURPGLUHFWH[SHULHQFHE\YHUEDOO\ UHIOHFWLQJXSRQRXURZQRURWKHU¶V
behaviour. We specifically relate this dimension to the generation of representational 
meaning, because it involves the manipulation of ideas and thoughts about experience. Here 
is interesting to note that Goldstein himself emphasized that the process of disintegration 
towards the concrete does not reduce the arousal of ideas and thoughts as such, but affects, 
and modifies the way of manipulating and operating with ideas and thoughts (Goldstein & 
Scherer, 1941). This distinction is extremely important because highlights that concreteness 
does not compromise primary or core experience, but instead the way we built reflective 
meaning upon these elements. Consider the case of Mr A to illustrate these matters:  
 
 ³0U$LVD\RXQJPDQLQKLVWKLUWLHVWKDWVXIIHUHGDVHYHUHWUDXPDWLFEUDLQLQMXU\
in a car accident. After two years of successful rehabilitation he was finally 
working in his former position, as executive of an important bank. Even though he 
still experienced some cognitive difficulties related to effort tolerance and 
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multitasking, he was able to perform his job without major problems. One day Mr 
$¶VZLIHFDOOHGKLVSV\FKRWKHUDSLVW&6LQDVWDWHRIFULVLV6KHWROGKLPWKDWIRU
several days, Mr A was acting strangely. He was restless, and complained of 
headaches. He also kept saying that he GLGQRWZDQW WRJR WR WKHRIILFH0U$¶V
wife found this quite unusual, because headaches were frequent, and Mr A never 
stopped working because of this complaint. She commented to the therapist that 
she tried to talk to him, to find out if there was something bothering him, in order 
to understand his avoidance to work, but without success. However, she 
mentioned to the therapist that perhaps Mr A was behaving this way because of 
the arrival of someone new to the office, which has been placed in a very similar 
position than Mr A. This made sense to the therapist, and he remembered that Mr 
A had talked about this new staff member weeks previously. However, Mr A did 
not looked explicitly conflicted by this event at that moment. Indeed, he made 
jokes and appeared to look patronizingly towards the new employee. During the 
QH[WVHVVLRQWKHWKHUDSLVWWULHGWRH[SORUH0U$¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKLVFULVLVDQG
his need to avoid work. Mr A was not able to link the events with any external 
circumstance or emotional state. He simply stated that he felt ill, and that this did 
not mean anything beyond that. It took several sessions to progressively link these 
bodily feelings to the changes that have taken place at work.  It took even longer 
to begin exploring more complex emotions associated to the threatening presence 
of the new staff member. Mr A realized the new employee was smart, and perhaps 
more skilful than him after the accident. He expressed irritation to how this new 
arrival was trying to win over his boss. He also referred feelings of anger at his 
accident and himself for making things hard at work, thus limiting his chances for 
DSURPRWLRQ´ 
 
0U $¶V FDVH LV LQWHUHVWLQJ IRU VHYHUDO UHDVRQV ,W LOOXVWUDWHV D FRPPRQ GLIILFXOW\ RI
FRQFUHWH SDWLHQWV WR ³PDNH VHQVH´ RXW of conflicting situations, by reflecting upon their 
experience as a coping mechanism (e.g. I feel threatened by this new employee who is 
smarter than me). It has been described that, in such situations, concrete patients tend to avoid 
the source of conflict (Krpan, Levine, Stuss & Dawson, 2007; Krpan, Stuss & Anderson, 
2011), as a way of down-regulating the emotional disorganization it produces (Riley, 
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Brennan & Powell, 2004). The case of Mr A is also an example on how concrete patients 
preserve a capacity to guide behaviour based on somatic sensations (e.g. headaches, 
restlessness), which mobilize the organism in a rather basic approach or withdrawal fashion.  
Difficulty reflecting on experience appears to be closely related to abstraction deficits6. 
Several studies have reported that patients with brain injury, and especially those involving 
the frontal lobes, such as traumatic brain injury, may present with impairments in the ability 
to structure and synthetize abstract concepts (Elmore & Gorham, 1957; Hagen, 1984; Yang, 
Fuller, Khodaparast & Krawczyk, 2010) as in proverbs, irony and metaphor (Groher, 1983; 
Hagen, 1984; Levin, Benton & Grossman, 1982; Towne & Entwisle, 1993). This type of 
LPSDLUPHQW ZRXOG FRPSURPLVH WKH SDWLHQW¶V FDSDFLW\ WR ORRN EH\RQG WKe most salient 
elements of experience, in order to generate a more broad understanding of situations that 
encompass multiple perspectives (see Table 3).   
Abstraction capacities appear to have a central role in a psychotherapeutic process. It 
has been proposed that abstraction is a key component in the generation of new mental 
structures during psychotherapy (Schneider, 1983, in Mergenthaler, 1996). In addition, the 
temporal coincidence of abstraction and emotion has been suggested to be related to 
therapeutic change (Mergenthaler, 1996).  
A paradigmatic impairment of abstraction in TBI patients is the difficulty to 
comprehend metaphor or, in simple words, that the map is not always the territory (which is a 
metaphor on itself that we are using to synthetize an idea). By using metaphors we compact 
meaning (Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000) and transfer information regarding internal states more 
effectively to others (e.g. I felt like hiding my head in the sand). As the reader can imagine, 
metaphor has an important role in psychotherapy and hence, metaphoric comprehension 
                                                 
6 Deficits in the use of abstraction capacities to generate representational meaning can also be caused by 
excessive amounts of arousal or negative emotion, which dampens higher order cognition. This has been 
described, for example, by Fonagy et al., (2004) in relation to how anxiety compromises the capacity to think 
DERXWRXURZQDQGRWKHUSHRSOH¶VPHQWDOVWDWHV 
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deficits can obstruct the use of metaphor to: a) access to personal memories and feelings 
)UDQN	)UDQNEIDFLOLWDWHWKHHQWU\IRUWKHWKHUDSHXWLFG\DGLQWRWKHSDWLHQW¶VLQQHU
world (Angus, Levitt & Hardtke, 1999); c) construct narratives that generate meaning 
(Sarbin, 1986; Schafer, 1992).  
 
 
 
Stimuli Concrete patient (left prefrontal stroke) Healthy Subject 
Fork /Spoon  
<RX«JHVWXUHV EULQJLQJ
something into the mouth) put it in 
your mouth  
Cutlery 
Socks/Shoes )RU\RXUIHHW«ZDUPWK Clothing 
Yellow/Green Colours Colours 
Dog/Lion Bark? Animals 
Coat/Suit 
+HUH«KHUH SXWV WKH VXLW SXWV KHU
KDQGV RQ KHU FKHVW«ZDUPWK
(keeps doing the gesture on her 
FKHVWWRIDVWHQ«ZRRO 
Clothing 
Orange/Banana Fruit. Fruits 
Eye/Ear 2Q\RXUIDFH«RQHLVIRUVLJKWDQGthe other one for hearing 
Senses  
Boat/Car Transport Transport 
Table/Chair )RU«JRRGIRUHDWLQJ Furniture 
Work/Play  They are ERWK JRRG IRU \RX«\RXwork and you play. 
Activities people do 
Steam/Fog 
Same really. Steam is by man and 
IRJ LV KHUH SRLQWV WR WKH VN\«
rain. 6WHDP«\RX SUHVV D EXWWRQ
and comes out.  
Made of water, misty. 
Egg/Seed 7KH\ DUH ERWK WKH VDPH UHDOO\«more generation 
Beginning of life 
Democracy/Monarchy One has a king and the other one does not 
Ways of ruling 
Poem/Statue Statue you see it and the poem is for you to say 
Forms of art 
 
Table 3: Comparison of a concrete patient and a matched healthy control on the Similarities 
task (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III). 
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2.3.6.4.Concreteness, Insight and emotional awareness 
Another aspect of the psychotherapeutic process that can be challenged by concreteness is the 
capacity to generate insight (Judd, 1999). Insight refers to an awareness and understanding of 
RQH¶V RZQ EHKDYLRXUDO SDWWHUQV DQG PRWLYDWLRQV /XERUVN\ &ULVW-Cristoph, Mintz, & 
$XHUEDFKDQGKDVEHHQFRQVLGHUHGDVDW\SHRI³WKHUDSHXWLFUHDOL]DWLRQ´WKDWRFFXUV
during sessions and leads to change (Orlinsky, 2009). Insight is a necessary capacity in the 
emotional adjustment of patients with traumatic brain injury (Coetzer, 2007), especially when 
addressing questions about normality or the meaning of life after brain damage (Prigatano, 
1986; 1991; 1999). The case of Mr A can illustrate this point in terms of the difficulties he 
experienced in understanding how his somatic states (headache and restlessness) were 
connected to environmental triggers (arrival of the new staff member). To him, nothing else 
existed besides the immediate distress that forced him to act. His capacity to detach from 
direct experience, and to reflect upon his behaviour, was somehow shattered -especially when 
in more challenging states of arousal. Here, it was not an external stimulus that forced 0U$¶
to function in certain direction, but an internal and urgent state of catastrophe (see Salas, 
2012).   
The case of Mrs I illustrates a slightly different quality of concreteness, which is the 
influence of emotion on cognitive ability and awareness. Although Mrs. I usually has little 
awareness of her neuro-behavioural impairments, she can occasionally become more 
accepting of the idea that her emotions, behavior and cognitive abilities have been altered and 
impaired by the TBI. However, these moments of insight are both transient and critically 
dependent upon Mrs. I having a strong sense of being heard and validated within the current 
session. In these moments, when Mrs. I is calmer and soothed, she seems more able to detach 
herself from direct experience, and adopt a slightly more reflective, and less defensive, 
position in relation to her difficulties. She can, for example, give clear descriptions of some 
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profound changes, such as being unable to inhibit overfamiliar responses with strangers. For 
further discussion on this point, see section on building mental schemas and manipulating 
negative arousal.  
,I LQVLJKW UHIHUV WR DQ DZDUHQHVV DQG XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI RQH¶V RZQ PRWLYDWLRQV
(Luborsky, Crist-Cristoph, Mintz, & Auerbach, 1988), and is closely linked to emotional 
relief (Orlinsky, 2009), the relationship between emotional experience and abstraction 
deficits needs to be further understood. Goldstein himself briefly wrote on this topic, 
VXJJHVWLQJWKDWSDWLHQW¶VHPotional responses (e.g. dulling of emotions or great excitability) 
were determined by their capacity to grasp the essentials of a situation, and not to a primary 
defect in emotional experience per se (Goldstein 1936b). Modern authors have proposed a 
similar idea regarding patients with frontal lesions, suggesting that disruption of emotion is 
highly dependent on context. For example, patients may show diminished emotional 
responses to issues that are abstract or not immediately present, together with exaggerated 
emotional responses to immediately present stimuli (Anderson, Barrash, Bechara & Tranel, 
2006). Consider the example of Mr R, a patient who suffered a large left frontal and parietal 
stroke, to illustrate how concreteness may narrow emotional life to the present moment 
(Goldstein, 1936a). As part of an experiment Mr R had to watch short film clips, which were 
intended to elicit sadness. After each of the clips he had to report how he felt during the films 
by rating emotional words (e.g. how shaky did you feel while watching the clip?). When 
DVNHG³KRZPXFK ORQHO\GLG\RX IHHO"´KHUHSOLHGSHUSOH[HG³ZK\VKRXOG , IHHO ORQHO\ LI
,¶PKHUHLQWKLVURRPZLWK\RX"´ 
0U5¶VEHKDYLRXUDQGYHUEDOUHSRUWLVLQWHUHVWLQJ,IZHFRQVLGHUKLVIDFLDOEHKDYLRXr 
during the clip, it is clear that he was able to experience sadness. However, when he was 
asked to offer some insight about the recently passed emotional experience he struggled to 
grasp the essence of the question. Although this type of question seems quite straightforward, 
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answering it would require him to: (a) detach from the present moment and move backwards 
LQ WLPH ZKLOH ZDWFKLQJ WKH FOLS E DFWLYDWH DQ ³DV LI´ HPRWLRQDO H[SHULHQFH RI D QRQ-
present situation (how did I feel then?); (c) infer abstract information related to the emotional 
H[SHULHQFH KRZPXFK"0U5¶V DQVZHU UHIOHFWHGGLIILFXOWLHVSHUIRUPLQJ WKHVHRSHUDWLRQV
and was instead forced by the salient elements of the present situation (he was, in fact, not 
alone in the room, at that moment) and the emotional states associated with it (he did not 
currently feel lonely). 
A further understanding of how concreteness compromises emotional awareness, and 
a key capacity for psychotherapy, can be obtained from research on alexithymia and TBI. 
Alexithymia, a clinical concept that has been widely related to mental health, has striking 
similarities with temporal and reflective changes involved by concreteness. For example, 
alexithymia has been defined as comprising a: (a) difficulty identifying and describing 
emotions; (b) a concrete communication style; (c) an externally oriented style of thinking; 
and (d) limited imaginal capacity (Taylor, Bagby & Parker, 1997). In addition, it has also 
been suggested that alexithymia is linked to a failure elevating emotions from pre-conceptual 
to conceptual levels of mental organization (Taylor, Bagby & Parker, 1997), a core feature of 
concrete thinking.  
In TBI, there are reports that suggest a high level of incidence of alexithymia 
(Becerra, 2002; Henry et al., 2006; Wood & Williams, 2007; 2010), which does not appear to 
be explained by low level emotion perception deficits (McDonald et al., 2011). TBI patients 
who exhibit alexithymic traits tend to present more physical symptoms (Wood, Williams & 
Kalyani, 2009), which appear to function as ways of dealing with emotional distress 
(Williams et al., 2001). This piece of evidence seems to support the idea that concreteness is 
characterized by a representational [but not somatic] difficulty generating meaning (as 
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SRUWUD\HG LQ 0U $¶V FDVH 8QIRUWXQDWHO\ WR RXU NQRZOHGJH QR UHVHDUFK SURJUDP KDV
explored the link between concreteness (as described by Goldstein) and alexithymia.  
 
2.3.6.5. Concreteness and the Therapeutic Bond 
Changes in the reflective and temporal dimensions of the Self not only influence the use of 
therapeutic tools (e.g insight), but also the interpersonal space where psychotherapy unfolds, 
often known as therapeutic bond (Orlinsky, 2009). Evidence associating the quality of the 
therapeutic bond with therapy outcome (Martin, Garske & Davis, 2000; Orlinsky, Ronnestad 
& Willutzki, 2004) appears to justify the need to comprehend how concreteness may 
compromise such a relevant dimension. 
According to Orlinsky (2009) two aspects of the therapeutic bond can be 
distinguished. Task team-work refers to how much patients and therapists are able to invest in 
their respective roles, and how they can coordinate positions of control and initiative. 
Personal Rapport denotes the level of empathic resonance that patient and therapist may 
accomplish, by attuning to one another. It also refers to the emotional climate generated by 
their emotional responses to one another.  
As reviewed above, in relation to therapeutic operations, concreteness can 
FRPSURPLVH SDWLHQWV¶ FDSDFLW\ WR SUHVHQW SUREOHPV RU GLIILFXOWLHV ZKLFK DUH WKH EDVLF
material for therapeutic work. This difficulty can influence the balance of control and 
initiative inside the dyad, forcing the therapist into a more pro-active or leading attitude. This 
particular team-work configuration is not negative per se, but it can potentially endanger the 
SDWLHQW¶V VHQVHRI DJHQF\ZKLFK LV EDVHG RQ WKH H[SHULHQFH RI FRQWrol and proactivity. To 
consider this is of extreme relevance, especially in view that a main goal for psychotherapy 
with brain injured patients is helping them regaining some sense of agency in their life, 
despite the difficulties set by cognitive deficits.  
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In relation to the second aspect of the therapeutic bond, personal rapport, several 
ideas need to be considered. Firstly, it is necessary to clarify that concreteness does not 
DSSHDU WR FRPSURPLVH SDWLHQWV¶ FDSDFLW\ WR UHDFW HPRWLRQDOO\ WR RWKHUV RU WR establish new 
emotional bonds, which are basic abilities required to found a therapeutic relationship. 
Nevertheless, concrete patients may present difficulties functioning in more abstract or 
representational levels of interpersonal life7. For example, concrete patients might struggle to 
generate emotionally-driven cognitions about the therapist (so called phantasies in 
psychoanalytic language), which are often a source of conflict, as well as material for the 
process. In other words, patients will react emotionally to the therapist according to past 
experiences (e.g. feeling negative during the week and deciding not to call the therapist), but 
will be less able to produce the associated affective-mental scripts about his/her relationship 
with the therapist (e.g. I will not call him now that I feel troubled; I do not have to bother 
him. I will wait until our next session. I should sort this out by myself. Yes! He has his own 
life. Why should he care for me? You have to do it by yourself! Or are you not able to? 
Before this damn accident you never asked for any help! Why should it be different now?). 
The exploration of such mental scenarios is a key element for psychotherapy, where 
affective-mental scripts that guide behaviour, progressively become more conscious, thus 
facilitating its voluntary regulation. However, affective-mental scripts that involve the 
therapist are especially relevant because they allow an in situ exploration, capturing the 
emotional intensity of present H[SHULHQFH 7KH µDUFKDHRORJLFDO¶ WDVN RI SXWWLQJ WRJHWKHU LQ
the simplest possible way, the different elements that compose affective-mental scripts is a 
fundamental step in the process of identity reconstruction after brain injury (Salas, 2009; 
Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000).   
 
                                                 
7 Here the distinction between Bottom-up and Top-down emotion generation described by Ochsner et al (2009) 
is extremely relevant to critically read evidence suggesting that TBI patients present a decrease in emotional 
reactivity.  
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Another core aspect of personal rapport is the emotional climate generated by patient-
therapist interaction. Here we would like to put forward two basic ideas in line with previous 
work on countertransference and brain injury (Coetzer, 2006; Lewis, 1999; Klonoff, 2010; 
3HSSLQJ6DODV7KHILUVWRQHUHODWHVWRWKHWKHUDSLVW¶Vexperience RIWKHSDWLHQW¶V
FRQFUHWH PLQG ZKLFK PD\ WULJJHU GLYHUVH IHHOLQJV DQG VHQVDWLRQV )RU H[DPSOH SDWLHQW¶V
difficulty generating meaning beyond what is tangible can be felt by the therapist as 
µLPSHQHWUDELOLW\¶ RU DQ LQDELOLW\ WR DFFHVV WKH VXEWOHWLHV RI VXEMHFWLYH OLIH ,PSDLUPHQWV LQ
LGHDJHQHUDWLRQFDQEHDOVRH[SHULHQFHGE\WKHWKHUDSLVWDVµLQHUWLD¶DVRUWRIUHVLVWDQFe of the 
mind to move in any direction. These sensations are, at the same time, obstacles in the 
WKHUDSHXWLF SURFHVV DQG µVDPSOHV¶ RI WKH SDWLHQW¶V LQQHU H[SHULHQFH RI KLV RZQPLQG(YHQ
though they can trigger feelings of frustration, they are valuable hints about the nature of the 
SDWLHQW¶VFRQFUHWHZRUOG 
This raises a second observation, which relates to the impact of the concrete mind of 
the patient, on the abstract mind of the therapist. This is not a phenomenon exclusively 
associated with concreteness, but one that can be widely observed when working with brain 
injured patients with different profiles of cognitive deficits, and which can be referred as 
µorganic countertransference8¶ )RU H[DPSOH ZKHQ ZRUNLQJ ZLWK G\VH[HFXWLYH SDWLHQWV
therapists may exhibit problems finding words or organizing thoughts, thus effectively 
PLPLFNLQJWKHSDWLHQWV¶GHILFLWV7KHEDVLFLGHDKHUHLVWKDWLQWKHVDPHZD\WKDWWKHUDSLVWV
RU UHODWLYHV LQIOXHQFH DQG HQKDQFH SDWLHQW¶V FRJQLWLYH SHUIRUPDQFH %RZHQ <HDWHV 	
3DOPHU)UHHGSDWLHQWV¶QHXURSV\FKRORJLFDOGHILFLWVFDQDOVRLPSDFWWKHUDSLVWV¶
(and relatives) mental functioning. This is a relational axiom that needs to be kept in mind 
when addressing the impact of concreteness on personal rapport, especially regarding the 
capacity to attune to each other. The main point here is that, when working with brain injured 
                                                 
8 The term organic countertransference is used to emphasize that some of the feelings and sensations 
H[SHULHQFHGE\WKHWKHUDSLVWVPD\QRWEHUHODWHGWRWKHSDWLHQW¶VFRQIOLFWVRUSHUVRQDOLW\WUDLWVDVLVRIWHQVHHQLQ
psychiatric populations, but to the peculiar way in which his µGLVRUJDQL]HGPLQG¶ZRUNV 
2.3. Concreteness and Psychotherapy 
 
127 
 
patients we do not just attune emotionally but, perhaps more importantly, also 
neuropsychologically.  
A specific difficulty involved in attuning to concrete patients is that therapists try to 
accomplish such goals using their abstract mind, which by default adds multiple layers of 
complexity to the simpler experience of concrete patients. Where there is pure vivid and 
intense experience, the abstract mind steps back, looking for connections, patterns or 
regularities. Thus the abstract mind is constantly complicating, diluting and unifying 
experience (Sacks, 1986). This is a challenge, perhaps one of the most important challenges, 
for any therapist working with concrete patients. Its relevance is manifold. No access to the 
phenomenological experience of the patient (Prigatano, 1999) is possible without the 
therapist becoming concrete. Similarly, no guidance can be offered to relatives without 
teaching them how to relate to the concrete. 
 
 
2.3.7. Technical modifications in psychotherapeutic work with concrete 
patients 
 
2.3.7.1.The starting point: preservation of [present] emotional experience 
After considering the challenges that concreteness sets to psychotherapy, the reader might 
wonder: to what purpose, given that these patients seem poor candidates for psychotherapy? 
This type of reaction by clinicians, which is a mixture of discouragement and disbelief on the 
suitability of our psychotherapeutic tools, for meaningful and effective work with brain-
injured persons, on many levels makes complete sense. Indeed, feelings of frustration are 
quite common among psychotherapists who work with this population (Judd & Wilson, 
2005).  
2.3. Concreteness and Psychotherapy 
 
128 
 
It is the experience of the authors that the only way out from this position of 
powerlessness is by focusing not exclusively on what is lost, but also on what is preserved. 
$VPHQWLRQHGDERYH LQ FRQFUHWHQHVV ³WKHSHUVRQDlity, identity and humanity, the being of 
the hurt creature, is preserved´ 6DFNV  HPSKDVLV DGGHG$Q LGHD VXFKDV WKLVPLJKW
seem counterintuitive, considering the massive transformations in psychological functioning 
that abstraction loss entails. However, while abstraction might be disrupted, the sentient self 
of concrete patients remains intact. Although this may be hard to picture, especially after our 
detailed description of concreteness as a deficit, the case of Mr J might be of help to illustrate 
more practically this point.  
Mr J is a 37 year old man who sustained a severe TBI after a traffic accident. As a 
consequence he experienced deficits in cognitive domains such as sustained attention and 
divided attention, prospective memory, working memory, set shifting and fluidity. In 
DGGLWLRQ KH DOVR VKRZHG DZDUHQHVV GLIILFXOWLHV LQ WHUPV RI ³LQGLIIHUHQFH´ WRZDUGV WKHVH
cognitive difficulties when they were not concretely evident. A striking fact about Mr J was 
that, despite his cognitive deficits, he remained someone capable of experiencing, and 
expressing, emotional states during interpersonal interactions. Furthermore, his emotional 
experience had the same features described by Sacks (1986); it was vivid, intense, detailed 
yet simple. This is observable in the following example, where Mr J was asked to perform a 
fluidity task: 
 
Task 1:ULWHILYHGLIIHUHQWVHQWHQFHVZLWKWKHZRUG³URFN´7KHUHLVDVHDJXOO
over the rock; 2) There is a sea lion sleeping on the rock; 3) I sit on the rock to 
watch the sea; 4) The rock is very hard; 5) Sea stars are stuck onto the rock. Task 
2: :ULWHILYHGLIIHUHQWVHQWHQFHVZLWKWKHZRUG³VN\´7KHVN\LVEOXH,QWKH
sky there are white clouds; 3) In the sky there are many stars; 4) If you look up 
into the sky at night you see only stars; 5) The sky is illuminated by stars. 
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0U -¶V DQVZHUV LQ WKH WDVN SUHVHQW VRPH FRPPRQ IHDWXUHV RI FRQFUHWHQHVV7KH\ DUH
highly detailed, and mainly based on sensory information. It is also possible to observe some 
tendency to perseverate in the topic or scene (e.g. a rock in the sea) without shifting to other 
different uses, or possible contexts, for the target object. Both elements, the high sensory 
level of detail, and the capture by a single situation or scenario, are examples of what we 
KDYHGHVFULEHGDERYHDVµSUHVHQWQHVV¶RUµEHLQJIRUFHG¶E\VWLPXOL+RZHYHULWLVLQWHUHVWLQJ
WR QRWH WKDW 0U -¶V DQVZHUV GR QRW H[FOXVLYHO\ SRUWUD\ WKH LPSDFW RI DEVWUDFW GHILFLWV LQ
thought processes, but also suggest richness of emotional experience in the present. His 
answers have, arguably, a genuine sense of depth, as if the detailed depiction of the scene 
could transmit the experiencing moment with unusual vividness. The apparent paradox 
between abstract loss and preservation of personality seem here to dissipate. Emotional 
experience always occurs in present time, and concreteness is presentness. Even though the 
capacity of the self to project into past or future scenarios adds invaluable layers of 
complexity to emotional life, emotional experience always unfolds in present time (feel ing 
sad), even if it is triggered by memories from the past (I lost some one I love) or phantasies 
about the future (I will be left alone).  
It is exactly the preservation of these basic emotional capacities what have led authors 
to suggest that is not only the disorganized mind that needs to be addressed in rehabilitation 
HJFRJQLWLYHUHWUDLQLQJEXWDOVRWKHZRXQGHGµVRXO¶3ULJDWDQR&RQFUHWHSDWLHQWV
like all patients with brain injury, need to regain a sense of meaning and identity in order to 
cope better with the psychosocial problems they face (Prigatano, 1986; 1994). This need has 
been perhaps underestimated by psychotherapists (Judd & Wilson, 2005), who have tended to 
assume that cognitive impairments prevent these patients engaging with and benefitting from 
psychotherapy (Jude & Wilson, 1999; 2005; Prigatano, 2003). This paper proposes a different 
point of view. We believe that by acknowledging, and comprehensively understanding, these 
2.3. Concreteness and Psychotherapy 
 
130 
 
impairments, it is possible to adapt the way we do psychotherapy (see Prigatano, 1986), and 
to work more effectively as a result. We also believe that this challenge has an ethical 
connotation, based on the recognition that concrete patients clearly experience psychological 
suffering (Goldstein, 1959; 1995 [1965], Hanfmann, Rickers-Ovsiankina & Goldstein, 1944, 
Salas, 2012), and often attempt to understand their situation, despite deficits of abstraction 
(Prigatano, 1986) and, at some point, they actively seek for help in order to gain such 
understanding (Freed, 2002; Salas, 2012). Consider Mr J as an example: 
 
Task 3ZULWHWKLQJV\RXGRDIWHU\RXJHWRXWRIEHG:HOO«,JHWXSDQGEUXVK
my teeth; 2) I get up and go wash my teeth; 3) I get up and feed the dog; 4) I get 
XSDQG WDNHDVKRZHU ,JHWXS«DQG\RXZLOOKDYH WRKHOSPHTask 4: write 
ILYHWKLQJV\RXGREHIRUH\RXJRWREHG:HOO,JHWXSDQG,GRQ¶WNQRZZKDWWR
GR,JHWXSDQGGRQ¶WNQRZZKDW,ZRXOGGR,JHWXSDQGGRQ¶WNQRZZKat 
WRGR¶,KDYHQHYHUIDOOLQGHVSDLU,KDYHQHYHU« 
 
2.3.7.2. Addressing presentness in psychotherapy: using external reality. 
It has been described that presentness implies a contraction in the temporal dimension of the 
self. Such transformation may challenge the initiation of a therapeutic cycle, which is usually 
characterized by patients proactively bringing into a session complaints related to 
problematic life situations. This difficulty has been noted by different authors (Klonoff, 2010; 
Prigatano, 1986), who have stressed the need to increase the frequency of sessions [to repeat 
and rehearse information] or include external aids [such as notebooks or lists of potential 
GLVFXVVLRQ WRSLFV@ LQ RUGHU WR PDQDJH DEVWUDFWLRQ DQG PHPRU\ SUREOHPV )URP 2UOLQN\¶V
model of generic psychotherapy (2009), presentness would compromise the generation of 
temporal patterns, which are the articulation, over the course of treatment, of the different 
dimensions of the psychotherapeutic process (explanations of the problems offered by the 
therapist, insights, emotional relief, etc.).   
2.3. Concreteness and Psychotherapy 
 
131 
 
Perhaps the most important idea to have in mind, when addressing presentness, is that 
external reality is the most powerful elicitor of emotional reactions. This is a fact that can be 
easily observed, for example, during the transition from inpatient to outpatient rehabilitation, 
where contact with the real world violeQWO\ VWULNHV SDWLHQWV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV RI WKHLU DELOLWLHV
Before this encounter, and due to difficulties triggering emotional states based on possible 
future scenarios, concrete patients are unable to emotionally size up this impact. In other 
words, it appears that, for concrete patients, problems only exist when they are occurring, not 
much before, and not much after.  
The implications of this particular state of mind for psychotherapy are manifold. For 
example, psychotherapy should carefully seek to identify real life events that generate 
GLVFUHSDQFLHVEHWZHHQSDWLHQW¶VDELOLWLHVDQGH[SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKHHQYLURQPHQWDQGXVHWKHP
as breaches to access subjective experience. This might seem obvious and simple, but is not. 
The case of Mr A. is an example of how a real life event (arrival of a new colleague) 
generated a crisis which is not detected by the therapist or reported by the patient. In this case 
LV WKDQNV WR WKH FORVH FROODERUDWLRQ RI 0U $¶V ZLIH WKDW WKLV HYHQW LV VSRWWHG DQG WKHQ
addressed with the patient. The use of these breaches, generated by real life events, requires 
WKH IOH[LEOHPDQDJHPHQWRI VHVVLRQ IUHTXHQF\ LQRUGHU WR ³VWULNHZKLOH WKH LURQ LV KRW´$
close coordination with relatives and key colleagues at work is vital to catch these events.  
A second implication of dealing with presentness is how to artificially generate 
breaches that allow access to subjective life. In other words, how it may be possible to mimic 
real life situations in the therapeutic setting, as a means to activate (and then address) 
conflicts. Two possibilities must be considered here. One is the use of couple or family 
sessions, alternated with individual sessions. Of special interest here are approaches 
GHYHORSHGWRDGGUHVV³LQWLPDF\´SUREOHPVDIWHUEUDLQLQMXU\%RZen, Yeates & Palmer, 2010) 
and dementia (Balfour, 2011). By including significant others in the sessions, it is possible to 
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engage the patient in real life interactions, which will arouse emotional reactions more 
effectively and bring interpersonal conflicts into the session. Another useful method to 
JHQHUDWH EUHDFKHV LV WR PRYH RXW IURP WKH FRQVXOWLQJ URRP LQWR WKH SDWLHQW¶V RZQ
environment. This approach allows the therapist to experience, with the patient, real life 
situations (at home, at work) which can be later used as source of therapeutic material. The 
work of Mark Ylvisaker and Timothy Feeney on identity reconstruction is perhaps the best 
example of doing psychotherapeutic interventions in ecological contexts (Salas, 2009; 
Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000). 
 
2.3.7.3. Making sense: building mental schemes and manipulating negative arousal. 
Making sense out of the experience of acquiring a brain injury, and the changes it implies, 
has been described as one of the main goals of psychotherapy after brain damage (Prigatano, 
 +RZHYHU GHILFLWV LQ DEVWUDFWLRQ FDQ FRPSURPLVH SDWLHQWV¶ Fapacity to reflect 
upon emotional experience and generate meaningful interpretations of what they are going 
through. Several technical modifications can be implemented to bypass or compensate such 
abstraction impairment.   
One suggestion is that insight regarding emotional or interpersonal difficulties can be 
best accomplished through continued repetition and generalization (Prigatano, 1986). In other 
words, compared to patients without neurological lesions, concrete patients require a 
prolonged exposure to information in order to fully incorporate it as part of a mental schema 
or mental category (which can be later used to guide behaviour and decision making). In 
some cases information may take months, or even years, to sink in -and when it does, is often 
in the context of an external event that has generated some type of internal disorganization. 
6RPHKRZ WKLV LQIRUPDWLRQ DSSHDUV WR KDYH EHHQ ³UHKHDUVHG´ LQVLGH VHVVLRQV DQG LV WKHQ
meaningfully (emotionally) connected with the event, and a new mental schema is formed. 
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The subjective experience that accompanies such situations can be a mixture of surprise and 
fulfilment. Professor F, a patient of one of the authors (CS) arrived in a state of puzzlement to 
one session, 4 years after the stroke:  
 
So this is wKDW\RXPHDQW«WKLVLVWKHSUREOHPWKDWZHNHHSWDONLQJDERXW«KRZ
P\KHDGGRHVQ¶WZRUNVRPHWLPHV«ZKHQLWJHWVPHVV\GLVRUJDQL]HG«ZKHQ,¶P
too nervous. Well, I was at work and received this call asking to finish this 
GRFXPHQW«DQG , GLG QRW H[SHFW WKDW0\head went blank and I did not know 
ZKDW WR GR ZKHUH WR VWDUW«, ZDV IUR]HQ $QG WKHUH , UHPHPEHUHG«DQG ,
WKRXJKW«WKLVLVZKDWZHKDYHWDONHGDERXW«WKHH[HFXWLYHWKLQJ,QDZHLUGZD\
that calmed me down a little bit. 
 
Once a mental schema has been internalized, it needs, ideally, to be generalized to other 
similar situations, and progressively brought under the same explanatory category. In the case 
of Professor F, many other life situations (e.g. booking a flight, sorting out bills) that were 
experienced as mind-GLVRUJDQL]LQJZHUH H[SODLQHG XQGHU WKH VDPH EDVLFPRGHO ³'HDOLQJ
with unexpected events makes you feel confused, and when you feel confused your head 
IHHOVPHVV\DQGLWGRHVQ¶WREH\\RX´7KLVEDVLFPRGHOZDVSURJUHVVLYHO\HQULFKHGWKURXJK
personal metaphors that he spontaneously used to explain his experience. For example, in 
moments of confusion, when he felt paralyzed, he would describe his mind as being in a state 
of inertia, without any thinking activity. 
Generalization also implies that insights need to be shared by significant others who 
may be present when the patient experiences these events, or are actively sought after for 
help. It is extremely important that significant others clearly understand the schema, so they 
can help the patient without diminishing his sense of agency. For example, Professor F 
spontaneously started calling his wife during moments of confusion, as a means to extract 
2.3. Concreteness and Psychotherapy 
 
134 
 
himself from the mental inertia. He did not need help deciding what was best to do, but could 
not initiate the process of thinking by himself. That was all he needed.  
$Q DGGLWLRQDO SUREOHP WR WKH JHQHUDWLRQ RI PHQWDO VFKHPDV LV FRQFUHWH SDWLHQWV¶
difficulty in tolerating psychological conflict -where a somatic response generates an impulse 
to act which is somehow counter-regulated by higher order processing9. By thinking about 
somatic experience we detach ourselves from a perception-action mode of functioning 
(doing), by adopting a reflective stance (thinking). Because abstraction is compromised in 
concrete patients, somatic responses can be experienced without a coherent representational 
correlate, only as a tendency to act (see previous section on Concreteness, representational 
meaning and abstraction ,Q 0U $¶V FDVH IRU H[DPSOH D QHJDWLYH HYHQW IURP the 
HQYLURQPHQW WULJJHUHG D EDVLF H[SHULHQFH RI µWKUHDW¶ ZKLFK ZDV TXLFNO\ UHJXODWHG E\
concretely avoiding the source of discomfort (work).  
The basic question that needs to be answered then is how psychotherapy can be shaped 
to address difficulties in the generation of representational meaning from somatic experience. 
6HYHUDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQV FDQ EH RI XVH KHUH 7KH ILUVW LV WKDW VXFK SDWLHQWV¶ UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO
capacity (abstraction) might fluctuate according to situational demands, and perceived 
availability of support. This is not a new idea. In fact, Bowen, Yeates and Palmer (2010) 
systematized a significant amount of evidence suggesting that performance in cognitive 
functions of different sort is heavily dependent on context. In addition, there is substantial 
literature on the impact of negative emotion (or arousal) on executive abilities (Davis & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Demanet, Liefooghe & Verbruggen, 2011; Gasper, 2003; Oei et al., 
2011; Schoofs, Preuss & Wolf, 2008; Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles & Phillips, 2009) or the 
capacity to think about mental states (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist & Target, 2004). A key point is 
WKDW DV SV\FKRWKHUDSLVWV LW LV SRVVLEOH WR LQIOXHQFH SDWLHQWV¶ UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO DELOLWLHV E\
                                                 
9 See Salas & Turnbull (2010) for a discussion on conflict, defence mechanisms and brain injury. 
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manipulating their level of negative arousal. This is of special relevance when working with 
couples/families, or when the patient-therapist relationship is the focus of the conflict (e.g. 
alliance rupture).  
$QRWKHUVRXUFHRIQHJDWLYHDURXVDO WKDW UHTXLUHVPRGXODWLRQ LV WKHSDWLHQW¶V VWUXJJOH
using his/her mind during sessions. Often, concrete patients can experience difficulties 
JHQHUDWLQJLGHDVILQGLQJZRUGVRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHUDSLVWV¶LQWHUYHQWLRQV7KHH[SHULHQFHRI
these deficits can generate vicious cycles where negative emotion impairs cognitive function 
IXUWKHU 7KH WKHUDSLVW¶V VWDQFH WRZDUG WKHVH GLIILFXOWLHV LV FUXFLDO +H KDV WR EH DYDLODEOH
enough to act as an auxiliary ego when, for example, the patient is unable to find a word. 
Nevertheless, at the same time he has to offer the patient enough space to use, and reclaim, 
KLVRZQPLQGWROHUDWLQJWKHWHQGHQF\WR³ILOOLQWKHJDSV´WKDWLVFDXVHGE\PXWXDOIUXVWUDWLRQ
A patient of one of the authors, Professor F, commented on this therapeutic attitude when 
writing about his brain injury: 
 
The weekly work with my psychotherapist has been very important: supporting 
without replacing, confirming without imposing, helping to understand without 
UXVKLQJLQWRFRQFOXVLRQVZHHNE\ZHHN,¶POHDUQLQJDQHZZD\RIUHODWLQJ 
 
A first step in the generation of meaning, or the building of mental schemas, is helping 
patients to learn that somatic responses refer to something important, disregard the exact 
PHDQLQJWKH\PD\KDYH:HKDYHGHQRPLQDWHGWKLVSURFHVVDV³IODJJLQJ´EHFDXVHLW LVQRW
about understanding what is going on, but simply about marking the somatic response to 
events as something relevant, so it can be brought in for later discussion. In the case of Mr A. 
he started paying more attention to headaches, and flagging whenever they occurred. At first 
he was not able to understand by himself their meaning, but collaborative exploration allowed 
WKHJHQHUDWLRQRIDVHWRI³W\SLFDOFDXVHV´ZKLFKKHFRXOGODWHUWHVWDVSRVVLEOHH[SODQDWLRQV 
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2.3.7.4.Making sense: using symbols to generate and compact meaning. 
We have described above how concrete patients struggle abstracting the essential from 
different elements (see table 3). A similar problem may occur during the process of 
synthetizing insights and awareness of changes after the injury. Although it may seem 
paradoxical, considering the research on metaphor comprehension impairment and TBI (e.g. 
Towne & Entwisle, 1993), several authors have suggested that the use of metaphor or 
symbols can help bypass these abstraction problems (Prigatano, 1986; 1989; 1999b; Salas, 
2009; Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000; Ylvisaker, Mcpherson, Kayes & Pellet, 2008). A possible 
explanation for this apparent contradiction is that metaphors used in experimental settings, 
compared to those used in psychotherapeutic interventions, are not chosen by patients 
themselves, and therefore, they are not personally compelling or emotionally meaningful (see 
Teasdale & Barnard, 1993 for an approach to metaphor based on affect and action 
tendencies). In addition, experimental designs actively avoid the overexposure of participants 
to stimuli, while in psychotherapeutic settings with concrete patients repetition is a key 
element in the generation of new mental schemas.  
Although different authors emphasize diverse aspects of metaphor in their use with 
concrete patients, they tend to agree that metaphor facilitates the understanding of complex 
ideas (Prigatano, 1986; Ylvisaker, Mcpherson, Kayes & Pellet, 2008), integrates cognition 
and affect (Prigatano, 1989), helps articulating identity issues (Prigatano, 1999b; Ylvisaker & 
Feeney, 2000) and can be presented as tangible graphic material (e.g. drawings or identity 
maps).  
 
For Prigatano (1986), symbols address the core issue with few words and powerful 
imagery, helping patients with information processing deficits to grasp abstract ideas. He 
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suggests that, paradoxically, metaphors and symbols are often necessary to help patients 
understand common experiences after acquiring a brain injury, such as the loss of normality 
(Prigatano, 1989). Even more importantly, symbols (e.g. the journey of the hero; birth/death) 
offer guidance in coping with such transformations (Prigatano, 1989), facilitating the process 
of rebuilding a meaningful life (Pepping & Prigatano, 2003). Thus him the use of symbols 
related to basic human activities, such as work, love and play, can help patients to integrate 
thoughts and feelings, re-establishing a new sense of self (Prigatano, 1989).  
Mark Ylvisaker and Timothy Feeney approach the use of metaphors from a slightly 
different point of view. Metaphors are, for these authors, effective instruments compacting 
information and generating positive versions of the self that can be used to create meaning, 
motivate and regulate behaviour (Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000; Ylvisaker, McPherson, Kayes & 
Pellet, 2008). Through the use of metaphor, for example by choosing a personal heroic figure 
(e.g. a sportsman), different values (e.g. strength of character), goals (e.g. be respected), 
feelings (e.g. being in control) and action strategies (e.g. careful preparation), can be 
emotionally unified into an identity schema, making it more accessible to memory with only 
one unit of thought (Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000). Usually the construction of these schemas is 
supported by external graphic organizers, which allow concrete patients to elaborate, 
organize, remember and express thoughts more effectively.  
 
 
 
2.3.7.5.Becoming concrete: concrete patients need concrete therapists 
 
When it comes to addressing the therapeutic challenges posed by concreteness, the 
modifications suggested in the section above can be assumed to be useful. For example, the 
generation of affective/mental scripts of the patient-therapist relationship can be facilitated by 
the use of metaphors and graphic organizers, as well as the basic principles of repetition and 
generalization. We will not develop this point further in order to focus on another often 
2.3. Concreteness and Psychotherapy 
 
138 
 
unattended problem, which is how to access these patienWV¶LQQHUH[SHULHQFHIURPDQDEVWUDFW
mind point of view.  
We believe that a first step in this task is to familiarize with a non-conceptual form of 
H[SHULHQFH0DUN<OYLVDNHU IRU H[DPSOH GHVFULEHG WKLV DV ³WDONLQJ IURP WKH JXWV´ 6DODV
2009), suggesting that concreteness is related to a rather visceral level of processing 
information, also called implicational meaning (Teasdale, 1997, in Ylvisaker & Feeney, 
2000). In practical terms this would require therapists to push themselves into a bottom-up 
therapeutic stance, where staying in the present moment, and attending to somatic and 
affective responses are the main points of orientation. This approach is not new. In fact, 
coming from a psychoanalytic background, Wilfred Bion (1963; 1967) suggested that the 
EDVLF FOLQLFDO DWWLWXGH ZDV WR FRQIURQW HYHU\ VHVVLRQ µZLWKRXW PHPRU\ GHVLUH RU
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶EHFDXVHWKH\PLJKWFORXGWKHWKHUDSLVW¶VFDSDFLW\WRJUDVSZKDWis happening 
during a session. Interestingly, a similar idea has been put forward by Mindfulness based 
WKHUDSLHV ZKLFK DWWHPSW WR GHYHORS WKH FDSDFLW\ IRU µVXVWDLQHG PRPHQW-to-moment 
DZDUHQHVV¶6LHJHO*HUPHU	2OHQGVNL 
Becoming concrete does not imply that the therapist should remain concrete, or 
completely abandon an abstract stance. As we have suggested before, that is impossible, for 
we are constantly distancing ourselves from experience in order to make sense of it. 
Becoming familiar with the world of the concrete is simply an initial step which offers first 
hand material with whicKWRFRPSUHKHQGWKHSDWLHQW¶VVXIIHULQJDQGWKHH[SHULHQFHWKDWFORVH
ones might also have of his/her new way of relating to them. An ideal therapist should be able 
to immerse himself in a concrete mode of functioning, so he can later emerge from it to 
reflect upon such experience. This constant shifting between the two modes of functioning is 
perhaps the heart of the therapeutic process.   
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We would like to offer a final observation on the emotional impact of treating 
concrete patients. Therapists often arrive at working with brain injured patients after being 
trained to work with normal or psychiatric populations. One of the consequences of such 
µFDUHHUSDWK¶LVWKDWWKHUDSLVWIUHTXHQWO\VSHQGTXLWHDORQJWLPHDGMXVWLQJWKHLUWKHRUHWLFDODQG
technical tools. This period of fine-tuning often involves a grieving process too, where the 
therapist mourns for the patient he will not have, that one he was trained for, the one who will 
get cured by gaining insight about his problems and history, the abstract patient.  In a way, 
SDUWRIWKHWKHUDSLVW¶VLGHQWLW\LVHQGDQJHUHGGXULQJVXFKWUDQVLWLRQZKDWDP,"$P, just a 
neuropsychologist? Am I just DFRXQVHOORU":KDWFDQ,GRLIP\WRROVGRQ¶WZRUN"7RDGGUHVV
these emotional difficulties is perhaps one of the most important tasks when working with 
concrete patients. 
 
2.3.8. Closing remarks 
Concreteness is a frequently observed phenomenon in rehabilitation settings, causing 
important obstacles to teams in helping patients to resume a productive and meaningful life. 
Concrete patients, as any other human being, experience emotional difficulties adapting to the 
drastic changes that a brain injury inevitably results. Overcoming these difficulties is 
HVSHFLDOO\GHPDQGLQJIRUWKHVHSDWLHQWVEHFDXVHWKHLU³WKLQNLQJ´DELOLW\DFRre capacity for 
psychotherapy, is compromised. In this paper we have tried to described in detail how 
concreteness transform different dimensions of the Self and how these changes may 
challenge the use of psychotherapeutic tools. We have also described technical modifications 
to address these changes (see Table 4 for a summary).  
 
The observation of concrete patients in therapeutic settings is also important for 
theoretical motives. It sheds light into several neuro-philosophical problems, such as the 
neural basis of reason and emotion, time and consciousness and the construction of meaning. 
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$IWHUFRQVLGHULQJ WKHHYLGHQFH WKDW WKHVH³H[SHULPHQWVRIQDWXUH´SUHVHQWZKHQ WKHYHLORI
abstraction (and its illusions) is removed, our idea of what is fundamentally human seem to 
change. We are organisms closely connected to our environment, and our behaviour, is the 
consequence of this incessant flux. Consciousness echoes this flux, always unfolding in an 
ever changing now. And emotion, visceral emotion, is the core that generates meaning, a felt 
PHDQLQJ 7KLV LV WKH µZRUOG RI WKH VLPSOH¶ GHVFULEHG E\ 2OLYHU 6DFNV RU WKH µVKUXQNHQ
HQYLURQPHQW¶ SRUWUD\HG E\ .XUW *ROGVWHLQ 6HYHUDO DXWKRUV KDYH DGGUHVVHG WKHVH VDPH
questions from other points of view. We hope this article will contribute by motivating 
psychotherapists and researchers to further explore and understand the world of the concrete.  
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Concreteness 
Features 
Impact on Psychotherapeutic 
Operations and Tools 
Theoretical and technical 
modifications 
Changes in the 
TEMPORAL 
dimension of the 
Self 
Initiation of a Therapeutic 
Cycle: difficulty using events 
from the past and possible future 
scenarios, as session material.  
Use real life events as 'breaches' to 
access subjective experience of conflict 
  
Close coordination with relatives and 
work colleagues to spot events of 
emotional significance 
 
  
Flexible management of sessions' 
frequency to capture events of 
emotional significance 
 
  
Alternate individual sessions with 
couple and family sessions to mimic 
real life situations  
 
  
Incorporate field trips to explore, with 
the patient, real life situations 
 
  
Therapeutic Bond, Task team-
work: difficulty coordinating 
positions of control and 
initiative 
Enhancing patient's sense of agency by 
calibrating when and how much help is 
needed 
Changes in the 
REFLECTIVE 
dimension of the 
Self 
Positive In-session impact, 
Insight: difficulty generating 
awareness of motivations and 
making sense of emotional 
responses  
Teaching patient to 'flag' somatic 
responses to events 
  Collaborative generation of a set of 
'typical' causes, or events, that trigger 
somatic responses 
 
  Prolonged exposure to information or 
repetition  
 
  Generalization of insight to other 
situations and use of significant others 
to reinforce new mental schemas 
 
  Use of personally compelling 
metaphors  
 
  Use of external graphic organizers (e.g. 
identity maps) 
 
Negative In-session impact: 
difficulty tolerating negative 
arousal when exploring 
Monitoring and manipulating patient's 
level of negative arousal 
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psychological conflict 
 
 Facilitate cognitive processing without 
compromising patient's sense of agency 
 
 
Therapeutic Bond, Personal 
Rapport: difficulty generating 
emotionally-driven cognitions 
about the patient-therapist 
relationship 
 
Use of graphic organizers, metaphors 
and repetition/generalization principles 
 
 
Therapeutic Bond, Personal 
Rapport: difficulty attuning to a 
concrete mode of experience 
 
Adopting a Bottom-up therapeutic 
stance: staying in the present moment 
and attending to somatic and affective 
responses 
 
  
Flexible shifting between concrete and 
abstract modes of functioning 
  
   
Elaborate mourning feelings associated 
to working with non-abstract patients. 
 
 
Table 4: Summary of technical modifications when working with concrete patients.
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3.1. Inside-out: comparing internally generated and 
externally generated basic emotions10. 
 
3.1.1. Abstract 
 
A considerable number of mood induction (MI) procedures have been developed to elicit 
emotion in normal and clinical populations. Although external procedures (e.g. film clips, 
pictures) are widely used, a number of experiments elicit emotion by using self-generated 
procedures (e.g. recalling an emotional personal episode). However, no study has directly 
compared the effectiveness of two types of internal versus external MI across multiple 
discrete emotions. In the present experiment, 40 undergraduate students watched film clips 
(external procedure) and recalled personal events (internal procedure) inducing four basic 
emotions (fear, anger, joy, sadness) and completing later a self-report questionnaire. 
Remarkably, both internal and external procedures elicited target emotions selectively, 
compared to non-target emotions. When contrasting the intensity of target emotions, both 
techniques showed no significant differences, with the exception of Joy, which was more 
intensely elicited by the internal procedure. Importantly, when considering the overall level 
of intensity, it was always greater in the internal procedure, for each stimulus. A more 
detailed investigation of the data suggests that recalling personal events (a type of internal 
procedure) generates more negative and mixed blends of emotions, which might account for 
the overall higher intensity of the internal mood induction.  
  
                                                 
10 Salas, C. E., Radovic, D. & Turnbull, O. H. (2011). Inside-out: Comparing internally generated and externally 
generated basic emotions. Emotion. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1037/a0025811 
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3.1.2. Introduction 
The study of emotion is today a mature field, with its own standardized measures, induction 
procedures, data analytic techniques, sub-disciplines and core theoretical debates (Coan & 
Allen, 2007). A number of mood induction (MI) procedures have been devised to elicit and 
manipulate emotional response, using a diverse range of techniques such as self-referential 
statements (Kenealy, 1986; Velten, 1968), posing facial expression (Ekman, 2007; Laird, 
Wagener, Halal & Szegda, 1982), autobiographical recall (Averill, 1982; Barlett, Burleson & 
Santrock, 1982; Brewer, Doughtie & Lubin, 1980, Camras & Allison, 1989; Izard, 1972, 
1977; Schaefer & Philippot, 2005; Scherer, Walbott & Summerfiel, 1986; Shaver, Schwartz, 
.LUVRQ	2¶&RQQRU, 1987; Turnbull, Evans & Owen, 2004), imagery (Wright & Mischel, 
1982), film clips (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Hagemann et al., 1999; Hewig, Hagemann, 
Seifert, Naumann & Bartussek, 2005; Philippot, 1993; Rottenberg, Ray & Gross, 2007; 
Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez & Philippot, 2010), music (Eich, Ng, Macaulay, Percy & Grebneva, 
2007;  Vastfjall, 2000), positive and negative performance feedback (Farmer et al., 2006; 
Isen, Clark, Shalker & Karp, 1978), social interactions (Roberts, Tsai & Coan, 2007) or a 
combination of the above mentioned (Berna et al., 2010; Furman, Hamilton, Joorman & 
Gotlib, 2010; Harkness, Jacobson, Duong & Sabbagh, 2010). 
The development and validation of these MI procedures is of special relevance since 
different scientific related fields rely on them, for instance, to elicit and measure emotion in 
clinical populations (Gemar, Segal, Sagrati & Kennedy, 2001; Hunt & Forand, 2005; Scher, 
Ingram & Segal, 2005; Van der Does, 2002), or to map the neurological basis of affective 
processes (Damasio et al., 2000; Kimbrell et al., 1999; Najib, Lorberbaum, Kose, Bohning & 
Mark, 2004; Posse et al., 2003). Until now emotional pictures (Bradley & Lang, 2007; Lang, 
Bradley & Cutbert, 2008) and film clips (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Hewig et al., 2005; 
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Rottenberg et al., 2007) have been the best standardized and the most widely used tools. 
However, when comparing the effectiveness of different MI procedures in eliciting target 
emotions, the evidence is rather scarce, and at least 15 years old. In one of these reports, 
Martin (1990) observed that the use of self-referential techniques (the so called Velten 
procedure), and the facial expression technique, showed on average 50% of success eliciting 
a target emotion. In contrast, imagination, music, films and autobiographical recall reached 
levels of 75%. According to the Westerman, Spies, Stahl and Hesse (1996) meta-analysis of 
MI procedures, the most effective technique for inducing elated and depressed mood is 
films/histories, paired with explicit instructions to the participants during the induction 
process. 
Although the available evidence seems to suggest that films are a robust MI procedure 
(Rottenberg et al., 2007, for a review), several studies have moved towards the more 
internally generated approach of autobiographical recall, as a means of eliciting emotions 
(Damasio et al., 2000; Harrison et al., 2008; Phan, Wager, Taylor & Liberzon, 2002; Turnbull 
et al., 2004). The rationale behind this choice appears to lie in the assumption that internally-
generated approaches have more ecological validity, since it uses personal events with 
individual meaning. Such a claim seems supported by evidence that relates higher emotional 
intensity to particular types of autobiographical memory (Philippot, Schaefer & Herbette, 
2003), and also from literature suggesting that some discrete emotions (e.g anger, fear) may 
not be as intensely elicited when using films (externally generated) compared to self-
generated stimuli (Harmon-Jones, Amodio & Zinner, 2007; Levenson, 2007; Lobbestael, 
Arntz & Wiers, 2008; Rottenberg, Ray & Gross, 2007). A distinction of this sort, between 
internal and external MI procedures, has been proposed before by Gerrards-Hesse, Spies and 
Hesse (1994), who suggest that MI procedures such as autobiographical recall are based on 
WKH ³IUHHPHQWDO´ JHQHUDWLRQ RI HPRWLRQDO VWDWHVZKLOH LQ ILOP FOLSV WKH HPRWLRQ LQGXFLQJ
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PDWHULDO LV ³SUHVHQWHG´ IURP WKH RXWVLGH ,W LV FOHDU that a substantial limitation of this 
literature is the absence of empirical findings that allow us to directly compare the internal-
external dimension. 
One of the main problems in evaluating the relative merits of induction procedures is 
the shortage of articles that use or compare more than one technique (for exceptions see 
Chartier & Ranieri, 1989; Clark, 1983; Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983; Lobbestael, Arntz & 
Wiers, 2008; Martin, 1990). Although not directly comparing different MI procedures in the 
same experiment, the available meta-analyses have suggested that film clips (with no 
instruction) and autobiographical recall show no difference in their efficacy to induce 
negative emotions, while films clips are more effective generating positive emotional states 
(Gerrards-Hesse et al., 1994; Westerman et al., 1996). Bearing in mind the well-established 
position of film clips, but the increased usage of self-generated procedures, and with the 
assumption that internally-sourced stimuli have an advantage over externally-sourced stimuli, 
it seems timely to compare these two internal (autobiographical recall) and external (film 
clips) procedures in terms of their efficacy in eliciting specific emotions.  
Another relevant issue when comparing the efficacy of MI procedures in eliciting 
emotions is the extent to which experimental designs include more than one emotion. Twenty 
years ago, Martin (1990) reported that most of the MI procedures have not investigated 
systematically the full range of basic emotions. For instance, there were no studies inducing 
fear or anger through autobiographical recall, or experiments that used film clips to elicit 
anger. In the last decade this panorama has changed, and several studies have progressively 
targeted a wider range of basic emotions using autobiographical recall (Damasio et al., 2000; 
Ray, Gross & Wilhem, 2008; Rivers, Brackett, Katulak & Salovey, 2007; Wenzel, Jackson, 
Brendle & Pinna, 2003), film clips (Rottenberg et al., 2007, for a review) and mixed 
procedures (Mayer, Allen & Beauregard, 1995). However, we are not aware of studies that 
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have directly compared external (e.g. films) and internal (e.g. autobiographical recall) 
procedures across multiple discrete emotions. The need to assess multiple basic emotions 
simultaneously is extremely relevant to the issue of selectivity. In other words, when we 
intend to elicit a specific emotion (e.g. fear), do we only generate fear, or are other emotions 
also generated (e.g. anger or sadness)? An approach of this sort seems vital, given that several 
authors have suggested that MI procedures may elicit more than one emotional state (Izard, 
1972; Polivy, 1981; Westerman et al., 1996), and that basic emotions (e.g. sad/anger) may 
correlate (Zelinski & Larsen, 2000).  
In sum, there are a number of questions in the emotion elicitation literature that are of 
considerable methodological interest, and remain unanswered. Our study had two main goals: 
to compare the selectivity of two types of internal and external MI procedures eliciting target 
emoWLRQVHJGRHVµIHDU¶HOLFLWRQO\IHDU"DQGWRFRPSDUHWKH intensity levels of emotional 
experience between these two internal and external MI procedures (e.g. is internally-
generated fear more intense?). 
 
3.1.3. Method 
3.13.1. Participants 
The participants for this study were 33 female and 7 male psychology undergraduates, who 
received course credits for their participation. The subjects were between 18 to 28 years old 
(M = 19.7, SD = 1.8). Individuals who were not English native speakers were excluded, to 
avoid the confounding effect of anxiety and emotional distress caused by language demands 
of the Affective Story Recall task.  
Although this sample was imbalanced on male/female proportion, we decided not to 
exclude males in order to avoid a significant decrease in the power of the study. To explore 
the effect of gender imbalance in the sample, a similar analysis to the one that is described in 
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the result section was performed, excluding the 7 male participants (n=33). The results of this 
analysis showed a similar trend to the one observed considering both sex groups (n=40).  
 
3.1.3.2. Stimuli 
3.1.3.2.1. Film Stimuli  
Four emotional clips, and two neutral clips were used, each of them matching one of the four 
basic emotions described by Panksepp (1998). These clips have been previously validated 
regarding their capacity to elicit specific and discrete emotions (Gross & Levenson, 1995; 
Hewig et al., 2005; Rottenberg, Ray & Gross, 2007). The neutral clips, $ODVND¶V:LOG'HQDOL 
(Hardesty, 1997), VKRZHG$ODVND¶s landscapes and wild life, and both were 150s in length. 
The Joy film, Bill Cosby Himself (Cosby, 1983), showed a standup comedy performance by 
Bill Cosby (121s). The Sadness clip, The Champ (Zeffirelli, 1979), showed a young boy 
facing the sudden death of his father after a boxing match (171s). The Fear clip, The Shining 
(Kubrick, 1980), showed a young boy alone in the hall of a Hotel before he opens the door of 
a room, whilst anxiety-inducing music plays in the background (122s). Finally, the anger clip, 
My Bodyguard (Bill, 1980), showed a young man who is bullied and humiliated (246s).  
 
3.1.3.2.2. Affective Story Recall Stimuli 
In the Affective Story Recall task (ASR), developed by Turnbull et al. (2004), participants 
were asked to recall a series of personal experiences, from events in their life, related to 
specific emotions. In this study we used the same discrete emotions as in the film clips 
(anger, joy, sadness and fear). Two neutral recall conditions (going shopping and fixing a 
meal) were added at the beginning and end of the task, to calculate initial and final baselines. 
Each recall was prompted with the following phrase: ³7U\WRUHFDOODQHYHQWLQ\RXUOLIHWKDW
has FDXVHG\RXWRIHHO«(e.g. anger). 7U\WREHYHU\GHWDLOHGDERXWWKHZD\\RXIHHO´. Each 
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participant had a maximum of 3 minutes to describe the event, although they could extend 
this if they felt they have not finished yet the story after the three minutes, or even finish 
before if they felt they have nothing else to say. A minimum of time was not set in order to 
avoid that task instructions could activate negative emotions by adding pressure and anxiety 
to the recollection11. 
 
3.1.3.3. Measures 
To generate several emotional measures after each clip and story, we designed a shortened 
version of the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994), the PANAS-XS. The PANAS-X is a 60 
items self-report that assesses specific emotional states. It has a general dimension of positive 
and negative affect, but also includes specific scales for discrete emotions. Participants are 
asked to rate each of the 60 emotional words (e.g. cheerful, hostile, shaky) indicating the 
extent to which they felt each emotion according to a 5-point scale (very slightly or not at all, 
a little, moderately, quite a bit and extremely). The adaptation of the PANAS-X to the 
PANAS-XS is justified by the need for a shorter version to use when emotional states need to 
be assessed in the same experiment several times, as is the case when reporting the subjective 
states of neutral conditions and four basic emotions during the film clips and ASR. The 
adaptation was produced by taking the elicitor of each basic emotion addressed in this study 
from the PANAS-X, and asking 20 male and 20 female university students to rate them 
according to how representative they felt each word was of each discrete emotion. The two 
words with the highest, and the word with the lowest overall score, were selected. 12 items 
                                                 
11 The average time in seconds for each emotion recollection was: Joy (M = 89.90, SD = 38.88), Anger (M = 
105.42, SD = 45.13),  Fear (M = 105.11, SD = 44.86), Sadness (M = 111.989.90, SD = 54.70). Only Joy was 
significantly different from the three negative emotions, in the average leght participants used to recall the story 
(F(3, 37) = 7.326. p < .001). The range of duration was: Joy 40s-177s; Anger 32s-187s; Fear 38s-198s; Sadness 
40s-236s.  
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finally compose the PANAS-XS: happy, joyful, and energetic (joy); sad, downhearted and 
alone (sadness); angry, hostile and disgusted (anger); scared, afraid and shaky (fear).  
 
3.1.3.4. Procedure 
Participants individually attended a 90-minute assessment session. They were told that they 
would be asked to recall personal events in relation to certain emotions. In addition they 
would have to watch clips from movies in the screen of a computer and report how they made 
them feel. Finally they were also informed that they would have to complete two 
questionnaires between tasks [see appendix 1].  
ASR and film clip tasks were counterbalanced in their order of appearance across 
participants to avoid possible order effects. In the ASR task participants sat in front of the 
experimenter. Next to the experimenter there was a computer that displayed a digital 
chronometer, so they could check the time left for each story (3 min max.). Before beginning 
the task the researcher explained the ASR task in some detail, and asked for a neutral episode, 
as a way of familiarizing the participant with the task, and obtaining a baseline measure. The 
order of the emotional clips was counterbalanced to control for possible order effects. Thus, 
four conditions were generated, considering that we were interested in observing the three 
possible ways in which negative emotions might interact, and the three possible ways in 
which positive and negative emotions might also interact (N1-F-S-J-A-N2; N1-S-A-F-J-N2; 
N1-A-J-S-F-N2; N1-J-F-A-S-N2). Participants were randomly allocated to each of them. 
After the first neutral episode, participants were introduced to how to fill in the PANAS-XS, 
asking them specifically to rate the highest amount of each emotional state (PANAS-XS 
words) they felt while recalling the personal event. They were also asked to register any other 
emotion they could have felt, but which was not described in the PANAS-XS. The same 
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procedure was repeated after each story recall. When the ASR was finished, participants took 
five minutes to answer two questionnaires.  
Before starting the Film Clips task, participants were told that they would watch clips 
from movies, and that they would be asked to report how each clip made them feel. The order 
of exposure to the film clips was counterbalanced using the same four conditions as in the 
ASR. Instructions were displayed on the screen, asking to fix their gaze on the screen and 
watch the clips carefully. After each clip an instruction asked them to answer the PANAS-
XS. This procedure was repeated after each video. Once each of the PANAS-XS was 
completed, an instruction asked the participants to press a key to continue. A debriefing 
procedure followed the test.  
 
3.1.3.5.Score Data Analysis 
The average score of each PANAS-XS subscale (Fear, Sadness, Joy and Anger) was 
calculated, this for each eliciting stimulus (Neutral 1, Fear, Sadness, Joy, Anger and Neutral 
2), on both tasks (ASR and FC). To test the Selectivity hypothesis these averaged scores were 
compared, using a repeated measures design. In the cases where the sphericity assumption 
was not respected, Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used (for Greenhouse-*HLVVHU¶V
(SVLORQ EHWZHHQ  DQG  RU PXOWLYDULDWH 3LOODL¶V 7UDFH VWDWLVWLF ZDV UHSRUWHG IRU
Greenhouse-*HLVVHU¶V (SVLORQ OHVV WKDQ . The differences between the target emotion 
score and the other emotions were calculated using a simple contrast, with the target emotion 
as reference. The Intensity hypothesis was assessed for each stimulus using a paired sample t-
test, first for the average of emotional intensity, and then for the target emotion intensity for 
both instruments. To explore further this hypothesis the average scores of the positive and 
negative non-target emotions were also compared using paired-sample t-test. In addition, 
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association measures between target and non-target emotions were calculated, using 
3HDUVRQ¶VELYDULDWHFRUUHODWLRQV 
 
3.1.4. Results 
The present study tested two hypotheses: a) The internal and external elicitation procedures 
will elicit the target emotion with greater intensity than any other basic emotion (Selectivity) 
b) The emotions elicited by the self-generated procedure will show greater intensity than the 
ones generated by the external procedure (Intensity).  
 
3.1.4.1.Selectivity 
In relation to the Selectivity hypothesis, both MI procedures elicited each of the four target 
emotions with higher levels of intensity than the other three emotions, demonstrating that 
internal (Affective Story Recall) and external (Film Clips) procedures are equally effective 
inducing an emotion selectively. The PANAS-;6 VXEVFDOH¶V DYHUDJH LQWHQVLW\ IRU HDFK RI
the four eliciting emotions, in both tasks, is illustrated in Figure 1. 
As Figure 1 shows, differences in the average intensity between the target emotion 
and the other emotions, across the four emotional stimulus, are observed in the internal (Fear: 
v= .67,  f(3, 37)= 25.03, p< .01; Sadness: f(2.61, 101.86)= 88.44, p< .01; Joy: v= .92,  f(3, 37)= 
148.91, p< .01; and Anger: f(3, 99.13)= 43.79, p< .01) , and external (Fear: v= .76,  f(3, 37)= 
39.45, p< .01; Sadness: v= .89, f(3, 37)= 95.85, p< .01; Joy: v= .85,  f(3, 37)= 67.02, p< .01; and 
Anger: f(2.64, 102.88)= 100.20, p< .01) procedure. Thus, the comparison between the target 
emotion and the other three emotions was statistically significant for each stimulus, and for 
both tasks, showing higher levels of intensity for the target emotion in each case (see Table 
1), with large effect sizes.  
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3.1.4.2.Intensity 
In relation to the Intensity hypothesis data was analyzed in three steps. Firstly, the intensity of 
the target emotion was compared between both MI procedures (e.g. when eliciting fear, are 
there differences in the score of fear between the internal and external procedures?). Using 
this approach, only Joy appeared significantly higher in the story recall than in the film clips. 
When eliciting sadness, anger or fear, it appears to make no difference whether we use 
internal or external MI procedures (see Table 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
Figure 1:  PANAS-XS scores across four basic emotions, for internal (Affective Story Recall) and external 
(Film Clips) stimuli.  In each case the internal and external procedure selectively induce the target emotion.  
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   Affective Story recall Film Clips 
Target emotion Non target  emotion Paired Dif F p d Paired Dif F p d 
 Fear Joy 1.28 28.83 < .01 1.84 1.30 48.07 < .01 2.68 
 Anger 1.36 75.14 < .01 1.61 1.35 99.99 < .01 2.68 
  Sadness 0.71 33.08 < .01 0.74 1.01 71.03 < .01 1.40 
Anger Joy 1.69 107.7 < .01 2.68 1.67 216.67 < .01 3.71 
 Fear 1.15 42.91 < .01 1.41 1.48 157.64 < .01 2.56 
  Sadness 0.54 12.36 < .01 0.60 0.93 94.61 < .01 1.45 
Joy Anger 2.48 451.2 < .01 4.12 1.68 189.54 < .01 3.52 
 Fear 2.32 221.7 < .01 3.53 1.73 204.37 < .01 3.61 
  Sadness 2.48 364.8 < .01 4.15 1.72 187.13 < .01 3.56 
Sadness  Joy 1.98 262.31 < .01 3.89 1.96 248.85 < .01 3.68 
 Fear 1.13 90.03 < .01 1.48 1.47 216.34 < .01 2.27 
  Anger 1.50 202.5 < .01 1.73 1.65 277.19 < .01 2.58 
 
Table 1: Difference between Target emotion and other emotions in internal (Affective Story 
Recall), and external (Film Clips), eliciting procedures. Internal and external procedures elicit 
selectively the target emotion.  
 
 
 
 
 Affective Story Recall Film Clips Paired Differences 
Target Mean (SD) Mean (SD) ASR-FC t p D 
Fear in FEAR 2.76 1.18 2.54 1,02 0.21 0.98 0.33 0.20 
Sadness in SAD 3.08 0.73 3.00 0.74 0.08 0.56 0.58 0.11 
Joy in JOY 3.53 0.78 2.74 0.77 0.79* 6.51 < 0.01 1.02 
Anger in ANGER 2.94 0.99 2.90 0.71 0.04 0.30 0.77 0.05 
 
Table 2: Target emotion intensity comparison between internal (Affective Story Recall), and external (Film 
Clips), eliciting procedures. Only Joy is significantly higher on the internally generated procedure. 
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As a second step, a general intensity level was calculated averaging the PANAS-XS 
score of all emotions (fear, sadness, anger, joy), and then comparing them between 
procedures (e.g. when eliciting fear, is the average intensity of the 4 basic emotions different 
between internal and external procedures?). As a result we obtained that the internal 
procedure average emotional intensity was significantly higher than the external procedure 
(see Table 3) in each of the four stimuli. 
 
 Affective Story Recall Film Clips Paired Differences 
Stimuli Mean (SD) Mean (SD) ASR-FC t p d 
Fear 1.92 0.58 1.63 0.44 0.29*  3.10 .004 0.57 
Sadness 1.93 0.53 1.73 0.36 0.20*  2.21 .033 0.45 
Joy 1.72 0.26 1.46 0.20 0.26*  7.07 < .001 1.11 
Anger 2.09 0.58 1.85 0.40 0.23*  2.75 .009 0.47 
 
Table 3: Average emotional intensity comparison between internal (Affective Story Recall) and external (Film 
Clips) mood induction procedures. When all PANAS-XS scores are averaged in each stimulus, the internal 
procedure (Affective Story Recall) is significantly higher. 
 
Because the target emotion did not differ significantly between internal and external 
procedures (with the exception of joy), but the general intensity level was higher in the 
internal one, differences in the associated emotions between procedures were explored. Thus, 
two scores were generated for each stimulus, one for the non-target positive emotion and 
another for the non-target negative emotions (e.g. when eliciting fear, is the average intensity 
of the non-target negative emotions [sadness and anger], or positive emotion [joy], higher in 
the internal procedure?). As a result, when eliciting any of the negative emotions (e.g. fear), 
the average score of the non-target negative emotions (e.g. anger & sadness) was always 
significantly higher in the internal procedure (Fear t(39)=3.59, p< .001; Sadness t(39)=2.65, p= 
.01; Anger t(37)=3.15, p< .001) with a medium effect size (Fear d= 0.65; Sadness d= 0.53; 
Anger d= 0.62). As for the positive non-target emotion (joy), only when eliciting fear it was 
significantly higher (t(39)=3.30, p< .001) in the internal procedure, with a small effect size (d= 
0.42). An unexpected finding was that when eliciting a positive emotion (joy), the negative 
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non-target emotions (anger, sadness, fear) were also significantly higher (t(39)= 2.30, p= .03) 
with a medium effect size (d= 0.47). Considering these findings, it is not possible to conclude 
that the higher general level of intensity generated by the internal procedure is explained 
exclusively by higher scores on the valence-like (positive or negative) non-target emotions. 
Finally, to explore even further the relationship between target and non-target 
emotions, associations between the target and non-target emotions were calculated for each 
stimulus, in both tasks (See Table 4). For the internally-generated procedure, when a negative 
stimulus was presented, the target emotions always showed positive associations with the 
non-target negative emotions. In the externally generated procedure, negative target and non-
target emotions were also positively associated, with the exception of Anger (target) ± Fear 
(non-target). Regarding the association of positive and negative emotions, the only significant 
association found was in the internal procedure, where Joy (target) was negatively associated 
to Anger (non-target).  
 
 
 
 Anger Sadness Fear Joy 
Target ASR FC ASR FC ASR FC ASR FC 
Anger 1 1 0.53* 0.61* 0.33*  0.27 0.12 0.21 
Sadness 0.61* 0.54* 1 1 0.62*  0.55* 0.04 -0.16 
Fear 0.55* 0.70* 0.71* 0.67* 1 1 -0.18 -0.10 
Joy -0.35*  0.06 -0.14 -0.15 -0.03 0.05 1 1 
 
Table 4: Associations between discrete emotions in the internal (Affective Story Recall), and external (Film 
Clips), mood induction procedures.  
 
 
 
3.1.5. A methodological comment 
One possible criticism of these results is that the elicitation of multiple emotions in a single 
session generates contamination between emotional episodes, or produces an overall affective 
arousal reducing emotion selectivity. To investigate this issue we conducted a series of 
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investigations of possible order effects. These demonstrated that the magnitude of the target 
emotion was, no higher in initial, versus central, versus late presentations using film clips 
(Fear F (3,36) = 1.89, p=.15; Sadness F(3,36) = 0.94, p=.43; Joy F(3,36) = 0.76, p=.55; Anger 
F(3,36) = 0.75, p=.53) and affective story recall (Fear F(3,36) = 2.51, p=.07; Sadness F(3,36) = 
1.48, p=.24; Joy F(3,36) = 0.88, p=.46; Anger F(3,34) = 1.09, p=.37). Moreover, the extent to 
which non-target emotions was elicited was also not significantly different across 
presentation order. 
 
 
3.1.6. Discussion 
As reviewed in the introduction, it has become clear that while emotion elicitation techniques 
are widely employed, several key issues remain under-investigated. Issues of effectiveness 
are probably the major concern: does a chosen MI procedure elicit the target emotion, and is 
one MI procedure more effective than another in eliciting a specific emotion? Given the 
central importance of these questions in the design for experimental work in the field, it is re-
assuring to note that our results demonstrate that the affective story recall (internal MIP) and 
film clips (external MIP) were equally effective in selectively eliciting the target emotion 
intended (e.g. fear), to the exclusion of other emotions (e.g. sadness, anger, joy, see Figure 1). 
One possible objection to the finding that the stimuli generate emotions which are 
selective to the target emotion is the issue of demand characteristics- that is that participants 
report that they have experience fear because they have been told to recall fearful life events 
or to watch fearful clips. Two points relate to this issue. Firstly, in the externally elicited 
procedure (film clips) we followed the widely employed guidelines designed specifically to 
avoid demand characteristics (Rottenberg, Ray & Gross, 2007). These generated, as expected, 
experiential evaluations which were higher for the target emotions, but also distributed to 
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non-target emotions (especially for negative-related target emotions). For the internally 
generated stimuli (affective story recall) there is, of course, a greater risk of demand 
characteristics, because participants are specifically requested to recall a single emotion (e.g. 
fear). Importantly, the reports of non-target emotions (e.g. sadness and anger) are also found 
for using this procedure ± and non-target activation levels are just as easily elicited in the 
internally generated process as they are for externally generated stimuli. On this basis, 
demand characteristics do not seem to be a central factor in explaining the findings relating to 
emotion specificity. 
$ IXUWKHU ZD\ RI DGGUHVVLQJ WKH µHIIHFWLYHQHVV¶ LVVXH FRPHV IURP FRPSDULQJ WKH
intensity of target emotions between procedures -by establishing which generates the stronger 
response in participants. The results of the present study show the interesting finding that 
only Joy appears to produce significantly higher levels of reported emotion when elicited by 
the internally generated procedure. This result does differ from that of Westerman et al. 
(1996), though their study did not compare the same participants in both internal and external 
procedures. 
A second goal of the present study was to explore whether an internal (affective story 
recall) and external procedure (film clips) differed in the intensity of the emotions they 
generated (i.e. the average of all positive and negative emotions experienced while exposed 
to a fear stimulus). Notably, this was significantly higher for the internal procedure, for each 
stimulus. Thus, although the intensity of target emotions did not differ significantly when 
using an internal or external elicitation technique (with the exception of joy), the internal 
procedure tended to generate a greater level of overall emotional arousal.  
Several possible explanations might account for this overall higher intensity of the 
LQWHUQDOSURFHGXUH$ILUVWSRVVLELOLW\LVWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VFRUHVLQWKHILOPFOLSVZHUHPRUH
widely distributed than the ASR, lowering the average score of all emotions. However, this 
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seemed unlikely, considering that the standard deviation of the overall averaged scores was 
always greater in the internal procedure (see Table 3).  
A second possibility considered is that internal mood induction procedures activated 
the associated non-target emotions with greater intensity than external procedures, because of 
its greater ecological validity. In other words, that when eliciting a negative emotion (e.g. 
fear) other negative non-target emotions (e.g. anger and sadness) may be activated more 
intensively. This claim is supported by previous studies examining realistic emotion, which 
suggested that negative emotion-producing situations are often complex and produce more 
than one emotional state (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Polivy, 1981; Scherer & Tannenbaum, 
1986). However, the results of the present study did not support this explanation, or at least 
only supported it incompletely. When eliciting a negative emotion, the average of the 
associated non-target emotions was always higher in the internal procedure. However, this 
effect was not restricted to the associated non-target negative emotions. Thus, when fear was 
internally generated, joy (a non-target positive emotion) also appeared to be significantly 
higher, and when eliciting joy, negative non-target emotions (e.g. anger, sadness, fear) also 
were more intensively activated. In conclusion, it appears that the higher overall intensity of 
the internal procedure may not be exclusively explained by the higher intensity of valence-
like emotions (negative blends) but to a higher intensity of all kind of emotions (negative 
blends and mixed blends).  
It is possible to suggest that the overall higher intensity of the internal procedure may 
be related to the fact that recalling an emotional event is a more complex and dynamic 
process than observing a film clip- generating positive, negative and mixed blends of 
emotion. In fact, a qualitative analysis of the stories recalled by the participants (see 
Appendix 3) appears to supports this hypothesis. For instance, when asked to recall an 
µDQJU\¶HYHQWH[DPSOH$DOWHUQDWHVEHWZHHQDQJHU µI absolute hated these girls who went to 
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GRWKDWWRP\VLVWHU¶DQGVDGQHVVFRQWHQWVµ,cry a lot because she is going through so much 
and she is my baby VLVWHU DQG ,¶P VXSSRVHG WR SURWHFW KHU¶ ,Q WKLV SDUWLFXODU HPRWLRQDO
event, it appears that different emotions seem to be simultaneously directed to different 
µREMHFWV¶DQJHUWRZDUGWKHEXOO\LQJJLUOVDQGVDGQHVVDERXWKHUVLVWHU 
The case of example B (Fear) and D (Joy) are clear instances of how negative and 
positive emotions may unfold sequentially over time, in an apparently interactive fashion. In 
VXEMHFW%WKHH[SHULHQFHRIIHDUµ,NHSWKHDULQJQRLVHVXSVWDLUVDQG,MXVWVRUWRIfroze¶ZDV
followed by a more positive feeling, a mixture of embarrassment for being previously scared 
µLWZDVWKHFDWSOD\LQJDURXQG«IHHOLQJDELWVWXSLGDERXWP\VHOI¶DQGUHOLHIµDQGWKHQ,IHOW
VRUWRIFDOP¶,QH[DPSOH'WKHH[SHULHQFHRIMR\µJHWWLQJD$Zas very, very exciting and 
it made me feel very KDSS\¶LVWHPSRUDULO\LQWHUUXSWHGE\WKHQHJDWLYHHPRWLRQRIIHDUµWKH
3URIHVVRUFDPHWRPHDQGVDLG³FDQZHXVH\RXUHVVD\LQWKHFODVVDVDQH[DPSOH",ZDVD
bit VFDUHG¶. It seems important to emphasize here how an emotion of different valence may 
emerge as a response of the subject to the initial emotional state (example B), or because an 
external event changes the initial trajectory of the emotional experience (example D). 
In sum, it appears that a possible explanation of the higher overall intensity of the 
internal procedure might be related to the dynamic nature and complexity by which positive 
and negative emotions unfold when people recall emotional events from their life. This is 
consistent with the observation of higher frequency of positive blends, negative blends and 
mixed blends in real life scenarios (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Scherer & Tannenbaum, 1986; 
Scherer et al., 2004). However, it remains a matter of further research whether this 
complexity is inherent to emotional life itself, or is an artefact of the process of recollection. 
The findings of this study also contribute to an on-going discussion regarding whether 
some mood induction procedures are better eliciting specific emotions. For example, one 
strand of literature suggests that anger may be difficult to elicit using film clips or 
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photographs (Harmon-Jones, Amodio & Zinner, 2007; Levenson, 2007; Rottenberg et al., 
2007) - whereas personal and interactive procedures are more effective inducers (Harmon-
Jones, Amodio & Zinner, 2007). However, these findings have been at their most clear with 
respect to physiological reactivity, and are less apparent in self-report (Lobbestael, Arntz & 
Wiers, 2008). In addition, there are a number of practical issues following from the use of 
interactive procedures - which usually require deception. Most notably, interactive 
procedures may well be unsuitable (or unethical) when exploring emotion in vulnerable 
groups, such as psychiatric or neurological populations. In consequence, although is 
necessary to acknowledge that some eliciting procedures may better activate of specific 
emotions (or some aspects thereof), the sorts of emotional induction procedures reported in 
the present study also have clear advantages of experimental control (one procedure for all 
emotions), and benefits as regards practical matters of implementation across various clinical 
populations. 
In conclusion, the findings of this study appear to support the use of both internally 
and externally generated procedures in emotion elicitation research, by demonstrating that the 
recall of personal events (internal) is equally effective in selectively eliciting emotions when 
compared with well-standardized film clips (external). Furthermore, the findings of the 
present study suggest that affective story recall may be more suitable for experiments 
targeting positive emotions such as joy, or experiments aiming to produce higher levels of 
arousal.  
Future research comparing the effectiveness of internal versus external MI procedures 
would also benefit by measuring other components of emotional response, such as behaviour 
and physiology. In addition, the consideration of age (including, for example, the greater 
sadness reactivity in older people, see Seider, Shiota, Whalen & Levenson, 2011) and gender 
3.1. Internal and External Emotion Elicitation 
 
164 
 
related issues (i.e. Brody & Hall, 2008) might reveal differences in patterns of response to 
specific emotional stimuli.  
The use of internal procedures, such as the ASR, seems especially useful when 
exploring the dynamic aspect of emotional response. Because of the complexity of recalling a 
personal emotional event, emotional blends more readily can be observed. However, it 
remains a matter for future investigation whether these blends are better explained by 
sequential or simultaneous patterns of emotional experience (do participants experience two 
emotions simultaneously, although they appear to be sequential because of the linear nature 
of verbal narrative?), or if they are related to the complexities of the scenarios in which they 
unfold (as in example A, where two different emotions are directed towards two different 
objects in the same situation).  
The scientific investigation of MI procedures appears to have favoured the use of 
externally generated stimuli (such as emotional pictures or film clips). This was a quite 
natural response to the desire for sound experimental control by the field, presumably with 
the expectation that a less controlled stimulus (recalling a personal event) might generate 
unpredictable and unreliable findings. The present study suggests that an internally generated 
MI procedure, such as the affective story recall, can produce effects that are as reliable as an 
external technique. Furthermore, such an approach opens the opportunity to investigate 
internally generated procedures in more detail, which by virtue of its verbal nature, provide a 
richer source of introspective data related to the subjective quality of emotional experience. 
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3.2. Internally and externally generated emotions in 
people with acquired brain injury: A brief report on 
right hemisphere damage. 
 
 
3.2.1. Abstract 
The study of emotional changes after brain injury has contributed enormously to the 
understanding of the neural basis of emotion. However, little attention has been placed on the 
methods used to elicit emotional responses in people with acquired brain damage. Of 
particular interest, for the topic of emotion elicitation, are subjects with unilateral right 
hemisphere [RH] lesions, whom have been described as presenting significant impairment in 
emotional processing and reactivity. In this article, an internal [affective story recall] and 
external [film clips] mood induction procedure [MIP] were used to trigger positive [joy] and 
negative [sadness] emotions, in a sample of 10 subjects with unilateral RH damage and 15 
KHDOWK\PDWFKHG FRQWUROV7KH SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ VXEMHFWLYH HPRWLRQDO H[SHULHQFHZDV UHJLVWHUed 
by using a self-report questionnaire. As observed in previous studies, internal and external 
MIPs were equally effective selectively eliciting the target emotion. However, the internal 
procedure generated higher levels of emotional intensity when compared to the external. 
There were no significant group differences in relation to the level of intensity elicited by 
both MIPs, thus suggesting that participants with RH lesions were equally able to experience 
positive and negative affect.  The results are discussed specifically in relation to the role of 
the RH in the capacity to experience negative emotions.  
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3.2.2. Introduction 
Research on emotional changes after acquired brain injury has a long history (Adolphs, 
2007; Borod, 2000; Gainotti, 1972, 2001), contributing to growing understanding of the 
neural basis of several emotional processes, such as emotional perception (e.g. Adolphs, 
Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Damasio, 2000; Borod, Bloom, Brickman, Nakhutina, & Curko, 
2010; Tsuchida & Fellows, 2012), expression (e.g. Borod et al., 2010; Kazandjian, Borod, & 
Brickman, 2007; Nakhutina, Borod, & Zgaljardic, 2006) and experience (e.g. Anderson & 
Phelps, 2002; Feinstein, Adolphs, Damasio, & Tranel, 2010; Feinstein, Duff, & Tranel, 2010; 
Feinstein, 2013; Gillihan et al., 2010; Hornak et al., 2003).  
Typically, studies on emotion use some type of mood induction procedure [MIP] to 
trigger the intended target emotion. There are a wide range of MIP, such as self-referential 
statements (e.g. Kenealy, 1986; Velten, 1968), autobiographical recall (e.g. Brewer & 
Doughtie, 1980; Schaefer & Philippot, 2005; Turnbull, Evans, & Owen, 2004), imagery (e.g. 
Tranel, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 1998; Wright & Mischel, 1982) or film clips (e.g. 
Gross & Levenson, 1995; Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007; Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, & 
Philippot, 2010). However, there is little research comparing the effectiveness of each 
method (Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994; Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983; Westermann, 
Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). Recently, it has been reported that internal MIPs [autobiographical 
recall] generate higher levels of overall affect compared to external MIPs [film clips] (Salas, 
Radovic, & Turnbull, 2011).Because the successful triggering of target emotions is a 
prerequisite for measuring other more complex emotional processes, such as emotional 
comprehension or regulation (Rosen & Levenson, 2009), the comparative effectiveness of 
different forms of MIP is, itself, an important topic of research.  
Notably, the correct selection of an MIP may well be critical when experimental subjects 
present with cognitive impairments that compromise the effective engagement with the 
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stimuli, especially after acquired brain injury (Levenson, 2007). For example, patients might 
struggle recalling details of personal events [autobiographical recall], or grasping the plot on 
a film [film clips] (Levenson et al., 2008). Unfortunately, there has been no systematic 
research effort to address this issue. Thus, it seems timely to explore which MIPs are best 
suited to elicit emotional states in neurological patients.  
Among the variety of patients with acquired brain damage, subjects with unilateral 
lesions to the right hemisphere (RH) are of particular interest for the topic of emotion 
elicitation. It has been widely reported that, compared to subject with left unilateral lesions, 
they present a wide range of  perceptive and expressive emotional deficits (for a review see 
Borod et al., 2010), as well as physiological hypo-reactivity to emotional stimuli (Heilman, 
Schwartz, & Watson, 1978; Morrow, Vrtunski, Kim, & Boller, 1981). Furthermore, it has 
been suggested that RH lesions compromise specifically the processing of negative, or 
withdrawal, emotions (for a review Gainotti, 2000), what have been called the valence 
hypothesis (Craig, 2005; Davidson, 1992a, 1992b, 2001). Unfortunately the evidence 
addressing this problem is small and present important methodological limitations. For 
example, most of the studies have focused on perceptual and expressive impairments, 
neglecting whether RH damage compromises or not the capacity to experience negative 
emotions.  
Additionally, the studies that have addressed changes in emotional intensity have used 
UDWLQJ E\ QDwYH MXGJHV DV D PHWKRG WKXV QRW FRQVLGHULQJ WKH SDWLHQW¶V UHSRUW RI KLV RZQ
experience (Borod et al., 1996; Montreys & Borod, 1998) To our knowledge there is only one 
case study that has experimentally addressed this problem, using an internal MIP [affective 
story recall] to explore the capacity of a patient with RH damage to experience negative 
emotions (Turnbull et al., 2004). The authors found that the patient was able to experience 
similar levels of negative emotions than controls, thus challenging the valence hypothesis. 
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Nevertheless, a limitation of this study is that results are also based on the rating of naïve 
judges, thus not considering the patients subjective emotional experience.  
The present study is the first to offer some insight on this problem, by comparing the 
effectiveness of two different MIPs in participants with unilateral RH damage and a matched 
sample of healthy controls. Following previous work on emotion elicitation (Salas et al., 
2011), internal [affective story recall] and external [film clip] MIPs were used to elicit 
positive [amusement] and negative [sadness] emotions. The affective experience of 
participants was registered using a self-report questionnaire.  
This study attempted to extend the findings of Salas et al. (2011), which were based on a 
student sample, to the key populations of patients with RH damage and normal elderly 
controls. In addition, this study also attempted to extend the findings of Turnbull and 
colleagues (2004), this time using both internal and external MIPs, and self-reports, to test 
whether participants with RH were able to experience negative emotions [sadness]. Based on 
the results of Salas et al. (2011) the following predictions were considered: 1) Selectivity: 
That internal and external MIPs will selectively trigger the target emotion but not the non-
target emotion, this in both healthy controls and neurological groups; 2) Intensity: That 
internal MIPs will generate significantly higher levels of self-reported emotion compared 
with external MIPs in both groups; 3) Right Hemisphere: that patients with RH lesions will 
report less levels of negative emotional intensity than controls when using both MIPs.  
 
3.2.3 Methods 
3.2.3.1. Participants 
The participants of this study were 10 subjects with right hemisphere damage (RH, Male = 4, 
Female = 6) and 15 healthy controls (HC, Male = 5, Female = 10). Both groups were 
matched in age (RH: M = 61.9, SD = 11.9; HC: M = 62.80, SD = 4.12) and education (ABI: 
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M = 13.63, SD = 1.36; HC:  M = 13.93, SD = 1.75). The average time since injury in the ABI 
group was 55.8 months (SD = 34.84; MIN = 13, MAX = 114). Participants were referred by 
neurologists from Bangor University and the North Wales Brain Injury Service. Exclusion 
criteria for the neurological group were having a non-focal lesion, duration of less than 6 
months since the brain injury, and moderate to severe language impairment. The details of 
SDWLHQW¶VOHVLRQORFDWLRQDUHGHVFULEHGLQ7DEOH 
 
 
 
Table 1. Clinical details of participants with acquired brain injury. 
 
 
3.2.3.2. Procedure 
The assessment took place mainly at the University of Bangor. In cases where participants 
with brain injury were not able to travel to the venue, researchers tested them at home. 
Participants were seen twice in order to collect data for the present study, and a larger one on 
emotion regulation. As a main introduction of the research, they were told that they would be 
asked to recall personal events in relation to certain emotions. In addition, they would have to 
watch some movies in the computer, and report on how they made them feel. For a detailed 
Age/Sex Months since injury Location Aetiology
57 F 84 Right Prefrontal MCA Stroke
50 M 20 Right Prefrontal MCA ACA Stroke
73 F 88 Right Prefrontal MCA Stroke
45 M 70 Right Prefrontal ACoA SAH
74 M 20
Right ventro-lateral prefrontal 
cortex, basal ganglia MCA Stroke
65 M 65 Right frontal and TPJ MCA Stroke
46 F 114 Right Prefrontal MCA Stroke
63 F 60 Right Prefrontal and TPJ MCA Stroke
78 F 13 Right Prefrontal MCA Stroke
68 F 24 Right fronto-parietal MCA stroke
ACoA = anterior communicating artery aneurism; SAH = subarachnoid haemorrhage, MCA = middle cerebral artery. ACA 
= Anterior cerebral artery. TPJ = Tempo Parietal Junction
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description of the procedure adapted for this study see Salas, Radovic and Turnbull (2011) 
[see section 3.1].  
During the first session the purpose of the experiment was explained to participants 
and their relatives and consent was obtained [see Appendix 2]. Participants completed a set of 
measures on overall cognitive functions and the Film Clip task. The Affective Story Recall 
was administered during the second session, along with other neuropsychological tasks that 
are not described here. 
 
 
3.2.3.3 Mood Induction Procedures 
3.2.3.3.1. Internal Mood Induction Procedure: Film Clips 
In this task participants are asked to watch a series of film clips and report their emotional 
experience while watching the clips. For that purpose, participants were placed in front of a 
¶¶ ODSWRSVFUHHQ+HDGSKRQHVZHUHSURYLGHG WRDYRLGDQ\SRVVLEOHGLVWUDFWLQJQRLVH7KH
IROORZLQJLQVWUXFWLRQZDVRIIHUHGµI will ask you to watch a couple of short film clips. Please 
SD\DWWHQWLRQDQGZDWFKWKHPFDUHIXOO\¶. After each film clip a self-report questionnaire was 
DGPLQLVWHUHG%HIRUHHDFKµHPRWLRQDO¶YLGHRDQHXWUDOYLGHRZDVSUHVHQWHGDQGWKHIROORZLQJ
instruction was given: µ1RZ,ZRXOGOLNH\RXWRZDWFKWKLVYLGHRDQGWU\WRUHOD[DQGFOHDU
\RXU PLQG RI DQ\ WKRXJKWV¶. 7KH µHPRWLRQDO¶ FOLSV >DPXVHPHQW-sadness] were 
counterbalanced across participants of each group to avoid order effects.  
In relation to the neutral and emotional clips used, all of them have been previously 
validated regarding their capacity to elicit specific and discrete emotions (Gross & Levenson, 
1995; Rottenberg et al., 2007). The neutral clips, Sticks (Gross & Levenson, 1995), were 60s 
in length and showed abstract shapes and colours. The amusement clip, Bill Cosby Himself 
(Cosby, 1983) showed a stand-up comedy performance by Bill Cosby (121 s). The sadness 
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clip, The Champ (Zeffirelli, 1979), showed a young boy facing the sudden death of his father 
after a boxing match (171 s).  
 
 
3.2.3.3.2. External Mood Induction Procedure: Affective Story Recall 
The Affective Story Recall task (Turnbull et al., 2004) was used as an internal MIP for both 
amusement and sadness.. In this task participants are asked to recall personal events from 
their lives related to specific emotions. In the same way that with the film clips, two neutral 
recall conditions (going shopping and fixing a meal) are used before each emotional recall as 
baselines. (DFK UHFDOOZDV SURPSWHGZLWK WKH IROORZLQJ SKUDVH ³7U\ WR recall an event in 
your life that has caused you to feel . . . (e.g., amusement). Try to be very detailed about the 
ZD\\RXIHHO´(DFK participant had a maximum of 3 minutes to describe the event, although 
they could extend this if they felt they have not finished yet the story after the 3 min, or even 
finish before if they felt they have nothing else to say. A minimum of time was not set in 
order to avoid that task instructions could activate negative emotions by adding pressure and 
anxiety to the recollection. The same self-report questionnaire administered after each clip 
was also administered after each recollection. 
 
3.2.3.4. Measures 
In order to capture the emotional experience of participants, after each clip and affective 
story, a self-report measure was adapted from the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994). The 
PANAS-X is a 60-item self-report that assesses specific emotional states. It has a general 
dimension of positive and negative affect, but also includes specific scales for discrete 
emotions. Participants are asked to rate each of the 60 emotional words (e.g., cheerful, 
hostile, shaky) indicating the extent to which they felt each emotion according to a 5-point 
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scale (very slightly or not at all, a little, moderately, quite a bit, and extremely). For the 
purpose of this study, a total of 20 emotional words were selected from the discrete emotion 
scales, with 5 emotional words for each of the four basic emotions [Joy: cheerful, delighted, 
happy, joyful, energetic; Sad: downhearted, sad, blue, lonely, alone; Anger: disgusted, angry, 
loathed, irritable, hostile; Fear: shaky, afraid, nervous, scared, frightened]. 
 
3.2.3.5. Score Data Analysis 
7KH DYHUDJH VFRUH RI HDFK 3$1$6¶ subscales [Fear, Sadness, Joy, and Anger] was 
calculated, this for each eliciting stimulus [Neutral 1, Sadness, Neutral 2, Joy] on both tasks 
[ASR and FC]. To test the Selectivity and Intensity K\SRWKHVLVWKH3$1$6¶VFRUHVIRUHDFK
stimulus were compared using a mixed-anova test.  More specifically, to answer the 
Selectivity hypothesis, the analysis was conducted separately for each stimulus and tasks, 
with the four subscales of the PANAS treated as the within-subject variable and controls v/s 
patients as the between-subject variable. The differences between the target emotion score 
and the other emotions were calculated using a simple contrast, with the target emotion as 
reference. In relation to the Intensity hypothesis, separated analyses for each stimulus were 
conducted, using the target emotion in both tasks [e.g. sadness or joy] as the within-subject 
variable and controls v/s patients as the between-subject variable. In both analysis, when the 
sphericity assumption was not respected, Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used (for 
Greenhouse-*HLVVHU¶V EHWZHHQ  DQG  RU PXOWLYDULDWH 3LOODL¶V 7UDFH VWDWLVWLF ZDV
reported (for Greenhouse-*HLVVHU¶V OHVVWKDQ)LQDOO\ WKHH[SORUDWLRQRI WKHLQWHUDFWLRQ
term in the mixed models allowed to test the third hypothesis (Right Hemisphere), and 
explore whether the comparisons in the within model differed between groups.  
 
3.2.4. Results 
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The present study tested three hypotheses: (a) that internal and external MIPs will elicit the 
target emotion with grater intensity than the non-target emotions, this in both groups 
(Selectivity); b) that target emotions elicited by the internal MIP will show greater intensity 
than the ones generated by the external MIP, in both groups (Intensity); c) that the 
neurological group would present lower levels of negative emotional intensity compared to 
the healthy control group when exposed to internal or external stimuli (Right Hemisphere). 
 
3.2.4.1. Selectivity 
In relation to the Selectivity hypothesis, both MIPs elicited effectively the two target emotions 
(e.g. sadness) with higher levels of intensity than the other three emotions considered in the 
PANAS (e.g. joy / anger / fear) [See Fig. 1]. This result demonstrates that both internal and 
external MIPs are effective inducing an emotion selectively, this for people with and without 
brain injury [see Table 2]. 
 
 
Table 2. PANAS score differences between target and non-target emotions for the internal (ASR) and external 
(FC) MIP. 
 
Differences in the average intensity between target and non-target emotions, for the two 
emotional stimulus, were observed in the internal [Sadness: F(3, 57) = 34.34, p < .001, Șȡ² = 
Mood Induction Procedure Target Emotion Non-Target Emotion Paired Differences df F p Șȡ² r
Internal Sad Joy 9.91 1,19 89.35 <.001 0.83 0.91
(Affective Story Recall) Anger 8.00 1,19 60.10 <.001 0.76 0.87
Fear 5.81 1,19 36.44 <.001 0.66 0.81
Joy Sad 12.65 1,21 154.80 <.001 0.88 0.94
Anger 13.17 1,21 202.65 <.001 0.91 0.95
Fear 12.08 1,21 155.10 <.001 0.88 0.94
External Sad Joy 5.83 1,22 25.64 <.001 0.54 0.73
(Film Clips) Anger 4.92 1,22 20.48 <.001 0.48 0.69
Fear 4.37 1,22 17.76 <.001 0.45 0.67
Joy Sad 8.17 1,22 41.74 <.001 0.66 0.81
Anger 8.3 1,22 54.03 <.001 0.71 0.84
Fear 8.21 1,22 45.70 <.001 0.68 0.82
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.6412, r = .80; Joy: v = .92, F(3, 19) = 74.36, p < .001, Șȡ² = .92, r = .96] and external 
[Sadness: F(2.44, 53.67) = 14.71, p < .001, Șȡ² = .40, r = .63; Joy: v = .75, F(3, 20) = 19.45, 
p < .001, Șȡ² = .75, r = .87] MIP. All the planned comparisons between target and other 
emotions were significant in both MIPs, as seen in table 2. No differences across groups were 
found [Interaction emotion*group; Sadness Internal: F(3, 57) = .19, p = .91, Șȡ² = .01, r = 
.10; Joy Internal: v = .12, F(3, 19) = .84, p = .49, Șȡ² = .12, r = .34; Sadness external: F(2.44, 
53.67) = 1.13, p = .34, Șȡ² = .05, r = .22; Joy external: Joy: v = .14, F(3, 20) = 1.07, p = .38, 
Șȡ² = .14, r = .37]. Thus the comparison between the target emotion and the other three 
emotions was statistically significant for each stimulus, in both tasks, showing the same 
pattern in healthy controls and neurological group.  
 
3.2.4..2. Intensity 
In relation to the Intensity hypothesis, the internal MIP elicited higher levels of intensity in 
the target emotion when compared to the external MIP, for both sadness and joy stimulus. No 
significant differences were found between groups. This result suggests that internal MIPs are 
more effective than external MIPs in triggering intense emotional experience [see Table 3].  
 
 
Table 3&RPSDULVRQRIWKHWDUJHWHPRWLRQ¶VOHYHORILQWHQVLW\ZKHQXVLQJDQLQWHUQDO$65RUH[WHUQDO)&
MIP. The internal MIP generates significantly higher levels of intensity.  
 
The average intensity of the target emotion in the internal MIP was higher than the 
external MIP for both sad [F(1, 18) = 22.53, p < .001, Șȡ² = .56, r = .75] and joy [F(1, 20) = 
                                                 
12 Șȡ² stands for partial eta square. To interpret Șȡ² it was transformed to r, using the formula r = square root 
(Șȡ²). Then, standards guides given by Cohen (1992) could be used (r< .10= small; r< .30= medium; r< .50= 
large). 
Mean SD Mean SD ASR-FC df F p Șȡ² r
Sadness in SAD 15.50 3.90 12.40 4.30 3.10 1,18 22.53 <.001 0.56 0.75
Joy in JOY 18.05 4.53 13.18 5.09 4.87 1,20 11.1 <.01 0.36 0.60
Paired DifferencesInternal (ASR) External (FC)Target Emotion
3.2. Emotional Reactivity in Right Hemisphere Damage 
 
177 
 
11.10, p = .003, Șȡ² = .36, r = .60] stimulus. Thus the comparison between internally and 
externally generated target emotions was statistically significant for each stimulus, with no 
differences between participants with and without brain damage [Sadness: F(1, 18) = .99, p = 
.33, Șȡ² = .05, r = .22; Joy: F(1, 20) = 2.08, p = .17, Șȡ² = .09, r = .30]. 
 
 
3.2.4.3. Right Hemisphere 
In relation to the Right Hemisphere hypothesis, participants with unilateral RH damage did 
not differ from healthy controls in level of intensity reached by positive and negative target 
emotions, this using internal and external MIPs. As described above, no significant 
interactions were observed between group and levels of intensity, for both positive and 
negative emotions. In conclusion, the data did not support the hypothesis suggesting that RH 
patients would have lower levels of emotional experience in response to negative stimulus. 
Results for all three hypotheses are described in Figure 1. 
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Fig. 1. PANAS score for internal (ASR) and external (FC) Sad and Joy stimuli. Both right Hemisphere 
participants and healthy controls are represented. In each case the internal and external procedure induce 
selectively the target emotion compared to non-target emotions. However, the internal procedure generates 
higher levels of experienced emotion. Participants with right hemisphere damage do not differ from controls in 
both measures. 
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3.2.5. Discussion 
The goal of this study was twofold. Firstly, it explored the effectiveness of internal 
and external MIPs in an older adult sample of people with RH damage and healthy controls. 
Secondly, it tested whether participants with RH lesions were able to experience negative 
emotions using an internal and external MIPs.  
A first finding of this study is that the levels of intensity were higher for the internally 
generated material. This is a replication of the results reported by Salas and colleagues in a 
student sample (2011), however it extends such results by suggesting that a similar pattern is 
also reported in elderly people and also in subjects with acquired brain injury. In addition, it 
was also found that emotional levels of intensity, measured by self-report, were not 
significantly different between participants with unilateral RH damage and healthy controls, 
for both positive [joy] and negative [sadness] emotions. 
The results from this study contribute to a growing literature on the elicitation of 
emotion (Coan & Allen, 2007). When this results are interpreted in relation to previous 
studies comparing the efficacy of internal and external MIPs (Salas et al., 2011), they appear 
to suggest that the higher levels of emotion generated by the internal MIP are independent of 
age, for this phenomenon is observed in both young and elderly adults populations. This is an 
interesting finding for the literature on emotional intensity, which has tended to focus on the 
structure of emotional intensity (e.g. Sonnemans & Frijda, 1994; Verduyn, Van Mechelen, 
Tuerlinckx, Meers, & Van Coillie, 2009), and the individual determinants on intensity levels 
(e.g. Lynch, Robins, Morse, & Krause, 2001; Neumann, 2001; Sonnemans & Frijda, 1995), 
with less consideration of the impact of the MIPs used (for a review see Salas et al., 2011). 
This study offers important evidence supporting the view that emotion can be more intensely 
triggered when using personally relevant material.  
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The data obtained in this study is also of relevance to the elicitation and assessment of 
emotion in people with acquired brain damage (Levenson, 2007; Levenson et al., 2008). It 
shows that, in the same way than healthy controls, people with right hemisphere damage 
generate higher levels of positive and negative emotion when using internal MIPs. This 
finding suggests that the recollection of personal affective memories is also a powerful form 
of eliciting emotional states in this population, and that such recollection does not appear to 
be compromised by the cognitive impairments commonly associated to brain damage.  
In terms of the RH debate on emotional experience, this data suggests that the 
capacity to experience positive and negative emotions, when measured by self-report, is 
preserved in patients with RH unilateral lesions. This finding supports the results reported by 
Turnbull and colleagues (2004), who described that negative emotional experience was not 
disrupted in a patients with right hemisphere damage, thus challenging the valence hypothesis 
(Craig, 2005;  Davidson, 2001, 1992a, 1992b). Furthermore, it agrees with a recent literature 
proposing that the capacity to experience emotions is largely preserved after cortical damage 
and cortical atrophy (Merker, 2007), for such ability depends on rather deep subcortical 
structures (Damasio et al., 2000; Panksepp, 1998, 2011).  
This study has two main limitations. The first one is the small sample used, which 
force us to consider these results as preliminary and requiring further confirmation with a 
larger population. The second limitation is rather technical, in that this study only focused on 
the subjective aspect of the emotional experience, without considering physiological or 
behavioural measures. This is relevant for future investigations, for it has been described that 
the three components of the emotional response [physiology, behaviour and experience] are 
not always associated (Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005). In fact, our 
findings challenge previous data from behavioural [facial] (e.g. Borod, Bloom, Brickman, 
Nakhutina, & Curko, 2002) and physiological studies (Heilman et al., 1978; Morrow et al., 
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1981) on emotion after RH damage. Future studies on this topic should consider this 
componential view of the emotional response, and incorporate the simultaneous assessment 
of experiential, behavioural and physiological elements. 
For decades emotional changes after brain injury have contributed to our 
understanding of the neural basis of emotional processes (Adolphs, 2007; Borod, 2000; 
Damasio, 1994; Feinstein, 2013; Gainotti, 2001; Robinson, 2006; Rosen & Levenson, 2009). 
However, little attention has been placed on the methods used to trigger emotional responses 
(Levenson, 2007; Levenson et al., 2008). This study has contributed to the field by showing 
that internal and external forms of elicitation are equally effective triggering selectively 
emotional states, although the internal procedure generates higher levels of intensity. More 
importantly, it suggests that these methods are also effective triggering negative emotional 
states in patients with RH unilateral damage, a population that has been traditionally 
described as impaired in the capacity to experience negative emotion. 
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4.1. Emotion Regulation after Acquired Brain 
Injury: Response Modulation after Right Prefrontal 
Damage 
 
 
4.1.1. Introduction 
There is a growing literature reporting emotion regulation [ER] problems after brain damage, 
as well as commenting on its impact to emotional adjustment and social functioning (Abreu 
et al., 2009; Bechara, 2004; Beer & Lombardo, 2007; Lewis, Lamm, Segalowitz, Stieben, & 
Zelazo, 2006; McDonald et al., 2010; Obonsawin et al., 2007; Salas, 2012; Tate, 1999). 
Evidence from different sources appears to suggest that damage to the right hemisphere, and 
particularly to the right prefrontal cortex [rPFC], generates changes in the capacity to 
modulate emotion. It has been noted, for example, that individuals with rPFC damage present 
more severe emotional deficits, such as disinhibition of sympathetic centres (Hilz et al., 
2006), emotion-based decision making impairment (Manes et al., 2002; Tranel, Bechara, & 
Denburg, 2002), delusional pathology (Feinberg, Venneri, Simone, Fan, & Northoff, 2010; 
Feinberg, 2011) and neuropsychiatric disorders like mania and alexithymia (Cummings, 
1997,  for a review). The mechanisms by which ER is disrupted after rPFC lesions are yet 
unknown, however, it has been proposed that this cortical area has a special role integrating 
cognition and affect (Stuss & Alexander, 1999; Stuss & Alexander, 2000).  
There is a large body of literature suggesting that response inhibition, often regarded 
as the process of withholding unwanted, prepotent and reflective actions (Aron et al., 2004; 
Dillon and Pizzagalli, 2007), is a key ability to ER or self-regulation (e.g. Barkley, 1997, 
2001; Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012; Quirk, 2007; Thayer & Lane, 2000). 
Interestingly, several sources of evidence have linked response inhibition to the rPFC. For 
example, neuroimaging findings (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; Aron, 2007; Chambers, 
4.1. Response Modulation and rPFC damage  
186 
 
Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009; Dillon & Pizzagalli, 2007; Forstmann et al., 2008; Levy & 
Wagner, 2011; Rubia, Smith, Brammer, & Taylor, 2003) and transcranial magnetic 
stimulation studies (Chambers et al., 2006, 2007) have suggested that response inhibition is 
mediated by a right hemisphere network, with a critical role for the inferior frontal gyrus 
[rIFG]. Lesion studies exploring the relationship between rPFC lesions and inhibition 
impairment appear to compliment neuroimaging findings. It has been reported that damage to 
the rIFG is associated with an increased reaction time in stop-signal inhibition tasks (Aron, 
Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003) and also to deficits in suppressing 
inappropriate responses on switching tasks (Aron, Monsell, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2004).  
An important limitation of this literature on response inhibition is that it has mostly 
used motor inhibition tasks, and not emotional inhibition tasks. To our knowledge there is 
only one single neuroimaging study that has used an emotional inhibition paradigm, or 
interference paradigm, in exploring the neural correlates of inhibiting facial emotional 
expressions of a neurologically intact population (Lee, Dolan, & Critchley, 2008). During the 
task, participants were asked to look at pictures of people displaying a variety of emotions, 
and to voluntarily manipulate their facial [emotional] expressions to the pictures. Two 
conditions were used: to inhibit the expression of facial displays, and to simulate an emotion 
of opposite valence [e.g. frown when watching someone smiling]. Similarly to the above 
mentioned studies on motor inhibition, it was found that, among other right hemisphere areas 
[insula, superior temporal sulcus], the right inferior frontal gyrus [BA 47] was activated 
during the inhibition of emotional expression. More importantly, the activation of BA 47 was 
positively correlated with the self-reported use of a well-known ER strategy: suppression, or 
the ability to inhibit a behavioural display while affectively aroused (Gross & Levenson, 
1997; Gross & John, 2003).  
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To our knowledge, the study of Lee, Dolan and Critchley (2008), is the only study 
that has considered a well-known ER strategy, that of suppression (Gross & Thompson, 
2007), to explore the neural correlates of the inhibition of emotional behaviour. This 
limitation is, however, not exclusive of inhibition studies, but can also be found in the 
literature on ER changes after rPFC lesions. It is surprising that, despite the rapid growth of 
the field of ER in the last decade (Gross & Thompson, 2007), neuropsychology and lesion 
studies have not yet incorporated the conceptualization of ER (Beer & Lombardo, 2007; 
Salas, Gross, & Turnbull, submitted).  
The Process Model of ER (Gross & Thompson, 2007) describes a set of strategies that 
people tend to use in modulating their emotional experience. One of these strategies, 
suppression, is extremely interesting in the exploration of the relationship between emotion 
modulation impairment after rPFC damage and inhibition deficits. Suppression has been 
described as a response modulation strategy, for its main goal is to influence emotion-
response tendencies when they have been already elicited (Gross, 1998; Gross & Thompson, 
2007). This process is commonly achieved by inhibiting the behavioral emotional display of 
an already triggered emotional response (Gross & Levenson, 1997). Available studies on the 
neural basis of suppression are consistent with reports on inhibitory control, suggesting also 
the activation of rPFC areas (e.g. Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008; Lévesque et al., 
2003). Nevertheless, no study has explored yet whether suppression ability is compromised in 
patients with rPFC lesions.  
This is the first study that brings together these separate fields of research, by 
exploring whether individuals with rPFC lesions, compared to neurologically healthy 
controls, are impaired in voluntarily manipulating the facial expression of emotional 
behavior, particularly in relation to intense positive emotions [amusement]. For this purpose, 
10 individuals with rPFC lesions and 15 matched healthy controls [HC] were tested on a 
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response modulation task, where they had to watch emotional film clips and manipulate their 
facial emotional expressions according to three instructions: watch spontaneously, hide and 
amplify. Self-report measures were used to assess the effectiveness of the emotional 
induction procedure and facial behavior analysis (FACS, Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002) 
was used to measure facial markers of positive emotions. 
It was hypothesized that individuals with rPFC lesions would: 1) present similar 
levels of spontaneous experienced positive affect than HC [Emotion reactivity Hypothesis]; 
2) present a decreased range of response modulation compared to HC [Response modulation 
range Hypothesis] and 3) show higher levels of facial behavior when instructed to inhibit 
[Inhibition Hypothesis]. It was also hypothesized: 4) that performance in the inhibition task 
would be associated to measures of inhibition [Cognitive Control Hypothesis]; and finally 
that 5) that inhibitory impairment would be associated with damage to motor inhibition areas 
previously described in the literature [Lesion Hypothesis]13. 
 
4.1.2. Methods 
4.1.2.1. Participants  
Healthy controls and participants with acquired brain injury were referred by neurologists 
from the Bangor University School of Psychology. The main inclusion criterion for the 
neurological group was to have a focal brain lesion that involved the rPFC. The lesion could 
involve exclusively the rPFC or extend to the posterior areas of the RH [rPFC+right 
posterior]. Several exclusion criteria were considered, such as time since injury [no less than 
6 months] and language ability [no moderate or severe language impairment]. Clinical details 
and aetiology of the neurological sample are presented in Table 1. 
                                                 
13 The results of this last hypothesis are not presented in this paper, for the lesion analysis is currently in 
progress 
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The overall sample involved a total of 25 participants, including individuals with 
rPFC lesions [rPFC, n = 10, female = 6, male = 4] and healthy controls [HC, n = 15, female 
= 9, male = 6]. Both groups were matched in age [rPFC, M = 61.78, SD = 12.64; HC, M = 
62.80, SD = 4.12] and years of education [rPFC, M = 14, SD = 1.51; HC, M = 13.93, SD = 
1.75]. The average number of months since the injury in the neurological group was 61.80 
[SD = 40.37]. 
 
 
Table 1. Clinical details and aetiology in the neurological group 
 
 
4.1.2.2. Procedure 
Eligible participants were seen twice. Assessment across two sessions was useful to avoid the 
impact of fatigue on the neurological group. During the first session the goal of the 
experiment was explained to participants and consent was obtained [see Appendix 2]. 
Measures of overall cognition function were also collected. In the second session participants 
completed a response modulation task and measures of executive function were obtained. At 
the end of this session participants were debriefed. 
 
Age/Sex Aetiology Months since onset Location
57F MCA stroke 84 Right Prefrontal, insula
50M MCA and ACA stroke 20 Right Prefrontal
73F MCA stroke 97 Right Prefrontal, Frontal Eye Field
45M ACoA SAH 70 Right Prefrontal
74M MCA Stroke 20 Right ventro-lateral prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia
65M MCA Stroke 65 Right Prefrontal, insula, Right TPJ
46F MCA Stroke 114 Right Prefrontal, insula
66F MCA Stroke 120 Right PFC, insula, middle and superior temporal gyrus, TPJ
78F MCA stroke 13 Right Prefrontal insula
68F MCA stroke 24 Right Prefrontal and parietal
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4.1.2.3. Instruments 
Overall Cognitive Assessment: The Mini Mental State Examination (Rovner & Folstein, 
1987), Telephone search and telephone search dual task (TEA, Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway, 
& Nimmo-Smith, 1994), Token Test (De Renzi & Faglioni, 1978), Logic Memory (Weschler, 
1987), Rey-Osterrieth Figure (Stern, Singer, Duke, & Singer, 1994) and the Frontal 
Assessment Battery (Dubois, Slachevsky, Litvan, & Pillon, 2000) were used in order to obtain 
an overall profile of cognitive function.  
Executive Functions Assessment: A set of neuropsychological tasks was used to obtain a 
profile of executive function. Digits Forward and Backward (Weschler, 1981), Verbal 
Fluency (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001) and Similarities (Weschler, 1981). Measures of 
inhibition included conflicting instructions (Stuss & Benson, 1986) inhibitory control 
(Drewe, 1975) and environmental autonomy (Lhermitte, Pillon, & Serdaru, 1986). 
Emotional Symptomatology and Suppression usage: In order to assess the presence of 
symptomatology, the Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (HADS, Zigmond & Snaith, 
1983), a self-report questionnaire, was employed. The HADS has been shown to be sensitive 
tool in assessing depression and anxiety symptoms in acquired brain injury population 
(Dawkins, Cloherty, Gracey & Evans, 2006). To calculate the use of reappraisal in daily life, 
the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross and John, 2003) was applied.  
Emotional Experience Self-Report Emotional experience during the Response Modulation 
task [see below] was assessed using a self-report questionnaire adapted from the PANAS-X 
(Watson & Clark, 1994). Following a previous study ( Salas et al., 2011), 12 emotional words 
were selected from the discrete emotion scales of the PANAS-X. A 5-point likert scale [very 
slightly or not at all, a little, moderately, quite a bit, and extremely] was used to rate the each 
word. Four emotional words were selected for the target emotion: amusement [cheerful, 
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delighted, joyful, happy, and energetic]. Six words related to negative affect were also 
considered: sad, lonely, downhearted, alone, blue, scared and angry. 
Facial Imitation task ,Q RUGHU WR GHWHUPLQH SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ FDSDFLW\ WR YROXQWDULO\ JHQHUDWH
facial expressions, a facial imitation task was adapted from Simmons, Ellgring and Smith 
(2003). Participants were asked to imitate facial movements of the researcher, which 
correspond to Action Units described in the Facial Action Coding System (Ekman et al., 
2002). Each Action Unit was accompanied by a visual prompt from the examiner and a 
verbal instruction, in order to facilitate its understanding: AU 4 (frown), AU 9 (wrinkle your 
nose), AU 10 (rise your upper lip), AU 14 (make dimples), AU 20 (stretch your lips 
downward), AU 24 (press your lips together), AU 26 (drop your jaw), AU 1 + 2 (raise your 
eyebrows), AU 12 + 6 (do a big smile and wrinkle your eyes), AU 5 (make your eyes look 
bigger by raising your eyelids), AU 15 (pull the corners of your mouth down), AU 17 (move 
your chin boss up). If participants were not able to imitate the Action Unit immediately, a 
PLUURUZDVXVHGLQRUGHUWRFRPSDUHWKHLUIDFLDOH[SUHVVLRQZLWKWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶V 
Response modulation task:This task is an adaptation from a previous study on response 
modulation in dementia (Henry, Rendell, Scicluna, Jackson, & Phillips, 2009), in which 
subjects are asked to watch short video clips and manipulate their facial expression according 
to three different instructions: watch spontaneously, suppress or amplify. The spontaneous 
condition was always performed first. Then, inhibition and amplification conditions were 
alternated for each participant, this to avoid order effects. Based on the available evidence on 
emotion elicitation using film clips (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Hewig, Hagemann, Seifert, 
Naumann, & Bartussek, 2005; Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007), three validated clips were 
selected to induce amusement (When Harry met Sally [155s], Robin Williams Live [205s], 
Whose line is it, Anyway? [211s]). On the same premises, three short clips of 60 seconds each 
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were generated from $ODVND¶V :LOG 'HQDOL (Rottenberg et al., 2007) and used as neutral 
stimuli14. 
3DUWLFLSDQWV VDW LQ IURQW RI D ´ ODSWRS LQ D TXLHW URRP+HDGSKRQHVZHUH XVHG WR
avoid possible distractions. A video-recording camera was placed two meters in front of the 
subjects. At the beginning of the task participants were told that they would watch a series of 
clips from movies and they would have to follow some instructions during each clip. Then 
participants watched the amusement-inducing clips. Neutral clips were viewed before each 
emotional clip. A self-report questionnaire of experienced emotion, adapted from the 
PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994), was administered immediately after viewing emotional 
clip [see Fig 1].  
 
Fig 1. Response Modulation Task. Three amusement inducing clips were presented to participants under three 
different conditions [spontaneous, hide/amplify, amplify/hide]. Before each emotional clip a neutral clip was 
shown, and after each emotional clip a questionnaire to capture emotional experience during the clip was 
administered. 
 
                                                 
14 The original experiment elicited not only joy but also sadness, using the same procedure described above. 
Such data is not reported here because the behavioural markers of sadness [Action Units] that have been 
reported previously in the literature were not found consistently for the neurological group or the healthy control 
group. Such failure to elicit the behavioural aspect of the emotion impedes any conclusions regarding the 
voluntary manipulation of such responses. 
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The instructions for each manipulation were also adapted from Henry et al. (2009). 
Before each neutral clip the following instruction was offered: ³QRZWU\ WRUHOD[DQGFOHDQ
\RXUPLQGRIDQ\WKRXJKWVZKLOH\RXZDWFKWKHIROORZLQJFOLS´ In the spontaneous condition 
participants received the following instruction: ³SOHDVH ZDWFK the following clip 
VSRQWDQHRXVO\DVLI\RXZHUHZDWFKLQJ79DWKRPH´ In the suppress condition participants 
were told: ³WKLVWLPH,ZLOODVN\RXWRKLGHDQ\IHHOLQJVWKDW\RXPLJKWKDYHZKLOHZDWFKLQJ
the following clip. As if later someone looking at the recording of this moment would not 
KDYHDFOXHUHJDUGLQJKRZ\RXZHUHIHHOLQJ,QRWKHUZRUGVXVHDSRNHUIDFH´ Finally, in 
the amplification condition participants were asked: ³WKLV WLPH ,ZLOODVN\RX WRDPSOLI\ WR
express as much as you can any feelings that you might have while watching the following 
clip. As if later someone looking at the recording would clearly understand how you were 
feeling´ $IWHU WKH LQVWUXFWLRQ ZDV JLYHQ SDUWLFLSDQWV ZHUH DVNHG WR UHSHDW LW LQ RUGHU WR
confirm that they have understood the command. The task was not initiated until participants 
were able to describe what they were supposed to do. After each emotional clip participants 
were asked to recall the instruction given. 
 
4.1.3. Data Analysis  
4.1.3.1. Data reduction 
In order to measure facial expressive behavior, the Facial Action Coding System, (FACS, 
Ekman, Friesen & Hager, 2002) was used to code the appearance and frequency of facial 
changes while watching the emotional clips. Based on previous research (Ambadar, Cohn, & 
Ian, 2009; Coan & Gottman, 2007; Paul Ekman, 2003; Rottenberg, Kasch, Gross, & Gotlib, 
2002; Soussignan, 2002) action unit [AU] 12+6 was selected as a proxy for intense positive 
affect [see Fig 2]. Several studies have associated AU 12+6, also called Duchenne smile to 
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the felt experience of positive affect and enjoyment (Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990; 
Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1993; Soussignan, 2002).  
 
 
Fig 2. The Duchenne Smile. The Duchenne smile [left] involves activation of the zygomatic major [AU 12, 
REOLTXHULVLQJRIWKHPRXWKFRUQHUV@DQGWKHSUHVHQFHRIRUELFXODULVRFXOLDFWLYDWLRQ>$8FURZ¶VZULQNOHVLQ
the eye region]. AU 12 alone [right], on the contrary, does not include AU 6.  
 
The coding process involved two FACS certified coders who were blind to the 
SDUWLFLSDQW¶V JURXS DQG WR WKH YLGHR¶V FRQGLWLRQ >VSRQWDQHRXV KLGH DPSOLI\@ &RGHUV
watched each video and looked for the appearance of AU 12+6. There was a high agreement 
between coders in detecting the occurrence of AU 12+6 [rs = .80]. 
 
4.1.3.2. Research hypotheses data analysis  
Hypothesis 1 [Emotion Reactivity]: In order to respond Hypothesis 1, that individuals with 
rPFC lesions would present similar levels of experienced positive affect, the average scores 
of positive affect in each conditions were compared between groups. Because normality and 
independence of variance assumptions were not met, a non-parametric test for differences 
between two groups was used [Mann-Withney U]. 
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Hypothesis 2 [Response modulation range]: To compare patients and controls in terms of 
their capacity to voluntarily manipulate positive emotion, a modulation range was calculated 
under the proposition that good regulators would be capable of decreasing the frequency of 
facial activity when instructed to suppress, and increasing it when instructed to amplify. In 
other words, good regulators would display a larger difference between suppression and 
amplification tasks. Following this logic, a 12+6 range score was calculated by subtracting 
the number of AU 12+6 in the suppression condition to the number of AU 12+6 in the 
amplifying condition. To assess the normality distribution of this variable, histogram 
exploration and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test were performed for the entire sample and for each 
group separately. These analyses suggested that the distributions were relatively similar to a 
normal distribution [Sample: D(25) = 1.10, p = .18; rPFC: D(10) = .70, p = .71; HC: D(15) 
= .80, p = .54]. The 12+6 range score was then compared using independent sample t-tests 
reporting one-tailed probability values. When violations of homogeneity of variance 
assumptions were found, adjusted values were reported.  
 
Hypothesis 3 [Inhibition hypothesis]: Because AU 12+6 reflects the experience and 
expression of intense positive emotion, no AU 12+6 was expected to be generated in the 
suppress condition. As a first step in the analysis of this variable, frequencies of appearance 
of AU 12+6 in the suppress condition were explored, both in neurological and healthy control 
groups. Then, all participants that had scores deviating from 0 were compared to the healthy 
control group using a modified t-test for small samples (Crawford & Howell, 1998). This t-
test is a modification to the independent sample t-test which can be used to compare a single 
specimen with a small sample (less than 50), offering an estimate of the rarity or abnormality 
of the individual score. Neuropsychological studies of different sorts have used this approach 
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when addressing research questions with small samples (e.g. Bowles et al., 2007; Maguire, 
Nannery, & Spiers, 2006; Schiltz et al., 2006). 
 
Hypothesis 4 [Cognitive Inhibition]: A non-parametric correlation test [Spearman, rs] was 
used to assess the associations between neuropsychological measures of inhibition 
[conflicting instructions, response inhibition and environmental autonomy] and performance 
LQWKHµVXSSUHVV¶FRQGLWLRQ>QXPEHURIAU 12+6]. 
 
4.1.4. Results  
4.1.4.1. Cognitive and Emotional Assessment.  
The assessment of emotional symptoms suggests that individuals with rPFC and healthy 
controls had scores below the cut-off point (> or = 8, Olssøn, Mykletun, & Dahl, 2005) in 
both the anxiety [rPFC: M = 6.70; SD = 4.73; HC: M = 4.70; SD = 3.10] and depression 
[rPFC: M = 6.40; SD = 4.62; HC: M = 2.67; SD = 1.79] subscales of the HADS. 
Nevertheless, the rPFC presented significantly higher scores in the depression subscale 
[F(2,22) = 2.84, p = .017] but not in the anxiety subscale [F(2,22) = 1.25, p = .11]. 
In addition, the neurological group did not differ from the healthy control group in the 
self-reported use of suppression, when measured by the ERQ [F(2, 22) = .11, p = .45]. A 
detailed description of the average scores of each group on the cognitive and emotional 
assessment can be found in table 2. 
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Table 2. Cognitive and Emotional performance of neurological groups and healthy controls 
 
 
4.1.4.2. Voluntary generation of facial expressions.  
The rPFC group was equally able than the healthy control group to voluntarily generate facial 
expressions. Of particular interest for this study, all subjects in the neurological group 
obtained scores between 1 and 2 when generating AU 12+615. The detail of both groups in 
the generation of a wider set of AU can be observed in Appendix 4. 
 
4.1.4.3. Emotional Reactivity.  
                                                 
15 Each AU was scored using a scale from 1 to 6 [1 = perfect intensity, long duration, no 
other AU; 2 = perfect intensity, short duration or another AU; 3 = prefer intensity, short 
duration and other AU; 4 = low intensity, short duration and other AU; 5 = movement does 
not correspond to AU; 6 = no movement]. 
M SD M SD
Overall Cognition Minimental State Examination 28.11 1.45 29.00 1.25
Sustained Attention (TEA) 7.88 1.64 11.00 1.57
Divided Attention (TEA) 10.00 4.89 11.00 1.79
Comprehensive Language (Token Test) 30.40 1.43 31.13 1.36
Memory (WMS-R) Coding 12.50 3.20 13.67 3.43
Memory (WMS-R) Free recall 14.30 3.65 16.33 3.77
Memory (WMS-R) Recognition 13.22 1.39 13.86 1.52
Executive Functions (FAB Total) 14.90 1.91 16.29 2.23
Cognitive Control Working Memory (Digits, WAIS) 8.90 2.61 10.77 2.22
Inhibition, Sensitivity to Interference 2.60 0.52 2.92 0.27
Inhibition, Inhibitory control 2.40 0.96 2.38 1.04
Inhibition, Environmental autonomy 2.90 0.31 3.00 0.00
Verbal Fluency (DKEF-S) Letter 7.82 2.23 10.71 3.27
Verbal Fluency (DKEF-S) Category 7.75 1.91 11.07 2.13
Abstraction (Similarities, WAIS) 9.63 3.29 11.86 3.13
Emotional Functioning Emotional Symptoms (HADS) Anxiety 6.70 4.73 4.70 3.10
Emotional Symptoms (HADS) Depression 6.40 4.62 2.67 1.79
Emotion Regulation (ERQ) Suppression 17.33 5.90 17.07 5.20
Task RH Group HC Group
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Individuals with rPFC lesions did not differ from HC in the self-reported experience of 
positive affect during the three conditions. Average scores of positive affect across the three 
conditions are described in Table 3. Using a non-parametric comparison of two independent 
samples, it was observed that the average of positive experience affect was not significantly 
different between groups in all three conditions [Suppress: U = 63, Z = -.68, p = .52, r = -.14; 
Mean Ranking: rPFC = 11.8, HC= 13.8; Spontaneous: U = 45, Z = -1.67, p = .10, r = .33; 
Mean Ranking: rPFC = 10, HC= 15; Amplify: U = 51, Z = -1.31, p = .21, r = .26; Mean 
Ranking: rPFC = 14.57, HC= 10.65].  In consequence, the Emotional Reactivity Hypothesis 
is confirmed, thus suggesting that individuals with rPFC lesions experienced similar levels of 
positive emotions than controls. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. PANAS scores of positive affect. Averages of self-reported positive affect, and mean ranks across the 
three conditions are presented in this table. 
 
 
4.1.4.4. Response Modulation Range 
Participants with rPFC damage were less able to voluntarily modulate the facial expression of 
positive affect. The comparison between the two groups showed that the HC group presented 
a larger response modulation range [M = 13.8, SE = 3.53] compared to rPFC group [M = 3.7, 
SE = 1.2]. This difference was statistically significant [t(21,03) = 2.49, p = .01, r = .48]. In 
consequence, the Modulation Range Hypothesis is confirmed, suggesting that individuals 
with rPFC lesions are less able to inhibit and amplify their facial expressions according to 
contextual demands. 
 
M SE Mean Rank M SE Mean Rank
Suppress 2.14 0.35 11.80 2.53 0.33 13.80
Spontaneous 2.36 0.44 10.00 3.28 0.23 15.00
Amplify 2.60 0.47 14.57 3.28 0.23 10.65
rPFC HCCondition
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Fig 3. Comparison of Range Score between groups. The range score [12+6 suppress ± 12+6 Amplify] was 
significantly smaller in subjects with rPFC lesions than controls. 
 
4.1.4.5. Inhibition of positive affect. Healthy controls were highly able to suppress the 
expression of intense positive affect. Individuals with rPFC lesions, on the contrary, 
presented a mixed performance, with some successfully inhibiting while others presenting an 
abnormally high frequency of AU 12+6. Only 2 out of 15 [13.3%] healthy controls were not 
able to inhibit the expression of AU 12+6 in the suppress condition. These participants 
generated 1 and 2 AU 12+6 respectively. 4 out of 10 [40%] individuals with rPFC were not 
able to successfully inhibit the expression of AU 12+6. 3 out of the 4 participants16 that failed 
inhibiting AU 12+6 had a higher score than the worst control [2 AU 12+6]. A t-test for small 
samples, (Crawford & Howell, 1998), suggested that the score of each of these four 
individuals with rPFC damage was significantly different than controls [for details see Table 
4]. In consequence the Inhibition Hypothesis is only partially supported, suggesting that not 
all subjects with rPFC present with emotional inhibition impairment, but that an important 
proportion of the group does exhibit abnormal performance17. 
 
                                                 
16 These are the identification codes for the four participants that obtained abnormal 
performance on the suppression condition, and the number of AU 12+6 generated by each of 
them:  45M, 2 AU 12+6; 46F, 4 AU 12+6; 66F, 5 AU 12+6; 65M , 6 AU 12+6. The 
description of their lesion can be found in Table 1. 
17 This hypothesis is being further explored using lesion analysis techniques, correlating 
performance in the suppress task with damage to specific areas of the rPFC.  
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Table 4. Frequency of AU 12+6 in the suppress condition. The frequency of AU 12+6 on the suppression 
condition is compared here between healthy controls and individuals with rPFC lesions.  
 
4.1.4.6. Suppression task and measures of cognitive inhibition.  
The ability to suppress the emotional expression of positive affect was associated with only 
one measure of inhibition: inhibitory control. Using non-parametric correlations [Spearman, 
rs], an inverse relationship was found between inhibitory control and suppression ability [rs = 
-.36, p = .01]. No associations were found between the suppression condition and sensitivity 
to interference or environmental autonomy. These data appears to support the Cognitive 
Inhibition Hypothesis, suggesting that the capacity to withhold a prepotent response 
[inhibitory control] is involved in the ability to suppress the expression of emotional facial 
displays.  
This data is interesting in view that suppression usage, as measured by the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire subscale, is positively associated to inhibitory control [rs = .43, p 
=.02]. In other words, it suggests that both, behavior [suppression task] and frequency of use 
[suppression subscale ERQ] are related to response inhibition. 
 
4.1.4.7 Results Summary 
In sum, data from this study appears to partially support the idea that the rPFC is associated 
to ER, particularly to the use of one ER strategy: suppression. Individuals with rPFC lesions 
are less able to voluntarily manipulate their emotional facial expressions according to context 
demands. In other words, compared to controls, they struggle inhibiting and amplifying the 
expression of intense positive affect. Nevertheless, this impairment is not present in all 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent T p value % population below case's score
0 13 86.7 6 60
1 1 6.7 0 0
2 1 6.7 1 10 3.12 .003 99.61
3 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 1 10 6.57 .001 99.99
5 0 0 1 10 8.29 .001 100
6 0 0 1 10 10.02 0.001 100
HCN° AU 12+6 
Suppress
rPFC 
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individuals with rPFC lesions. In fact, while some of them have abnormal performances, 
others appear to fall within the normal range. Data from the PANAS and the imitation task 
suggest that this impairment cannot be explained by an inability to trigger, and experience 
positive emotions, or a difficulty voluntarily generating positive facial displays [AU 12+6]. 
Finally, these results also offer supporting evidence to the relationship between an ER 
strategy [suppression] and inhibitory control, for behavior in the suppression task and 
suppression frequency of use are both associated to the capacity to withhold prepotent 
responses.  
 
4.1.5 Discussion  
There is an important body of literature that suggests that emotion dysregulation is frequent 
after rPFC lesions. However, one of the main limitations of this line of research has been the 
lack of an adequate theoretical framework for ER. This study is the first to explore ER 
impairment after rPFC using a well-known model of ER, the Process Model (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007). Furthermore, this study is unique in that it tests whether response 
modulation, or the capacity to voluntarily manipulate [suppress and amplify] the expression 
of emotional experience, is compromised after rPFC damage.  
Results from this study are consistent with previous literature on emotion reactivity 
after brain injury, suggesting that the experience of emotion [in this case positive emotion] is 
largely preserved after cortical damage [for a detailed discussion on this point see section 3.2] 
(e.g. Feinstein, 2013; Merker, 2007; Solms & Panksepp, 2012). Furthermore, findings from 
this study appear to support previous claims on the role of the right hemisphere, and 
particularly the rPFC cortex, in emotion regulation (Borod, 2000; Stuss & Alexander, 1999; 
Stuss & Alexander, 2000; Turnbull, Evans, & Owen, 2004).  
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A novel finding of this study is that individuals with rPFC lesions are less able than 
controls to voluntarily manipulate the facial emotional expressions. It could be argued that 
such impairment does not reflect a regulatory defect, but instead, the inability to produce 
facial expressions. There are two reasons against this interpretation. The first one is that, in 
this study, individuals with rPFC were equally able than controls posing facial expressions 
[see imitation task results]. The second argument is that the literature on posed facial 
expression impairment after right hemisphere is not conclusive. For example, from the nine 
studies review by Borod et al. (2002) only four reported impairment of posed expression in 
right hemisphere patients.  
Another possible explanation to this finding is that individuals with rPFC present an 
impairment producing spontaneous facial expressions. In fact, the same review from Borod et 
al. (2002) reported that eight out of thirteen studies described an impairment spontaneously 
generating facial expressions after right hemisphere damage. This interpretation of the data 
seems unlikely when the performance of individuals with rPFC lesions in this study is 
considered. Data from the spontaneous condition here, where participants were not asked to 
manipulate their facial expressions, is here informative. It was observed that, even though the 
rPFC group produced less AU 12+6 than controls [rPFC: M = 3.60, SD =5.37; HC = 7.40, SD 
= 9.2], this difference was not significant with a medium effect size [T(2, 23) = -1.75, p = .12, 
d = .50]. This result suggests that the spontaneous facial expression of emotions is not 
drastically reduced in patients with rPFC, and that there is a wide variability even between 
controls.  
 This study offers novel data regarding the relationship between suppression, 
inhibitory control and rPFC damage. Firstly, it suggests that suppression impairment after 
rPFC lesions is not a homogenous deficit, with some subjects performing equally as controls, 
and other presenting remarkably abnormal performance. A possible explanation of this 
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finding is that the extension of the damage, and the involvement of key cortical structures, 
may play a critical role on generating a deficit on suppression. For example, as reviewed in 
the introduction, it has been suggested that the right inferior frontal gyrus, or BA 47, is 
particularly important in implementing motor inhibitory control. The question of which areas 
of the rPFC are related to the performance on the suppression condition of this experiment is 
still a work in progress. However, it is interesting to note that three out of the four subjects 
with abnormal performance on this task present large fronto-posterior lesions with insula 
involvement.  
 In the last couple of years, a handful of studies have explored the relationship between 
cognitive control and the suppression of emotional experience. So far, the only cognitive 
control process that has been found to be associated to the suppression of emotional 
experience is verbal fluency (Goodkind, Gyurak, McCarthy, Miller, & Levenson, 2010; 
Gyurak et al., 2009). It is intriguing that associations between suppression and inhibition have 
not been found, especially considering that suppression involves the process of inhibiting the 
behavioral emotional display of an already triggered emotional response (Gross & Levenson, 
1997). This study is the first one to offer supporting evidence to this theoretical assumption, 
by reporting inverse associations between the capacity to withhold prepotent responses 
[response inhibition] with the ability to suppress or hide the expression of feelings.  
It is interesting that the studies addressing the role of cognitive control in suppression 
have used a Stroop task as an inhibition task (Gyurak et al., 2009; Gyurak, Goodkind, 
Kramer, Bruce, & Levenson, 2012). In this task participants are presented with color words 
>HJ µUHG¶@ WKDW DUH HLWKHU SULQWHG LQ FRQJUXHQW LQN FRORUV >HJ WKHZRUG UHG SULQWHG LQ UHG
ink], or incongruent ink colors [e.g. the word red printed in blue ink]. Then, participants are 
asked to read the words and not the colors. The inhibitory effort demanded by this task is that 
verbal command [read the words and not the color] conflicts with sensory information [the 
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ink color of the word], so subjects must withhold the tendency to say the color [which is more 
automatic] in order to read the word. In this study we tested three tasks that assess different 
aspects of inhibition. One of them, referred in this study as sensitivity to interference task, 
follows the same logic of the Stroop task, for it requires participants to obey verbal 
commands and refrain from what they see [e.g. when I tap once, you tap twice]. This task did 
not present significant associations to the suppression task, thus replicating the above 
mentioned studies. The task that did exhibit significant relationship was slightly different, and 
is more related to go-no go paradigms. In this paradigm, subjects must inhibit a response that 
was previously given [e.g. not tapping when the examiner taps twice]. It would be interesting 
to explore in the future what makes the response inhibition task more sensitive to suppression 
impairment than the sensitivity to interference task. Perhaps the use of several measures of 
inhibition in studies interested in suppression would allow understanding this point further. 
The results presented in this study are of relevance for neuropsychological 
rehabilitation, for they suggest that some individuals with rPFC are particularly impaired 
hiding and amplifying their feelings according to contextual demands. These deficits may 
KDYH D JUHDW LPSDFW RQ SDWLHQWV¶ VRFLDO OLIH FRPSURPLVLQJ WKH LQWHUSHUVRQDO UHJXODWLRQ RI
emotions (Niven et al., 2009) and the attainment of intimate relationships (Bowen et al., 
2010) )RU H[DPSOHZKHQ H[SHULHQFLQJ MR\ DW RWKHU¶V SHRSOHPLVIRUWXQDWH D SKHQRPHQRQ
also known as Schadenfreude (Smith et al., 996; van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Wesseling, & van 
Koningsbruggen, 2011), people may need to inhibit their initial expression of joy, in order to 
show concern, or sympathy. In this case, inhibition of facial expression would allow 
suppressing of the prepotent feeling, and thus tuning to the negative emotions experienced by 
the other. In a similar way, the inability to amplify positive emotions when witnessing 
VRPHRQHHOVH¶VDFFRPSOLVKPHQWDOVRNQRZQDV6\QKHGRQLD(Royzman & Rozin, 2006), may 
also have interpersonal detrimental effects. In this case, the amplification of joy, would allow 
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connecting to others, thus triggering a spiral of positive affect and increasing mutual well-
being (Gable, Reis, Impett, & Asher, 2004). In the future it would be interesting to describe 
LQGHWDLOKRZWKHVHSDWWHUQVRIVXSSUHVVLRQLPSDLUPHQWPD\LPSDFWSDWLHQWV¶TXDOLW\RIOLIH 
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4.2. Reappraisal generation after acquired brain 
damage: the role of laterality and cognitive control. 
 
 
4.2.1. Introduction 
Emotion dysregulation has been long recognized as a common impairment after focal and 
diffuse brain damage, compromising emotional adjustment and social functioning (Abreu et 
al., 2009; Bechara, 2004; McDonald et al., 2010; Obonsawin et al., 2007; Tate, 1999). 
However, little is known about the mechanisms that underlie such impairment. The process 
model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998;  Gross & Thompson, 2007) suggests the existence 
of a set of five mechanisms, called strategies, that people commonly use to modulate how 
they feel. Recently, it has been proposed that these strategies may be selectively impaired in 
groups of patients with damage to discrete brain areas (Beer & Lombardo, 2007).  
Reappraisal is an emotion regulation [ER] strategy of special interest to understand 
emotion dysregulation after brain injury. It refers to the capacity to modify the meaning of a 
situation in order to manipulate its emotional impact (Gross, 1998;  Gross & Thompson, 
2007), this by re-interpreting the event in less negative, or more positive, terms (McRae, 
Ciesielski, & Gross, 2011; Ochsner & Gross, 2007). In view that brain damage, and 
particularly frontal lesions, impair different components of discursive thinking (Goldstein & 
Scherer, 1941; Goldstein, 1936; Gomez Beldarrain, Garcia-Monco, Astigarraga, Gonzalez, & 
Grafman, 2005; Luria, 1966), it is likely that reappraisal generation may be compromised as 
well. 
From a neuropsychological point of view, it has been suggested that reappraisal 
depends on capacities like set shifting [to inhibit the current negative appraisal and generate a 
new one] and language [to generate a narrative or history to tell oneself] (Mcrae, Jacobs, 
Ray, John, & Gross, 2011). These abilities are frequently compromised after left prefrontal 
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lesions (Alexander, Stuss, Picton, Shallice, & Gillingham, 2007; Coelho, Lê, Mozeiko, 
Krueger, & Grafman, 2012; Geva et al., 2011; Luria, 1959; Luria, 1966; Mecklinger, Von 
Cramon, Springer, & Matthes-von Cramon, 1999; Morin, 2009; Robinson, Shallice, Bozzali, 
& Cipolotti, 2010).  
Neuroimaging studies on reappraisal appear to support the relevance of the left 
hemisphere. It has been reported that reappraisal is closely associated with the activation of 
cognitive control and language areas, particularly in the left PFC (Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & 
Gross, 2008; Green & Malhi, 2006; Kalisch, 2009; Kim, Cornwell, & Kim, 2011; Ochsner & 
Gross, 2005;  Ochsner et al., 2004; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; Vanderhasselt, 
Baeken, Van Schuerbeek, Luypaert, & De Raedt, 2012). To our knowledge there is only one 
case study that has explored how damage to the left hemisphere [a fronto-parietal lesion], and 
impairment to cognitive control and language areas, is related to reappraisal generation 
difficulties (Salas et al., 2013). However, no group study has tested whether unilateral lesions 
to the left hemisphere have a larger impact on reappraisal generation compared to right 
hemisphere lesions.  
Finally, a couple of studies have begun to unpack the cognitive control processes 
associated with reappraisal in non-brain injured subjects. It has been suggested that working 
memory, response inhibition, abstract reasoning and verbal fluency may be necessary 
capacities to reappraise (Mcrae et al., 2011). Nevertheless, evidence has only supported a 
relationship between working memory and reappraisal ability (Mcrae et al., 2011; 
Schmeichel, Volokhov, & Demaree, 2008). The study of people with brain damage may 
contribute considerably to this line of research, by exploring whether impairment in a specific 
neuropsychological capacity [e.g. verbal fluency] is related or not to reappraisal generation 
ability. 
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This is the first study to experimentally test whether lesion laterality has an effect on 
reappraisal generation. In addition, this study is also the first to explore the relationship 
between cognitive control impairment and the capacity to generate reappraisals. For this 
purpose, participants with unilateral lesions to the left and right hemisphere, and matched 
healthy controls, were tested on a reappraisal generation task. In order to obtain a profile of 
neuropsychological impairment, a set of cognitive tasks was administered. Additionally, 
measures of emotional symptomatology and emotion regulation were collected. 
 Based on the available literature, this article explored two hypothesis: (1) that 
participants with left hemisphere [LH] lesions will present a more marked impairment 
generating reappraisal compared to subjects with right hemisphere lesions and controls [LH 
Reappraisal Hypothesis]; (2) that cognitive control abilities, such as, response inhibition, 
working memory, verbal fluency and abstraction will be negatively associated to reappraisal 
difficulty and positively associated to reappraisal productivity [Cognitive Control 
Hypothesis]. 
 
4.2.2. Methods 
4.2.2.1. Participants  
Healthy controls and participants with unilateral lesions and healthy controls were referred by 
neurologists from the Bangor University School of Psychology. The main inclusion criterion 
for the neurological group was to have a focal brain lesion. Several exclusion criteria were 
considered, such as time since injury [no less than 6 months] and language ability [no 
moderate or severe language impairment].  
The overall sample involved a total of 30 participants, including individuals with left 
hemisphere damage [LH, n = 8, female = 4, male = 4], right hemisphere damage [RH, n = 8, 
female = 5, male = 3] and healthy controls [HC, n = 14, female = 9, male = 5]. The three 
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groups were matched in age [LH: M = 62.83, SD = 9.98; RH: M = 57.43, SD = 13.34; HC: M 
= 62.86, SD = 4.28] and education [LH: M = 12.83, SD = 1.3; RH: M = 14.14, SD = 1.3; HC: 
M = 14, SD = 1.8]. One subject from the LH group died before completing the assessment. 
Both neurological groups were matched in relation to the average of months since the injury 
[LH: M = 69.16, SD = 49.19; RH: M = 63.22, SD = 44.35]. For details on lesion location and 
aetiology see Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Clinical details of Left Hemisphere and Right Hemisphere groups 
 
 
 
4.2.2.2. Procedure 
Healthy controls and participants with brain injury were tested at Bangor University. In cases 
where participants with acquired brain injury had mobility problems or could not travel, they 
were seen at home. Eligible participants were seen twice. Assessment across two sessions 
Lesion Laterality Age/Sex Aetiology Months since onset Location
Left Hemisphere 52F MCA stroke 104 Left Prefrontal
76F MCA stroke 25 Left Prefrontal, Insula
64F MCA stroke 129 Left temporo-parietal
76M MCA stroke 65 Left temporo-parietal
49M Herpes encephalitis 24 Left hippocampus, amygdala, insula
59M MCA stroke 48 Left temporo-parietal
57M MCA stroke 126 Left temporo-parietal
72M MCA stroke 72 left fronto-parietal
Right Hemisphere 57F MCA stroke 84 Right Prefrontal, insula
50M MCA and ACA stroke 20 Right Prefrontal
45M ACoA SAH 70 Right Prefrontal
74M MCA Stroke 20 Right ventro-lateral prefrontal        cortex, basal ganglia
46F MCA stroke 114 Right Prefrontal, insula
66F MCA stroke 120 Right parietal
78F MCA stroke 13 Right Prefrontal insula
68F MCA stroke 24 Right Prefrontal and parietal
ACoA = anterior communicating artery aneurism; SAH = subarachnoid haemorrhage, MCA = middle cerebral artery.ACA = Anterior 
cerebral artery.
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was useful to avoid the impact of fatigue on the neurological group. During the first session 
the general goal of the research was explained and consent was obtained [see Appendix 2]. 
Measures of overall cognition were also collected and participants completed the reappraisal 
task. In the second session the response modulation task was carried out and measures of 
executive function were obtained. Finally participants were debriefed upon completion. 
 
4.2.2.3. Instruments 
Overall Cognitive Assessment: The Mini Mental State Examination (Rovner & Folstein, 
1987), Telephone Search [TEA, Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway, & Nimmo-Smith, 1994], Token 
Test (De Renzi & Faglioni, 1978), Logic Memory (Weschler, 1987), Rey-Osterrieth Figure 
(Stern et al., 1994) and the Frontal Assessment Battery (Dubois et al., 2000) were used in 
order to obtain an overall profile of cognitive function.  
 
Cognitive Control Assessment: A set of neuropsychological tasks was used to obtain a profile 
of several cognitive control capacities: working memory [Digits Forward and Backward, 
Weschler, 1981], abstraction [Similarities,  Weschler, 1981], verbal fluency [D-KEFS, Delis, 
Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001] and inhibition [conflicting instructions, Stuss & Benson, 1986; 
inhibitory control, Drewe, 1975; environmental autonomy, Lhermitte, Pillon, & Serdaru, 
1986]. 
 
Emotional Functioning Assessment: In order to assess the presence of symptomatology, the 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (HADS, Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), a self-report 
questionnaire, was employed. The HADS has been shown to be a sensitive tool to in 
assessing depression and anxiety symptoms in the acquired brain injury population (Dawkins, 
Cloherty, Gracey & Evans, 2006). To assess the use of reappraisal in daily life, the Emotion 
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Regulation Questionnaire (Gross and John, 2003) was applied. This instrument has not been 
used in acquired brain injury population before. 
 
4.2.2.4. Reappraisal Generation Task  
This task is adapted from several studies on reappraisal ability, and is described in detail in 
Salas and colleagues (2013) [see section 5.2]. Thirteen pictures18 were selected from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), depicting 
negative events of different sorts. These pictures were selected to cover the wide range of 
possible negative scenarios that people commonly face (death, natural disasters, accidents, 
illness, violence, etc.) [See )LJ@7KHSLFWXUHVZHUHGLVSOD\HGLQD¶FRPSXWHUVFUHHQ 
At the beginning of the task participants were trained to generate reappraisals, using 
WKUHHSUDFWLFH,$36SLFWXUHV7KHWDVNZDVLQWURGXFHGDVIROORZV³6RPHWLPHVSHRSOHWU\WR
feel better by looking on the bright side of things. You will watch pictures of negative events 
and will be asked to think aloud about the positive side of these situations. Try to be fast and 
VD\DVPDQ\SRVLWLYHVLGHV\RXFDQWKLQNRI´ 
In order to avoid memory bias for the neurological group, on the screen, above each 
picture, WKH WDVN LQVWUXFWLRQZDV VXPPDUL]HG ³7KLQN DORXG DERXW WKH SRVLWLYH VLGH RI WKLV
VLWXDWLRQ7U\WREHTXLFN´3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHLQIRUPHGWKDWWKHLUDQVZHUVZRXOGEHWLPHG and 
recorded verbatim. They were also informed that the aim of the task was to produce as many 
positive reinterpretations as possible. If they were not able to generate a correct reappraisal 
IRUWKHILUVWSLFWXUHVHYHUDOUHDSSUDLVDOH[DPSOHVZHUHRIIHUHGHJ&DU&UDVK>@µZKHQ
ORRNLQJDWWKLVSLFWXUHVRPHSHRSOHVD\WKDWKHOSLVRQWKHZD\¶RUµLVQRWDVEDGDVLWORRNV¶
The same procedure was followed with the second and third trial picture. Both, the 
                                                 
18 3LFWXUHV¶WKHPHDQG,$36QXPEHU5LRW6KRSOLIWLQJ6LFNEDE\%XUQWEXLOGLQJ
Funeral (2799), Tornado (5971), Pollution (9341), Flood (9926), Car crash (9903), Graveyard (9220). The 
picture set had an overall negative valence (M = 3.01; SD = 0.8) according to the IAPS database 
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neurological group and the non-brain injured group were able to offer adequate reappraisals 
by the end of the trial run.  
 
 
 
Fig 1. IAPS pictures used in the Reappraisal Generation Task. From upper left corner [clockwise]: Sick Baby 
(3350); Funeral (2799); Car crash (9903); Pollution (9341). 
 
 
 
4.2.3. Data Analysis 
In order to respond Hypothesis 1 [that participants with left hemisphere lesions will present a 
more marked impairment generating reappraisals compared to subjects with right hemisphere 
lesions and controls], two variables were generated, following a similar analysis to that used 
by Salas et al. (2011). Reappraisal difficulty was obtained averaging the number of seconds 
that each subject required to offer the first reappraisal in each picture. Reappraisal 
productivity was measured by averaging the number of spontaneous reappraisal [with no 
prompting] generated during each picture. The two variables were compared between groups. 
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Because normality and independence of variance assumptions were not met, a non-parametric 
test for differences between 3 or more groups (Kruskal-Wallis) was used. If the overall model 
showed significant differences, two planned comparisons were tested using Mann-Whitney 
test [Healthy controls v/s Brain injury patients (Left + Right Hemisphere); Left Hemisphere 
v/s Right Hemisphere]. 
 
Hypothesis 2 [that cognitive control abilities would be negatively associated to Reappraisal 
Difficulty, and positively related to Reappraisal Productivity] was addressed using 
correlational methods. As a first step, bivariate correlations were used to explore independent 
associations between Reappraisal Difficulty and Reappraisal Productivity with cognitive 
control abilities. As a second step, a multiple linear regression model was tested. From the 7 
initial tasks considered to assess the four cognitive processes, three were dropped. Two of 
them, related to inhibition [sensitivity to interference and environmental autonomy], did not 
show enough variability [most of the participants performed with the highest score]. The two 
fluidity tasks [Letter Fluency and Category Fluency] showed a medium correlation between 
them [r = .5, p = .01]. In consequence, category fluidity was discarded in order to reduce the 
number of parameters and avoid possible multicollinearity. The decision to preserve letter 
fluency was based on evidence suggesting that, compared to category fluency, it is more 
strongly associated to cognitive control abilities (Henry & Crawford, 2004).  
 
4.2.4. Results  
4.2.4.1. Cognitive and Emotional functioning  
The assessment of emotional symptoms suggests that all three groups had subclinical levels 
of anxiety [LH: M = 3.67; RH: M = 5; HC: M = 4.64] and depression [LH: M = 4.33; RH: M 
= 4.75; HC: M = 2.71]. In addition, none of the neurological groups differed from healthy 
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controls in the self-reported use of reappraisal [F(2, 22) = 2.38, p = .11]. A detailed 
description of the average scores of each group on the cognitive and emotional assessment 
can be found in table 2. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Cognitive and Emotional performance of neurological groups and healthy controls 
 
 
 
4.2.4.2. Reappraisal difficulty and productivity 
Reappraisal Difficulty: the average amount of seconds used to generate a first reappraisal did 
not differ between the LH and RH groups. However, significant differences were found 
between patients with brain injury in general [LH+RH], and HC. A Kruskal-Wallis non-
parametric test was used to compare the amount of seconds used by each group. It was 
observed that the number of seconds was significantly different between groups [H(2) = 
10.77, p = .002; Mean Ranking: LH = 21.71, RH = 18.25, HC = 9.79]. According to planned 
comparisons, it was found that such difference was only significant, and had a large effect 
size, between the HC group and the Brain Injury group (LH+RH) [U = 32, Z = -3.19, p < 
M SD M SD M SD
Overall Cognition Minimental State Examination 25.67 2.88 27.83 1.60 29.17 1.34
Sustained Attention (TEA) 7.67 1.52 7.83 1.83 11.00 1.78
Divided Attention (TEA) 9.00 3.60 11.16 5.11 11.22 1.73
Comprehensive Language (Token Test) 26.00 9.53 31.17 1.17 31.33 0.78
Memory (WMS-R) Coding 6.67 2.50 13.00 3.84 14.58 2.97
Memory (WMS-R) Free recall 8.67 3.05 14.00 4.33 16.83 3.51
Memory (WMS-R) Recognition 13.67 0.57 13.33 1.36 13.75 1.60
Executive Functions (FAB Total) 13.33 4.04 15.50 0.23 17.08 0.99
Cognitive Control Working Memory (Digits, WAIS) 10.00 4.58 9.17 2.56 10.67 2.31
Inhibition, Sensitivity to Interference 2.83 0.41 2.63 0.51 2.91 0.30
Inhibition, Inhibitory control 2.00 1.92 2.50 0.92 2.58 0.79
Inhibition, Environmental autonomy 3.00 0.00 2.83 0.40 3.00 0.00
Verbal Fluency (DKEF-S) Letter 7.67 5.13 7.50 2.43 10.71 3.27
Verbal Fluency (DKEF-S) Category 4.33 0.57 8.00 2.09 10.73 2.19
Abstraction (Similarities, WAIS) 6.67 2.08 10.00 3.69 11.64 3.50
Emotional Functioning Emotional Symptoms (HADS) Anxiety 3.33 0.57 6.17 4.04 4.27 3.52
Emotional Symptoms (HADS) Depression 4.00 6.92 6.00 5.40 2.55 1.86
Emotion Regulation (ERQ) Reappraisal 23.67 14.50 33.00 4.19 32.00 5.07
HC GroupRH GroupLH GroupTask
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.001, r = .59], but not between LH and RH groups [U = 25, Z = -.24, p = .43, r = -.04]. In 
conclusion, data does not support the LH Reappraisal Hypothesis as patients with LH and RH 
damage were equally slower in generating reappraisals.  
Reappraisal Productivity: the average number of reappraisals generated in each 
picture did not differ between groups, suggesting that individuals with LH and RH lesions, 
and healthy controls, are equally productive when time is not considered. A Kruskal-Wallis 
non-parametric test was used to compare the total reappraisals generated by each group. It 
was observed that the number of reappraisals was not significantly different between groups 
[H(2) = 3.51, p = .175; Mean Ranking: LH = 14.07, RH = 10.88, HC = 17.82]. A detailed 
GHVFULSWLRQRI WKHJURXSV¶SHUIRUPDQFHFDQ be found in Table 3. A graphic summary of the 
results can also be found in Fig 2.  
 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of reappraisal generation and productivity, for both neurological groups and 
healthy controls. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2. Laterality and Reappraisal Generation. The figures describe differences between neurological groups and 
controls in reappraisal difficulty and generation. Patients with LH and RH lesions are equally slow generating 
the first reappraisal [left side figure]. However, they do not differ from controls in the average number of 
reappraisal produced in each picture [right side figure]. ** = p < .001 
 
  
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Reappraisal Difficulty 43.3 25.88 33.58 17.6 38.13** 21.62 16.7 7.07
Reappraisal Productivity 1.82 0.59 1.61 0.95 1.71 0.78 2.22 0.79
**  = p < .001
LH Group RH Group HCBI Group
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4.1.4.3. Cognitive Control Hypothesis 
Reappraisal Difficulty. From the four cognitive control processes considered, only two 
[inhibition and verbal fluency] were significantly associated with reappraisal difficulty. The 
final model tested used Reappraisal Difficulty as a dependent variable and Working Memory, 
Abstraction, Verbal Fluency and Inhibition as predictors. Multicollinearity, homoscedasticity 
and independency of errors assumptions were met. The model was significant [F(4,24) = 
7.70, p < .001] and explained a 49% of the variance. The final model is presented in Table 4. 
From the four predictors, Inhibition and Verbal Fluency were the only two significantly 
associated to Reappraisal Difficulty. By looking at the standard coefficient it is possible to 
conclude that Inhibition showed the strongest predictive value. In relation to the other two 
independent variables, abstraction was marginally related and working memory showed no 
relationship. 
 
Reappraisal Productivity. The same model was tested for Reappraisal productivity. Contrary 
to the previous model, this one did not explain significant amounts of variance [adjusted R2 = 
.022, F(4,24) = 1.16, p = .35] 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Multiple linear model for Reappraisal Difficulty. The table describes the percentage of variance 
explained by each cognitive control process. Inhibition and Verbal Fluency are the only two significant 
variables. Abstraction presents a marginal relationship with reappraisal difficulty. 
 
 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 87.12 12.59 6.92 0.00
WORKING MEMORY (Digits) 0.26 0.93 0.04 0.28 0.78
ABSTRACTION (Similarities) -1.64 0.87 -0.27 -1.88 0.07
VERBAL FLUENCY (Letter) -2.28 0.9 -0.37 -2.53 0.02*
INHIBITION (Inhibitory Control) -10.27 3.07 -0.47 -3.35 0.003*
a Dependent Variable: REAPPRAISAL DIFICULTY
Unstandardized Coefficients
t Sig.
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4.2.4.4. Results summary 
In sum, data from this study does not support the LH Laterality Hypothesis, thus challenging 
the assumption that LH lesions generate a more marked impairment in the quick generation 
of a first reappraisal [reappraisal difficulty] or the total number of reappraisals that can be 
produced [reappraisal productivity]. Nevertheless, the results of this study suggest that having 
a brain injury, with disregard of the laterality of the lesion, does have an impact on 
reappraisal difficulty. This pattern is not observed in relation to reappraisal productivity, 
where participants with brain injury reach similar levels than controls. In conclusion, 
participants with brain injury are slower, but equally productive than people with no brain 
injury. 
The results of this study appear to support the Cognitive Control Hypothesis, 
suggesting that the velocity to generate a first reappraisal, which is compromised in brain-
injured patients in general, is associated with two cognitive control abilities. Thus, inhibition 
and verbal fluency present both negative relationships to reappraisal difficulty. In relation to 
abstraction, it only exhibits a marginally significant negative association. Working memory 
does not appear to be associated to the amount of time required to reappraise. Interestingly, 
no cognitive control variable appears to be associated with reappraisal productivity. 
 
4.2.5. Discussion 
In the last decade there has been a growing body of literature exploring the neuroanatomical 
basis of reappraisal through the use of neuroimaging. These studies have suggested that 
reappraisal tasks activate a set of areas in the left hemisphere that are commonly associated 
with language and cognitive control. The main goal of this study was to investigate such a 
hypothesis in two ways. Firstly, to test whether participants with unilateral lesions to the LH 
were more impaired than participants with RH lesions, and neurologically healthy controls 
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with a reappraisal generation task. Secondly, to explore which cognitive control abilities are 
associated with reappraisal generation.  
In relation to the LH reappraisal hypothesis, it was observed that participants with 
lesions to the LH and RH needed considerably more time than controls to generate a first 
reappraisal for each picture. In other words, it appears that RH damage generates similar 
levels of impairment than LH damage. However, both neurological groups, and healthy 
controls, were equally productive when time was not considered. As for the cognitive control 
hypothesis, a negative relationship was observed between inhibition, verbal fluency and 
reappraisal difficulty. In contrast, no cognitive control ability was associated to reappraisal 
productivity. The relevance of these findings is discussed in relation to the neuroanatomical 
basis of reappraisal, the relationship between cognitive control and reappraisal, and the 
implications of reappraisal for neuropsychological rehabilitation. 
 
4.2.5.1. The neuroanatomical basis of reappraisal generation 
This is the first study that uses a brain injury population to explore the neural basis of 
reappraisal. More specifically, this study has focused on reappraisal generation, or the 
capacity to produce positive reinterpretations of negative events. This is an important point to 
clarify, because most behavioral and neuroimaging studies tend to focus on reappraisal 
ability, or the capacity to modulate emotion through the use of reappraisal. Such emphasis on 
ability is sensible, considering that people with healthy brains probably have an intact 
capacity to generate reappraisals. However, a robust set of evidence on the 
neuropsychological consequences of brain injury suggests that the generation and 
manipulation of thoughts can be compromised by lesions to diverse brain areas (Goldstein & 
Scherer, 1941; Gomez Beldarrain et al., 2005; Luria, 1966; McGrath, 1991). If reappraisal 
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relies on the flexible use of thinking (Ochsner & Gross, 2004), then it is likely that people 
with brain injury may struggle using such strategy to modulate how they feel.  
Data from this study suggests that lesions to the LH, which has been long related to 
language functions (Corballis, Badzakova-Trajkov, & Häberling, 2012; Frost et al., 1999), 
and verbally mediated cognitive control (Gruber & Goschke, 2004; Henry & Crawford, 2004; 
Stephan et al., 2003), do not impair reappraisal difficulty more markedly than lesions to the 
RH. This is interesting, since reappraisal has been mostly considered as a language- mediated 
ER strategy (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Mcrae et al., 2011). A possible explanation for this 
negative finding may well be that lesions to the RH compromise reappraisal generation via 
impairment of other non-language mechanisms, such as attention. If individuals with RH 
lesions present marked attentional difficulties (Anderson, Jacobs, & Harvey, 2005; Leclercq, 
2002; Molenberghs et al., 2009; Robertson, Tegnér, Tham, Lo, & Nimmo-Smith, 1995; 
Shallice, Stuss, Alexander, Picton, & Derkzen, 2008; Wilkins, Shallice, & McCarthy, 1987), 
and reappraisal involves the manipulation of attentional focus (Ochsner et al., 2002), it is 
likely that such an impairment may also have an impact on reappraisal generation. However, 
this explanation remains speculative and requires scientific exploration.  
 
 
4.2.5.2. Neuropsychological components of reappraisal generation 
A different perspective to this problem is to consider the correlational data between 
reappraisal generation and cognitive control abilities. This approach might offer important 
information on the neuropsychological mechanisms that sustain reappraisal generation. 
The available literature on cognitive control and reappraisal is scarce and focuses 
exclusively on reappraisal ability. So far, it has suggested that reappraisal ability is positively 
related to working memory (Mcrae et al., 2011; Schmeichel et al., 2008) and marginally 
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related to abstraction (Mcrae et al., 2011). Interestingly, no associations have been reported 
for abilities that reflect key theoretical aspects of reappraisal, such as inhibition [e.g. to 
detach from the negative emotional experience], or verbal ability [e.g. to generate alternative 
interpretations].  
This study suggests that an inhibitory control task (Drewe, 1975), where participants 
must withhold a response that was given to the same stimulus before [e.g. tap once when the 
examiner taps twice], can significantly predict the amount of time that it would take to 
generate a first reappraisal. In other words, if an individual decreases his score by one point 
in the inhibition task (Dubois et al., 2000), his response time to generate a first reappraisal 
will increase by 10.27 seconds. This finding is the first to support the view that inhibition is a 
key ability in decreasing the salience of automatic negative appraisals (Mcrae et al., 2011), 
for when inhibition is impaired, reappraisal generation requires considerably more time. 
There is one case study that has reported this relationship in detail (Salas et al., 2013) [see 
Chapter 5], describing how inhibition impairment after a left prefrontal lesion produced a 
remarkable difficulty in spontaneously generating reappraisals. Finally, it is important to note 
that this data is consistent with models of executive function that propose behavioral 
inhibition as a requisite to any goal directed behavior (Barkley, 1997, 2001) [see Fig 3]. 
4.2. Reappraisal Generation, Laterality and Cognitive Control 
 
222 
 
 
 
Fig 3. Behavioral Inhibition and Executive Functions. The figure describes the relationship between behavioral 
inhibition and related executive functions (from Barkley, 1997). 
 
 
The results obtained in this experiment also suggest that performance on a verbal 
fluency task (Delis et al., 2001), in which participants are expected to generate as many 
words that begin with a letter in one minute, also predict the amount of time used to generate 
a first reappraisal [this, to a less extent than inhibition]. Verbal fluency is an interesting 
measure in understanding reappraisal, for it presents high associations with verbal ability 
(Crawford, Moore, & Cameron, 1992; Crawford, Obonsawin, & Bremner, 1993; Miller, 
1984; Sollberger et al., 2010), a core component of reappraisal (Mcrae et al., 2011). In 
addition, verbal fluency also appears to recruit other processes that are key to reappraisal, 
such as the retrieval and recall of information, self- monitoring and inhibition (Henry & 
Crawford, 2004; Perret, 1974).  
Based on these findings, and considering previous studies on reappraisal ability 
(Mcrae et al., 2011; Schmeichel et al., 2008), a two-stage reappraisal model is here proposed. 
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In a first stage [reappraisal generation] inhibition is required to disengage from the 
automatic negative appraisal. If inhibition is successful, alternative interpretations can be 
generated -this moderated by verbal fluency. In a second phase [reappraisal ability], working 
memory ability allows the retention of the previously generated interpretations. This, in order 
to reevaluate the meaning of the emotional stimulus, which still remains in the focus of 
attention (Kanske, Heissler, Schönfelder, Bongers, & Wessa, 2010), and engage with the 
most adequate interpretation (Mcrae et al., 2011). The successful engagement with a positive 
reinterpretation will down-regulate the initial levels of negative emotion. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 A two-stage process of reappraisal.  The figure describes a two phase model of reappraisal. On a first 
phase reappraisals are generated. On the second stage reappraisals are mentally manipulated, so they can 
compete with the negative stimulus and down-regulate emotion. Inhibition and verbal fluency are key abilities 
for reappraisal generation, while working memory is central for reappraisal ability. 
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4.2.5.3 Reappraisal generation impairment and neuropsychological rehabilitation 
This study offers interesting information regarding how brain damage may compromise the 
use of emotion regulation strategies. It suggests that brain injury, without regard for lesion 
laterality, impairs the capacity to quickly generate positive reinterpretations of negative 
events. However, when longer periods of time are provided, patients are able to produce 
reappraisals as well as the controls did. These findings are relevant for two reasons. Firstly, 
they offer supporting evidence to the idea that brain-injured patients in general are vulnerable 
to experiencing emotion dysregulation (Salas, 2012), particularly when confronted with 
emotional situations where they need to react quickly. This is consistent with studies 
describing that focal and non-focal brain damage compromises the capacity to rapidly react to 
environmental demands (Gerritsen, Berg, Deelman, Visser-Keizer, & Meyboom-de Jong, 
2003; Goldstein, 1995; Mathias & Wheaton, 2007; Winkens, Van Heugten, Fasotti, Duits, & 
Wade, 2006), as well as to reports suggesting that negative emotional events can compromise 
cognitive abilities (e.g. Demanet, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2011).   
Secondly, they suggest that a psychological capacity for reappraisal can be externally 
modulated, by manipulating environmental demands [time]. This is in line with evidence 
proposing that neuropsychological impairments are not stable, but can be modulated by 
physical or interpersonal context (Bowen, Yeates, & Palmer, 2010, for a review). For 
example, it has been reported that the use of prompts facilitates the process of disengagement 
from negative visual material, increasing dramatically the capacity to generate positive 
reinterpretations (Salas et al., 2013). This evidence appears to support the theoretical 
proposition that extrinsic forms of emotion regulation, such as affective and cognitive 
engagement (Niven et al., 2009), can be used to compensate for intrinsic emotion regulation 
difficulties [reappraisal] (Freed, 2002; Salas, 2012).  
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4.2.6. Conclusion 
In recent years, scientists have become increasingly interested in the neural basis, and 
neuropsychological foundations, of emotion regulation. This study has contributed to such 
literature by exploring the role of each hemisphere, and the relevance of several cognitive 
control abilities, in reappraisal generation. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, this 
study has addressed these issues using a well-known ER paradigm on a sample of individuals 
with acquired brain injury. Such an approach opens important possibilities to ER research, 
complementing behavioral studies with healthy controls and neuroimaging studies. 
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5.1. Concrete Behaviour and Reappraisal Deficits 
after a Left Frontal Stroke: A Case Study19 
 
5.1.1. Abstract 
Concrete behaviour, the inability to disengage from immediate experience in order to 
manipulate ideas and thoughts, has long been understood to be a common problem after 
frontal lobe lesions. However, there has been little consideration of the impact that 
concreteness may have on emotional functioning, specifically in the use of thinking to 
manipulate emotional responses. One widely-studied emotion regulation strategy is 
reappraisal, which depends on several frontal lobe related cognitive control processes. While 
there have been numerous neuroimaging findings on reappraisal, no study has used brain 
injured patients to investigate this issue. The present case study is the first to describe the 
capacity to generate reappraisals in a patient (Mrs M), whose behaviour became concrete 
after a left prefrontal stroke. Using a picture-based reappraisal paradigm, her performance 
was compared to non-concrete brain-lesioned patients, and neurologically-healthy controls. 
Although Mrs M showed relatively preserved overall cognitive function, she was completely 
unable to spontaneously generate reappraisals. In striking contrast, once external support was 
offered, in the form of prompts, her capacity to reappraise dramatically improved. The results 
are analyzed in terms of three neuropsychological capacities ± all compromised in Mrs M± 
previously proposed as reappraisal components: response inhibition, abstraction and verbal 
fluency. A number of implications for rehabilitation are discussed, including how the use of 
prompting may facilitate reappraisal capacity.  
                                                 
19 Salas, Gross, Rafal, Viñas-Guasch & Turnbull (2013). Concrete Behaviour and Reappraisal Deficits After A 
Left Frontal Stroke:A Case Study. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 37-41,10.1080/09602011.2013.784709   
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³%OXH IHHOVEHWUD\HGE\ WKHPDQZKRZDVRQFH OLNHD IDWKHU WRKLP
DQGZKHQKHILQLVKHVWKHOHWWHUKHIHHOVHPSW\«,¶PRQP\RZQKH
thinks, there is no one to turn to anymore. This is followed by several 
hours of despondency and self-pity, with Blue thinking once or twice 
WKDWPD\EHKH¶GEHEHWWHURIIGHDG«%XWHYHQWXDOO\KHZRUNVRXW
KLVZD\RXWRIWKHJORRP«%\WKHWLPHVXSSHUUROOVDURXQGKHKDV
even began to look on the bright side. It might be a good thing after 
all, he says to himself. It might be better to stand alone than to depend 
on anyone else. Blue thinks about this for a while; he is no longer an 
DSSUHQWLFH7KHUHLVQRPDVWHUDERYHKLPDQ\PRUH´ 
Paul Auster, The New York Trilogy. 
 
5.1.2. Introduction 
Concrete behaviour, or concreteness, is often defined as a difficulty disengaging from 
immediate experience in order to manipulate ideas and thoughts (Fuster, 2008; Goldstein, 
1936a, 1936b; Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941; Mesulam 2000, 2002; Salas, Vaughan, Shanker 
& Turnbull, 2013). Concrete behaviour is common after lesions to the frontal lobe (Fuster, 
2008; Luria, 1966; Mesulam, 2000, 2002). It has long been associated with diffuse lesions, as 
in traumatic brain injury (Judd, 1999; Klonoff, 2010; Ogden, 1996), as well as more localized 
lesions in the left hemisphere (Goldstein, 1942), particularly to its dorsolateral surface 
(Fuster, 2008; Scott and Schoenberg, 2011).  
In recent decades, there has been only a modest amount of research relating to the 
idea of concreteness, though the concept is still commonly used amongst rehabilitation 
professionals (see Salas, Vaughan, Shanker & Turnbull, 2013 for review). Such clinical value 
appears to derive from the fact that concreteness, while it clearly overlaps with concepts of 
executive function [see Table 1], offers clinical insights beyond the cognitive domain, for 
H[DPSOH LQ UHODWLRQ WR SDWLHQWV¶ WUDQVIRUPDWLRQV LQ HPRWLRQDO DQG LQWHUSHUVRQDO OLIH
(Hanfmann, Rickers-Ovsiankina & Goldstein, 1944).  
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6\PSWRPDWLFIHDWXUHVLQFRQFUHWHSDWLHQW¶VSHUIRUPDQFH 
(Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941) 
 
 
Concreteness is characterized by difficulty: 
 
detaching our ego from the outer world or from inner experience 
assuming a mental set wilfully and consciously  
accounting for acts to oneself and verbalizing the account 
shifting reflectively from one aspect of the situation to another 
holding in mind simultaneously various aspects 
grasping the essential of a given whole; breaking up a given whole 
into parts, isolating and synthesizing them 
abstracting common properties reflectively; forming hierarchies and 
concepts 
planning ahead ideationally; assuming an attitude towards the 'mere 
possible', thinking and performing symbolically 
 
Table 1. *ROGVWHLQ¶Vdescription of common deficits observed in patients with acquired concreteness  
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In modern neuropsychology, however, discussions of concreteness still view it 
predominantly as a thinking problem, as in concrete thinking (Cicerone and Giacino, 1992; 
Judd, 1999; Ponsford, Sloan and Snow, 1995), without reference to the impact that 
concreteness may have on emotional life, and to emotional adjustment to brain injury (for a 
review see Salas, Vaughan, Shanker and Turnbull, 2013). Nevertheless, one particularly 
important implication of concrete behaviour may be its influence on emotion regulation 
(Gross, 1998), especially on one widely studied type of emotion regulation strategy, 
UHDSSUDLVDORU WKHDELOLW\ WRFKDQJHDVLWXDWLRQ¶Vmeaning in a way that alters its emotional 
impact (Gross and Thompson, 2007). 
Reappraisal involves changing the way that we think about a situation, usually 
reframing the meaning of an aversive event in less negative or more positive terms (McRae, 
Ciesielki and Gross, 2011; Ochsner and Gross, 2007). To achieve this goal, several cognitive 
control processes are thought to be required, including:  (1) keeping the automatic appraisal 
of a negative situation to mind (working memory), (2) decreasing the salience of that 
appraisal (inhibition), (3) generating alternative interpretations (working memory 
manipulation and verbal ability), (4) identifying and engaging the interpretation that is most 
appropriate (set shifting), (5) keeping the new appraisal in mind  (working memory 
maintenance), and (6) keeping track of the success of regulation (monitoring) (McRae, 
Jacobs, Ray, John & Gross, 2011).  
This study suggests the possibility that patients with marked concrete behaviour may 
experience difficulties generating reinterpretations of negative events in order to alter its 
emotional impact ± with substantial consequences for the emotional lives of such patients and 
their families. Indeed, most of the processes thought to be implicated in reappraisal (McRae, 
Jacobs, Ray, John & Gross, 2011) are compromised in concrete patients [see Table 1], who 
often struggle to voluntarily disengage from immediate experience and to manipulate ideas 
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and thoughts (Beldarrain et al., 2005; Fuster, 2008; Goldstein, 1936a; 1936b, Goldstein & 
Scheerer, 1941; Mesulam, 2000; 2002). Furthermore, reappraisal appears to engage left 
prefrontal cortical regions (Ochsner & Gross, 2007) which, when lesioned, are often 
associated with concrete behaviour (Goldstein, 1942).  
 Surprisingly, despite exponential growth in the emotion regulation field (Gross, 
2007), and growing understanding of emotion regulation problems after brain damage 
(Abreau et al., 2009; Cattran, Oddy, Wood and Moir, 2011; McDonald et al., 2010; 
Obonsawin et al., 2007; Rochat, Ammann, Anoni and Linden, 2009; Tate, 1993), there is an 
absence of brain injury studies using emotion regulation paradigms (Beer and Lombardo, 
2007). This is unfortunate because the investigation of patients showing concrete behaviour 
could offer especial insight into the underlying neurological and neuropsychological basis of 
reappraisal. While there have been several neuroimaging findings on this topic (Goldin et al., 
2008; Green and Mahli, 2006; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, Gabrieli, 2002; Ochsner et al., 2004; 
Kalisch, 2009; Vanderhasselt et al., 2012), no study has investigated how damage to specific 
brain areas, and neuropsychological functions, might compromise the capacity to generate 
reappraisals. This is a promising avenue of research to complement the correlational findings 
offered by neuroimaging studies.  
 7KHSUHVHQW VWXG\GHVFULEHVRQH¶VSDWLHQW FDSDFLW\ WRJHQHUDWH UHDSSUDLVDOV 0UV0
after her behaviour became markedly concrete, following a stroke that involved the left 
dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC). Employing a set of neuropsychological tasks, her profile of 
concreteness is characterized, as well as her overall level of cognitive function. Using a 
picture-EDVHG UHDSSUDLVDO SDUDGLJP 0UV 0¶V SHUIRUPance is analysed in detail, and 
compared to the profile of patients with no concrete thinking and neurologically healthy 
controls. Three main issues are considered: a) Reappraisal difficulty: Whether Mrs M would 
present with larger reaction times when generating a reappraisal, compared to non-concrete 
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brain injured patients and controls; b) Reappraisal generation: Whether Mrs M would 
generate fewer reappraisals for each picture, compared to non-concrete brain injured patients 
and controls; c) Reappraisal monitoring: Whether Mrs M would require more external 
prompts to reappraise, compared to patients without concrete thinking and controls. Finally, 
LQ DGGLWLRQ WR WKH H[SHULPHQWDO DVVHVVPHQW RI UHDSSUDLVDO LQIRUPDWLRQ UHJDUGLQJ0UV0¶V
awareness of her capacity to use reappraisal is reported.   
  Mrs M is a 72 year old right handed woman, married and mother of two sons. She 
finished secondary school but did not pursue any further education. She is Welsh-English 
speaking and at the time of the stroke was living with her husband. Thirty-five months prior 
to this study Mrs M suffered an ischemic stroke that involved the left middle cerebral artery 
WHUULWRU\GDPDJLQJSDUWVRIWKHOHIWLQIHULRUDQGIURQWDOJ\UL%$DQGLQFOXGLQJ%URFD¶V
area, the frontal operculum and anterior insula (see Fig. 1). She had no history of psychiatric 
problems. Medically, the only remarkable antecedent was a history of hypertension and 
elevated cholesterol.  
She presented with loss of muscle tone to the right side of her face, having also had 
some weakness of the right leg, which had recovered within a few days. In the acute stages 
she was reported to have had some difficulty in expressive language, taking the form of a 
Broca-type aphasia. She is described in her language report as being able to offer information 
about herself, but needed prompting and cueing, with trouble naming objects and with 
occasional perseverations and misnaming. She could read single words, follow simple 
commands, and understand simple questions. Four days later her comprehension was 
substantially improved, and at two months later, she was reported to have had a mild 
expressive aphasia, which had in many respects recovered by the time of the study, though 
she still had some problems with correct articulation and repetition, and a mild word-finding 
difficulty. Her comprehension was intact, and she was able to communicate effectively. The 
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neurological examination did not reveal any other deficit apart from the facial weakness, and 
there were no features of apra[LD $FFRUGLQJ WR 0UV 0¶V KXVEDQG WKH PRUH LPSRUWDQW
observable changes after the injury were difficulties in planning and decision making. He also 
reported a moderate increase in depression and anxiety. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 0UV0¶VOHVLRQ. T-weighted MRI images obtained on a Philips Achieva 3T scanner 
with .7mm isometeric voxel resolution. Top: axial sections; Bottom left: Coronal sections; 
Bottom right: Volume rendered reconstruction viewed from the left front. The lesion involves 
the midGOHDQGLQIHULRUIURQWDOJ\ULRIWKHOHIWKHPLVSKHUHLQFOXGLQJ%URFD¶VDUHDWKHIURQWDO
operculum and parts of the anterior insula.  
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5.1.3. Methods 
5.1.3.1. Participants  
0UV0¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQWKHFRJQLWLYHDVVHVVPHQWDQGUHDSSUDLVDOWDVNZDVcompared to a 
JURXSRIEUDLQLQMXUHGSDWLHQWVDQGKHDOWK\FRQWUROV0UV0¶VDJHZDVQRWVLJQLILFDQWO\
different from the control group [t(11) = 1.55, p = .07, M = 63.57, SD = 5.2] or brain injured 
group [t(11) = 0.76, p = .23, M = 63.27, SD = 10.99]. 6LPLODUO\0UV0¶VQXPEHURI\HDUVRI
education was not significantly different from the control group [t(11) = -1.07, p = .15, M = 
14, SD = 1.79] or the brain injury group [t(11) =  -1.68, p = .06, M = 14. 27, SD = 1.34]. Only 
one subject from the entire sample, a patient with brain injury, was left handed. Clinical 
details of Mrs M and the neurological control patients are shown in Table 2, including 
aetiology, duration of illness and lesion localisation.  
 
5.1.3.2. Procedure 
Healthy controls, and participants with acquired brain injury, were referred by 
neurologists from the Bangor University School of Psychology. Exclusion criteria for the 
neurological group were duration of less than 6 months since their brain injury, and moderate 
to severe language impairment. Eligible participants were seen twice, in order to collect data 
for the present study. Assessment across two sessions was useful to avoid the impact of 
fatigue on the neurological group. During the first session the main goal of the research was 
explained, and measures of overall cognitive and emotional function were collected. The 
second session started with the administration of the reappraisal task, after which participants 
completed several measures of concreteness.  
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Age/Sex Aetiology Years since onset Location 
72F MCA stroke 2 Left prefrontal, insula 
51M MCA and ACA stroke 2 R prefrontal 
74F Falx meningioma resection 9 Bilateral medial frontal 
46M ACoA SAH 6 Right prefrontal 
61F Lobar haemorrhage from venous sinus thrombosis 14 
Right prefrontal, small haemorrhage in the left frontal 
eye field 
75M Right MCA stroke 2 Right ventro-lateral prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia 
63M MCA stroke 3 Rigt prefrontal and orbitofrontal 
65F MCA stroke 9 Left prefrontal 
66F MCA stroke 11 Right parietal 
78M MCA stroke 5 Left parietal 
49M Herpes encephalitis 1 Left hippocampus, amygdala, insula 
59F MCA stroke 4 Right prefrontal, insula 
72/M MCA and ACA stroke 6 Left prefrontal and parietal 
ACoA = anterior communicating artery aneurism; SAH = subarachnoid haemorrhage, MCA = middle cerebral artery. ACA = 
Anterior cerebral artery. 
 
Table 2. Clinical details of Mrs M (in italics) and non-concrete brain injury control patients  
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5.1.3.3. Measures 
Concrete Behaviour Assessment 
Considering the set of cognitive abilities compromised by concrete behaviour [see 
Table 1], and the neuropsychological components of reappraisal proposed by McRae and 
colleagues (2011), five tasks were used as proxies for different aspects of concreteness that 
are of relevance to reappraisal:   
a) Inhibition: A Conflicting Instructions (Stuss and Benson, 1986) and Inhibitory 
&RQWURO 'UHZH  WDVN ZHUH XVHG WR DVVHVV VXEMHFWV¶ ³GHWDFKLQJ´ FDSDFLW\
(Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941). In the conflicting instructions task participants must 
SURYLGH DQ RSSRVLWH UHVSRQVH WR WKH H[DPLQHU¶V DOWHUQDWLQJ VLJQDOV IROORZLQJ
verbal command and withholding automatic responses based on visual input (e.g. 
tapping once when the examiner taps twice). In the inhibitory control task subjects 
must inhibit a response that was previously given to the same stimulus (e.g. no 
tapping when the examiner taps twice).  
b) Abstraction: Similarities (WAIS-R:HFKVOHUZDVXVHG WRDVVHVV VXEMHFWV¶
abilit\WR³DEVWUDFWFRPPRQSURSHUWLHVUHIOHFWLYHO\DQGIRUPKLHUDUFKLFFRQFHSWV´
(Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941). In this task participants were asked to think in 
ZKLFK ZD\ WZR LWHPV ZHUH DOLNH HJ ERDWFDU ³PHDQV RI WUDQVSRUW´ WKXV
detaching from the most saOLHQWSHUFHSWXDOIHDWXUHVHJ³ERWKKDYHPRWRUV´³RQH
KDVZKHHOVWKHRWKHUGRHVQRW´ 
c) Verbal fluency: Verbal fluency (D-KEFS, Delis, Kaplan and Kramer, 2001) was 
LQFOXGHGWRDVVHVVHVLQGLYLGXDO¶VFDSDFLW\WR³DVVXPHDPHQWDOVHW´*ROGVWHLQ	
Scheerer, 1941), by initiating a verbal response and retrieving specific information 
in accordance with a rule (e.g. say as many words you can think of that start with 
WKHOHWWHUµV¶H[FOXGLQJSHRSOH¶VRUSODFH¶VQDPHV2IVSHFLDOUHOHYDQFHKHUHIRU
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concrete thinking and reappraisal, is the subtask of category switching, which taps 
LQWR WKHFDSDFLW\ WR³VKLIW UHIOHFWLYHO\ IURPRQHDVSHFWRID VLWXDWLRQ WRDQRWKHU´
(Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941). In this task subjects are asked to flexibly alternate 
between two different mental sets (furniture/fruits).  
d) Divided Attention: Telephone search and Telephone search dual task (TEA, 
Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway and Nimmmo-Smith, 1994) were used to assess 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ DELOLW\ WR ³KROG LQ PLQG VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ YDULRXV DVSHFWV RI D
VLWXDWLRQ´ *ROGVWHLQ 	 6FKHHUHU  ,Q WKH ILUVW WDVN VXEMHFWV DUH DVNHG WR
visually scan for target symboOVLQDWHOHSKRQHGLUHFWRU\HJƑƑZKLOHLQWKH
second one a simultaneous auditory task is added to the visual search (counting 
the number of tones played in a recording). A divided attention score is calculated 
by subtracting the amount of seconds used in the first task from the second one.  
e) Working Memory: Digits Forward and Backward (WAIS-R, Wechsler, 1981) was 
XVHG WR DVVHVV SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ FDSDFLW\ WR µPDQLSXODWH LGHDV DQG WKRXJKWV¶
(Goldstein, 1936a; 1936b, Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941). In the digit forward task 
participants listened to a series of single-digit numbers and repeat them in the 
same order. The number of digits in each series increased from two to nine. The 
digit backward task had the same structure, but the participant repeated the 
numbers in reverse order. 
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Overall Cognitive Assessment  
The Mini Mental State Examination (Rovner and Folstein, 1987), Token Test (De 
Renzi and Faglioni, 1978), Logic Memory (WMS-R, Wechsler, 1987), Rey-Osterrieth figure 
(Stern et al., 1994) and Frontal Assessment Battery (Dubois, Slachevsky, Litvan and Pillon, 
2000) were used in order to obtain an overall profile of cognitive function.  
 
Emotional functioning  
In order to assess the presence of symptomatology, the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression scale (HADS, Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), a self-report questionnaire, was 
employed. The HADS has demonstrated to be a sensitive tool to assess depression and 
anxiety symptoms in acquired brain injury population (Dawkins, Cloherty, Gracey & Evans, 
2006). The Iowa Scale of Personality Change, ISPC (Barrash et al., 1997; Barrash et al., 
2011) was also applied. The ISPC is an informant questionnaire that offers a quantification of 
the magnitude of several affective, behavioural and social disturbances after brain damage, as 
well as the assessment of the extent to which there has been change from pre-morbid levels. 
 
Reappraisal use frequency 
To assess the use of reappraisal in daily life, the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
(Gross and John, 2003) was applied. This questionnaire differs from the reappraisal task used 
LQ WKLV VWXG\ LQ WKDWFDSWXUHVSHRSOH¶Vperception of how frequently they use reappraisal to 
manage emotions, and not reappraisal ability.   
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Reappraisal Generation Task 
The paradigm used in this experiment is adapted from several studies on reappraisal 
ability, where participants are exposed to negative emotional pictures, and asked to decrease 
their emotional response by reinterpreting the displayed situation in more positive terms 
(Kanske, Heissler, Schonfelder, Bongers & Wessa, 2010; Lieberman, Inakagi, Tabibnia & 
Crockett, 2011; McRae, Ciesielski & Gross, 2011; McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John & Gross, 2011; 
Ray, McRae, Ochsner & Gross, 2010; Urry, 2010). Thirteen pictures20 were selected from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Lang, Bradley and Cuthbert, 2008), depicting 
negative events of different sorts. These pictures were chosen to cover the wide range of 
possible negative scenarios that people commonly face (death, natural disasters, accidents, 
illness, violence, etc.).  
Before beginning the task, participants were trained to generate reappraisals, using three 
practice IAPS pictures. Instructions were simplified, in order to facilitate the patLHQWV¶JUDVS
of what reappraisal meant, using a model of previous research on reappraisal in children 
(Carthy, Horesh, Apter, Edge & Gross, 2010). For example, an image of a glass half full (or 
half empty) was used as a graphic metaphor to demonstrate the idea of reappraisal. The task 
was introduced as follows:  
 
 ³6RPHWLPHVSHRSOHWU\WRIHHOEHWWHUE\ORRNLQJRQWKHEULJKWVLGHRIWKLQJV<RX
will watch pictures of negative events and will be asked to think aloud about the 
positive side of these situations. Try to be fast and say as many positive sides you 
can think of´ 
 
                                                 
20 3LFWXUHV¶WKHPHDQG,$36QXPEHU5LRW6KRSOLIWLQJ6LFNEDE\%XUQWEXLOGLQJ
Funeral (2799), Tornado (5971), Pollution (9341), Flood (9926), Car crash (9903), Graveyard (9220). The 
picture set had an overall negative valence (M = 3.01; SD = 0.8) according to the IAPS database. 
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7KHSLFWXUHVZHUHGLVSOD\HG LQD¶FRPSXWHU VFUHHQDQGSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHVDW DWQR
more than 40 cm from it. In order to avoid memory bias for the neurological group, above 
each picture WKHWDVNLQVWUXFWLRQZDVVXPPDUL]HG³Think aloud about the positive side of this 
situation. Try to be quick´3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHLQIRUPHGWKDWWKHLUDQVZHUVZRXOGEHWLPHG and 
recorded verbatim. They were also informed that the aim of the task was to produce as many 
positive reinterpretations as possible. If they were not able to generate a correct reappraisal 
IRUWKHILUVWSLFWXUHVHYHUDOUHDSSUDLVDOH[DPSOHVZHUHRIIHUHGHJ&DU&UDVK>@µwhen 
looking at this picture some people say that help is RQWKHZD\¶ RUµis not as bad as it looks¶
The same procedure was followed with the second and third trial picture. Both, the 
neurological group and the non-brain injured group were able to offer adequate reappraisals 
by the end of the trial run.  
Once the task started, each participant had a maximum of 120 seconds to offer the first 
reappraisal in each picture. In cases where no reappraisal was generated during the 120 
seconds, the examiner prompted the participant by reading the instruction on the screen 
DORXGµMr X, FRXOG\RXSOHDVHWU\WRWKLQNQRZRIDSRVLWLYHVLGHRIWKLVVLWXDWLRQ¶. In cases 
when participants were still unable to generate a reappraisal, or commented that the only 
things they could think of were the negative elements of the picture, a more extended prompt 
was offered: µ0U;GRQRWZRUU\7KLVWDVNLVGLIILFXOWIRUPDQ\SHRSOH7KHUHDVRQZK\LWLV
hard is because you need to ignore the negative elements of the pictures, in order to think of 
a positive side. Could you try to do thaWRQHPRUHWLPH"¶.  
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5.1.4. Results 
5.1.4.1. Concrete Behaviour Assessment  
,Q UHODWLRQ WRPHDVXUHVRIFRQFUHWHQHVV0UV0¶VSURILOH LVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\PDUNHG
difficulties in inhibitory control (3/6 max score), abstraction (Similarities scaled score21 5), 
phonological fluency (scaled score 2), category fluency (scaled score 4) and set shifting 
between categories (scaled score 4), working memory (Digit Span scaled score 6). However, 
unexpectedly, she presents an average performance in divided attention (scaled score 10). 
Mrs M is the only brain injured subject with a consistent low performance across concrete 
behaviour proxy measures (see Table 3). She has the lowest score in 4/7 tasks and the second 
worst score in 2/7 tasks. When the six proxy scores of concreteness are ranked and averaged, 
she is placed first. The two brain injured participants that follow her are positioned almost in 
third place, but none of them has low scores in abstraction (similarities), a cardinal feature of 
concrete behaviour according to Goldstein and Scheerer (1941). In sum, although some brain 
injured patients also present low performance on some of the proxy measures of 
concreteness, none of them is as consistently impaired as Mrs M.  
 
 5.1.4.2. Overall Cognitive Assessment 
Mrs M presents a relatively preserved overall cognition, which is reflected by the mild 
level of cognitive impairment (24/30) detected in the Mini Mental State Examination (see 
Table 3 for comparison to control group and brain injury group). Her profile of cognitive 
deficits is characteristic of lesions to the left dorsolateral frontal cortex (Anderson and Tranel, 
2002).  
In language comprehension tasks (Token Test) she is below average (15/32), failing 
on items where the manipulation of three or more units of information is required. A related 
                                                 
21 Scaled Scores are adjusted by age  
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difficulty can be observed in tasks where she is instructed to mentally manipulate 
information, such as the 100-7 (MMSE, score 3/5) or digits backwards (WAIS-R, maximum 2 
items).  
Her memory profile appears as characterized by impairment in coding and retrieving 
new information. In a Logical Memory task (WMS-R) her immediate recall was highly 
compromised  
 
 
 
  Tasks Mrs M BI (n = 12) Controls (n = 12) 
    score M SD M SD 
Concreteness  Similarities 5 10.00* 2.71 11.86* 3.13 
 Letter Fluency 2 8.33* 2.45 10.71* 3.26 
 Category Fluency 4 7.56 2.46 11.07* 2.13 
 Category Fluency Switching 4 7.44 2.60 12.43* 2.17 
 Telephone Search 8 7.5 4.84 11.50* 1.95 
 Telephone Search Dual Task 10 7.63 1.60 11.00 1.57 
 Inhibition  3 4.20 1.32 5.50* 0.79 
 Digit Span 6 9.18 2.13 10.77* 2.24 
Overall Cognition Mini Mental State Examination 24 26.64 0.69 29 0.38 
 Token Test 20 15 30.73** 0.40 30.92** 0.41 
 Ray-Osterrieth Copy 30 30.27 2.02 33.58 0.97 
 Logical Memory Immediate Recall 4 12.27** 1.08 14.17** 1.05 
 Logical Memory Delayed Recall 8 13.00* 1.31 16.42** 1.12 
 Logical Memory Recognition 14 13.73 0.33 13.83 4.77 
  Frontal Assessment Battery 9 14.64** 0.71 16.5** 0.57 
 Reappraisal Score (ERQ) 38 29.36** 1.49 31.17** 1.62 
BI: Brain Injury group. P-values for modified t-test comparing Mrs M to BI group and controls: *  = p < .05; **  = p < .001 
 
Table 3. Overall Cognitive Performance and Concrete Behaviour profile. Mrs M is the only brain injury subject 
who consistently presents the lowest scores in proxy tasks for concrete behaviour. 
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(4/15 units), but it improved considerably (12/15 units) after a second exposure. The free 
recall of information, after a delayed period of time, appears moderately compromised (8/15 
units) improving significantly with cues (14/15 units). She did not present executive or 
constructive errors in the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure copy (30/36 units) and the delayed 
recall was within normal limits compared to controls (16/30 units).  
 Executive impairment was evident in the brief Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB). 
Although this is a bed side screening test for executive abilities, it has shown concurrent 
validity with more standardized executive function measures, such as the Stroop and 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Cunha, 2010). In addition, significant correlations between the 
FAB scores and frontal lobe metabolism have also been reported (Guedj et al., 2008; Sarazin 
et al., 1998). Mrs M obtained a score of 9/18 in the FAB (12 is the cut off score for presence 
of frontal lobe deficits), where she failed on tasks of concept formation, verbal-fluency and 
inhibitory control. Her performance on tasks that assess motor programing, sensitivity to 
interference and environmental dependency was normal. These results are congruent with 
information obtained from the Iowa Scale of Personality Change (Barrash et al., 1997; 
Barrash et al., 2011), where the executive dysfunction/decision making subscale presented the 
KLJKHVWDYHUDJHVFRUHRIFKDQJH¨ ZLWKDGUDPDWLFLQFUHDVHLQODFNRISODQQLQJ¨ 
4) and poor judgement ¨ DFFRUGLQJWRKHUKXVEDQG 
 
5.1.4.3. Emotional functioning 
Mrs M. does not refer significant levels of emotional distress according to the 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). She reports sub-clinical 
levels of anxiety [score = 4], referring to occasions where she experiences frightened 
feelings, worrying thoughts, difficulties to relax and sudden feelings of panic. Mrs M does 
not report any sign of depression [score = 0]. Nevertheless, the Iowa Scales of Personality 
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Change (Barrash et al., 1997; Barrash et al., 2011) suggests the presence of post injury 
emotional disturbances. According to her husband, she has exhibited mild changes in the 
'LVWUHVV6FDOH¨ ZLWKPRGHUDWHLQFUHDVHLQGHSUHVVLRQ¨ DQGDQ[LHW\¨  
 
5.1.4.4. Reappraisal use frequency 
In relation to the use of reappraisal in daily life, Mrs M reports using reappraisal more 
frequently than controls [t(11) = 4.05, p < .01] and non-concrete brain injured patients [t(11) 
= 5.57, p < .001]. ThLVLVH[WUHPHO\LQWHUHVWLQJLQYLHZRI0UV0¶VORZSHUIRUPDQFHRQWKH
reappraisal task, perhaps reflecting some type of dissociation between reappraisal awareness 
and reappraisal ability (see discussion section). 
 
5.1.4.5. Reappraisal Performance: Quantitative Analyses 
 ,QRUGHUWRDQVZHURXUK\SRWKHVHVUHJDUGLQJ0UV0¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQWKHUHDSSUDLVDO
task three variables were generated. Reappraisal difficulty was obtained averaging the 
number of seconds that each subject required to offer the first reappraisal in each picture. 
Reappraisal generation was measured as the average number of spontaneous and prompted 
reappraisal answers during the complete task. Finally Reappraisal monitoring was calculated 
by averaging the number of prompts that each subject needed throughout the complete task in 
order to reappraise. Results are summarized in Table 4. 
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  Mrs M BI  Control BI (n = 12) Controls (n = 12) 
  Score worst worst M SD M SD 
Reappraisal Difficulty 95.67 66.9 32.8 37.65* 20.64 16.69**  7.07 
Reappraisal Generation (spontaneous) 0.0 0.4 0.9 1.69 1.05 2.17* 0.82 
Reappraisal Generation (prompted) 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.87 0.92 2.29* 0.79 
Reappraisal Monitoring 10 4 2 1.8**  1.61 0.57** 0.77 
BI: Brain Injury group. P-values for modified t-test comparing Mrs M to BI group and controls *  = p < .05; **  = p < .001 
 
Table 4. 0UV0¶V5HDSSUDLVDOWDVNSHUIRUPDQFHFRPSDUHGWR%UDLQ,QMXU\DQG&RQWURO*URXS0UV0SUHVHQW
the lowest scores in all four reappraisal measures. 
 
 
Reappraisal difficulty: 0UV0¶V DYHUDJH WLPH JHQHUDWLQJ D UHDSSUDLVDO ZDV VXEVWDQWLDO $W
95.67s, it was almost 30s slower than the worst patient (66.9s) and more than 50s slower than 
the worst control (32.8s). Using a modified t-test for small samples (Crawford and Howell, 
1998)22, it is clear that Mrs M required considerably more time to generate a reappraisal when 
compared to non-concrete patient [t(11) = 2.67, p = 0.03] and controls [t(11) = 10.730, p < 
.001].  
 
Reappraisal Generation (spontaneous): Mrs M was not able to produce a single reappraisal 
on her own, and her performance was significantly lower compared to controls [ t(11) = -2.54, 
p = 0.03] and marginally lower compared to other brain injured patients [t(11) = -1.546, p = 
@+RZHYHU0UV0¶V score of 0 was below the worst non-concrete brain injured patient 
(0.4) and the worst control (0.9).  
 
                                                 
22 This method is a modification to the independent sample t-test which can be used to compare a single 
specimen with a small sample (less than 50), offering an estimate of the rarity or abnormality of the individual 
score. Neuropsychological studies of different sort have used this approach when addressing research questions 
with small samples (see for example Bowles, Crupi, Mirsattari, Pigott, Parrent, Pruessner, Yonelinas and 
Kohler, 2007; Maguire, Nannery and Spiers, 2006; Schiltz, Sorger, Caldara, Ahmed, Mayer, Goebel, and 
Rossion, 2006) 
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Reappraisal Generation (prompted) 0UV 0¶V SHUIRUPDQFH LPSURYHG FRQVLGHUDEO\ ZKHQ
prompted to reappraise, reaching an average of 0.8 reappraisals per picture. When 
considering the total of reappraisals per picture, including prompting, Mrs M was not the 
worst score among patients (three subjects obtained a score of 0.8), but still was below the 
lowest control (one subject obtained a score of 1.0).  
 
Reappraisal Monitoring: Mrs M required the highest number of prompts during the task 
(10/10), differing significantly from controls [t(11) = 11.766, p < .001] and non-concrete 
brain injury patients [t(11) = 4.893, p < .001]. The worst non-concrete patient required 4/10, 
and the worst control 2/10.  
 
 ,QVXP0UV0¶VUHDSSUDLVDOSHUIRUPDQFHFRXOGEHGHVFULEHGDVVLJQLILFDQWO\slower, 
with more marked generative problems and requiring more external monitoring, when 
compared to other brain injured patients and controls. However, effectiveness improved to 
similar levels than non-concrete patients, when external compensation (in the form of 
prompts) was offered.   
 
5.1.4.6. Reappraisal Performance: Qualitative Analyses 
 A qualitative analysis of Mrs M performance on the reappraisal task offers valuable 
additional information. We would like to comment further on this point given that 
QHXURSV\FKRORJLFDODVVHVVPHQWLVQRWUHVWULFWHGWRDSDWLHQW¶VIRUPDOWHVWVVFRUHVEXWSHUKDSs 
more importantly, to how the task is performed (Luria, 1966; Lezak, Howieson and Loring, 
2004).  
 0UV0¶VRYHUDOOEHKDYLRXUPLJKWEHGHVFULEHGDVDQµRYHUHQJDJHPHQW¶ZLWKWKHWDVN
(see Appendix 5 IRUDWUDQVFULSWRI0UV0¶VDQVZHUVGXULQJWKHUHDSSUDLVDl task). Most of the 
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time she leaned forward on top of the desk, some 20 centimetres from the screen, looking 
VRPHKRZ µDEVRUEHG¶ E\ WKH SLFWXUHV D SKHQRPHQRQ QRW VHHQ ZLWK RWKHU SDWLHQWV 7KLV
physical proximity to the stimulus was exhibited throughout the task, only altered during the 
final moments of her responses -ZKHQVKHZDVDVNHGWRRIIHUUHDSSUDLVDOVDQGUHSOLHG³,GRQ¶W
NQRZ´ZKLOHUHWXUQLQJWRDQXSULJKWSRVLWLRQFuneral [9220]; Flood [9926]). The amount of 
time visually engaged with the slide was also greatly prolonged.   
 7KHPRVW VWULNLQJ REVHUYDWLRQ DERXW0UV0¶V EHKDYLRXU ZDV KHU HPRWLRQDO K\SHU-
reactivity toward the pictures23, in the form of frequent emotional exclamations µOh! -Smiles 
with surprise-:KDW¶V WKH PDWWHU ZLWK WKDW«ZKDW«ZKDW«ZKDW« RK 2K GHDU -sad 
H[SUHVVLRQ¶Sick Boy >@µWKLVLVWHUULEOH¶Flood [9926]) and recurrent facial emotional 
expressions (Sick Boy [3350]; Graveyard [9220]; Flood [9926]) when the stimulus was 
presented.  
 Mrs M expressive language was informative but lacked fluidity and synthesis; 
sentences were short and often interrupted by pauses. The most common aphasic feature was 
DGLIILFXOW\QDPLQJREMHFWVZKLFKVKHFRPSHQVDWHGE\VXEVWLWXWLRQRUFLUFXPORFXWLRQµORts 
of things KHUH¶ LQVWHDG RImachines or cables, Sick Baby [3350]; µFXUO\ ZLQG¶ LQVWHDG RI
tornado, Tornado [5971]).  
 0UV0¶V WKLQNLQJ SURFHVV VHHPHG KLJKO\ JXLGHG E\ WKH SHUFHSWXDO IHDWXUHV RI WKH
slides. Firstly, there was as an apparent capture of the thinking process by pictorial details 
³$OOWKHWLUHVWKRXJK«WLUHVWKHUH«DOOWLUHVWKHUH´- pointing to tires placed in different parts 
of the picture, Pollution >@³RQHWZRIRXUIDFWRULHV«EODFNVPRNH´±while touching the 
screen, Factory [9280]), with a failure to filter from amongst complex stimuli, and an 
inability to follow the more abstract instructions of reappraisal. This was exemplified by 
                                                 
23 A similar description of emotional hyper-reactivity to pictures (neutral and emotive), in 
concrete patients, can also be found in Hanfmann, Rickers-Ovsiankina and Goldstein (1944). 
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DZDUHQHVVRIXQXVXDOGHWDLOV RI D VRUW UDUHO\PHQWLRQHGE\RWKHU VXEMHFWV µWKDW LV -RKQRU
something -reading the name in one of the JUDYHV¶, Graveyard >@ µWKHUH LV D PDQ
VWDQGLQJRQWKHULJKWXSSHUFRUQHU¶Pollution [9341]). A second feature was the intrusion of 
stimulus-related thoughts after DSURPSWWRUHDSSUDLVHKDVEHHQRIIHUHGµGRHVQ¶WKHORRN old 
DOWKRXJK KH LV WLQ\"¶ Sick Baby >@ µDOWKRXJK , GRQ¶W NQRZ ZKDW WKLV LV«D KDQG ±
SRLQWLQJ WR D VPDOO KDQG LQ WKH ORZHU ULJKW FRUQHU¶ Funeral >@ ³WKH\ DUH DOO
VWDQGLQJDQGKHLVVWDQGLQJWKHUHVRRQH WZR WKUHH«QRUHDOO\´Pollution [9341]). These 
types of responses were significantly less frequent in patients with brain injury and almost 
non-existent for controls. The mean number of intrusions per picture for Mrs M was 1.6, for 
the Brain Injury Group was 0.24 [t(11) = 4.083, p < .001] and 0.08 for controls [t(11) = 13. 
90, p < .001]. Taken together, these peculiarities of her thinking process suggest an inability 
to abstract relevant cues from the pictures and to inhibit perceptual elements that are 
irrelevant to the task. 
 
 
5.1.5. Discussion  
 The last decade has seen dozens of neuroimaging studies offering insights into the 
neural basis of reappraisal. This case is the first description of reappraisal performance in a 
neurological patient, who appears to present with a specific impairment in disengaging from 
immediate experience in order to manipulate ideas and thoughts, when looking at emotional 
images. 
  The case of Mrs M is interesting because she presents with relatively preserved 
overall cognitive function, but exhibits a remarkable impairment of reappraisal. Compared to 
controls, and to other non-concrete brain injured patients, Mrs M appears to be completely 
unable to spontaneously generate reappraisals, despite having extended periods of time to 
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complete the task. In striking contrast, once external support is offered in the form of 
prompts, her capacity to reappraise is dramatically improved.  
 The SURORQJHG SHULRGV RI WLPH IRU0UV0¶V DQVZHUV ZHUH QRW HPSW\ DV VRPHRQH
might expect of a patient with mild expressive aphasia. Instead, they were filled with remarks 
DERXWREVHUYDEOHHOHPHQWVRIWKHSLFWXUHRIWHQUHSHDWHGVHYHUDOWLPHVµ2KGHDU«YHU\VLck 
ER\«, GRQ¶W NQRZ ZKDW \RX FDQ VD\ UHDOO\«YHU\ VLFN¶ Sick Baby [3350]). These were 
accompanied by emotional comments (see Appendix 5), again often repeated in different 
ZD\V µ2K«LW¶V VDG«ZKR DUH WKHVH" 'RHV LW PDWWHU ZKR WKH\ DUH" ,W FRXOG EH WKH
relatLYHV«WKDW LV -RKQ >SRLQWLQJ DW D QDPH LQ RQH RI WKH JUDYHV@ YHU\ VDG¶ Graveyard 
[9220]). There were also often substantial latency periods between these comments and 
observations while Mrs M appeared to be gathering her thoughts.  
 $QHVSHFLDOO\QRWDEOHDVSHFWRI0UV0¶VSHUIRUPDQFHZDV WKDWVKHRIWHQPHQWLRQHG
elements from the pictures that were used by controls as the raw material to construct 
appropriate reappraisal solutions. For example, in the Sick Baby [3350] picture, she 
speFLILFDOO\PHQWLRQV WKHKDQGKROGLQJ WKHEDE\µYHU\VLFNER\«DOWKRXJK WKHUH LVDKDQG
WKHUH UHDOO\« D KDQG WKHUH¶ )RU FRQWUROV VHH $SSHQGL[ 5), this pictorial element often 
elicited reappraisals where the baby was being held and cared for - in other words, where the 
hand represented something else (support/comfort), typically with an inferential or abstract 
positive meaning. However, despite noticing this useful element, Mrs M failed to capitalize 
on this material, perseverating on the perceptual elements and their emotional consequences 
µDKDQGWKHUH«,GRQ¶WNQRZZKDW\RXFDQVD\DERXWWKDWUHDOO\«KHLVVLFN¶ 
 Finally, it seems necessary to comment on the remarkable discrepancy between Mrs 
0¶V SRRU SHUIRUPDQFH UHDSSUDLVLQJ DQG KHU VHOI-assessment of such capacity. She rated 
herself high on the use of reappraisal (Emotion Regulation Questionnaire) as a strategy to 
IHHOµOHVVQHJDWLYH¶RUµPRUHSRVLWLYH¶DERXWDVLWXDWLRQ7KLVLQWHUHVWLQJGLVFUHSDQF\FRXOGEH
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interpreted as a deficit in self-awareness, a common problem in brain-injured patients, and 
especially in patients with concrete thinking, who may underestimate their physical, cognitive 
and social difficulties (Sherer, Boake, Levin, Silver, Ringholz and High, 1998; Prigatano, 
$OWPDQDQG2¶%ULHQ, 1990; Sawchyn, Mateer and Suffield, 2005). A similar observation can 
be made to account for the discrepancy between her self-report of emotional difficulties 
+$'6DQGWKHUHODWLYH¶VSHUFHSWLRQVRIKHUHPRWLRQDOSUREOHPV,RZD6FDOHRI3HUVRQDOLW\
Change).  
 7ZRFOHDUTXHVWLRQVVHHPWRDULVHIURP0UV0¶VGDWDLI0UV0LVDEOHWRJHQHUDWH
reappraisals once external aid is provided, how can we explain her selective deficit in 
performing the task by herself? In other words, which is the neuropsychological component 
WKDWRQFHGDPDJHGFRPSURPLVHVKHUDELOLW\WRVSRQWDQHRXVO\UHDSSUDLVH"+RZ0UV0¶V
performance, in the reappraisal task, might be related to her neuropsychological profile of 
concreteness? In other words, which neuropsychological components, associated to concrete 
behaviour, might account for the reappraisal impairment? 
 
5.1.5.1. Concreteness and Disengagement 
 'XULQJWKHUHDSSUDLVDOWDVN0UV0¶VPDLQGLIILFXOW\DSSHDUVWREHRQHRIGHWDFKLQJRU
disengaging from the initial appraisal of a picture, in order to acquire a reflective stance to 
reinterpret such negative events. Once such detachment is accomplished, by means of 
external compensation in the form of prompts, Mrs M is able to reappraise at a similar level 
than other brain injured patients. 
 These observations appear to offer support to the idea that concrete behaviour impairs 
reappraisal because, in order to reappraise, a decrease in the emotional salience of the initial 
(automatic) response is required (McRae et al., 2011a). This is consistent with the classical 
definition of concreteness as an inability to disengage from immediate experience (Goldstein, 
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1942; Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941), which has been re-cast (by more contemporaneous 
authors) as the resurgence of a default mode, where inflexible stimulus-response linkages 
remain impervious to modification by context or experience (Mesulam, 2000; 2002), or as a 
form of temporal concreteness, where behaviour is anchored in the present, devoid of 
temporal perspective, and principally dominated by present needs and stimuli (Fuster, 2008).  
 7KHVSHFLILFQHXURSV\FKRORJLFDOIHDWXUHVUHODWHGWR0UV0¶VOHVLRQVLWH%$
frontal operculum), appear to support the disengagement hypothesis. Her lesion encompasses 
the left dlPFC, an area commonly reported as underpinning cognitive control (Petrides, 2005; 
Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, Segalowitz and Carter, 2004) and thought to exert 
inhibitory effects on the posterior brain regions involved in perception (Anderson and Tranel, 
2002). It has also long been reported that patients with damage to this area may exhibit a 
dependency on immediately-present environmental cues (Lhermitte, Pillon and Serdaru, 
1986). In the case of Mrs M, this could be interpreted as the emotional capture by the 
SLFWXUH¶VFRQWHQWVDQGWKHLQWUXVLRQRIWDVN-irrelevant perceptual elements.  
 
5.1.5.2. Concreteness and Reappraisal Generation 
 We have reported that once Mrs M is prompted, her reappraisal ability improves 
substantially [see Appendix 5 for examples]. In other words, it seems that once the process of 
inhibiting the emotional appraisal is facilitated, she is able to generate positive 
reinterpretations of the negative scenes, achieving similar levels of performance to that of 
other non-concrete patients. However, the average number of reappraisals offered by Mrs M 
and non-concrete patients after prompting is still significantly lower than that of controls, 
suggesting a more general effect of frontal lesions on the generative component of 
reappraisal, which seems crucial for the production of multiple alternative interpretations. 
This is consistent with evidence suggesting that frontal lobe lesions, in general, compromise 
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spontaneous counterfactual thinking (Baldarrain, Garcia-Monco, Astigarraga, Gonzalez & 
Grafman, 2005). Thus, the ability to detach from initial emotional appraisals appears to be a 
necessary (but not sufficient) component in the complex multi-step process of reappraisal 
(Ochsner and Gross, 2008), and is selectively compromised by concreteness. However, the 
subsequent generation of alternative interpretations, although heavily dependent on effective 
disengagement, appears to be compromised not by concreteness in particular, but by frontal 
lesions in general. This claim appears to receive support from executive function models that 
place response inhibition (here disengagement), or the ability to delay prepotent responses, as 
a pre-requisite for other executive functions, such as word generation (Barkley, 1997, 2001). 
 
 5.1.5.3. Alternative Accounts  
 :KLOHZH KDYH DUJXHG WKDW0UV0¶V GHILFLWV LQ UHDSSUDLVDO DUH D FRQVHTXHQFH RI D
failure to disengage from perceptual elements (and its emotional consequences) we would 
like to briefly consider some alternative explanations for her performance, and discuss why 
ZHWKLQNWKH\GRQRWVHUYHDVVXIILFLHQWH[SODQDWLRQV0UV0¶VGHILFLWLVFOHDUO\QRWDIDLOXUH
to identify the relevant pictorial elements in each image. She is invariably accurate in 
recognising objects in a scene (e.g. baby, medical equipment, hand etc.), identifying the 
RYHUDOO WKHPH RI HDFK SLFWXUH HJ µVLFN EDE\¶ Sick Baby >@ µVRPHRQH KDV GLHG¶
Funeral >@DQGVSHFLI\LQJLWVHPRWLRQDOFRQVHTXHQFHVHJ µWKH\DUHDOOYHU\VDGWKDW
KHKDVGLHG¶Funeral [9220]).  
 Language impairment cannot fully account for her performance. Her failure in 
reappraisal is not the consequence of inability understanding task instructions, because her 
performance is so much improved after prompting. A skeptical reader might also wonder 
ZKHWKHU0UV0¶VLPSDLUPHQWJHQHUDWLQJVSRQWDQHRXVUHDSSUDLVDOVLVQRWjust the consequence 
of an expressive language disorder. This seems unlikely, and cannot explain two facts. 
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Firstly, although lacking fluidity, Mrs M is able to offer informative accounts about the 
emotional pictures. In other words, her expressive language seems preserved enough to 
describe the slides and its emotional consequences (see Appendix 5). Secondly, her response 
time improves dramatically when prompted (spontaneous M = 95.67s, SD = 26.28; prompted 
M = 23.59s, SD = 20.17). When cued she is as quick (Mrs M: M = 23.59s, SD = 20.17; BI 
group: M = 37.65s, SD = 20.64) as other brain injured patients ± so that it is unlikely that the 
spontaneous reappraisal deficit can be exclusively the result of expressive aphasia which 
improves after prompting. Nevertheless, it is necessary to acknowledge that Mrs M does 
present difficulties in executive function-related language ability, verbal fluency, a task that is 
highly dependent on cognitive control mechanisms such as self-monitoring, initiation and 
strategic retrieval (Henry and Crawford, 2004). The involvement of a more executive aspect 
RIODQJXDJHLQ0UV0¶VUHDSSUDLVLQJGHILFLWDSSHDUVWREHVXSSRUWHGE\HYLGHQFHWKDWUHODWH
her lesion (BA 44, 46), to deficits in other executive language capacities, such as selecting 
among multiple competing propositions for language generation (Robinson, Shallice, Bozzali 
& Cipolotti, 2012), updating of task representations (Derrfuss, Brass, Neumann & von 
Cramon, 2005), inner speech (Geva et al., 2011; Jones, 2009) and conceptual self-referential 
thinking (Morin & Hamper, 2012).   
 ,Q WKH GRPDLQ RI H[HFXWLYH IXQFWLRQ0UV0¶V IDLOXUH LV DOVR QRW D FRQVHTXHQFH RI
attentional impairment, or of the ability to sustain attention. She is within normal limits also 
in measures of such capacities (Telephone Search and Telephone Search dual task), and she 
is also able to stay focused for up to two minutes, on each picture. However, as described 
above, several other executive functions that require disengagement from immediate 
experience are compromised by concrete behaviour (Barkley, 1997, 2001), most notably 
abstraction, verbal fluency (categorical and lexical) and set shifting. Apparently, impairment 
in one or two of these tasks makes it difficult to generate reappraisals -but not impossible, 
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whereas failing in most or all of them ±which might reflect a more marked profile of 
concreteness, does appears to severely compromise the capacity to reappraise at all. This data 
is in line with clinical observations suggesting that concreteness is not a homogeneous deficit 
(Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941, Prigatano, 1989) and, therefore, only patients with more 
marked concrete behaviour will present more difficulties generating reappraisals.  
 
 5.1.5.4. Concreteness Profile and Reappraisal Components 
 0UV 0¶V SURILOH RI FRQFUHWHQHVV LV FKDUDFWHUL]HG E\ PDUNHG LPSDLUPHQW LQ WKUHH
neuropsychological domains, all of which have been also proposed as relevant for the process 
of reappraisal (McRae et al., 2011a): i) response inhibition, ii) abstraction and iii) verbal 
fluency.  
 i) Response inhibition (disengagement) has been suggested as having an important 
role in emotion regulation, by enabling the suppression of the more automatic aspects of 
emotional responding (Barkley, 1997, 2001; Gyurak et al., 2012). This claim seems 
VXSSRUWHGQRWRQO\E\0UV0¶VLPSDLUPHQWLQGLVHQJDJLQJIURPLQLWLDODSSUDLVDOVGXULQJWKH
task, but also by her performance on response inhibition tasks. In a similar way to other 
patients with dlPFC lesions described in the literature (Anderson and Tranel, 2002), Mrs M 
presents with difficulties inhibiting responses associated with previously learned tasks (Motor 
Inhibition) and also inhibiting the most salient attributes of objects, in order to generate a 
superordinate category (Similarities).  
 To our knowledge, only one study (McRae et al., 2011a) has directly addressed the 
relationship between response inhibition and reappraisal, concluding that reappraisal ability, 
as measured by a decrease in negative affect, was not related to response inhibition (on a 
Stroop-like task). A possible explanation for the discrepancy with the data in the present case 
may lie in the different use of experimental paradigms. Most studies (which use 
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neurologically-normal participants) have taken the reappraisal generation aspect of the 
process for granted, and have investigated only reappraisal ability. However, an important 
feature of the focus of the present study, on neurological patients, derives from the fact that 
impairments in idea generation are a common feature of frontal lobe lesions and concrete 
behaviour (Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941; Jones-Gotman and Milner, 1977; Baldo, Shimamura, 
Delis, Kramer and Kaplan, 2001). The present study suggests that response inhibition 
(disengagement) is an initial, and necessary, step in the generation of alternative versions of 
reality (Barkley, 2001). If this ability is compromised, negative emotional thoughts tend to 
persist. These observations in Mrs M are supported by findings (in psychiatric populations) 
that relate depressive rumination, or the persistence of negative thoughts, to difficulties 
inhibiting negative information (Joorman, 2005; Withmer and Banich, 2007). 
 ii) Abstract reasoning, though little explored, has also been suggested as a component 
in reappraisal (McRae et al., 2011a). Abstraction is typically viewed as allowing humans to 
grasp the essentials of a given situation, or to break up a given whole into part in order to 
isolate and to synthesize them (Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941). The loss of an abstract attitude 
is a cardinal feature in patients with concrete behaviour, who often struggle with abstraction 
tasks because their thinking is captured by the most salient features of immediately present 
objects and mental representations (Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941, Salas, Vaughan, Shanker & 
Turnbull, 2013). For example, in the similarities task, when asked in which way socks and 
VKRHVDUHDOLNH0UV0DQVZHUV³IRU\RXUIHHW«ZDUPWK´2UZKHQDVNHGLQZKLFKZD\D
WDEOH DQG D FKDLU DUH DOLNH VKH UHSOLHV ³JRRG IRU HDWLQJ´%RWK DQVZHUV DUH FRQFUHWH LQ WKH
sense that, although they do establish a proper relationship between objects; the link is based 
on physical/sensory and use properties (socks and shoes: sensory/warmth; table/chair: 
use/eating). Reappraisal is, in contrast, an abstract exercise, in the sense that it demands that 
RQHLQKLELWVZKDWLVVHHQRUIHOWLQWKHSUHVHQWPRPHQW³2K:KDW¶VWKHPDWWHUZLWKWKDW«
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ZKDW« ZKDW« RK 2K GHDU 9HU\ VLFN ER\´ Sick Baby [3350]), in order to emphasize 
abstract ideas or beliefs WKDW FDQ FKDQJH WKH HPRWLRQDO WUDMHFWRU\ RI D VLWXDWLRQ ³+H ZLOO
UHFHLYHJRRGWUHDWPHQW´³KHLVOXFN\WREHDOLYH´Sick Baby [3350]).  
 It is interesting to note that McRae and colleagues (2011a) did not find significant 
associations between abstract reasoning and reappraisal ability in their study. Their task, 
KRZHYHU GLIIHUHG IURP RXUV LQ WKH VHQVH WKDW UHVSRQVHV ZHUH µFORVHG¶ ± with offering a 
limited set of choices. In order to better investigate abstraction, tasks should ideally be open-
HQGHGRUWDNHWKHIRUPRIDQµLOO-VWUXFWXUHG¶VLWXDWLRQ7KHVHDUHWKHSURSHUWLHVRIWKHUHDOOLIH
scenarios where reappraisal unfolds, and map onto the ecological validity criterion that is so 
central for measures of executive function (Burgess et al., 2006; Goel, 2010).   
 iii) Verbal fluency has also been suggested as a relevant component for emotion 
regulation, by enabling the rapid generation of alternative interpretations, in accordance with 
a predetermined criterion (Gyurak et al., 2012; McRae et al., 2011a). Although no study has 
directly explored the relationship between verbal fluency and reappraisal, verbal fluency 
appears to be related to other emotion regulation strategies, such as response modulation, for 
basic (Gyurak et al., 2012) and primitive emotional responses (Gyurak et al., 2009).  
 As with other brain injured patients with left dlPFC lesions (Baldo, Shimamura, Delis, 
Kramer and Kaplan, 2001; Costafreda et al., 2006; Jones-Gotman and Milner, 1977; 
Robinson, Shallice, Bozzali & Cipolotti, 2012), Mrs M presents with impairment on verbal 
fluency tasks. Compared to healthy population standards, her capacity to generate sets of 
ideas (her phonological and semantic fluency), and to switch between them (her switching 
category fluency), is highly compromised. Nevertheless, when compared to non-concrete 
EUDLQLQMXUHGVXEMHFWV0UV0¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQO\GLIIHUVVLJQLILFDQWO\RQSKRQRORJLFDOOHWWHU
fluency. This is especially interesting because phonological fluency, by comparison with 
semantic (category) fluency, appears to rely more heavily on the integrity of executive 
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functions (Henry & Crawford, 2004). Furthermore, and of interest to the discussion on 
disengagement and concreteness, it has been suggested that phonological fluency relies on an 
inhibitory component, which is required to suppress the habitual use of words in relation to 
their meaning (Perret, 1974). Taken together, it is likely that this impairment in phonological 
fluency might contribute to the low number of reappraisals she is able to generate 
spontaneously, and once prompted (on average less than one per picture), and this might have 
important implications for the effectiveness of this strategy. A difficulty generating 
alternative interpretations may seriously narrow the scope of possibilities from which a 
reappraisal can be selected, thus compromising the flexibility needed to test and modify a 
chosen reappraisal when it is not effective.  
 Finally, we note that there are two reappraisal components, often suggested in the 
literature, which did not appear selectively comSURPLVHG LQ 0UV 0¶V QHXURSV\FKRORJLFDO
profile. The first is working memory, which is thought to enable the storage and manipulation 
of perceptual and contextual information (Gyurak et al., 2011), and which has been 
significantly associated to reappraisal ability (McRae et al., 2011a; Schmeichel, Volokhov 
and Demaree, 2008). Although Mrs M presents with some difficulties in mentally 
manipulating information (100-7), her level of impairment does not differ significantly from 
that of other brain injured patients (Digit Span). In consequence, it seems unlikely that a 
working memory deficit (as measured by the digit span task used in this study) can account 
for her selective reappraisal impairment. The second component that did not appear 
FRPSURPLVHG E\0UV0¶V lesion was divided attention. This ability would be required to 
bring to mind alternative thoughts or images that contradict the initial appraisal (Sheppes and 
Gross, 2011), thus demanding a splitting of attentional resources between competing 
representatiRQV8QH[SHFWHGO\0UV0¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQWKHTelephone search dual task was 
at, or above, the levels achieved by the non-concrete patient group, and within the range of 
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controls (Table 3). A possible explanation for this apparent preservation is that the dual task 
used in this study might be more associated with sustained attention than attentional 
switching (Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway and Nimmo-Smith, 1996), a capacity that is 
preserved in left dlPFC patients, but often impaired in subjects with damage to the superior 
medial or right lateral prefrontal cortex (Wilkins, Shallice, McCarthy, 1987; Shallice, Stuss, 
Alexander, Picton and Derkzen, 2008). 
 
5.1.5.5. Implications for Rehabilitation 
 The results presented in this case study expand our understanding of how brain injury 
in general, and concreteness in particular, may disrupt emotional life. By narrowing 
experience to the immediacy of the present moment, concreteness appears to limit not only a 
SDWLHQW¶VDELOLW\WRSURFHVVDSSURSULDWHLQIRUPDWLRQEXWDOVRWKHLUFDSDFLW\WRPRGXODWHKRZ
they feel, by means of detaching from experience and reflecting upon it.  
 The implications of this type of impairment for rehabilitation are diverse. Firstly, Mrs 
0¶V SHUIRUPDQFH VXJJHVWV WKDW UHDSSUDLVDO LPSURYHV JUHDWO\ ZKHQ RIIHUHG H[WHUQDO
scaffolding, through prompts (which facilitate disengaging from the initial appraisal). Several 
explanations may account for this improvement. For example, it is possible that prompts 
IXQFWLRQ DV DQ µH[WHUQDO¶ IRUPRI VSHHFK WKHsocial speech of Vygotsky, 1986[1934]) that 
allows Mrs M to compensate for her difficulty of internally guiding her behaviour through 
inner speech (e.g. µstop describing what you see and think about a positive side of this¶7KLV
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH GDWD ZRXOG EH LQ OLQH ZLWK /XULD DQG 9\JRWVN\¶V HDUO\ ZRUN RQ WKH
regulatory role of speech (Luria, 1959; 1960; 1966; Vygotsky 1986[1934]), as well as with 
more modern developmental research, suggesting that the externalization of speech in 
children facilitates the detachment from the immediate environment (Muller, Jacques, Brocki 
& Zelazo, 2009).  
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Another possibility, from the perspective of restoration of function, is that prompting 
PLJKW ZRUN DV DQ µRULHQWDWLRQ RI WKRXJKW¶ /XULD  DOORZLQJ 0UV 0 WR JR EH\RQG
passively describing what she sees [e.g. a sick baby], allowing her to temporally restore 
active thinking, or the capacity to create an inner plan of thinking. Even though these 
explanations remain tentative, and require further research, both stress the fact that 
reappraisal, in the same way as other psychological processes (Bowen, Yeates, Palmer, 
2011), can be influenced externally and interpersonally for the purposes of rehabilitation. 
Furthermore, it also suggests the need to consider extrinsic mechanisms of emotion 
regulation when compensating for intrinsic regulatory failures (Nive, Totterdell and Holman, 
2009; Rime, 2007; Salas, 2012).  
There is a large literature suggesting that the externalization of speech, also known as 
private speech, has a mediating role in self-regulation, in both healthy and clinical 
populations (for a review see Winsler, 2009). The therapeutic possibilities of this idea with 
brain injured patients have also been explored, for example, in relation to the use that 
FKLOGUHQZLWK7%,PDNHRI µWKLQNLQJDORXG¶ LQFODVVURRPHQYLURQPHQWV 5HHV	6NLGPRUH
2011), or the use of self-advocacy video tapes during the process of identity reconstruction 
(Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000). It is in this context that the use of prompting to facilitate 
reappraisal is relevant as a therapeutic tool. Furthermore, it is even possible to suggest that 
prompting may be used by therapists in different forms, all of them aiming to scaffold 
UHDSSUDLVDO FDSDFLW\ )RU H[DPSOH WKHUDSLVWV PD\ XVH SURPSWV WR >@ FKDQJH WKH SDWLHQW¶V
focus of attention when he/she is stuck on a specific negative appraisal (e.g. let¶V QRW WDON
DERXWZKDW\RXORVWOHW¶VWDONDERXWZKDW\RXKDYHQRZ); [2] offer content that can be used as 
raw material for new reappraisals (e.g. ZKDWLI,DVN\RXQRZWRWKLQNDERXW\RXUNLGV"/HW¶V
talk about your kids); [3] help patients to adopt a different point of view from which to 
reappraise (e.g. what would your wife think in this same situation?); [4] or synthetize 
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reappraisals from more diverse associations HJ\RXWDONHGDERXWEHLQJDWKRPH«\RXDOVR
PHQWLRQ WKH NLGV« ZDWFKLQJ PRYLHV« DP , Uight if I say that not working anymore has 
changed your lifestyle for the better?). Relatives and caregivers can thus also be trained in 
KRZWRPDQDJHSDWLHQWV¶UHJXODWRU\GLIILFXOWLHV)RUH[DPSOHWKH\PD\OHDUQWRGHWHFWZKHQ
patients are stuck on a negative emotion or thought, as well as to learn the steps that facilitate 
the transition out of such states. In some exceptional cases, patients themselves may even 
learn to recognize when they feel stuck, and look to significant others as a source of external 
regulation (Salas, in press).  
 
5.1.6. Limitations and Future Directions 
This case study also reveals some limitations that might be addressed in the future. 
We note that the observed difficulties in reappraising are likely to be amplified in real life 
(rather than laboratory) situations, where personally-meaningful events appear to generate 
higher levels of arousal (Salas, Radovic and Turnbull, 2011), compromising even further the 
necessary cognitive control abilities required to reappraise (Demanet, Liefooghe and 
Verbruggen, 2011; Oei et al., 2011). This is an extremely interesting possibility for future 
research, and taps into a developing trend in affective research, which is the study of emotion 
in more naturalistic contexts (Scherer & Tannembaum, 1986; Scherer, Wranik, Sangsue, Tran 
& Scherer, 2004). Even though this article does not address such matters directly, it seems 
possible in the future to partially address this issue in experimental settings, for example, by 
exploring the relationship betweHQ D SLFWXUH¶V YDOHQFH DQG WKH UHDSSUDLVDO¶V OHYHO RI
difficulty. 
 7KHDQDO\VLVRI0UV0¶VSHUIRUPDQFHVXJJHVWVQHZDYHQXHVRIUHVHDUFKRQDSUREOHP
only partially addressed by the neuroimaging literature on reappraisal: that of lateralization. 
Neuroimaging studies have long reported left hemisphere activation when reappraising, thus 
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suggesting a shared neural substrate with language and cognitive control abilities. However, 
the present study bears on the question of how the right hemisphere might contribute to the 
process of reappraisal. Lesion studies have suggested that cognitive control involves a 
number of distinct processes, which they may be localized across both hemispheres 
(Alexander, Stuss, Picton, Shallice and Gillingham, 2007). For example, while patients with 
left lateral damage show difficulties in task setting, or disengaging from a previous task to 
initiate a new one (as in the case of Mrs M), subjects with right lateral lesions exhibit a rather 
different profile of monitoring impairment (Stuss, 2011). The study of patients with such 
monitoring impairments might offer valuable information regarding how damage to this 
specific cognitive control component can differentially compromise reappraisal ability.  
 We have primarily addressed the impact of concreteness on a specific emotion 
regulation strategy, but this does not consider the impact of concreteness in emotion 
generation; which often relies on abstract cognitions (McRae et al., 2011b; Ochsner et al., 
2009). If we acknowledge that emotion generation and regulation are two interactive 
processes (Gross and Barret, 2011), the impact of concreteness on how emotions are 
triggered is clearly important and needs to be addressed in future studies. In addition, a 
further limitation of this study is its focus on the generative component of reappraisal, not 
considering reappraisal ability or efficacy. It remains to be explored how left dorsolateral 
lesions may impact the down-regulation of negative affect. Finally, in order to further 
understand the relationship between reappraisal generation/effectiveness and underlying 
neuropsychological components, a multiple single-case group study would be required, to 
confirm the associations between cognitive deficits (e.g. response inhibition) and reappraisal 
performance suggested by this case study. 
 The growing number of neuroimaging studies on reappraisal underscores the scientific 
and clinical relevance that this emotion regulation strategy has acquired in recent years. We 
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have proposed that the study of brain injured patients may offer a complementary source of 
information, describing a patient with a selective impairment in reappraisal generation. In 
addition, we note that, even by studying the profile of deficit in a single patient, it is possible 
to identify new rehabilitation approaches, of substantial clinical importance, which tackle 
problems that lie on the border of cognition and affect ± for it is increasingly clear that the 
most disabling difficulties that brain injured patients have to face are not cognitive, but are 
emotional and interpersonal.  
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5.2. Opening to a new dimension: Changes in 
Emotion Reactivity and Emotion Regulation in a 
Case of Executive Impairment after Left Fronto-
Parietal Damage24. 
 
 
5.2.1. Abstract 
Dysexecutive impairment is a common problem after brain injury, particularly after damage 
to the frontal lobes. There is a large literature describing the cognitive deficits associated to 
executive impairment, however, little is known about its impact on emotional functioning. 
This case study describes changes in a 72 years old man [Professor F], who became markedly 
dysexecutive after a left fronto-SDULHWDO VWURNH 3URIHVVRU )¶V FDVH LV UHPDUNDEOH LQ WKDW
despite exhibiting typical executive impairments [e.g. set shifting, verbal fluency], abstraction 
and working memory capacities were spared. Such preservation of insight-related capacities 
allowed him to offer a detailed account of his emotional changes. A mixed method approach 
was adopted, using quantitative [self-report and informant-report questionnaires, 
experimental tasks] and qualitative tools [in depth interview] to explore modifications in 
several well-known emotional processes [e.g. emotion recognition, emotional reactivity, 
emotional undeUVWDQGLQJ HPRWLRQ UHJXODWLRQ@ 7KH UHVXOWV VXJJHVW WKDW 3URIHVVRU )¶V WZR
main emotional changes were in the domain of emotional reactivity and emotion regulation. 
Modifications in emotional reactivity were observed as an increase in the experience of both 
positive and negative emotions. As for emotion regulation, he reported important difficulties 
down-regulating negative emotions [particularly sadness]. Professor F related both changes to 
difficulties in his thinking process, especially to a difficulty generating and manipulating 
                                                 
24 Salas, C.E., Radovic, D., Yuen, K.S.L., & Turnbull, O.H. (in preparation). Opening to a new dimension: 
Changes in Emotion Reactivity and Emotion Regulation in a Case of Executive Impairment after Left Fronto-
Parietal Damage. 
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thoughts during moments of negative arousal. These results are discussed in relation to the 
literature on executive function and emotion regulation, both intrinsic and extrinsic. The 
relevance of these findings for the debate on the neural basis of emotional reactivity and 
emotion regulation is also addressed.  
  
5.2. Emotional Changes in Executive Impairment 
 
269 
 
And the question is,                                                  
was I more alive                                                       
then than I am now?                                                     
I happily have to disagree;                                            
I laugh more often now,                                                
I cry more often now,                                                    
I am more me 
 
Peter, Bjorn and John, Object of my affection 
 
5.2.2. Introduction 
Executive impairment is a common problem after frontal lobe lesions, often compromising a 
wide range of necessary capacities to resume productive and social life (Crepeau & Scherzer, 
1993), such as initiation, problem solving, self-monitoring and behavioural regulation 
(Burgess & Robertson, 2002; Evans, 2005; Fuster, 2008; Wilson & Evans, 2008). Even 
though executive impairment is commonly associated with cognitive difficulties, there is a 
small literature suggesting that emotional deficits, and particularly emotion regulation 
deficits, may also co-occur (Burguess, Alderman, Wilson, Evans & Emslie, 1996; Eslinger, 
Flaherty-Craig & Chakara, 2013). For example, some reports have described the presence of 
shallow levels of emotion itself (Baddeley & Wilson, 1988; Burgess & Robertson, 2002), 
while others have referred to difficulties in controlling emotion (Fuster, 2008; Godefroy et 
al., 2010, Tang et al., 2009; Yeates et al., 2008). Unfortunately there has not been a 
systematic exploration of this problem in order to interpret such apparently contradictory 
reports.  
Addressing the topic of emotional changes after brain injury has been a complex task 
for researchers, presenting important limitations. For instance, emotional change has been 
poorly operationalized, with dissimilar conceptualizations used by authors, defining 
emotional change as a modification in: emotional expression (Baird et al., 2006; Brahman et 
al., 2009; Hornak, Rolls & Wade, 1996; Hornak et al., 2003), intensity and frequency of 
discrete emotional experience (Hornak et al., 2003; Rolls, Hornak, Wade & McGrath, 1994), 
transient and dispositional emotion (Gillihan et al., 2010), public behaviour and interpersonal 
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relationships (Brahman et al., 2009; Hornak et al., 2003) or mood and personality (Cohen et 
al., 2001; Robinson, 2006). Nevertheless, there is a recent literature addressing this gap, by 
suggesting a set of key emotional processes to be explored when assessing emotional change 
after brain injury (Levenson et al., 2008; Rosen & Levenson, 2009). 
Another limitation has been the under-UHSRUWLQJRIWKHSDWLHQW¶VVXEMHFWLYHH[SHULHQFH
of affective changes, including the way that patients perceive these changes, and how they 
impact on their lives. Even though some studies have tried to capture this using semi-
structured questionnaires that ask about emotional changes (e.g. Rolls, Hornak, Wade & 
McGrath, 1994; Hornak et al., 2003), such data have never been reported in detail. This class 
of evidence could inform, in a bottom-up fashion, our understanding of emotional change, for 
example in subjects with executive impairment (Turnbull & Solms, 2004). Furthermore, a 
better description of emotional changes, from the inside, could also contribute to the 
understanding of related problems in neuropsychological rehabilitation, such as identity 
change (Carrol & Coetzer, 2011; Coetzer, 2008; Gelech & Desjardins, 2011; Salas, 2009; 
Segal, 2010; Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000).  
Why might researchers have avoided the in depth exploration of emotional changes in 
dysexecutive patients? A possible answer is that this population often presents with a wide set 
of cognitive deficits [disorganized thinking, cognitive rigidity, concreteness, or impaired 
working memory], deficits that may compromise the capacity to reflect upon, and report, 
subjective experience (Eslinger, Flaherty-Craig & Chakara, 2013; Salas, Vaughan, Shankers 
& Turnbull, 2013; Ylvisaker, Szekeres & Feeney, 1998). Nevertheless, these methodological 
concerns can be moderated by a number of arguments. First, there is an emerging literature 
addressing the technical challenges imposed by interviewing people with cognitive (Paterson 
& Scott-Findlay, 2002) and language difficulties after brain injury (Carlsson, Paterson, Scott-
Findlay, Enfhors & Ehrenberg, 2007; Lloyd, Gatherer & Kalsy, 2006). Secondly, it is clear 
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that the so-called dysexecutive syndrome has heterogeneous presentations (Stuss & 
Alexander, 2007), and the degree of cognitive impairment can vary widely (Evans, 2005). 
Some dysexecutive patients may preserve substantial capacity to reflect upon experience, and 
offer a detailed account. In our opinion, the study of such high-functioning dysexecutive 
patients opens important opportunities to understand the nature and extent of emotional 
changes in dysexecutive patients.  
There is a long history of subjective reports of patients with neuropsychological 
impairment. However, this literature is almost exclusively about patients with posterior 
lesions, who have intact executive function (e.g. Kapur, 1996; Luria, 1972). This article 
explores the emotional change in a man [Professor F] who acquired dysexecutive symptoms 
after a left fronto-parietal lesion, caused by an ischemic stroke. What is unique about this 
FDVHLV3URIHVVRU)¶VH[WUDRUGLQDU\SUHPRUELGFDSDFLW\DQGWKHUHPDUNDEOHSUHVHUYDWLRQRIWKH
ability to abstract, which offers a rare window into the subjective experience of dysexecutive 
patients. In order to address some of the limitations of previous studies on emotional change, 
this article considers a wide range of emotional key processes (Levenson, 2007; Levenson et 
al., 2008). In addition, by using a case study methodology, different data collection methods 
are combined (Yin, 1994): with reports of in-depth interviews, self-report questionnaires, 
relative-report questionnaires and a range of experimental tasks. It has been suggested that 
such convergence of methods, often called triangulation (Denzin, 1978), allows a more 
complete and contextual portrait of the phenomenon at study (Jick, 1979).  
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5.2.3. Methods 
5.2.3.1. Case Description 
Professor F is a 72 year old right-handed male, married and father of three. At the time of his 
brain injury, 6 years ago [2006], he was actively working in academia as a lecturer [in a 
social science discipline] and as the dean of his department. His teaching career had extended 
for almost forty years, with an active research agenda and numerous publications [mostly 
essays and qualitative papers] that can be traced up to the year of the accident. He was taken 
to the emergency service several hours after the stroke, which occurred at night while 
sleeping. At that point, he was confused, also presenting severe expressive aphasia and right 
hemiparesis. According to medical records, after being pharmacologically treated [details 
about this procedure were not clear on his medical records], within hours there was a positive 
recovery of language deficits and hemiparesis. There are no records of radiological 
examinations at the time of the injury. 
Once Professor F became stable, he was immediately transferred to a sub-acute 
inpatient rehabilitation unit, where he stayed hospitalized for a period of two months. 
Records of the initial neurological and neuropsychological assessment suggest good 
understanding of this immediate environment and relatively preserved communication ±with 
some difficulty finding words- and high levels of anxiety. At three months of evolution he 
was discharged from the sub-acute unit and moved back to his house. At that point [2006] he 
started attending an outpatient rehabilitation clinic.  
When interviewed at arrival, he ±and his wife- reported the following problems: 
difficulties managing time, fatigue and high levels of anxiety. When queried about the 
possible causes of his anxiety, Professor F commented that his main concern whether he 
would ever recover his intellectual capacities, for he had noticed changes in the way his mind 
now worked. He found himself forgetful, unable to focus and with moments where his mind 
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went blank. He also commented on difficulties following conversations, a problem that made 
him feel lost and frustrated.  
The outpatient rehabilitation phase lasted 15 months [2006-2007] and Professor F 
attended the centre twice a week. During this period the main goals of treatment were: 1) to 
improve cognitive function, specifically his tolerance to mental effort, fluidity and mental 
flexibility; 2) to incorporate the use of compensation strategies to manage the impact of 
H[HFXWLYHSUREOHPVLQHYHU\GD\OLIH>FDOHQGDUVGLDU\@WRIDFLOLWDWH3URIHVVRU)¶VUHWXUQWR
academic activities; 4) to emotionally support the increased awareness of changes generated 
by the exposure to his former working routine; 5) to educate and support family members 
>HVSHFLDOO\3URIHVVRU)¶VZLIH@LQWKHSURFHVVRIDGMXVWPHQW%\WKHHQGRIWKLVSKDVH>@
and despite his executive disorder, Professor F was working two mornings a week at the 
University.  
Even though the outpatient rehabilitation phase was over, Professor F continued 
privately with the support of a clinical neuropsychologist, an occupational therapist and a 
physiotherapist, this one more sporadically. Such work has been sustained until present time 
[2008-2013]. 
A radiological examination, five years after the vascular event [2011], suggested a 
watershed stroke at the junction of the middle and anterior cerebral artery territories, in the 
left frontal and parietal lobes. The damage involved the medial part of the dorsal prefrontal 
cortex and extended into the intra-parietal cortex [see figure 1].  
Interaction with Professor F suggests that he is a relatively independent individual. At 
the time of writing [2013], he has many areas of elementary cognitive impairment, but works 
hard to compensate for them. He is able to use the telephone, but needs to take notes to 
remember conversations. He remembers appointments only if they are registered in his diary, 
particularly new ones. He can shop independently for small purchases. He collaborates 
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proactively with household chores. He is able to travel independently by subway or taxi. 
However, he only feels confident when travelling a familiar route. In cases where he needs to 
arrive to a new place [as it was the case when he started attending to the session with his 
psychologist], he needs to be accompanied by a family member initially. However, after only 
a couple of closely monitored trips, he is able to start doing the route alone. His capacity to 
move independently has also been limited by his right leg, which did not recover completely, 
generating fatigue and balance problems. He was also able to manage money but needs help 
with banking and major purchases. In fact, all the household finances were taken over by 
3URIHVVRU)¶VZLIHDIWHr the accident.  
Today, Professor F still works twice a week at the University. However, his duties 
have changed in import ways. He does not teach anymore, neither is he in charge of any 
administrative duties. His capacity to read highly theoretical books, a common task in his pre-
stroke everyday work, is rather limited, especially for texts that present new and unfamiliar 
ideas. His actual work has mostly focused on tutoring undergraduate and postgraduate 
students, who are working on areas related to his past field of expertise. In addition, he had 
begun marking student theses, a task that was slowly mastered [it took almost a year], thanks 
to the development of a system that organizes and register information. This system consists 
of making small notes and comments on each paragraph. Then, after the complete text has 
been read and commented, Professor F goes over it a couple of times, but now just reviewing 
his comments. Based on this second reading, new and more inclusive comments are 
generated, allowing him to synthetize his impressions and elaborate a report.  
 
 
 
 
5.2. Emotional Changes in Executive Impairment 
 
275 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1. 3URIHVVRU)¶V/HVLRQ&RURQDOVHFWLRQVRI&RPSXWHULVHG7RPRJUDSK\7KHOHVLRQLQYROYHVWKH
medial part of the dorsal prefrontal cortex and extended into the intra-parietal cortex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2 ' UHFRQVWUXFWLRQ RI 3URIHVVRU )¶V OHVLRQ 7KH LPDJH VKRZV KRZ WKH GDPDJH PRVWO\
compromised the dorsolateral and dorso-medial left PFC. 
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During his spare time, when he does not attend to university, he has started writing. 
He has completed short autobiographical stories, and published two historical books about 
the institutions where he has worked. Even though this level of productivity is impressive, 
Professor F has to invest high levels of effort to write and re-write such documents. The most 
prominent difficulties he faces when approaching these tasks are generating and organizing 
ideas, as well as multitasking. A common problem is that he does not know how to start 
writing, often reporting that he is not able to come up with ideas, or that he struggle 
manipulating ideas in his mind or coming up with a scheme [or plan] of what to write. 
However, writing down his thoughts appears to facilitate the idea generation process, and 
focusing for months exclusively on the same project appear to help him to keep information 
fresh and at hand. The support of the occupational therapist has been crucial here, especially 
GXULQJSHULRGVZKHUHWKHZULWLQJSURFHVVEHFRPHVµVWXFN¶RUQHHGVWREHSODnned.  
3URIHVVRU)¶VVRFLDOOLIHKDVVKUXQNQRZFOXVWHULQJPRVWO\DURXQGKLVQXFOHDUIDPLO\
$OWKRXJKVXFKFKDQJHVLQVRFLDOOLIHDUHFRPPRQZLWKDJH3URIHVVRU)¶VFKDQJHVKDYHEHHQ
specifically influenced by several factors. In first place, because of his leg problem, he gets 
tired when walking long distances, thus limiting his mobility range. Secondly, he reports 
struggling in social situations, which are experienced by him as exhausting, and difficult to 
follow. Thirdly, his capacity to plan social activities appears to be reduced. He has 
FRPSODLQHGWKDWKHGRHVQRWVSRQWDQHRXVO\WKLQNDERXWµIXQDFWLYLWLHV¶WRGRZLWKKLVZLIH+H
justifies this by suggesting that it may be related to his mind focusing completely on his 
writing during his spared time.  
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5.2.3.2. Quantitative Data Collection 
5.2.3.2.1. Procedure 
7KHQHXURSV\FKRORJLFDODQGHPRWLRQDODVVHVVPHQWZDVFDUULHGRXWLQDW3URIHVVRU)¶V
house in three separate sessions (2 hours each). In the first session the rationale of the study 
was explained to him and his wife, and consent was obtained. The neurological tasks and 
questionnaires were spaced throughout the sessions in order to reduce the impact of fatigue 
RQ SHUIRUPDQFH 3URIHVVRU )¶V TXHVWLRQQDLUHV ZHUH DGPLQLVWHUHG XQGHU FORVH VXSHUvision 
from one of the researchers (CS) in order to check that the participant understood each 
question and the logic of the corresponding scale. Relative-report questionnaires were also 
LQWURGXFHG LQ GHWDLO WR 3URIHVVRU )¶V ZLIH H[SODLQLQJ WKH ORJLF RI Hach instrument, so she 
FRXOGDQVZHUWKHPRQKHURZQ,QWKHODVWVHVVLRQWKHPDLQUHVHDUFKHUDQG3URIHVVRU)¶VZLIH
revised the questionnaires checking for items that might not have been clear. 
 
5.2.3.2.2. Instruments  
5.2.3.2.2.1. Neuropsychological Assessment 
$EDWWHU\RIQHXURSV\FKRORJLFDO WDVNVZDVXVHG WRREWDLQDSURILOHRI3URIHVVRU)¶VRYHUDOO
cognitive, especially focusing on his executive capacities: Speed Processing Index (WAIS -R, 
Weschler, 1981), Free and Cued Selective Recall Reminding Test (FCSRT, Grober & 
Buschke, 1987),Verbal Fluency (D-KEFS, Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001), Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test (WCST, Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay, & Curtiss, 1993), Similarities (WAIS-R) 
and Matrix Reasoning (WAIS-R). In order to further XQGHUVWDQG 3URIHVVRU )¶V SURILOH RI
dysexecutive impairment, the Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX, Wilson, Alderman, 
Burguess, Emslic, & Evans, 1996) was applied. The DEX is a 20-item questionnaire that 
explores a range of problems commonly associated with the Dysexecutive Syndrome. The 
DEX comes in two versions, one to be completed by the patient and another by the relative.  
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5.2.3.2.2.2. Emotion and Personality Assessment 
Emotion and personality were assessed by considering the outcome of experimental tasks, 
self-report questionnaires and relative-report questionnaires. In order to capture the 
complexity of emotional processes, the following key emotional components were assessed: 
emotion recognition, emotional expressiveness, emotional comprehension, emotion 
regulation, emotional symptomatology and personality change.  
a) Emotion recognition is a basic aspect of emotional and interpersonal life. Professor 
)¶V HPRWLRQ UHFRJQLWLRQ DELOLW\ZDV DVVHVVHG XVLQJ WKH )DFLDOO\([SUHVVHG(PRWLRQ
Labelling Test software (FEEL, Kesler, Bayerl, Deighton & Trauce, 2002). The FEEL 
measures the perception of facially expressed emotions and has been used in 
psychiatric (Kessler, Schwarze, Filipic, Traue, & von Wietersheim, 2006) and brain 
injury (Brau, Traue, Frisch, Widder, Deighton & Kessler, 2005) populations. During 
the task a slideshow of portrait images is presented, each for a period of 300ms, 
expressing six possible basic emotions: happiness, sadness, disgust, anger, fear and 
surprise. After the image is presented participants are asked to choose the 
corresponding emotion, from six available options (words) displayed on the screen. 
For each basic emotion seven portraits are presented during the task. 
 
b) Emotional Expressiveness refers to the behavioural changes that typically accompany 
emotion, or the form in which an individual manifest emotional impulses 
behaviourally (Gross & John, 1997). This capacity is often assessed using the 
Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ, Gross & John, 1997). The BEQ is a 16 
questions self-report, where participants have to rate how much they agree with each 
statement using a 7 point-likert scale. It is composed of three subscales that measure 
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different facets of emotional expressiveness: Negative Expressivity, Positive 
Expressivity and Impulse Strength.  
 
c) Emotional Understanding refers to a more complex aspect of emotional life. Professor 
)¶VDELOLW\WRXQGHUVWDQGHPRWLRQVZDVDVVHVVHGXVLQJWKH7RURQWR$OH[LWK\PLD6FDOH
20 (TAS-20, Bagby, Parker & Taylor, 1994). This self-report questionnaire has three 
subscales that capture different aspects of emotion understanding. The Difficulties 
Identifying Emotions (DIE) subscale refers to problems distinguishing between 
emotions and bodily sensations and also between different emotions. The Difficulty 
Describing Emotions (DDE) subscale assesses the inability to verbally express 
emotions. Finally, the External Oriented Thinking (EOT) scale refers to a concrete 
non-introspective cognitive style.  
 
d) Emotional Symptoms. Emotional symptoms, such as anxiety and depression are 
common after brain injury (Robinson, 2006). The presence of emotional symptoms 
was assessed using a self-rating questionnaire, the Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Rating Scale (HADS, Olssøn, Mykletun, & Dahl, 2005). The HADS has been widely 
used in subjects with brain injury (Dawkins, Cloherty, Gracey, & Evans, 2006). The 
scale consists of 14 items that assess different manifestations of anxiety [HADS-A 
subscale] and depression [HADS-D subscale]. In each item, participants are expected 
to select an answer from four possible choices that reflect the frequency of such 
symptoms in a time period of a week.  
 
e) Emotion Regulation refers to the set of processes that individuals use to influence 
which emotions they have , when they have them and how they experience and 
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express those emotions (Gross, 1998). Emotion regulation has been considered as a 
key emotional process (Rosen & Levenson, 2009), that is often compromised after 
brain injury (Abreau et al., 2009; Beer & Lombardo, 2007; Salas, 2012). In order to 
H[SORUH 3URIHVVRU¶V ) UHJXODWRU\ FDSDFLWLHV WKH (PRWLRQ 5HJXODWLRQ 4XHVWLRQQDLUH
(ERQ, Gross & John, 2003), was used to assess the frequency of usage of two 
emotion regulation strategies: suppression and re-appraisal. Suppression has been 
GHILQHG DV WKH FRQVFLRXV LQKLELWLRQ RI RQH¶V RZQ HPRWLRQDO H[SUHVVLYH EHKDYLRXU
while affectively aroused (Gross & Levenson, 1997), while re-appraisal has been 
GHVFULEHG DV WKH DELOLW\ WR FKDQJH D VLWXDWLRQ¶V PHDQLQJ LQ D ZD\ WKDW DOWHUV LW
emotional impact (Gross & Thompson, 2007).  
 
f) Personality Change following acquired brain injury has been described as an 
alteration or discontinuity in personhood post injury (Yeates, Gracey & McGrath, 
2008), often reported after frontal lobe lesions (Chow, 2000 for a review). The Iowa 
Scale of Personality Change (ISPC, Barrash, Anderson, Hathaway-Nepple, Jones & 
Tranel, 1993) is an informant questionnaire that assesses disturbances in several 
personality dimensions, such as decision making, social behaviour, irascibility, 
motivation and distress (Barrash, Asp, Markon, Manzel, Anderson & Tranel, 2011). It 
is composed of 30 items, each of them targeting one type of personality disturbance. 
For each item the informant rates the presence of the behaviour after (Now Score) and 
before (Before 6FRUHWKHLQMXU\$FKDQJHVFRUH¨LVJHQHUDWHGE\subtracting the 
Now score from the Before 6FRUH7KXVDSRVLWLYH¨VFRUH LPSOLHVDQ LQFUHDVH LQD
GHWHUPLQHG GLVWXUEDQFH ZKLOH D QHJDWLYH ¨ VFRUH VXJJHVWV D GHFUHDVH LQ VXFK
behaviour.  
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5.2.3.3. Qualitative data Collection 
5.2.3.3.1. Procedure 
,QRUGHUWRFDSWXUH3URIHVVRU¶V)VXEMHFWLYHH[SHULHQFHRIKLVHPRWLRQDOFKDQJHVDVHULHVRI
three semi-structured interviews were carried in 2012, using a thematic analysis approach 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). The interview schedule intentionally focused on the impact that the 
brain injury had on emotional life. For example, initial questions asked Professor F to report 
on any changes that he had noticed on individual and interpersonal aspects of emotional life. 
Following this, Professor F was asked to reflect more specifically on possible changes on his 
capacity to experience, understand and regulate emotions. Each of these interviews lasted 120 
minutes approximate and was digitally audio-recorded for analytical purposes. See Appendix 
6 for the interview protocol. 
 
5.2.3.3.2. Technical adaptations to address dysexecutive impairment during the 
interview process 
,QRUGHUWRPDQDJHWKHLPSDFWRI3URIHVVRU)¶VG\VH[HFXWLYHLPSDLUPHQWRQWKHLQWHUYLHZVD
series of strategies were developed. First, as suggested by several researchers, interviews 
were spaced in time to avoid fatigue and overstimulation (Carlsson et al., 2007; Patterson & 
Scott-)LQGOD\  ,Q DGGLWLRQ GXULQJ WKH FRXUVH RI HDFK VHVVLRQ 3URIHVVRU)¶V OHYHO RI
fatigue was constantly monitored and short breaks were suggested (Lewis & Porter, 2004).  
Different compensatory strategies were used to manage the impact of dysexecutive 
LPSDLUPHQW RQ WKH LQWHUYLHZ SURFHVV )LUVWO\ DV D IRUP RI FRPSHQVDWLQJ IRU 3URIHVVRU )¶V
difficulty recalling information [see Table 1 below], direct interview questions were 
formulated. These questions were intended to collaboratively find concrete situations that 
would facilitate the recall process (Patterson & Scott-)LQGOD\  2QFH VXFK µW\SLFDO
VLWXDWLRQV¶ ZKHUH IODJJHG >HJ D VRFLDO VLWXDWLRQ ZKHUH KH IHOW KH FRXOG QRW PDQDJH KLV
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emotions] the interviewer actively facilitated the re-construction process, managing typical 
dysexecutive phenomena such as distraction and perseveration. Such facilitation was 
accomplished mainly by helping Professor F fixing the focus of attention on specific contents 
>HJ µOHW¶VVWD\IRUDZKLOHRQKRZ\RXH[SHULHQFHG\RXUPLQGDW WKDW WLPH"¶@DQGDOVRE\
shifting the focus of attention to other related contents in order to enrich the narrative [e.g. 
µOHW¶VWU\WRWKLQNQRZKRZ\RXWULHGWRUHFRYHUIRUWKRVHLQWHQVHIHHOLQJV"¶@ 
CRPSHQVDWRU\VWUDWHJLHVZHUHDOVRXVHGWRPDQDJH3URIHVVRU¶V)GLIILFXOW\LQPRYLQJ
from detailed to general levels of thinking, and vice versa. This is a common difficulty in 
subjects with dysexecutive impairment, who tend to get stuck into the details of a situation 
(Eslinger, Flaherty-Craig, & Chakara, 2013), thus compromising the transit from offering 
examples to abstracting meaning from them. The interviewer actively formulated questions 
that facilitated the transition from concrete to abstract levels of thinking [e.g. µSo you tell me 
DERXW WKLV VLWXDWLRQZKHUH \RXGLGQRWNQRZZKDW WRGR«:HUH \Ru trying to tell me this 
VWRU\DVDQH[DPSOHRIKRZKDUGLVIRU\RXWRPDQDJHKRZ\RXIHHO"¶@DQGIURPabstract to 
concrete OHYHOV RI WKLQNLQJ >HJ µ<RX VD\ WKDWZKHQ WKHUH DUH WRRPDQ\ VWLPXOL \RXGRQ¶W
NQRZZKDW WRGR«&DQ\RX WHOOPHKRZ\RXUPLQGIHHOs, or how your body feels, in those 
PRPHQWV"¶@ 
 
5.2.3.3.3. Qualitative Data Analysis 
All data were collected prior to analysis and interviews were transcribed verbatim. The 
TXDOLWDWLYHGDWDDQDO\VLVVRIWZDUH19,92465,QWHUQDWLRQDO3W\/WGZDVused to 
retrieve and code data, as well as to develop theory building. A thematic analysis, which 
allows the identification and reporting of patterns within qualitative data, was conducted in 
accordance to the procedure described by Braun and Clark (2006). Three main features 
characterize the type of thematic analysis used in this research. First, it adopted an 
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essentialist/realist approach, which holds that language reflects, and enables us to articulate, 
meaning and experience. Second, it was theoretically driven, offering a detailed description 
of certain aspects of the data which are relevant for the research question [in this case 
emotional change], and not the entire data set. Third, it followed a semantic approach, which 
implies that themes are identified within the explicit meanings of the data, and that data 
handling involves a progression from descriptive to interpretative levels.  
Data analysis followed general guidelines established by the Grounded Theory 
approach.  Firstly, data was fragmented into codes, which were organized in more general 
concepts [categories]. Secondly, data was reorganized, by generating connections between 
categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). More specifically, and as a first step, the interview was 
read and re-read separately by two coders [CS and DR], in order to identify preliminary 
themes. Then the interview was broken down into codes, which were organized into 
categories and subcategories. This analysis was made using the constant comparison 
approach, in which researchers go back and forth between newly uncovered and pre-existing 
data, thus constantly modifying the emerging categories (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
Comparisons were made between objects [codes] and theory [categories], as suggested by 
Strauss and Corbin (1998). Themes where then refined, and their names revised according to 
the different codes extracts and the entire data set. The reorganization of the data was made 
by relating categories in consideration of their properties and dimensions, as well as looking 
on how they linked together. Finally, in order to report the results of the analysis, vivid and 
compelling extracts were selected. 
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5.2.4. Results  
5.2.4.1. Neuropsychological Assessment  
Data from neuropsychological tasks, self-report and relative-report questionnaires suggest 
that, 7 years after the stroke, Professor F presents with moderate dysexecutive deficit. The 
profile of such impairment [see Table 1 for details] may be characterized as: (1) a decrease in 
speed of processing, requiring long periods of time to correctly deal with complex 
information [Speed Processing Index, WAIS III]; (2) Verbal fluency problems, especially 
when using categories as a guide [D-KEFS]; (3) increased sensitivity to interference [failure 
to maintain set errors, WCST] and cognitive inflexibility [perseverative errors, WCST]; (5) 
preserved capacity to store new information, but severely impaired free recall [Free and Cued 
Selective Recall Reminding Test, FCSRT, Grober & Buschke, 1987]. It is interesting to note 
WKDWLQFRQWUDVWZLWKWKHLPSDLUPHQWLQVHYHUDOGRPDLQVRIH[HFXWLYHIXQFWLRQ3URIHVVRU)¶V
abstract capacities appear to be relatively spared [Similarities and Matrix Reasoning, WAIS].   
3URIHVVRU )¶V UDQJH RI H[HFXWLYH LPpairments can be better appreciated by considering his 
self-report on the DEX. He describes himself as having frequent difficulties planning ahead, 
assessing the magnitude of problems, avoiding distractions, making decisions, and frequently 
acting without thinking. When compared to a sample of 78 patients with diverse neurological 
disorders (Wilson et al., 1996), Professor F reports similar levels of dysexecutive problems in 
everyday life [DEX, t(77) = 0.32, p = .37, M = 27.21, SD = 14.48]. Notably, he acknowledges 
more dysexecutive problems than his ZLIHRQWKH'(;>3URIHVVRU)¶VVFRUH 3URIHVVRU)
ZLIH¶VVFRUH @ 
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Table 1 
6XPPDU\RI3URIHVVRU)¶VQHXURSV\FKRORJLFDODVVHVVPHQW 
 
 
 
  
Neuropsychological 
Processes Task Score Interpretation
Speed Processing Processing Speed Index (WAIS) 88 mildly impaired
           Digit Symbol-Coding (WAIS) 7ss mildly impaired
           Symbol Search (WAIS) 9ss mildly impaired
Language Letter fluency (D-KEFS) 9ss mildly impaired
Category fluency (D-KEFS) 4ss impaired 
Working Memory Working Memory Index  (WAIS) 111 normal
          Arithmetic (WAIS) 10ss normal
          Digit Span (WAIS) 11ss normal
          Letter-number sequencing (WAIS) 14ss above average
Memory Free Recall FCSRT 11 impaired
Total Recall FCSRT (free and cued recall) 26 impaired
Recognition FCSRT 15 normal
Categories Completed (WCST) 4 impaired
Perseverative errors (WCST) 24 impaired
Failures to maintain set (WCST) 8 impaired
Category switching fluency  (D-KEFS) 3ss impaired
Abstraction Similarities (WAIS) 10 ss normal
Matrix Reasoning (WAIS) 12ss above average
ss = scaled scores;WAIS = Wechsler Adult Inteligence Scale; D-KEFS = Delis Kaplan Executive Function System; FCSRT = Free and cued selective Recall Reminding Test; 
WCST = Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
Category Generation and 
Set Shifting
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5.2.5.2. Emotion and Personality Assessment  
a) Emotion Recognition >)((/ WHVW@ 3URIHVVRU )¶V FDSDFLW\ to recognize accurately, and 
label, basic emotions is preserved for all emotions except disgust. When compared to a 
sample of 15 age matched controls he does not present significant differences in the total 
score [t(14) = -0.19, p = .18, M = 33, SD = 5.5]0RUHVSHFLILFDOO\3URIHVVRU)¶VSHUIRUPDQFH
is in normal range for anger [t(14) = 0.13, p = .44, M = 3.6, SD = 2.8], sadness [t(14) = -0.32, 
p = .37, M = 5.6, SD = 1.8], surprise [t(14) = -0.48, p = .31, M = 5.8, SD = 1.6], happiness 
[t(14) = 0.48, p = .31, M = 6.7, SD = 0.6] or fear [t(14) = -0.53, p = .30, M = 5.1, SD = 2.0]. 
Nevertheless, Professor F appears significantly impaired in the recognition of disgust [ t(14) = 
-3.55, p < .001, M = 6.3, SD = 0.9] .  
 
b) Emotional Expressivity [BEQ]: Professor F capacity to express negative and positive 
emotions, as well as the intensity of his emotional reactions, appears to be in normal range. 
When compared to a sample of 19 non brain-injured subjects of matched age (Gross et al., 
1997), no significant differences were found in terms of negative expressivity [t(18) = 0.73, p 
= .23, M = 3.69, SD = .85], positive expressivity [t(18) = 0.57, p = .28, M = 5.18, SD = .96] or 
impulse strength [t(18) = 0.18, p = .43, M = 4.5, SD = .93]. 
 
c) Emotional Understanding [TAS-20]: Professor F capacity to identify and describe 
emotions appears to be within normal range. Interestingly, he seems to use a rather abstract 
cognitive style when relating to emotions. When compared a sample of 58 non brain-injured 
older (Henry et DO  3URIHVVRU )¶V VFRUHV GR QRW GLIIHU VLJQLILFDQWO\ LQ WHUPV RI
identifying emotions [t(57) = 0,67,  p = .25, M = 16.1, SD = 5.77] or describing emotions 
[t(57) = 0.51,  p = .30, M = 13.4, SD = 3.10]. However, his score on the concrete cognitive 
style subscale is significantly lower [t(57) = -3.93, p < .001, M = 22.9, SD = 3.02].  
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d) Emotion Regulation >(54@3URIHVVRU)¶VXVDJHRI UHDSSUDLVDO >WKH FDSDFLW\ WR JHQHUDWH
positive interpretations of negative events] and suppression [the ability to withhold the 
expression of emotional reactions] appear to be within normal range. When compared to a 
sample of 20 non brain-injured older adults (Winecoff et al., 2011), no differences were 
found in the frequency of use of suppression [t(19) = 0.26, p = .40, M = 14.6, SD = 5.2], but 
marginal differences were observed in relation to reappraisal [t(19) = -1.39, p = .09, M = 
32.4, SD = 4.6].  
 
e) Emotional Symptoms [HADS]: Professor F reported no clinical signs of depression or 
anxiety. His scores for the Anxiety Scale (score = 4) and Depression Scale (score = 1) were 
not higher than the proposed cut-off score [< 8] (Olssøn et al., 2005). 
 
f) Personality change >,63&@$FFRUGLQJWR3URIHVVRU)¶VZLIHWKHUHZDVDmoderate change 
LQ WKH'LVWUHVV6FDOH ¨ ZLWKKLJK VFRUHVRI FKDQJH LQ WKH LWHPV DQ[LHW\ ¨  DQG
YXOQHUDELOLW\ WR SUHVVXUH ¨    7KH ([HFXWLYH '\VIXQFWLRQ'HFLVLRQ 0DNLQJ 6FDOH
presented mild OHYHOVRIFKDQJH¨ ZLWKODFNRILQLWLDWLYH¨ DQGLQGHFLVLYHQHVV¨
= 3) as the items with highest score. Finally, the Hypo-emotionality Scale also presented mild 
OHYHOVRIFKDQJH¨ ZLWKVRFLDOZLWKGUDZDO ¨ DQGDSDWK\ ¨ ) as the items 
ZLWK WKH KLJKHVW VFRUH ,QWHUHVWLQJO\ EOXQWHG DIIHFW SUHVHQWHG D PLOG GHFUHDVH ¨   -1), 
suggesting an augmentation of emotional experience. See Table 2 for further details. 
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Table 2 
6XPPDU\RI3URIHVVRU¶V)HPRWLRQDODQGSHUVRQDOLW\DVVHVVPHQW3URIHVVRU¶V)VFRUHVDUH
compared to age matched control samples. 
 
 
  
Emotional Components Professor F 
Score M SD p
Anger 4 3.6 2.8 .44
Sadness 5 5.6 1.8 .37
Disgust 3 6.3 0.9 .001**
Surprise 5 5.8 1.6 .31
Happiness 7 6.7 0.6 .31
Fear 4 5.1 2.0 .30
Negative Emotions 4.33 3.69 0.9 .23
Positive Emotions 5.75 5.18 1.0 .28
Impulse Strength 4.66 4.5 0.9 .43
Identifying Emotions 23 16.1 5.8 .25
Describing Emotions 15 13.4 3.1 .30
External Oriented Thinking 11 22.9 3.0 .001**
Reappraisal 26 32.4 4.6 .09
Supression 16 14.6 5.2 .40
Anxiety 4
Depression 1
Distress ¨ 
Executive Dysfuntion/ 
Decision Making ¨ 
Hypoemotionality ¨ 
Disturbed Social Behavior ¨ 
Obsessive ¨ 
Irascibility ¨ 
Self-centered ¨ 
Self-serving ¨ 
¨ GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHSRVWLQMXU\DQGSUHLQMXU\VFRUHV
Personality Change                                   
(ISPC)
Healthy Controls
Emotion Recognition                                    
(FEEL test)
Emotional Expressiveness                   
(BEQ)
Emotional Understanding                   
(TAS-20)
Emotion Regulation                                    
(ERQ)
Emotional Symptoms                            
(HADS)
5.2. Emotional Changes in Executive Impairment 
 
289 
 
5.2.4.3 Summary of neuropsychological and emotional findings 
,QVXP3URIHVVRU)¶VQHXURSV\FKRORJLFDOSURILOHDSSHDUVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\VORZLQIRUPDWLRQ
processing [Speed Processing Index, WAIS III], difficulties with free recall of verbal 
information [FCRST], difficulties in mental generation [Verbal Fluency, D-KEFS], 
distractibility [WCST] and mental inflexibility [WCST]. Such profile of impairment is 
consistent with the executive difficulties that Professor F reports on the DEX (e.g. planning 
ahead, avoiding distractions, making decisions and acting without thinkinJ DQGKLVZLIH¶V
report of change on the Executive Dysfunction /Decision Making Scale [ISPC].  
It is interesting, however, that not all executive-related abilities appear compromised 
LQ 3URIHVVRU )¶V SURILOH %RWK DEVWUDFWLRQ >6LPLODULWLHV DQG 0DWUL[ :$,S] and working 
memory [Working Memory Index, WAIS] appear within the normal range. The possible 
implications of this discrepancy between damaged and spared capacities for ER would be 
addressed in the discussion section. 
As for the emotional assessment, Professor F appears within normal range in most of 
the measures of key emotional processes, such as emotion recognition for basic emotions 
[FEEL], emotional expressivity [BEQ], emotional understanding [TAS-20], emotion 
regulation [ERQ] and depressive/anxious symptomatology [HADS]. Nevertheless, he does 
present some abnormalities. For example, he has a low performance in the recognition of 
disgust [FEEL], and a markedly higher performance in the Concrete Cognitive Style subscale 
(TAS-20), suggesting a clearly abstract approach to thinking about emotions. This last point 
is interesting in relation to the preserved abstraction reported by formal tests. There is also a 
trend suggesting a less frequent use of reappraisal compared to controls [ERQ]. It is 
important to note that, even though Professor F does not report significant emotional 
difficulties [HADS], his wife mentions several. For example, she reports that the most 
PDUNHGFKDQJHLQ3URIHVVRU)¶VSHUVRQDOLW\LVLQWKH'LVWUHVV6FDOH>,63&@SDUWLFXODUO\ZLWK
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an increase in anxiety and vulnerability to pressure. She also mentions an increase in social 
withdrawal and a decrease of blunted affect (i.e. increased emotional reactivity). 
 
 
5.2.4.4 In-depth interview results 
A first point that needs to be mentioned, before describing the main themes of the interview, 
LV WKHLPSDFWRI3URIHVVRU)¶VH[HFXWLYHLPSDLUPHQWRQWKHLQWHUYLHZSURFHVV+HLVDEOHWR
understand and address questions correctly; however, his train of thought is often fragmented 
and constantly interrupted by related, but peripheral, contents. This generates a difficulty 
getting to the point, requiring longer periods of time and external support to answer. This 
profile appears to be consistent with previous studies that have described patients with left 
3)& OHVLRQV¶GLVFRXUVHDVYDJXHGLVRUJDQL]HGDQG UHSHWLWLYH  (Michael P Alexander, 2006; 
Coelho et al., 2012).  
 
5.2.4.4.1. Descriptive analysis of themes 
The analysis identified four themes related to emotional change, which are presented 
individually. The theme Opening to a new dimension describes how Professor F attributes 
meaning to acquiring a brain injury, by stressing changes in the emotional domain. Becoming 
dysexecutive addresses his experience of having a disorganized mind, by means of describing 
his main cognitive difficulties. Emotional Changes describes modifications in basic 
emotional processes, such as emotional reactivity and emotional understanding. Finally, 
Emotion Dysregulation and Regulation GUDZV RQ 3URIHVVRU )¶V GLIILFXOWLHV UHJXODWLQJ
negative emotional states and on the intrapersonal and interpersonal mechanisms he has 
discovered to overcome such problems.  
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7KHPHRQHµ2SHQLQJWRWKHHPRWLRQDOGLPHQVLRQLQPH¶ 
According to Professor F the main change that he perceives is the emergence of a new 
µGLPHQVLRQ¶IURPZKLFKKHQRZUHODWHVto himself and to the world. This aspect is referred 
by him as the emotional dimension: 
 
[A1]The impact of the accident in me has been multiple. First is this thing of being 
opened to a new world. This is related to what I just said, I thank the accident because 
deep down I start to perceive in myself, to perceive from reality, things that I did not 
perceive before. I mean, ways of relating, of being with myself, ways that I did not 
KDYHEHIRUH7KLVKDVEHHQWKHVWURQJHVWFKDQJH«WREHQRZEHJLQQLQJWRJUDVSWKH
emotional thing, the emotional dimension in me.  
 
The predominance of the emotional dimension implies a personality change, a re-
arrangement of the way in which cognition and emotion used to interact. To him, emotions 
are not shadowed by reason any more, and being rational appears as something from the past: 
 
[A2] I have always had this >HPRWLRQDO@GLPHQVLRQEXW,GRQRWNQRZZK\LQKHOO«,
GRQRWNQRZ«WKDWGLPHQVLRQ«RUWKDWDVSHFWRIP\OLIH«ZDVVLOHQFHG(PRWLRQV
ZHUHKLGGHQE\UDWLRQDOLW\«ZLWKWKHDFFLGHQWWKLVLQWHOOHFWXDOGLPHQVLRQWKH
rationality, this serious way of being thaW,KDG«WKDWZDVORVW,GRQRWKDYHWREH
VHULRXVWRDQ\RQHEHFDXVH,FDQ¶W«EHFDXVHWREHVHULRXVZRXOGEHWRUHDGDWKHVLVWR
SURSHUO\ZULWHDWKHVLVLQWHOOHFWXDOO\VSHDNLQJ>«@ZLWKWKHDFFLGHQW«WKHUHDUHWZR
WKLQJVRQHLVWKDW,FDQ¶WGRLWDQ\PRUe, and the other one is that I do not want to do it 
anymore. 
 
The re-arrangement of the rational and emotional dimensions has not only transformed 
the way he relates to himself, but also how he relates to others. According to him, others 
notice this change, and he notices that he relates to them differently: 
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>$@ 7KH FKDQJH WKDW RWKHUV VHH LQ PH LV WKDW«WKDW WKH 3URIHVVRU ) ZKR ZDV
UHVSRQVLEOH DQG VHULRXV«OLNH D EUDLQ WR WKHP«KH LV QRW WKDW RQH DQ\PRUH , KDG D
reputation of being a serious guy. Now at the university I relate to people very 
GLIIHUHQWO\,¶PIULHQGOLHUPRUHZDJJLVKVXSSRUWLQJWKHPFDULQJIRUWKHP«QRWDERXW
ZKDWWKH\KDYHWRGRRUVWXG\«WKDWUHDOO\PDNHVPHKDSS\«,VHHWKDWZKHQ,JHWWR
the University in the morning and I talk to them, aVDQHTXDO,ZRXOGQ¶WKDYHGRQHWKDW
before. 
 
 
7KHPHWZRµ%HFRPLQJ'\VH[HFXWLYH¶ 
Along the years, Professor F has gained awareness of the cognitive difficulties left by the 
brain injury, mostly by realizing its impact on his professional life. When questioned about it, 
he refers to mental slowness and mental inflexibility as the main problems: 
 
>%@,XVHGWRDUWLFXODWHWKHRU\WRPDNHVWRULHV«WKDWLVZKDW,XVHGWROLNH:HOO«DQG
WKDW \HW«, GRQ¶W IHHO OLNH SOD\LQJ WKDW JDPH DQ\PRUH«EHFDXVH , GR QRW KDYH the 
FDSDFLW\WRGRLWWKHUHTXLUHGVSHHGFUHDWLYLW\«PDQ\WKLQJVDUHVORZHUQRZ«,NQRZ,
DPFUHDWLYHEXW,¶PFUHDWLYHLQRWKHUZD\VLQWKLQJVWKDWZHUHXQNQRZQWRPHEHIRUH 
 
In relation to problems of mental flexibility he comments: 
 
[B2] Every situatiRQ«ZRUN«WRILJXUHRXWZKDWWRGRLQOLIH«LVDPXGGOH6LWXDWLRQV
ZKHUHFKDQJHLVUHTXLUHG«,GRSHUFHLYHWKRVHFKDQJHVEXW,GRQRWPDQDJHWRNQRZ
KRZ WR UHDFW WR WKHP 7HFKQRORJLFDO SROLWLFDO DQG FXOWXUDO FKDQJHV«WKH\ EHORQJ WR
completely different levels, but the sum of those levels is what confuses me. 
 
Professor F acknowledges that cognitive deficits compromise thinking and 
introspection, particularly in situations where he needs to think about something on the spot: 
 
[B3] Something really unpleasant is not being able to argue. In other words, not being 
DEOH WR WKLQN 7R UHDOO\ WU\ WR WKLQN«UHDOL]LQJ WKDW ZKDW RWKHU SHRSOH DUH VD\LQJ LV
5.2. Emotional Changes in Executive Impairment 
 
293 
 
QRQVHQVH« WKDW , KDG DUJXPHQWV WR UHSO\ WR WKDW EXW WKDW ,ZDV QRW DEOH WR 7KDW LV 
UHDOO\XQSOHDVDQW«ZDQWLQJWRWKLQNEXWQRWEHLQJFDSDEOHRIGRLQJVR 
 
It is interesting to note that the inability to think is often associated with the experience 
RIKLVPLQGJRLQJEODQNZLWKQRFRQWHQWV ,QVXFKPRPHQWVRIµVLOHQFH¶DVKHOLNHVWRFall 
them, active thinking is replaced by contemplation: 
 
>%@,KDYHWKHVHVSDFHV«WKDW,RIWHQFDOOVSDFHVRIVLOHQFH«TXLHWVSDFHVVLOHQWRQHV
And my mind often goes blank in those moments, without any explicit 
FRQWHQW«ZLWKRXWDQ\UHIOH[LYHFRQWHQW«EXWwith truths and emotional certainties. This 
RIWHQRFFXUVGXULQJSUD\LQJ«ZLWKP\DIIHFWLRQWRZDUGVP\ZLIHP\NLGV:KDW,WU\
to do then is to remain silent and contemplate. If you ask me contemplate what? I do 
not know. It is some form of empty contemplation, with no images, but certainly it has 
reality.  
 
The subjective experience of Professor F during these moments of silence is that of 
heightened bodily sensations and peace: 
 
[B5] In those moments of silence I do not look at anything, but I feel a great serenity. 
They are moments of pure sensation. For example, often when my wife works and the 
QHZV LV RQ«,RIWHQGLVFRQQHFWP\VHOI IURP WKHQHZVEHFDXVH , JHW WLUHG DQGERUHG
But I stay there quietly. Then I am just feeling. I have learnt to sense that at those 
moments I can pay attention to what I feel. And because before I did not know how to 
GRWKDW«QRZ,OLNHLW, OLNHLWDQG,KDYHEHFRPHVRPHKRZDGGLFWHGWRWKRVHVSDFHV
ZKHUH,FDQMXVWVWD\OLNHWKDW,QWKHFDU«IRULQVWDQFH«ZKHQZHWUDYHOZLWK my wife 
WRWKHQRUWK«VRPHWLPHVWKHUHLVPXVLFSOD\LQJLQWKHFDU«EXW,VWD\LQWKDWVSDFH«
ZKLFKZDVRFFXSLHGEHIRUHE\UHIOHFWLRQ«DQGQRZLVVLPSO\EHLQJWKHUH 
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7KHPHWKUHHµ(PRWLRQDO&KDQJHV¶ 
One of the most remarkable changes reported by Professor F is an increase in emotional 
reactivity for positive and negative emotions. According to him, this is related to a higher 
variation of emotional intensities, which boosts his capacity to be emotionally moved by 
events.  
 
>&@ +DSS\ IHHOLQJV «WKH DFFLGHQW GLG QRW UHGXFH WKHP EXW RQ WKH FRQWUDU\ LW
DXJPHQWHGWKHP7KHFDSDFLW\WRIHHOPRYHGWKHFDSDFLW\WRFU\>«@QRZ,H[SHULHQFH
these things where I am happier, or sadder, or that I have variations on intensity. That 
did not exist before. Because now I feel things, and this is part of my life. The accident 
made me more sensitive to that.  
 
The subjective experience of increased emotional reactivity appears to depend on which 
type of emotion is heightened. In the case of positive emotions, this seems to generate 
feelings of wellbeing and satisfaction, as well as to facilitate the capacity to empathize with 
RWKHU¶VSHRSOHKDSSLQHVV 
 
[C2] I am certainly happier than before. That is what my friends tell me, everybody 
GRHV6LQFHWKHDFFLGHQW«PRUHVDWLVILHG«,GRQRWNQRZDERXWZKDW«,GRQRWNQRZLI
LW LV UHODWHG WR VRPHWKLQJ«LW LV MXVW WKDW , OLve more happily. Sometimes I have these 
ORZPRPHQWVEXWLQJHQHUDOWKHH[SHULHQFHLVWKDW,IHHOKDSS\>«@\HVWHUGD\,UHDOL]HG
I was feeling happy because my son accomplished something at work. There I noted 
VRPHWKLQJGLIIHUHQW,XVHGWRWKLQNµZHOOWKLVLVQRWP\EXVLQHVVHV¶%XWWRIHHOµKRZ
JUHDWWKDWKHGLGJRRG¶«ZHOO,QRWLFHGWKHUHVRPHWKLQJXQXVXDOOLNHVXUSULVLQJP\VHOI
I did not have that register before.  
 
The increased intensity of negative emotions, on the contrary, appears to have a 
different effect. Professor F describes that in moments where he experiences such emotions 
he feels bewildered, with no control and somehow trapped: 
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 [C3] For example, this happens when I feel nervous. It is a very ugly sensation that 
one of being suddenly perpOH[HG«RI IHHOLQJ UHDOO\XQHDV\DERXW D VLWXDWLRQ WKDW \RX
FDQ¶WFRQWUROVRPHWKLQJ\RXFDQ¶WUHDFWWR,WLVDIHHOLQJRILQVWDELOLW\RIGDQJHU>«@,
KDYH WKHIHHOLQJ WKDW WKLV LQWHQVLW\«WKDW , IHHO WKLV LQWHQVLW\ZLWKPRUH LQWHQVLW\QRZ
$QGWKDWLVZK\«HVSHFLDOO\LQUHODWLRQWRVDGQHVV«WKHLQWHQVLW\SXOOVPHWREHVDGGHU
than I am.  
 
Professor F reports that he has no difficulties naming the emotions he feels [emotional 
labelling]. However, he recognizes that understanding why he feels that way [emotional 
understanding], particularly when aroused by negative emotions, is highly taxing: 
 
[C4] For example, there are times when I have been sad and I do not know why. When 
\RX DUH WKHUH LV OLNH« OLNH D OLWWOH RSSUHVVLRQ«OLNH VRPHWKLQJ REVFXUH«OLNH DQ
oppressive feeling and darkness, because I enter in something dark without knowing 
why. Then is where the confusion appears, because at that point I start looking for 
reasons. 
 
During moments of high negative arousal, where thinking is compromised, Professor F 
describes to experience something like a mental block. This experienced is a vicious cycle 
where negative emotions, and unpleasant bodily sensations generated by the disorganized 
mind render Professor F powerless: 
 
[C5] The mental block is something in the head. There are two things that I feel in the 
head, sadness and tiredness. I feel that like a stitch in the top of my head. Then it is a 
real struggle to think. The mental block is like a little stitch, a physical sensation. For 
example that time at the meetiQJ«WKH ILUVW WKLQJ WKDW , IHOWZDV DQ LQFUHDVH LQEORRG
SUHVVXUH0\IDFHJRWUHDOO\UHG«,QRWLFHGWKDW,ZDVIHHOLQJKRWDQGWKDWWKHRWKHUJX\
ZDVWDONLQJ«DQG,DOVRVWDUWHGIHHOLQJDKHDGDFKH«ZKLFK,UDUHO\GR«WKHQDVWRPDFK
discomfort. It is so unpleasant not to be able to think. It was like a fight with myself 
µ+RZ FRPH \RX DUH QRW DEOH WR VD\ VRPHWKLQJ«\RX«3URIHVVRU )¶ Because at that 
5.2. Emotional Changes in Executive Impairment 
 
296 
 
SRLQW,WKRXJKW,NQHZWKHWUXWK«WKDW,ZDVWKHDXWKRULW\«6RLWZDVDQDZIXOPL[RI
SK\VLFDOVHQVDWLRQV«RISRZHUOHVVQHVV7KDWLVWKHZRUG«WRIHHOSRZHUOHVV«LQHYHU\
way you could imagine. 
 
 
7KHPHIRXUµ(PRWLRQ'\VUHJXODWLRQDQG5HJXODWLRQ¶ 
The mental block might be considered an episode of emotion dysregulation, where impaired 
cognitive resources do not allow the self-modulation of negative affect. Professor F 
exemplifies this when describing his inability to voluntarily shift away from sad states, which 
KHFDOOVWKHµVWLFN\VDGQHVV¶ 
 
[D1] Having difficulties walking is something that saddens me. But then I have this 
H[SHULHQFHWKDW«ZHOO«,NQRZLVRNWRIHHOVDGEXWWKLVLVQRWMXVWIHHOLQJVDGWKLVLV
like a sticky sadness, which makes me feel sadder than I should. That is really, it is like 
ZKHQ\RXVWHSLQWKHPXG«VR\RXQHHGWRPDNHDQHIIRUWWROLIW\RXUIRRWDQGLQRUGHU
WROLIW\RXUIRRW\RXKDYHWRFOHDQLWWRR,FDQ¶WJHWRXWRIWKHPXGE\P\VHOI>«@LW¶V
not a matter of intensity here, but the sensation of a weight, of mud, of something that 
JUDEV\RXUIRRW,¶PDIUDLGRIWKHPXGEHFDXVHLWLVVRVWLFN\WKDWHYHQP\FDSDFLW\WR
imagine collapses.  
 
Professor F comments that it is only thanks to external help that he manages to come 
out of such persistent negative states. It is his wife who helps him to generate an external 
dialogue, which allows him to consider alternative ways of thinking about his feelings: 
 
>'@:KHQ,¶PLQWKHVWLFN\VDGQHVVLW¶VYHU\GLIILFXOWWRFKDQJHWKe way I think. There, 
my wife is of great help. She is the one that pulls me out of such states. Because when 
,¶PIHHOLQJVWLFN\LW¶VZULWWHQDOORYHUP\IDFH6RVKHVWDUWVDVNLQJTXHVWLRQVWhat is 
wrong? why do you feel like this? 6KHGRHVLWXQWLO,¶Pable to come up with an answer. 
$QG VKH DOZD\V DVNV PH IRU WKH RWKHU VLGH«VKH VD\V We have moved forward on 
WKLV«\RXDUHZDONLQJZHOOHQRXJK«LIZHQHHGWRGRPRUHH[HUFLVHZHZLOOGRLW. It is as 
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if she helps me to get out of that place, by putting anotheU LPDJH LQP\PLQG«OLNH
those old machines where you pass slides [slide projectors]. She removes the bad slide 
DQGSXWVLQDJRRGRQH6KHUHPRYHVRQHDQGVD\V«QRZORRNDWWKLVRQH«LQVWHDGRI
using those specs use this ones. So then I start to see that new one. If you ask me if I 
FDQFKDQJHWKHVOLGHE\P\VHOI«,GRQ¶WWKLQNVR 
 
According to Professor F, it is the help provided by his wife, in the form of questions, 
which facilitates the generation of an external dialogue, thus compensating for his inabili ty to 
internally think about what he feels: 
 
 >'@7RDVNPHTXHVWLRQVTXHVWLRQVWKDWXQIROGPH«WKDWDOORZVPHWRUHIOHFWXSRQ
me, to see myself. It is like putting it out there so you can see it as an image. My wife 
asks me: Why are you sad? What happened to you? She asks me questions, and those 
TXHVWLRQVKHOSPHWRSXWZKDW,¶PIHHOLQJRXWDQGWKLQNDERXWLW,WLVDIRUPRISXWWLQJ
P\ KHDG LQ RUGHU 7KHUH LV VRPHWKLQJ FRJQLWLYH WKHUH«WKH IDFW WKDW WKHUH LV DQRWKHU
possible way of arranging the same pieces. And by re-arranging them you can breathe. I 
FDQ¶WGRWKDWE\P\VHOI 
 
Such conversations can be later remembered by Professor F, thus activating internal thoughts:  
 
 [D4] My head works with the memory of these conversations. It is weird. For example 
\HVWHUGD\\RXVSRNHZLWKP\ZLIHDQGWKHQ, WDONHGWRKHUDERXW LW«VRZHGLVFXVVHG
how we could help each other more. With that memory new things appeared in my 
PLQG:KDW , ZDV WHOOLQJ \RX EHIRUH DERXWZRUN«WKDW DSSHDUHGZKHQ ,ZDV LQ WKH
VKRZHUWRGD\«LQ relation to what my wife had been talking with you. I do not know 
how that link was made, but when I woke up it was there, so I kept thinking about it 
 
Even though Professor F has important difficulties modulating how he feels in a 
moment of dysregulation, he reports that he has developed strategies to avoid such situations. 
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7KHVHW\SLFDOO\FRQVLVWRIGHWHFWLQJWKHSUHOLPLQDU\VLJQVRIDSRVVLEOHµPHQWDOEORFNDJH¶VR
that current behaviour can be stopped. He comments on this point: 
 
[D5] There was a second meeting where I really managed the situation. I said to myself 
here, F, you shut your mouth! Stay out of this! I even managed to have a good time, by 
talking and listening to what other people were saying. But there was another meeting 
where there was really a huge discussion, and even though I knew I had to stay away 
from it, I got carried away. But I managed to notice when things were starting to go 
ZURQJ«7KHWXUQLQJSRLQWZDVZKHQ,IHOWP\PRXWKGU\«VR,UHDOL]HG,ZDVHQWHULQJ
LQWRVRPHWKLQJEDG«VRPHWKLQJWXUELG«VR,UHDOL]HG,KDGWRGLVFRQQHFWP\VHOI 
 
Another strategy that he has developed to deal with the mental block, especially during 
interpersonal conflict, is writing. He describes different uses of writing. The first refers to the 
writing of his thoughts after experiencing the mental block, as a form of resuming a 
discussion or argument. The second refers to the organization of his thinking beforehand, so 
that a situation that may potentially generate an episode of mental block can be contained: 
 
[D5] I remember that I had this big argument with my sons. During the argument I felt 
FRQIXVHGDQGFRXOGQ¶WWKLQN6RDIWHUWKDW,ZURWHP\WKRXJKWVDERXWKRZ,IHOWDWWKDW
moment and why I felt so bad. And then I read what I wrote to them. So writing was a 
JRRGVWUDWHJ\EHFDXVHWKHSUREOHPZDVWKDW,FRXOGQ¶WDUJXHSURSHUO\>«@1RZIRUWKH
community meeting I also write my thoughts, when we have to talk about ourselves in 
IURQWRIWKHJURXS,ZULWHP\LGHDVDOOWKHWLPH7KDWKHOSVPH«EHFDXVHLI,have 
ZDQWHGWRVD\WKHPIURPWKHWRSRIP\KHDG«DVRQFH,WULHGWR«JRRGE\H7KDWGRHV
not work. 
 
 
5.2.4.4.2. Thematic map of analysis 
As reported above, two main themes related to emotional change are described by Professor 
F during the interview. The first one is emotional reactivity [see Fig. 2], which refers to an 
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increase in the intensity of experienced positive and negative emotions. This augmentation of 
felt experience is associated by Professor F to a decrease in thinking abilities, particularly his 
capacity to generate ideas. Professor F exemplifies this with the metaphor of having a blank 
mind, or mind without contents. Interestingly, the increased reactivity for positive and 
negative emotions appears to trigger quite different psychological processes and self-states. 
Positive emotions are experienced as an increase in somatic sensations, which becomes the 
focus of contemplation. The self-state generated by this dynamic is one of wellbeing. The 
increase of negative emotions, on the contrary, generates a mental block, which further 
increases negative arousal and dysregulation. The self-state generated by this dynamic is one 
of powerlessness. 
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Fig 2. Emotional Reactivity thematic map. The figure describes the differential impact of thinking impairment 
[blank mind] on the experience of positive [left] and negative [right] emotions. In both cases, thinking 
impairment generates an imbalance between cognition and emotion. Nevertheless, it triggers quite different 
psychological processes, and creates radically opposing self-states.  
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The second main theme described by Professor F is emotion dysregulation and 
regulation [see Fig 3]. It could be considered that this theme is an amplification of the 
dynamics generated by the mental block [dysregulation]. However, it extends beyond that by 
also describing how such states can be modulated. The basic idea here is that the interaction 
of executive impairment and increased emotional reactivity generates a difficulty to use 
WKLQNLQJ DV D WRRO WRPRGXODWH QHJDWLYH HPRWLRQDO VWDWHV 6XFK LQDELOLW\ WR XVH RQH¶V RZQ
PLQG WR WKLQN DERXW RQH¶V RZQ IHHOLQJV LQFUHDVHV HYHn further the negative arousal, thus 
compromising even more the already debilitated executive capacities. In consequence 
Professor F becomes stuck in the negative emotion, a situation that he describes as the sticky 
sadness. Nevertheless, it appears that in such moments of emotional perseveration emotions 
FDQ VWLOO EH UHJXODWHG EXW IURP RXWVLGH 7KLV VHHPV WR EH DFFRPSOLVKHG E\ KLV ZLIH¶V
scaffolding of executive abilities, which promotes reflective capacity and mental flexibility. 
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Fig 3. Emotion  Dysregulation and Regulation thematic map. The figure describes the processes by which 
HPRWLRQLVG\VUHJXODWHGDQGUHJXODWHGXVLQJ3URIHVVRU)¶VH[DPSOHRIWKHµVWLFN\VDGQHVV¶>@,QSHUVRQVZLWK
no brain injury [left] the experience of an intense negative emotion impacts executive functions (EF), which 
demands a further strengthening of executive control, thus down-regulating the negative state [right]. [2] In 
patients with executive impairment, the baseline situation is unbalanced by default: EFs are less efficient and 
emotional reactivity is higher [left]. In consequence, there is a larger impact of negative emotions on EF, thus 
compromising even further its regulatory capacity. The negative emotion, in this case sadness, is therefore 
experienFHGZLWKJUHDWHULQWHQVLW\DQGSHUVLVWHQFHDµVWLFN\VDGQHVV¶>ULJKW@>@7KHHPRWLRQDOVWDWHRISDWLHQWV
with executive impairment can, nevertheless, be modulated externally, by relying on the EF of another. In the 
case of Professor F, such scaffolding process attains the down-regulation of sadness. 
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5.2.5. Discussion  
For many decades neuropsychologists have tried to elucidate the mechanisms that underlie 
emotional change after brain injury. Such a task has not been simple, for a range of important 
theoretical and technical reasons (as discussed in the Introduction). While there have been 
some case reports of non-dysexecutive patients describing their subjective experience of 
change, this study is the first one to portray such transformations in a patient with executive 
impairment, a population that has been often considered as challenging because of deficits in 
reflective capacity. However, Professor F is remarkable in that, partly because of his 
excellent premorbid abilities, and also because of the preservation of some executive 
capacities related to insight [abstraction and working memory], he was able to offer an 
extraordinarily detailed description of his experience of change. The novelty of this account 
is also technical, in that it uses a mixed methodology to evaluate a range of well-known 
emotional processes. 
 
5.2.5.1. What type of dysexecutive patient is Professor F? 
$ILUVWSRLQWWKDWQHHGVWREHFODULILHGLVWKDW3URIHVVRU)¶VSURILOHRIG\VH[HFXWLYHLPSDLUPHQW
is more in the domain of thinking than in the domain of behavioural disinhibition. The three 
major difficulties reported by him during interview were mental slowness, mental inflexibility 
and lack of fluidity [B1, B2, B3]25. This is consistent with his neuropsychological assessment, 
which suggests his main deficits to be: slow information processing [WAIS], mental 
inflexibility [WCST] and difficulties in word generation [D-.()6@,QDGGLWLRQ3URIHVVRU)¶V
description of everyday problems [DEX] emphasized deficits of executive cognition (e.g. 
planning ahead, avoiding distractions, acting without thinking) but not behavioural 
UHJXODWLRQ3URIHVVRU)¶VZLIHRIIHUVIXUWKHUVXSSRUWLQJHYLGHQFHRQWKLVLVVXH6KHUHSRUWVLQ
                                                 
25 7KHFRGHVUHIHUWRWKHLQWHUYLHZ¶VSDUDJUDSKIURPZKHUHLQIRUPDWLRQKDVEHHQWDNHQ 
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the Iowa Scale of Personality Change) modifications on the Executive Dysfunction/ Decision 
0DNLQJ GLPHQVLRQ ¨    EXW DOPRVW QR FKDQJH RQ WKH 'LVWXUEHG 6RFLDO %HKDYLRXU
GLPHQVLRQ¨ 7KHORFDWLRQRI3URIHVVRU)¶VOHVLRQLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKLVGLVWLQFWLRQ
the damage involves the lateral and superior medial surfaces of the left prefrontal cortex, both 
areas commonly  associated with cognitive impairment rather than behavioural impairment 
(Anderson & Tranel, 2002; Eslinger et al., 2013; Tim Shallice, Stuss, Picton, Alexander, & 
Gillingham, 2008; Stuss & Alexander, 2007).  
$QLQWHUHVWLQJIHDWXUHRI3URIHVVRU)¶VSURILOHRIH[HFXWLYHLPSDLUPHQWLVKLVUHODWLYHO\
preserved capacity for abstraction, with scores in the average or above average range 
[Similarities and Matrix Reasoning, WAIS]. It is possible that this preservation of abstraction 
ability, along with his excellent premorbid intellectual capacity, are the elements that allow 
him to offer such an insightful account of his emotional changes. It is also interesting to note 
here that, compared with people without brain injury, Professor F has a significantly lower 
score on the External Oriented Thinking scale [TAS-20], suggesting a highly introspective or 
abstract cognitive style. From a neuroanatomical perspective, a likely explanation is that 
3URIHVVRU)¶VOHVLRQGLGQRW compromise rostral areas of the PFC [e.g. BA 10], known to play 
a key role in abstract forms of cognitive control %DGUH+RIIPDQ&RRQH\	'¶(VSRVLWR
2009; Christoff, Keramatian, Gordon, Smith, & Mädler, 2009; Petrides, 2005). 
 
5.2.5.2. Increased subjective emotional reactivity: The balance between feeling and 
thinking. 
A main emotional change reported by Professor F is the increase in emotional reactivity for 
positive and negative emotions. In his interview Professor F suggested that the accident 
DXJPHQWHGWKHLQWHQVLW\RIµKDSS\¶DQGµVDG¶IHHOLQJV>C1, C2, C3]. This phenomenon is also 
reported by his wife in the Iowa Scale of Personality Change, where she mentions a decrease 
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of blunted DIIHFW ¨  -1). An interesting point here is that, to Professor F, such change is 
FORVHO\UHODWHGWRWKHµLQDELOLW\WRWKLQN¶RUWKHµEODQNPLQG¶>B5]. In other words, Professor 
)¶VSURSRVDOLVWKDWKLVLQDELOLW\WRJHQHUDWHWKRXJKWV±in relation to a felt emotion- modifies 
the intensity level with which such emotion is experienced. This observation is especially 
interesting because is consistent with the idea that emotional changes after dlPFC lesions are 
secondary to the cognitive deficits generated by such damage (Anderson & Tranel, 2002). 
3URIHVVRU)¶VVXEMHFWLYHDFFRXQWPD\RIIHU some preliminary evidence to support such claim.  
One should always be cautious about how to interpret subjective reports; however, Professor 
)¶VGHVFULSWLRQRILQFUHDVHGUHDFWLYLW\LVSURYRFDWLYHEHFDXVHLWPD\DOORZXVWRREVHUYHWKH
interaction between emotion and cognition. It suggests that the somatic aspect of an 
emotional response is influenced by the mental representations originated from such visceral 
states. In other words, when the representational machinery is ineffective [the blank mind], 
somatic states become less constrained and acquire a heightened quality. This is perhaps what 
3URIHVVRU)UHIHUVWRZKHQUHSRUWLQJWKDWKLVHPRWLRQVDUHQRORQJHUµVLOHQFHG¶RUµKLGGHQ¶E\
rationality [A2], or when describing that in moments with no thinking [PRPHQWVRIµVLOHQFH¶@
WKHUHLVµSXUH¶ sensation [B5]. This interpretation of the data is consistent with our increasing 
awareness of a dynamic balance between cognitive control areas [PFC] and emotion 
generation areas [subcortically] (Knight, Staines, Swick, & Chao, 1999; Solms & Panksepp, 
2012; Thayer & Lane, 2000), a balance that can be altered after damage to neocortical 
VWUXFWXUHV >VHH ILJ @ $QRWKHU VRXUFH RI HYLGHQFH WKDW DSSHDUV WR VXSSRUW 3URIHVVRU )¶V
description comes from studies exploring the impact of thinking-about-feelings [or affect 
labelling] in emotional reactivity. Recent work suggest that labelling has a dampening effect 
on both positive and negative emotions (Lieberman, Inagaki, Tabibnia, & Crockett, 2011), 
presumably by inhibiting the activity of subcortical structures in charge of emotion 
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generation (Creswell, Way, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2007; Hariri, Bookheimer, & 
Mazziotta, 2000; Lieberman et al., 2011; Payer, Baicy, Lieberman, & London, 2012). 
3URIHVVRU )¶V HQKDQFHG FDSDFLW\ WR H[SHULHQFH HPRWLRQV WDSV GLUHFWO\ LQWR one of the most 
relevant issues in affective neuroscience today, which is the debate about the role of the 
neocortex in emotional processes. For decades, neuropsychologists have studied patients with 
focal brain lesions to shed light on this matter, investigating whether damage to selective 
cortical areas compromises the capacity to experience discrete emotions. Typical examples of 
this approach have been studies on hemispheric laterality and the processing of positive and 
negative emotions (Borod et al., 2010; Demaree, Everhart, Youngstrom, & Harrison, 2005; 
Shenal, Harrison, & Demaree, 2003), as well the recognition of disgust and the insula 
(Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young, 2000). This opinion has also been supported by a 
range of physiological studies (Craig, 2010; Craig, 2008; Craig, 2009; Davidson & Irwin, 
1999; Davidson, 1992a, 1992b, 1998). The main idea of this approach is that damage to the 
neocortex impairs the processing of emotion, a view that has been often interpreted as 
compromising the experience of emotions.  
This approach to the problem has recently been challenged by case studies reporting 
that emotional experience is largely preserved after cortical damage (Turnbull, Evans, & 
Owen, 2004, Damasio, Damasio, & Tranel, 2012; Feinstein et al., 2010), and also after 
cortical atrophy (Merker, 2007). Indeed, even patients with bilateral lesions to subcortical 
structures [amygdala] traditionally assumed to participate in emotion generation [fear] still 
appear to experience such emotions in specific contexts [survival threat] (Feinstein et al., 
2013). Instead, it has been argued that emotion is generated not by cortical areas, but rather 
by deep subcortical structures, with the neocortex playing its principal role in emotion 
regulation (Damasio et al., 2000; Holstege et al., 2003; Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Panksepp, 
1998, 2011).  
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,I 3URIHVVRU )¶V HPRWLRQDO FKDQJH FDQQRW EH FKDUDFWHUL]HG DV DQ LQDELOLW\ WR
experience an emotion, it remains to be answered how such change might be defined. An 
alternative approach is to suggest that cortical injuries do not compromise the capacity to 
experience emotions, but they may alter the dynamics of such experience. Emotions 
dynamics have typically defined as the response parameters that modify the quality [the 
magnitude and temporal features] of emotional behaviour: such as intensity, range, lability, 
latency, rise time, recovery or persistence (Thompson, 1991). In the case of Professor F, for 
example, it appears that his executive impairment produces ±indirectly mediated by 
cognition- a change the intensity [increased in magnitude] and recovery time [e.g. sticky 
sadness]. The perspective of emotion dynamics offers the possibility to disentangle the role of 
different cortical areas, offering a window into the ways in which the dynamic landscape of 
the emotional response may change. 
 
5.2.6.3. Emotion dysregulation, reappraisal impairment and neurologically induced 
rumination 
Another emotional change reported by Professor F is his difficulty in self-regulating negative 
emotions, particularly sadness, by the use of thinking. He describes that the increased 
intensity of negative emotions impacts his capacity to react to them [C3]. In such moments, 
3URIHVVRU)FRPPHQWVKHH[SHULHQFHVDµPHQWDOEORFN¶ZKHUHµLWLVDUHDOVWUXJJOHWRWKLQN¶
[C5]. This mental state should be viewed not merely as a cognitive block, given that it is [in 
his account] also a mixture of felt emotion, unpleasant physical sensations and fatigue [C5]. 
When in this state he remains able to recognize what he is feeling [D1, I know it is ok to feel 
sad]. However, his ability to understand the cause of this feeling seems beyond his grasp 
[C4]. The final consequence of this dysregulatory process is that the initial emotion is 
experienced more intensely and persistently [D1, this is like a sticky sadness, which makes me 
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feel sadder than I should], together with the fact that he is unable to get out of such states 
without external assistance [D1, ,¶PDIUDLGRI WKHPXGEHFDXVH LW LVVRVWLFN\ WKDWHYHQP\
capacity to imagine collapses]. 
The idea that thinking helps people to modulate how they feel has history (Freud, 
1946; Freud, 1964[1910]; Janet, 1909). During the last decade there has been a substantial 
research effort on the topic. Studies have particularly focused on how people regulate their 
emotions, especially by changing the way they think about negative events, a capacity often 
described as cognitive change or reappraisal (Gross & Thompson, 2007; McRae, Ochsner, & 
Gross, 2011; Ochsner & Gross, 2004)  ,WLVLQWHUHVWLQJWRFRQVLGHU3URIHVVRU)¶VUHJXODWRU\
LPSDLUPHQW IURP WKLV SHUVSHFWLYH LQ RWKHU ZRUGV WR YLHZ KLV µLQDELOLW\ WR WKLQN¶ DV D
difficulty generating, and shifting to, more positive reinterpretations. This explanation seems 
supported by tKHIDFWWKDW3URIHVVRU)¶VWZRPDLQH[HFXWLYHGHILFLWV>IOXHQF\DQGVHWVKLIWLQJ@
have been described as key components of reappraisal ability (Mcrae et al., 2011). 
)XUWKHUPRUH3URIHVVRU)¶VVFRUHRQWKHUHDSSUDLVDOVFDOHRIWKH(54(Gross & John, 2003) is 
relatively low [p = .09], suggesting that he uses cognitive change less frequently than people 
ZLWKQREUDLQ LQMXU\&RQVLVWHQWZLWK WKLV3URIHVVRU)¶V OHVLRQHQFRPSDVVHV WKHKLJKRUGHU
language and cognitive control areas in the left PFC that are commonly recruited during 
neuroimaging studies on reappraisal (Goldin et al., 2008a; Green & Malhi, 2006; Kalisch, 
2009; Kim et al., 2011; Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Ochsner et al., 
2004, 2002; Vanderhasselt et al., 2012).  
3URIHVVRU)¶VVHOI-regulatory impairment can be further understood if we consider his 
HPRWLRQDO H[SHULHQFH GXULQJ WKH µPHQWDO EORFN¶ DV D neurologically-induced ruminative 
process. A phenomenon reminiscent of the rumination of some psychiatric patients, Professor 
F remains focused on the negative emotions in a repetitive and passive way, staying 
somehow fixed on the feelings states, and unable to do anything about them (Nolen-
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Hoeksema, 1991). Professor F and such ruminative patients are alike, in that both present 
with an inflexible cognitive style that interferes with active problem solving (Nolen-
Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Thus, both are unable to disengage from affective 
states (Genet, Malooly, & Siemer, 2012; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Watkins, 2008), which 
leads to the prolonged activation of negative content in working memory (Genet et al., 2012) 
and the exacerbation of negative affect (Joormann & Siemer, 2011).  
There is, however, an important distinction between such ruminative patients and 
Professor F. Psychiatric patients exhibiting rumination are often rather productive in 
generating repetitive [negative] thoughts (Genet et al., 2012), while Professor F generates 
considerably less contents [the blank mind]. This distinction is  interesting in the view that 
ruminative thoughts in psychiatric patients tend to dwell on the causes and consequences of 
current feelings (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), a mental state that Professor F reports as 
highly taxing to generate [C4, I enter into something dark without knowing why, then is when 
the confusion appears]. A possible result of his not being able to think about causes and 
consequences, when in such a state, may well be the impossibility of attributing meaning to 
negative experience [C4, I don¶WNQRZZK\, IHHOVDG], thus adding further to his confusion 
and distress.  
 
5.2.5.4. Emotion dysregulation and emotional symptomatology  
There is substantial evidence suggesting that emotion dysregulation lies at the core of a range 
of psychopathological symptoms (for reviews see Kring & Sloan, 2010; Kring, 2010; Werner 
& Gross, 2010). In consHTXHQFH LW LV LQWHUHVWLQJ WR FRQVLGHUZKHWKHU RU QRW 3URIHVVRU )¶V
regulatory difficulties are related to the presence of emotional symptomatology. Data from 
his emotional assessment [HADS] suggests that he does not present with clinically significant 
levels of anxiety [score = 4] or depression [score = 1]. However, in relation to anxiety, he 
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GRHV UHSRUWV VRPH V\PSWRPV VXFK DV IHHOLQJ WHQVH µIURP WLPH WR WLPH¶ H[SHULHQFLQJ
ZRUU\LQJ WKRXJKWV µD ORW RI WKH WLPH¶ DQG KDYLQJ µPLOG GLIILFXOWLHV¶ LQ UHOD[LQJ As for 
GHSUHVVLRQKHPHUHO\UHSRUWVWKDWKHGRHVQRWHQMR\H[SHULHQFHVµTXLWHDVPXFK¶DVKHXVHG
to do.  
3URIHVVRU )¶V VHOI-UHSRUW LV HVSHFLDOO\ LQWHUHVWLQJ ZKHQ FRQWUDVWHG ZLWK KLV ZLIH¶V
assessment of his personality change [ISPC]. She does suggest an increase in 
symptomatology. From her perspective, the personality dimension with the highest score was 
a moderate change on Emotional Distress ¨ ZKLFKPHDVXUHVWKHSUHVHQFHRIQHJDWLYH
emotionality (Barrash et al., 2011). Interestingly, and following a similar trend to the anxiety 
symptoms reported by him on WKH+$'63URIHVVRU)¶VZLIHUDWHGKLPZLWKmoderate levels 
of change in anxiety related items [Anxiety ¨ Vulnerability to Pressure ¨ @DQG
mild levels of change in depression related items [Depression ¨  @7KLV DUH RI FRXUVH
self-report measures, should be treated with caution. However, it seems clear that there 
appears to be some inconsistency between the reports of Professor F and his wife on 
measures of emotional symptomatology.  
7KH LQFUHDVH LQ DQ[LHW\ UHSRUWHG E\ 3URIHVVRU )¶VZLIH, is consistent with his own 
description of the emotional experience associated to his executive impairment. His inability 
to think, the mental block, is often accompanied by substantial levels of anxiety, which makes 
him vulnerable in cognitively demanding situations [&:KHQ , IHHO QHUYRXV«LV DQ XJO\
VHQVDWLRQ WKDW RQH RI EHLQJ VXGGHQO\ SHUSOH[HG«RI IHHOLQJ UHDOO\ XQHDV\ DERXW D VLWXDWLRQ
WKDW \RX FDQ¶W FRQWURO VRPHWKLQJ \RX FDQ¶W UHDFW WR]. This suggests that the impaired 
executive function is the cause of the change in emotional state. Of course the direction of 
causality may be reversed, with anxiety serving as a cause of the mental block. Notably, 
however, when the executive impairment can be resolved by compensation [by the action of 
an external agent] this immediately results in a reduction in anxiety [see section below on 
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intrinsic and extrinsic emotion regulation strategies]. This description is also in line with 
evidence suggesting a regulatory role of executive functions in the production and 
management of anxiety (Olssøn et al., 2005). In addition, it is interesting to note that 
3URIHVVRU)¶VDQ[LRXVUHDFWLRQLVTXLWHVLPLODUWRWKHORQJUHFRJQL]HGµFDWDVWURSKLF¶UHDFWLRQ
as an emotional response of anxiety and confusion experienced by people with brain injury, 
when they fail to use their cognitive resources to respond to environmental demands 
(Hendrawan, Yamakawa, Kimura, Murakami, & Ohira, 2012; Vytal, Cornwell, Arkin, & 
Grillon, 2012).  
According to both, Professor F and his wife, his depressive symptoms are not as 
disruptive as anxiety symptoms. However, the emotion that Professor F reports as most 
difficult to regulate is sadness [D1 µVWLFN\VDGQHVV¶@ ,W LV LQWHUHVWLQJ WKDWZKLOH3URIHVVRU)
struggles to self-regulate sad events, such episodes do not escalate to a fully fledge 
GHSUHVVLRQ:K\WKLVPLJKWEH")LUVWO\3URIHVVRU)¶VSUHPRUELGSHUVRQDOLW\PD\RSHUDWHDVD
protective factor, somehow buffering the impact of emotion dysregulation after brain injury. 
This seems probable, given that well established that pre-morbid personality is a key element 
in socio-emotional adjustment after brain injury (Aben, 2002; Greenop, Almeida, Hankey, 
Van Bockxmeer, & Lautenschlager, 2009; Storor & Byrne, 2006).  
6HFRQGO\DVLWZLOOEHGLVFXVVHGEHORZ3URIHVVRU)¶VG\VUHJXODWRU\HSLVRGHVDUHRIWHQ
externally modulated by his wife, thus limiting their time length and impact. This observation 
is consistent with a range of evidence suggesting that the availability of a supporting 
environment is crucial in facilitating emotional adjustment (Hammond et al., 2012; Sady et 
al., 2010; Schönberger, Ponsford, Olver, & Ponsford, 2010) 
7KLUGO\3URIHVVRU)¶VHPRWLRQDOFKDQJHVDUHQRWUHVWULFWHGWRWKHLQFUHDVe of negative 
emotions, and its dysregulatory impact, but they also extend to the amplification of positive 
emotions [C1]. This is interesting in view of a literature suggesting that the experience of 
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positive emotions buffers, and even undoes, the impact of negative affect (Fredrickson & 
Levenson, 1998; Fredrickson, Mancuso, Branigan, & Tugade, 2000). In other words, 
3URIHVVRU)¶VLQFUHDVHGUHDFWLYLW\WRSRVLWLYHHPRWLRQVPD\DFWDVDUHJXODWRU\LQIOXHQFH 
Finally, it is important to consider that the frequency of emotion dysregulation episodes also 
depends on the success of coping strategies. Professor F offer several examples of using 
avoidant coping strategies to control the possible impact of challenging situations [D5, I say 
to myself here, F, you shut your mouth! Stay out of this!]. This is consistent with evidence 
suggesting that avoidant coping is a common strategy among brain injured patients (Krpan, 
Levine, Stuss, & Dawson, 2007; Krpan, Stuss, & Anderson, 2011a, 2011b).  Notably, such 
strategies, despite reducing the range of interaction with the environment, appear to enhance 
WKH SDWLHQW¶V FDSDFLW\ WR UHDFW WR LW (Goldstein, 1995; Hanfmann, Rickers-Ovsiankina, & 
Goldstein, 1944; Krpan et al., 2011b; Riley, Brennan, & Powell, 2004; Salas, 2012). 
 
5.2.6.5. Intrinsic and extrinsic ER strategies: The use of social speech and antecedent-
focused ER strategies. 
Professor F is a remarkable example of how both intrinsic and extrinsic forms of emotion 
regulation are functionally related (Gross & Thompson, 2007). A clear example of this is that, 
when intrinsic ER is not possible, Professor F defaults to interpersonal regulatory strategies 
[D2]. These might be classified as taking the form of affective and cognitive engagement 
(Niven, Totterdell, & Holman, 2009). Niven and colleagues (2009) define affective 
HQJDJHPHQWDVWKHHIIRUWVGLUHFWHGWRWU\WRLPSURYHWKHZD\WKHµWDUJHWLQGLYLGXDO¶>3URIHVVRU
F] feels aboXW D VLWXDWLRQ7ZRH[DPSOHV RI WKHVH VWUDWHJLHVPLJKW EH3URIHVVRU)¶VZLIH¶V
approach of active listening [D2, So she starts asking questions? Why do you feel like this?], 
and her positive attitude emphasising his achievements [D2, we have moved forward on 
WKLV«\RX DUH ZDONLQJ ZHOO HQRXJK]. Cognitive engagement, on the other hand, is usually 
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GHILQHGDVWKHHIIRUWVWRFKDQJHWKHZD\WKHµWDUJHWLQGLYLGXDO¶SHUVRQWKLQNVDERXWDVLWXDWLRQ
(Niven et al., 2009) 7KLV FDQ EH REVHUYHG LQ 3URIHVVRU )¶V ZLIH¶V DWWHPSWV WR JHQHUDWH
positive reinterpretations of negative events [D2, And she always asks me for the other side]. 
From a neuropsychological point of view it is interesting to consider the relationship 
EHWZHHQ 3URIHVVRU )¶V H[HFXWLYH GHILFLWV DQG KLV ZLIH¶V UHJXODWRU\ LQWHUYHQWLRQV $ EHWWHU
insight into how these processes are linked might shed some light on the mechanisms by 
which intrinsic regulation failure is compensated by extrinsic regulation.  
According to Professor F the first step in the extrinsic regulatory process is when his 
wife starts asking questions to understand what is going on [D2, What is wrong? Why do you 
feel like this? 6KHGRHVLWXQWLO,¶PDEOHWRFRPHXSZLWKDQDQVZHU]. Such basic questioning 
allows him to generate a rudimentary schema, from which more complex meaning can be 
built [I am feeling X because of Y]. The questions offered by his wife facilitate the generation 
of ideas, thus re-activating a reflective process that was frozen because of executive 
impairment [D3, To DVNPH TXHVWLRQV TXHVWLRQV WKDW XQIROGPH«WKDW DOORZPH WR UHIOHFW
upon me, to see myself@7KHXVHRIVXFKTXHVWLRQVDVDIRUPRIµEUHDNLQJGRZQWKHVWLPXOL¶
or to clarify a narrative, has been described before by Luria, when discussing the restoration 
of active thinking after brain injury (Luria, 1963[1948] p. 213). An alternative, and probably 
complementary, way of understanding this point is that questioning allows some form of 
detachment from immediate experience [D3, questions that allow me to see myself]. There is 
some evidence supporting this interpretation. For example it has been shown that questioning 
[in the form of prompting] dramatically improves the performance of concrete patients who 
struggle to detach from emotional stimuli (Salas, Gross, Rafal, Vinas-Guasch, & Turnbull, 
2013). It has been also suggested, in neuroimaging studies, that the self-referential talk 
generated by questioning, activates the same brain areas that are lesioned areas in Professor F 
(Geva et al., 2011; Jones, 2009; Morin & Hamper, 2012).  
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Another particularity of the extrinsic regulatory process in which Professor F and his 
wife engage is that it occurs externally in the space between the two mind/brains [D3, It is 
like putting it out there so you can see it as an image. She asks me questions, and those 
TXHVWLRQVKHOSPH WRSXWZKDW ,¶PIHHOLQJRXW and think about it]. Professor F needs to say 
aloud what he thinks, or to hear it from his wife, as a way of perceiving [hearing] himself. 
This is a well- established neuropsychological concept. The externalization of internal speech 
was extensively described by Luria, principally as an strategy that facilitates the regulation of 
behaviour in patients with left PFC lesions (Luria, 1959, 1966 pp. 250-265). Recently, it has 
been suggested that externalizing voiced thoughts, or thinking aloud, may function as a 
cognitive tool that engages with internal dialogue, thus facilitating problem solving (Rees & 
Skidmore, 2011). In sum, it can be argued that a core part of the extrinsic regulatory process 
used by Professor F is based on the use of early evolutionary forms of thinking, which are 
both social and inter-mental (/HRQW¶HY/XULD>@.  
3URIHVVRU )¶V GLDORJXH ZLWK KLV ZLIH DOVR DSSHDUV WR FRPSHQVDWH IRU H[HFXWLYH
impairment by organizing his thinking, and facilitating the mental manipulation of 
information [D3, It is a form of putting my head in order. There is something cognitive 
WKHUH«WKHIDFWWKDWWKHUHLVDQRWKHUSRVVLEOHZD\RIDUUDQJLQJWKHVDPHSLHFHV]. Such a new 
arrangement suggests the inhibition of current negative appraisals, and the change of 
attentional focus towards more positive mental representations [D3, It is as if she helps me to 
get out of that place, by putting another image in my mind. She removes the bad slide and 
puts in a good one@,QFRQVHTXHQFH LWFDQEHDUJXHGWKDW3URIHVVRU)¶VZLIHVFDIIROGVWZR
basic executive processes that are compromised in him: set shifting and fluency. These 
observations are consistent with a range of clinical and experimental data suggesting that 
cognitive impairment can be modulated by interpersonal and contextual influence (Bowen, 
Yeates, & Palmer, 2010; Freed, 2002; Salas, 2008, 2009, 2012; Ylvisaker & Feeney, 1998).  
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$ SRLQW WKDW UHPDLQV WR EH GLVFXVVHG LV WKH ORQJ WHUP LQIOXHQFH RI 3URIHVVRU )¶V ZLIH
interventions. In other words, do these new mental structures, which are conjointly 
constructed, persist in time? Or more simply put, does this extrinsic regulation process 
become intrinsic? Professor F does report some form of internalization, described by him as 
remembering conversations [D4, My head works with the memory of these conversations. It is 
ZHLUG)RUH[DPSOH\HVWHUGD\\RXVSRNHZLWKP\ZLIHDQGWKHQ,WDONHGWRKHUDERXWLW«VRZH
discussed how we could help each other more. With that memory new things appeared in my 
mind]. However, such recollection does not appear to be voluntarily guided, because mental 
representations appear rather unexpectedly [D4, what I was telling you before, about 
ZRUN«WKDWDSSHDUHGZKHQ,ZDVLQWKHVKRZHUWRGD\«LQUHODWLRQWRZKDWP\ZLIHKDd been 
talking with you. I do not know how that link was made, but when I woke up it was there, so I 
kept thinking about it]. This phenomenon may be related to his difficulties freely retrieving 
information. In sum, it appears that Professor F does internalize, at some level, the episodes 
of extrinsic regulation, which he can access to, more or less voluntarily. However, the 
question of how such schemas are triggered still remains to be answered. It is possible that 
such encoded mental schemas may be more easily activated by emotionally relevant stimuli, 
as it has been suggested by Ylvisaker and Feeney (2000) when describing the advantages of 
implicational coding after brain injury.   
2QH ODVW REVHUYDWLRQ QHHGV WR EHPDGH UHJDUGLQJ 3URIHVVRU )¶V LQWULQVLF UHgulatory 
capacities. Even though he struggles to manage dysregulation events on the spot, he has 
developed a series of alternative strategies. As mentioned before, he has learnt to deal with 
situations that typically trigger catastrophic reactions by completely avoiding them, or by 
changing his behaviour when it is leading to dysregulation [D5, There was a second meeting 
where I really managed the situation. I said to myself here, F, you shut your mouth! Stay out 
of this!] . This is interesting in that avoiding situations resemble an ER strategy known as 
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situation selection, while changing behaviour to alter the emotional trajectory of a situation is 
often defined as situation modification (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Werner & Gross, 2010). It 
is possible that, because he is not able to use cognitive resources optimally during moments 
of negative arousal, Professor F has enhanced the use of antecedent-focused ER strategies, 
which are implemented before the emotional response is triggered (Gross & Muñoz, 1995).   
Another important strategy developed by Professor F to cope with dysregulation is writing. 
He describes to use writing as a form of organizing his ideas before attending to a situation 
where he has to express himself, thus preventing the collapse of his executive abilities by 
having to think on the spot [D5, Now, for the community meeting I also write my 
WKRXJKWV«7KDWKHOSVPH«EHFDXVHLI,KDYHZDQWHGWRVD\WKHPIURPWKHWRSRIP\KHDG«DV
RQFH,WULHGWR«JRRGE\H7KDWGRHVQRWZRUN@ He also uses writing as a form of organizing 
his thoughts after a dysregulation episode, as a way of re-gaining, a posteriori, some form of 
control of the situation. This is particularly important when a core aspect of his identity is 
threatened [D5, I remember that I had this big argument with my sons. During the argument I 
IHOW FRQIXVHGDQGFRXOGQ¶W WKLQN6RDIWHU WKDW ,ZURWHP\ WKRXJKWVDERXWKRZ , IHOWDW WKDW
moment and why I felt so bad. And then I read what I wrote to them]. The mechanisms that 
underlie the efficacy of using writing as a strategy to restore thinking remain to be explained. 
However, it has been described before that writing may compensate for impairments in the 
µIORZRIWKRXJKW¶E\DOORZLQJSDWLHQWVWRIUDJPHQWWKHQDUUDWLYHWKH\KDYHLQWKHLUKHDGVDQG
re-arrange their components through visual control (Luria, 1963[1948], pp. 217-218). 
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5.2.6. Conclusions 
Case studies are a well-established methodology in neurology (see Neurocase Journal),  
neuropsychology (Andrewes, 2001; Funnell, 2000; Humphreys, 1999; Ogden, 1996; Parkin, 
1997) and neuropsychological rehabilitation (Wilson, 1999) . However, few case studies have 
considered the topic of emotional change after brain injury (Damasio, 1994; Kaplan & Solms, 
2000). This methodology is particularly suited to address such area of research, for it allows 
the simultaneous consideration of subjective and objective aspects of complex psychological 
processes (Turnbull & Solms, 2004). The articulation of these two dimensions has been a 
recurrent technical issue in the field (Mauss et al., 2005). 
This paper has tried to show the potential of the case study approach to explore 
emotional changes in a man [Professor F], who became dysexecutive after a left fronto-
parietal lesion. A remarkable feature of Professor F was that, despite exhibiting important set 
shifting and fluency problems, his abstract ability remained largely preserved, thus allowing 
him to offer a detailed account of his emotional changes. The use of a mixed methodology, 
which combines qualitative [subjective] and quantitative [objective] sources of information, 
appears to be particularly promising in the study of high functioning dysexecutive patients 
like Professor F.  
The data gathered by this study suggests that dysexecutive impairment not only 
compromises cognitive capacities, but may also have an impact on several emotional 
processes, such as emotion reactivity and emotion regulation. These findings are consistent 
with a literature proposing that executive functions have a role in emotional reactivity 
(Ochsner et al., 2009), and are central to emotion regulation (Barkley, 2001; Hofmann et al., 
2012). The results offered by this study need, however, to be considered with caution, for 
they are based in data obtained from one single subject. It will be necessary to gather data 
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from other patients, or group of patients, with similar lesions and neuropsychological 
profiles, in order to determine whether the same pattern of emotional change is observed.  
It has been widely suggested that self-regulatory deficits are a core feature of the 
dysexecutive syndrome (Eslinger et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 1996). However, there is little 
HYLGHQFHRQWKHPHFKDQLVPVWKDWXQGHUOLHVXFKGLIILFXOWLHV3URIHVVRU)¶VDccount is unique in 
that it describes how impairment to specific neuropsychological processes [e.g. verbal 
fluency], compromise the use of some emotion regulation strategies [e.g. reappraisal] but not 
others [e.g. situation selection]. Thus, this article contributes to a small, but emergent, 
literature exploring the neuropsychological basis of emotion regulation processes (Beer & 
Lombardo, 2007; Salas et al., 2013; Salas, Gross, & Turnbull, submitted).  
In the last decade, the field of neuropsychological rehabilitation has become more 
interested in socio-emotional functioning and participation problems after brain injury 
(Bowen et al., 2009; Mateer, Sira, &  O`Connell, 2005; McGrath, 2004; Wilson, 1997, 2008; 
Wilson, Gracey, Evans, & Bateman, 2010) 7KLV µUHODWLRQDO WXUQ¶ LQ QHXURSV\FKRORJLFDO
rehabilitation (Bowen et al., 2010) has generated some interest on the socio-emotional, and 
interpersonal consequences, of having a dysexecutive syndrome (Godfrey & Shum, 2000; 
Rochat, Ammann, Annoni, & Linden, 2009; Yeates et al., 2008) 3URIHVVRU )¶V FDVH
contributes to such a literature in several ways. Firstly, it offers evidence to support the idea 
that emotional change after dorsolateral PFC damage is closely related to the underlying 
cognitive impairments generated by such lesions (Anderson & Tranel, 2002). Secondly, it 
offers preliminary data to understand the mechanisms by which intrapersonal emotion 
G\VUHJXODWLRQ LV FRPSHQVDWHG WKURXJK WKH XVH RI DQRWKHU SHUVRQ¶V H[HFXWLYH FDSDFLWLHV
[extrinsic regulation]. Even though this is a well-recognized clinical phenomenon, the use of 
RWKHU SHRSOH¶V PLQGV WR FRPSHQVDWH IRU FRJQLWLYH DQG HPRWLRQDO LPSDLUPHQW KDV UHFHLYHG
little attention (Freed, 2002; Salas, 2008, 2012; Yeates, 2009). This case study emphasizes 
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WKHQHHGWRIXUWKHUH[SORUHKRZWKHµLQWHU-PHQWDOVSDFH¶/HRQW¶HY/XULD>@ 
is used by brain injury survivors to regain cognitive reintegration and affective balance. Such 
an approach is in line with a growing neuroscientific interest in how cognitive and affective 
processes emerge from brain to brain coupling (Hasson, Ghazanfar, Galantucci, Garrod, & 
Keysers, 2012; Konvalinka & Roepstorff, 2012). 
 
 320 
 
 321 
 
Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
6. Discussion  
 
322 
 
  
6. Discussion  
 
323 
 
The main goal of this thesis was to bridge the theoretical and experimental gaps between 
the fields of emotion regulation [ER] and neuropsychology, particularly neuropsychological 
rehabilitation. The relevance of such an enterprise is justified by the surprising lack of dialogue 
between these two fields, despite the exponential scientific growth of ER research in the last 
decade, and the well-recognized presence of ER problems after brain injury. Because the 
intersection of these two disciplines is so complex [as outlined in the introduction], this thesis 
has adopted a multilevel approach, considering several experimental designs [group and single 
case studies] and methodologies [quantitative and qualitative].  
Despite the variety of topics treated in this thesis, there is one common thread that crosses 
almost every chapter, which is a clinical interest in understanding how brain injury modifies 
SHRSOH¶VFDSDFLW\WRUHJXODWHHPRWLRQ6XFKDSHUVSHFWLYHLVKHDYLO\LQIOXHQFHGE\WKHIDFW WKDW
the author of this thesis is not at core an experimental psychologist, but a clinical 
neuropsychologist and psychotherapist. In consequence, this background infuses these articles, 
and can be observed in the constant interest to capture the subjective experience of emotional 
changes, the impact of such changes on relationships, and the acknowledgement that 
experimental settings are limited in recreating the complexities of emotional life. This clinical 
interest can also be perceived in seeking to identify the therapeutic value of the new acquired 
knowledge: what is the relevance of this new finding for neuropsychological rehabilitation? How 
GRHV WKLVFKDQJH WKHZD\ WKDW UHKDELOLWDWLRQSURIHVVLRQDOVXQGHUVWDQGSDWLHQWV¶SUREOHPV"+RZ
does this data modify the way we offer treatment to patients?  
In this closing section, the main findings of this thesis will be discussed. Firstly, the 
contribution of this work to the existing literature on ER and brain injury will be addressed. 
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Then, novel findings will be described in more detail. Finally, the limitations of these studies will 
be identified, as well as suggestions for future research on the topic. 
 
6.1. A reappraisal of what is known. 
Since the early case description of Phineas Gage, changes in emotion regulation have been 
associated with brain injury (Harlow, 1848, 1868; Macmillan, 2000). However, only recently, a 
handful of articles has offered supporting scientific evidence for this relationship (e.g. 
McDonald, Hunt, Henry, Dimoska, & Bornhofen, 2010; Obonsawin et al., 2007; Rochat, 
Ammann, Annoni, & Linden, 2009; Tate, 1999). An important limitation of this emergent 
literature has been the absence of a comprehensive theoretical framework to explain such 
impairments. This thesis has addressed this gap in two general ways. Firstly, it brings together 
the fields of ER and neuropsychology, by using a well-NQRZQ WKHRUHWLFDO IUDPHZRUN >*URVV¶V
Process Model, Gross & Thompson, 2007], and also by importing widely used ER paradigms to 
study brain injured patients. Secondly, and most importantly, data from this thesis supports the 
clinical assumption that individuals with acquired brain injury are particularly vulnerable to 
experience episodes of emotion dysregulation (Salas, 2012). For example, people with acquired 
brain injury are slower to re-interpret negative events, and appear to struggle inhibiting the 
expression of strong emotions [see below Novel Findings]. 
In addition, data from this thesis also support neuroimaging and behavioural studies 
proposing that ER depends on a set of cognitive control processes, commonly regarded as 
relating to frontal lobe functioning (Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Ochsner et 
al., 2004; Quirk & Beer, 2006; Zelazo & Cunningham, 2007). This thesis offers the first set of 
data to confirm a long assumed relationship between inhibition, verbal ability [fluency] and 
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reappraisal generation [see chapter 4.2], as well as between inhibition and suppression [see 
chapter 4.1]. Thus, evidence from patients with brain damage appears to complement 
behavioural studies on neurologically intact individuals (Gyurak et al., 2009; Gyurak, Goodkind, 
Kramer, Bruce, & Levenson, 2012; Mcrae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 2011; Schmeichel & 
Demaree, 2010), by allowing the exploration of how specific deficits [e.g. inhibition] are 
associated with the impairment of ER strategies. These findings suggest that, despite recent 
criticisms to the value of lesion methods in a neuroimaging era (Rorden & Karnath, 2004, for a 
review), the study of patients with acquired brain damage is an important complement to  
neuroimaging and behavioural approaches. Such a convergence of methods is a central tenant of 
modern cognitive neuroscience (Gonsalves & Cohen, 2010).  
Finally, this thesis also offers substantial support for the commonly accepted idea that 
emotion dysregulation in people with brain injury can be externally modulated, by manipulating 
context demands, or by offering cognitive and emotional support (Bowen, Yeates, & Palmer, 
2010; Freed, 2002; Goldstein, 1995). The case studies described in chapter 5 are notable 
examples of this, describing in detail how intrinsic and extrinsic forms of ER are functionally 
related (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Niven, Totterdell, & Holman, 2009). This data is consistent 
with authors that have stressed the necessity of including an attachment viewpoint on brain 
injury rehabilitation (Salas, 2012; Wilson et al., 2010), as well as considering the value of the 
working alliance between patients and teams (Klonoff, 2011; Lustig, Strauser, Weems, Donnell, 
& Smith, 2003; Schönberger, Humle, & Teasdale, 2006).  
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6.2. Novel Findings. 
This thesis has contributed to the literature on ER and brain injury in several domains. In this 
section, novel findings, and their implications, will be discussed.  
 
6.2.1. Mood induction and ER.  Emotion induction is a key methodological problem for 
any researcher interested in ER (Coan & Allen, 2007). The reason is that in order to regulate 
emotion, an emotional response needs to be adequately triggered. This issue is especially 
relevant when experimental subjects can be impaired in triggering emotional reactions based 
RQ HPRWLRQDO VWLPXOL WKH SKHQRPHQRQ FRPPRQO\ UHIHUUHG WR DV µHPRWLRQ UHDFWLYLW\¶
problems. The first methodological article of this thesis (Salas, Radovic, & Turnbull, 2011, 
section 3.1.) compared the effectiveness of an internal [autobiographical recall] and an 
external [movie clips] mood induction procedure, across four basic emotions [fear, joy, anger, 
sadness], on a student population sample. It was found that both procedures were equally 
effective triggering the target emotions. However, the internal one generated considerably 
higher levels of felt emotion. This is the first study to systematically compare two commonly 
used mood induction procedures across four basic emotions, offering valuable information a 
sound methodological base for the design of emotional assessment protocols. 
In a related experiment [section 3.2] the same two mood induction procedures where 
used to elicit a positive [joy] and negative [sadness] emotion, on a sample of people with 
unilateral right hemisphere [RH] lesions and healthy adult controls. Interestingly, similar 
results were found; the internal procedure generated higher levels of emotional intensity, in 
both emotions. Furthermore, this finding was observed in the healthy controls and also in the 
group with RH lesions. Taken together with the results reported above, these two articles 
contribute to the literature on emotion elicitation, by concluding that the higher intensity 
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generated by the internal mood induction procedure is independent of age [with the same 
phenomenon is observed in young and older samples]. 
 
6.2.2. Emotional Reactivity. As commented above, emotional reactivity is a key issue when 
studying ER after brain injury. This thesis contributes to the literature with two novel 
findings on this topic. Firstly, and related to the emotion elicitation experiment described in 
the previous section, it suggests that individuals with unilateral RH lesions present a 
preserved capacity to experience positive and negative emotions [when measured by self-
report]. These data extend previous findings by Turnbull et al. (2004), which described the 
case of a man with a large right hemisphere lesion who was able to experience positive and 
negative emotions. These data are specially interesting because it challenges behavioural and 
physiological reports suggesting that individuals with RH damage are hypo-reactive to 
emotional stimuli (e.g. Heilman, Schwartz, & Watson, 1978; Morrow, Vrtunski, Kim, & 
Boller, 1981). In addition, this finding contributes with important information to the debate 
on the role of the cortex in the generation of emotion (Panksepp, 1998, 2011), by supporting 
the view that emotional experience is largely preserved after cortical damage (Damasio, 
Damasio, & Tranel, 2012; Feinstein et al., 2010) and even cortical atrophy (Merker, 2007). 
A second contribution of this thesis relates to the role of the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex in emotional reactivity. It has been suggested that emotional changes after dorsolateral 
lesions are secondary to the cognitive deficits generated by damage to such areas (Anderson 
& Tranel, 2002). However, until today, such a claim had never been supported by robust 
evidence. The case study presented in section 5.2 (Salas, Radovic, Yuen, & Turnbull, in 
preparation) offers great insight on this matter, for it describes how impairment in thought 
generation is related to an increase in emotional reactivity for positive and negative emotions. 
This finding appears to suggest that damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex does not 
6. Discussion 
328 
 
compromise emotion generation in itself, but instead causes a change in emotion regulation, 
by heightening emotional experience and compromising the capacity to think about it. 
 
6.2.3. Brain Injury and Emotion Regulation: Evidence to support the impact of brain 
injury on ER abilities is offered extensively through this thesis [see chapter 4 and 5]. These 
findings are particularly relevant because they are the first to interpret ER changes after brain 
injury using a well-established model of ER, the Process Model (Gross & Thompson, 2007). 
More specifically, this thesis offers important information on how brain injury modifies two 
widely studied ER strategies: reappraisal and suppression. Reappraisal is an interesting ER 
strategy to explore after brain injury, because it refers to the use of thinking to change the 
interpretation of a negative event, and thinking impairment is common after diffuse (e.g. 
Goldstein & Scherer, 1941) and focal brain damage (e.g. Luria, 1966). Data from this thesis 
suggests that people with brain damage, independent of the laterality of their lesion, are 
considerably slower than healthy controls in the generation of reappraisals. However, when 
time constraints are removed [when they are allowed as much time as they need], they can 
generate as many reappraisals as healthy controls. This is an interesting finding, because it 
QRW RQO\ SRLQWV WR EUDLQ LQMXUHG SDWLHQWV¶ GLIILFXOW\ XVLQJ WKLQNLQJ WR TXLFNO\ GHDO ZLWK
emotional situations, but also recognizes the preservation of these abilities when 
environmental demands are modulated [time]. This point has substantial implications for 
rehabilitation and will be addressed in more detail later. 
A second novel finding is the presence of changes in the capacity to inhibit the 
expression of intense positive emotions in patients with right PFC lesions. This is interesting 
in view of a growing literature suggesting that damage to the rPFC generates marked 
emotional disturbances (Stuss & Alexander, 1999; Stuss & Alexander, 2000), and that such 
brain area is related to the inhibition of motor and emotional responses (Dillon & Pizzagalli, 
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2007). Results suggest that not all patients with right frontal lesions present deficits inhibiting 
emotional expressions. However, a considerable number of subjects with damage to such area 
are particularly unable to conceal the expression of strong positive emotions. On a related 
note, this thesis offers supporting evidence to the idea that the suppression of emotional 
expressions is associated to measures of response inhibition. 
In addition, it is also reported here that individuals with rPFC lesions, compared with 
people with no brain damage, present a more limited range of voluntary manipulation 
[amplification and inhibition] of facial emotional expressions. This is also a novel 
contribution to the literature of RH damage and emotional expression impairment, which has 
mainly tended to focus on expressive and perceptive deficits (Borod et al., 2010, for a 
review), without addressing the voluntary manipulation of facial emotional expressions. 
 
6.2.4. Emotion Regulation Theory. The study of ER changes after brain injury not only 
RIIHUVLQIRUPDWLRQRQKRZEUDLQGDPDJHDOWHUVSHRSOHV¶FDSDFLW\WRPRGXODWHWKHLUIHHOLQJV
but also contributes to a better conceptualization of ER and its mechanisms. This thesis 
addresses this point in two ways. Firstly, it suggests the involvement of several psychological 
processes that have not been previously considered as relevant for ER [see section 2.2], such 
as time-traveling [for situation modification] and inner speech [for reappraisal]. These two 
processes can be selectively impaired after lesions to specific brain areas [hippocampus and 
left inferior frontal gyrus, respectively]. In the future it would be interesting to explore 
whether these processes are related to ER performance on neurologically intact individuals.  
A second contribution in this regard is the generation of a two stage model of 
reappraisal, based on the correlational results from section 4.2. This model suggests that in 
the first stage, [reappraisal generation] automatic negative appraisals are inhibited and 
reappraisals are generated. In the second stage [reappraisal ability] the generated reappraisals 
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are kept in mind so the subject can engage with the most appropriate reinterpretation, while 
the negative stimuli remain within the focus of attention. The novelty of this model is that it 
incorporates reappraisal generation, an often neglected aspect of reappraisal in studies with 
non-brain injured subjects, which tend to focus exclusively on reappraisal ability. 
 
6.2.5. Neuropsychological rehabilitation and adaptation of psychotherapeutic tools. A 
main goal of this thesis has been to stress the importance of emotion regulation [intrinsic and 
extrinsic] for neuropsychological rehabilitation [see section 2.1]. Such interest is not purely 
theoretical, but most importantly practical. By understanding the ways in which ER ability 
can change after brain injury, it is possible to generate better diagnostic formulations and to 
modify our therapeutic tools. The modification of therapeutic tools is a recent concern in 
neuropsychological rehabilitation, especially when using psychological interventions to deal 
with emotional adjustment after the injury (Klonoff, 2010; Weatherhead et al., 2013).This 
thesis makes several contributions on this point. Firstly, it offers a theoretical model of 
understanding how concreteness impacts on emotional life, and describes several technical 
modifications to address such changes in a psychotherapeutic setting [section 2.3]. Secondly, 
it proposes compensatory strategies to address reappraisal impairment, such as the use of 
prompting [section 5.1], questioning [section 5.2] or the modification of time constraints 
[section 4.2]. The usefulness of these strategies to overcome cognitive difficulties is not new 
in neuropsychological rehabilitation (e.g. Luria, 1963). Nevertheless, this is the first time that 
scientific evidence is gathered to support its relevance when compensating for emotion 
regulatory failures.  
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6.3. Limitations 
As one might expect, this thesis has limitations. The majority are related to the fact that 
bringing together two large fields of knowledge [emotion regulation and neuropsychology] 
imposes multiple theoretical and methodological challenges. In this particular case, there are 
few precedents to answer these challenges. In addition, these difficulties are amplified when 
the complexities of assessing people with brain injury are considered.  
Sample size, which is a main limitation of the group studies in chapter 4, stands out as 
the most obvious and important. A large sample not only guarantees more statistical power, 
but also allows more fine grained neuroanatomical hypotheses to be established, this by 
clustering patients in smaller groups with similar lesion sites and profiles of cognitive 
impairment.  
A limitation of working with a small sample is a decrease in the capacity to detect an 
effect [associations or differences]. In other words, a small sample may lead to a type II error. 
In the paper on response modulation and right PFC damage [4.1], for example, no significant 
differences were found between the neurological group and the healthy control group on the 
average of AU 12+6 [Duchenne smiles] produced during the spontaneous condition. This 
suggests that the behavioural reactivity of both groups was similar. However, this difference 
presented a medium effect size [d = .50], thus requiring this result to be considered with 
caution.  
A small sample size can also compromise the use of statistical analyses that attempt to 
capture multiple associations between variables. For example, in the paper on reappraisal and 
laterality [4.2.], where the contribution of several cognitive control abilities to reappraisal 
generation was explored, the ideal statistical procedure to use was a multiple regression 
analysis. However, it has been suggested that in order to test a regression model with a high 
level of power, a minimum of 10 participants per group is needed (Field, 2009). Therefore, 
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the available sample of the study (n = 30) was considerably smaller than the number of 
participants required to build a model with four predictors (n = 40). Nevertheless, considering 
that a main goal of the paper was to explore associations between cognitive control abilities 
and reappraisal generation, it was decided to use a multiple regression model in order to 
control for the shared variance. This is particularly important when the predictors are 
theoretically related [cognitive control], as was the case here. However, the results of this 
model need to be considered with caution, as the use of a small sample may artificially 
increase the explained variance. In addition, some predictors that show small and non-
significant associations [working memory and abstraction] might become significant if using 
a larger sample. 
Finally, and as suggested above, an important problem when working with small 
samples of patients with focal lesions is that the capacity to test fine grained neuroanatomical 
hypotheses is limited. This is particularly relevant when exploring complex psychological 
processes [e.g. reappraisal] that depend on several neuropsychological components which are 
associated to diverse brain areas. For example, in the case of reappraisal, it has been 
suggested that this strategy heavily relies on language abilities. It is widely known that 
posterior areas of the LH [temporal and parietal lobes] are associated with more basic aspects 
of language [e.g. comprehension], while more anterior areas of the LH [PFC] are related to 
executive language [e.g. expression and mental manipulation]. In consequence, when 
exploring the contribution of language areas to reappraisal, a model should consider, at least, 
these two basic groups of patients [anterior and posterior lesions]. This is an important 
limitation of the study on reappraisal and laterality [4.2], where due to the small sample size 
all patients with unilateral lesions to the LH were considered as one group, with the common 
factor of impaired language abilities. Even though this is partially correct [patients with LH 
lesions were more impaired in language abilities than individuals with RH damage], such 
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clustering does not reflect the different forms of language impairment that may emerge after 
lesions to anterior and posterior areas of the LH. Therefore, conclusions regarding the 
relevance of those areas for reappraisal cannot be established. This might be particularly 
important considering that, as reviewed in chapter 2, neuroimaging studies on reappraisal 
have predominantly shown activation of the left PFC. It is possible, and remains to be tested, 
whether anterior lesions to the LH, involving the PFC, may result in more marked disruptions 
of reappraisal than lesions to posterior areas [e.g. temporal lobe]. 
The understanding of how several cognitive processes are related to ER strategies was 
a main goal of the group studies. In recent years there has been a growing interest in this 
relationship, with a handful of behavioural studies exploring such associations on non-
neurological populations. Surprisingly, no relationships have been found between key 
theoretical processes [e.g. verbal ability] and ER strategies [e.g. reappraisal]. As discussed in 
chapter 2.2, a possible explanation may well be that people without a brain injury perform at 
the upper limit of what neuropsychological instruments report, with low variance [ceiling 
effect]. This may also be related to the fact that tasks that assess neuropsychological abilities 
are not designed to capture variations in normal population, but are more sensitive to detect 
marked abnormalities in performance. Following this logic, it was decided in the article on 
reappraisal and laterality [4.2.] to apply the multiple regression model to the whole sample 
[patients + healthy controls], as a way of increasing the power of the analysis, but also as a 
means of  increasing variability on the neuropsychological performance. This approach raises 
questions about the applicability of the model to these two different populations separately, a 
question that could not be tested because of the small sample size. 
Beyond issues of sample size, the group studies also present limitations in terms of the 
methods employed to measure emotional response. They used reaction time measures, self-
report and facial behaviour. However, they do not consider physiological measures. This is a 
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second limitation ± particularly on the response modulation study [section 4.1]. The technical 
demands of collecting behavioural and subjective data were already substantial, especially in 
a neurological patient population. Because this was a preliminary investigation, which 
implied studying the same phenomenon from different points of view, it was not possible to 
implement all these measures simultaneously. Nevertheless, this point is relevant and needs 
to be addressed in the future. The emotional response has been typically described as 
composed of several components [behavioural, subjective and physiological], which may not 
always cohere (Mauss et al., 2005). This constitutes an important limitation, particularly 
when some of the results presented here: that patients with RH preserve emotional 
experience, when measured by subjective self-reports, challenge previous findings reporting 
that patients with RH damage present a behavioural and physiological hypo-reactivity. It is 
possible that, in the same way as healthy controls, the components of the emotional response 
in patients with brain injury may not cohere. It is also possible, that such non-coherence may 
be abnormally exacerbated. Unfortunately such a discussion cannot be settled without testing 
all three components at the same time.  
   
6.4. Future Directions 
Perhaps the main goal of a research project of this sort like this is not to offer definitive 
findings on how brain injury compromises ER, but to open new avenues of enquiry. In this 
section several possible directions of future research are identified. 
 
6.4.1. ER and non-focal brain damage. An interesting question is whether individuals with 
diffuse brain lesions present difficulties implementing specific ER strategies, and if these 
difficulties are similar to those exhibited by patients with focal brain damage. It has been 
frequently reported that emotion dysregulation is a core feature of traumatic brain injury, TBI 
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(e.g. Tate, 1999), however no studies have yet used ER tasks based on the Process Model to 
investigate this. Naturally, a limitation of using subjects with diffuse lesion [e.g. TBI] is that 
neuroanatomical conclusions are more difficult to establish. However, an advantage is that 
TBI presents with a well-known profile of executive impairment, offering an impressive 
opportunity to explore how cognitive control is associated to ER strategies, a topic of 
substantial clinical importance. 
 
6.4.2. ER and circumscribed cognitive impairment. The study of patients with restricted 
cognitive impairment is a very promising line of enquiry. It would allow the exploration of 
how such deficits impact one or several ER strategies. For example, in patients with amnesia 
[e.g. after hippocampal damage] it would be of great interest to understand the psychological 
basis of situation selection. In another line of enquiry, individuals with deficits of expressive 
speech, and perhaps also inner speech [after damage to the left inferior frontal gyrus] would 
allow offer a better understanding of how important internal thinking is for reappraisal. A 
ODUJHUOLVWRIWKHVHSRVVLEOHµWDUJHW¶SDWLHQWVFDQEHIRXQGLQVHFWLRQ 
6.4.3. Single case studies on emotion dysregulation after RH damage. Single case studies 
are a key approach to understand ER changes after brain injury. They offer insight into the 
subjective experience of such change, and also of how the individuals [and their 
environment] has spontaneously adapted [or not] to it. The two case studies presented in this 
thesis (Salas et al., in preparation; Salas et al., 2013) are of individuals with left fronto-
parietal lesions, offering important insight into the role of language and verbal cognitive 
control for reappraisal. It would be interesting to explore in depth cases of subjects with say 
[right fronto-parietal lesions], in order to compare the profiles of dysregulation that may 
arise. It has been suggested, for example, that left lateral lesions compromise a task-switching 
aspect of cognitive control, while right lateral lesions impair monitoring (Shallice, Stuss, 
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Picton, Alexander, & Gillingham, 2008a, 2008b). Our case studies appear to support such a 
claim, and offer additional evidence of how left lateral lesions compromise the use of specific 
ER strategies. It would be interesting to see the effect that monitoring impairment may have 
on the implementation of ER strategies. 
 
6.4.4. Brain injury and reappraisal ability. This thesis has explored one particular aspect of 
reappraisal, which is reappraisal generation. The rationale behind such an approach is that the 
generation and manipulation of ideas is commonly compromised after brain injury. It remains 
to be studied how well patients with brain injury are able to use the generated appraisals to 
down-regulate negative states. It is possible that a different set of cognitive control abilities 
than those recruited in the generative phase are required at this point of the process.  
 
6.4.5. Use of extrinsic emotion regulation strategies. An interesting, but anecdotal finding 
of this thesis is that extrinsic forms of ER appear to be able to compensate for intrinsic 
regulatory failures. The case of Professor F (Salas et al., in preparation) is a notable example 
of how these two processes are connected, and more importantly of how such compensation 
might emerges spontaneously. This finding is of substantial relevance when developing 
interventions that can facilitate patient and family emotional adjustment.  In consequence, it 
appears necessary to explore more systematically the way in which relatives address intrinsic 
regulatory failures, thus mapping patterns of interaction that facilitate and hinder emotional 
adjustment. A better understanding of these interpersonal mechanisms may offer valuable 
information to educate and train family members.  
 
6.4.6. Implementing and testing interventions to improve ER. This thesis has offered 
LPSRUWDQWJXLGHOLQHVLQKRZWRVFDIIROGSDWLHQW¶VLQWULQVLFUHJXODWRU\DELOLWLHV)RUH[DPSOHLW
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KDVEHHQVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHXVHRISURPSWLQJDQGTXHVWLRQLQJPD\HQKDQFHSDWLHQWV¶FDSDFLW\
to reappraise. It would be interesting to explore whether these strategies can be applied, and 
are equally effective in therapeutic and family settings, and if there are family dynamics that 
facilitate or impede their use.  
 
6.5. Closing words 
 Clinical neuropsychologists are constantly dealing with the behavioural and 
interpersonal difficulties caused by brain damage. However, they do not always label such 
difficulties as ER problems, or have a clear theoretical framework to think about them and to 
justify why they do what they do. This is an important limitation, for the lack of an 
appropriate theoretical model reduces the capacity to share information [with colleagues, 
families and funding agencies] and test whether what we do is effective or not.  
It is strange how this task has not been done before, particularly considering that ER 
problems have been reported since the foundation of our discipline. A possible explanation to 
this situation is that, only recently, we have become aware of the limitations of a cognitive 
µUHVWRUDWLYH¶DSSURDFKDQG realized the relevance of addressing emotional adjustment issues. 
However, there seems to be another reason, perhaps more influential. In order to understand 
ER, we need to comprehend the mechanisms by which emotion and cognition influence each 
other. And today, such knowledge is still limited. Nevertheless, clinical neuropsychologists 
are in a privileged position to offer insight into this matter. We have the skills to assess 
cognitive functions, and also the ability to explore subjective, and interpersonal, emotional 
experience. We are trained to test patients in rigorous experimental settings, but at the same 
time are skilled in capturing how deficits impact everyday life. This thesis is an example of 
the many possibilities that a clinical and neuropsychological perspective opens for the study 
of ER. 
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Appendix 1. Ethics permission letter, information sheet and consent form for undergraduate 
student study. 
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Date:  Tue, 02 Nov 2010 11:50:07 +0000 [02/11/10 11:50:07 BST] 
From:  Everil McQuarrie <e.mcquarrie@bangor.ac.uk> 
To:  Oliver Turnbull <pss40d@bangor.ac.uk>, Salas,Christian Eduardo 
<pspa35@bangor.ac.uk> 
Subject:  Ethics proposal 1658 
Dear Colleagues 
 
*Emotion regulation in patients with Acquired Brain Injury Ethics 1658 
*  
 
Your research proposal referred to above has been reviewed by the School of Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee and they are satisfied: 
 
(i)That the research proposed accords with the relevant ethical guidelines. 
 
(ii)That the research proposed is appropriate for sponsorship by BangorUniversity.**  
 
*Approval is granted subject to you submitting Welsh translations of your 
information/consent and debrief forms to me. *  
 
If you wish to make any non-trivial modifications to the research project please inform the 
committee in writing before proceeding.Please also inform the committee as soon as 
possible if research participants experience any unanticipated harm as a result of 
participating in your research. 
 
You should now forward the application to NRES and to the appropriate Local Research 
Ethics Committee (LREC). * If you need a signature on the form regarding research 
sponsorship by the University, and/or a letter confirming this sponsorship, please send the 
final version of your NRES form to me and I will make arrangements for this.*  
 
* *  
 
The NHS Research Ethics Committee expect one of the investigators to make an oral 
presentation in support of the proposal at their meeting.You will be contacted by their 
committee with details as to the date and place of the meeting at which your proposal will be 
considered. 
 
You may not proceed with the research project until you are notified of the approval of the 
Local Research Ethics Committee and have R&D approval from the relevant NHS Trusts. 
 
The approval for this project is given on the understanding that you will complete a review 
form on the project when requested; to this end I would be grateful if you could complete the 
form below and return it to me. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Everil 
 
*UWB-SPONSORED RESEARCH PROJECTS* 
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* *  
 
*MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS FORM*  
 
Principal Investigator: __________________________________________________ 
 
Project Title: __________________________________________________________ 
 
Because Bangor University has agreed to act as research sponsor for the research project 
named above, we are required to ensure that arrangements are in place to monitor the 
progress of the project. Please read through the information below, tick the box that applies 
to this project, and return to the ethics coordinator. 
 
o*This research is funded by an external agency that requires regular progress reports. *  
 
In this case, please copy all such progress reports to the ethics coordinator for review. 
 
o*This is student research under your supervision.*  
 
It is the responsibility of the supervisor to monitor the progress of research conducted by 
students and to report any significant changes or issues arising to the ethics coordinator. 
 
o*Progress reports are not required for this research by the external funder, or this is non-
funded research conducted by you as a staff member.*  
 
The ethics coordinator will contact you at regular intervals for a short progress report. 
 
--  
 
/Everil McQuarrie, 
Research and PhD Administrator, 
Room 113, 
School of Psychology 
Brigantia Building, 
Penrallt Road, 
Bangor 
LL57 2AS 
 
Tel: 01248 383671/ 
 
* /THE LAST DATE FOR PAPER ETHICS SUBMISSIONS IS/** /30th September 2010/*  
 
* /THE LINK TO THE ELECTRONIC FORM IS 
/** /https://intranet.psychology.bangor.ac.uk/ethics//*   
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Information sheet 
 
Researchers 
 
Mr. Christian Salas, Dr. Oliver Turnbull.  
 
1. Study title  
Emotional Persistence: transitions between basic emotions. 
 
2. Invitation paragraph 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is important for 
you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take time 
to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us if 
there is anything that is not clear, or if you would like more information.  Take time to decide 
whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
 
Thank you for reading this. 
 
 
3. What is the purpose of the study? 
The aim of the study is to look at how people experience different emotions in time. Some 
people tend to be more affected by certain emotions than others, and can experience emotions 
for longer or shorter periods of time. These differences between people are important when 
trying to understand how people manage their emotions. 
 
4. Why have I  been chosen? 
For the purpose of this study we need to recruit university students, who are English native 
speakers.  
 
5. Do I  have to take part? 
Participation is entirely voluntary. If you change your mind about taking part in the study you 
can withdraw at any point during the session, and at any time in the two weeks following the 
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session. You can withdraw by contacting me by email, providing me with your participant 
code. If you decide on withdrawal your data will be destroyed and will not be used in the 
study. There are no consequences to deciding that you no longer wish to participate in the 
study. 
 
6. What will happen to me if I  take part? 
If you decide to take part in the study, you will take part in a 1-hour session. During that 
session you will have to complete two tasks. In the tasks you will be asked to watch short 
movie clips as well as telling personal episodes associated to certain emotions. In both tasks 
you will have to report systematically how you feel. The second task will be video taped for 
later analysis.  
 
7. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
Because this study intends to explore how emotions work, you might experience different 
feelings during the assessment and afterwards. Making people feel emotions is the only way 
to investigate them. Many people usually do not experience any distress after being exposed 
to a film clip, or after being asked to recall a personal event. However, there is a chance that 
you keep experiencing some emotions after the session, or that negative personal memories 
keep coming into your mind. If this is the case we ask you to get in touch with the principal 
researcher, so we can give you advice where you might seek help, for example referring you 
to the University Counselling Office. 
 
8. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
As an undergraduate student, by taking part in this study you will gain an insight into how a 
psychology research project is conducted, and what is like to be a participant. This may be 
helpful to your own undergraduate project and how to design it. You will also receive credit 
for your participation. 
  
9. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Yes. The raw data extracted from the sessions will be handled under strict confidentiality 
regulations: your name will be changed to a letter-digit code, the data registered (including 
videos) will be stored in a safe place, and only the named researchers will have access to it. 
To analyze the data some other researchers might have to access to it. Before they do it they 
will have to sign an agreement of confidentiality.  
 
 
10. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the study will be written up as part of my PhD thesis. If the results are novel 
they might also be presented at academic conferences or written up for publications in 
specialized journals. In all these cases there would not be any personal reference to the 
participants, and we will not display video material one it has been coded.  
 
11. Who is organising and funding the research? 
The research project has been organised by Christian Salas, who is a PhD student at the 
School of Psychology, Bangor University. This project is not externally funded. 
 
12. Who has reviewed the study? 
The project has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology, Bangor 
University and North Wales Research Ethics Committee. 
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13. Contact details for further information 
 
Mr. Christian Salas 
School of Psychology,  
Adeilad Brigantia, Of. 261 
Penrallt Road 
Gwynedd LL57 2AS 
pspa35@bangor.ac.uk 
Tel: (01248) 388895 
 
Dr. Oliver Turnbull (Supervisor)  
Tel: (01248) 388261 
o.turnbull@bangor.ac.uk 
 
 
17. What if something goes wrong?  
If you have any complaints about how this study is conducted please address these to either 
of the persons below: 
 
Dr Paul Downing 
Deputy Head of School 
School of Psychology 
University of Wales, Bangor 
Brigantia Building 
Bangor, ll57 2AS 
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Consent Form 
 
 
Emotional Persistence I I . Transitions between Basic Emotions. 
 
 
 
Participant reference code______________ 
 
 
x I have read and understood the attached information sheet and, by signing below, I 
consent to participate in this study. 
x I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the study without giving a reason 
at any time during the study itself. 
x I understand that I also have the right to change my mind about participating in the 
study for a short period after the study has concluded (two weeks). 
 
 
 
 
Participant signature:____________________________________________ 
 
Print name:________________________________________ Sex: _________ 
 
Participant psu: __________________________________Age:____________ 
 
 
If you want to receive information about the results of this research write here your e-mail 
address. It will be used for this exclusive purpose: 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Researcher signature:____________________________________________ 
 
Print name:________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 2. NHS Ethics committee approval letter, information sheets and consent forms for 
studies with acquired brain injury population. 
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Participant Identification Number: 
Date: 29/11/10 
Version: 2 
 
Information sheet 
 
Researchers 
Dr Oliver Turnbull, Mr Christian Salas  
 
1. Study title  
Emotion Regulation in People with Acquired Brain Injury. 
 
 
2. Invitation paragraph 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide to take part in the 
study it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve.  Please take the time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with 
RWKHUVLI\RXZLVK3OHDVHGRQ¶WKHVLWDWHDVNXVLIWKHUHLVDQ\WKLQJWKDWLVQRWFOHDURr if you 
would like further information.  Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
Thank you for reading this. 
 
3. What is the purpose of the study? 
The aim of this study is to look at how people regulate their emotions after a brain injury. 
Some people that have acquired a brain injury may experience changes in their capacity to 
feel or control positive or negative emotions. We are planning to look at how lesions to 
different parts of the brain may impair different aspects of this capacity to regulate emotions, 
DQGKRZWKLVPD\LPSDFWSHRSOH¶VDELOLW\WRFRSHZLWKWKHLQMXU\DQGUHWXUQWRVRFLDOOLIH 
 
 
4. Why have I  been chosen? 
You have been invited to take part in this study because you have had a brain injury and 
because the borders of this injury are well defined, so we know which areas of your brain 
were affected. Neurologists and neuropsychologist from Bangor University and Staff from 
the North Wales Brain Injury Service (NWBIS) think that you would be able to take part in 
this study and the tasks this involves. 
 
 
 
5. Do I  have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you do decide to take part you will 
be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide 
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to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  A 
decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part, will not affect the standard 
of care you receive. 
 
6. What will happen to me if I  take part? 
If you decide to take part in the study, you will need to attend two sessions of approximately 
2 hours each. In the first session an initial assessment will be carried out, where we will ask 
you to complete some questionnaires about how you are feeling at the present moment and 
how you manage your emotions (with help from the researcher if you need it). We will also 
briefly assess your concentration, language, memory and capacity to organize. We will also 
need a relative of yours (wife, husband, parent or son/daughter) to complete two 
questionnaires about you.  
 
Approximately one or two weeks after your initial assessment, the second session will be 
carried out. In this session you will be asked to perform different tasks, for example, watch 
short clips from movies and report how they make you feel, or remember an event in your life 
when you felt a specific emotion (for example joy or sadness).  
 
During all these tasks we will need to video-record you. This is because we are interested in 
studying emotions and facial expression are one of the most important sources of information 
about how people feel. Although we know it might feel uncomfortable, we hope you agree 
with this, because this information is very important to understanding the emotional changes 
that occur after a brain injury. 
 
The assessments will take place either in the North Wales Brain Injury Service in Colwyn 
Bay, in another health service venue that the Brain Injury Service uses for patient 
appointments (such as your GP surgery or a community hospital) or at the university in 
Bangor. If it is difficult for you to travel to one of these places, it may also be possible for 
you to be seen at your home. You will be offered money for travel expenses (£ 6 for each 
hour you spend travelling) and each assessment session you attend (£ 10), in recognition of 
the time and energy that participation in this project will ask of you.  
 
 
7. What do I  have to do? 
Other than the need to attend to two assessment sessions, the research study will not affect 
your lifestyle or normal routine in any other way. 
 
8. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
The risks of this study are the same as watching a movie on TV or having a conversation with 
another person about you. We have run this experiment before and rarely found it to be 
distressing for participants.  
 
 
9. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
We hope that taking part in the study will be helpful in two ways. First, in case that you are 
interested, after the study we will give you brief feedback letter which may be used in your 
rehabilitation process, or simply as a way of knowing yourself better. Second, we believe that 
the emotional changes that a person has after a brain injury are very important in how he/she 
may cope with the brain injury and return to their work and family life. Because there is such 
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scarcity of information on this, the results of this study may help in the future to design 
interventions that would help people to cope better with brain injury.  
 
10. What happens when the research study stops? 
The information obtained will be studied in detail and the main conclusions of the study will 
be shared with the professionals to generate new ways of helping people with brain injury. In 
case you want it, a brief feedback letter will be offered to you too.  
 
 
11. Involvement of my Family Doctor 
We will write to your family doctor to let them know that you have decided to take part in 
this study.  
 
12. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All information that is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept 
strictly confidential and you will not be identified in any report or publication. This 
agreement of confidentiality only will be broken in cases where your well-being and safety 
are put at risk. If something like this happens, the researcher will report the situation to the 
professionals in charge of your care (rehabilitation team or consultant neurologist). 
  
13. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
When the study is finished, you will receive a letter telling you about the results. Our findings 
will also contribute to an educational qualification, copies of which will be given to the 
Library of the University of Wales, Bangor. The results will be published in scientific 
journals and may be presented at conferences. 
 
14. Who is organising and funding the research? 
The research project has been organised through the School of Psychology, Bangor 
University.  
 
15. Who has reviewed the study? 
The project has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology, Bangor 
University and North Wales Research Ethics Committee. 
 
16. Contact details for further information 
Mr. Christian Salas 
Chief Investigator 
School of Psychology 
Bangor University 
Bangor, Gwynedd LL57 2AS, UK. 
 
Available during the week 
Tel: 01248 38 8895 
 
17. What if something goes wrong?  
If you have any complaints about how this study is conducted please address these to either 
of the persons below: 
 
Dr Valerie Morrison  Dr. Rosella Roberts 
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Deputy Head of School 
School of Psychology 
University of Wales, Bangor 
Brigantia Building 
Bangor, ll57 2AS 
Tel: +44 (0) 1248 383624 
Fax: +44 (0) 1248 38 2599 
Clinical Governance Officer  
Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board 
Ysbyty Gwynedd 
Bangor, Gwynedd 
LL57 2PW 
Tel: +44 (01248) 384877 
 
 
1 for patient;  1 for researcher;  1 to be kept with hospital notes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Appendix 
355 
 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
 
Study title: Emotion Regulation after acquired brain injury. 
 
Name of Researchers:  
Mr Christian Salas, Dr Oliver Turnbull. 
 
Name of Researchers who will obtain consent: Mr Christian Salas 
 
       Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated    .................. 
 (version ...............) for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time,   
 without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
3.  I understand that relevant sections of my medical notes may be looked at by 
     Mr Christian Salas. I give permission for this researcher to have access to my records. 
 
4 I understand that all collected information during this research will be kept strictly 
confidential. However if there is a situation where my well-being or safety is  
compromised, I understand that the investigators will have to report the situation to the professionals 
on charge of my care.  
xv 
5.  I agree to my family doctor being informed of my participation in the study. 
 
6.   I agree that the tasks in the study can be video-recorded.  
 
7.  I agree that the video recordings can be used for educational purposes. 
 
8.  I agree to a close relative to participate in the study by answering two questionnaires  
 
9. I agree to take part in the above study.    
 
________________________ __________________________________ 
Name of Patient Date Signature 
 
_________________________ ___________________________________ 
Name of Person taking consent Date Signature 
(if different from researcher) 
 
_____________________ __________________________________ 
Researcher Date Signature 
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Participant Identification Number: 
Date: 29/11/10 
Version: 2 
 
Information sheet family members 
 
Researchers 
Dr Oliver Turnbull, Mr Christian Salas  
 
1. Study title  
Emotion Regulation in People with Acquired Brain Injury. 
 
 
2. Invitation paragraph 
You and your relative have been invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it 
is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you 
wish.  Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  
Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
Thank you for reading this. 
 
3. What is the purpose of the study? 
The aim of this study is to look at the capacity of people to regulate emotions after a brain 
injury. Some people that have acquired a brain injury may experience changes in their 
capacity to feel or control positive or negative emotions. We are planning to look at how 
damage to the brain may impair different aspects of this capacity to experience and regulate 
HPRWLRQVDQGKRZWKLVPD\DIIHFWSHRSOH¶VDELOLW\WRFRSHZLWKWKHLQMXU\DQGUHWXUQWRVRFLDO
life. Because the capacity to regulate emotions is usually at work when we relate to friends 
and family, and because as a relative you also have knowledge of the patient from before the 
injury, your information is extremely relevant for this research.  
 
 
4. Why have I  been chosen? 
You have been invited to take part in this study because you have a close relationship with 
WKH SDWLHQW SDUWQHU SDUHQW VLEOLQJ HWF DQG DUH DEOH WR RIIHU LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ WKH SDWLHQW¶V
level of social functioning. Neurologists and neuropsychologist from Bangor University and 
Staff from the North Wales Brain Injury Service (NWBIS) think that your relative is suitable 
to take part in this study and the tasks this imply. 
 
Ysgol Seicoleg 
Prifysgol	  Cymru,	  Bangor	  
 
Adeilad Brigantia, Ffordd Penrallt 
Bangor, Gwynedd LL57 2AS 
 
Ffon:(01248) 382211 - Ffacs:(01248) 382599 
e-bost: psychology@bangor.ac.uk 
www.psychology.bangor.ac.uk 
School	  of	  Psychology	  
Bangor	  University	  
 
Adeilad Brigantia, Penrallt Road 
Bangor, Gwynedd LL57 2AS 
 
Tel:(01248) 382211 - Fax:(01248) 382599 
e-mail: psychology@bangor.ac.uk 
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5. Do I  have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you do decide to take part you will 
be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide 
to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  A 
decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part, will not affect the standard 
of care your relative receive. 
 
6. What will happen to me if I  take part? 
If you decide to take part in the study, you will need to answer two questionnaires, which will 
take no more than an hour. If you accompany your relative while he or she is being tested you 
might use that time to fill in the questionnaires. If you are not attending we might send you 
the questionnaires by post. 
 
 
 
8. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
To participate in this study has no risks for you and the information you will provide will be 
kept confidential.  
 
 
9. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Taking part on this study will be useful in several ways. First, in case that you and your 
relative want it, after the study, we will give you a feedback which may be used in your 
UHODWLYH¶VUHKDELOLWDWLRQSURFHVV6HFRQGZHEHOLHYHWKDWWKHHPRWLRQDOFKDQJHVWKDWD
person has after a brain injury are very important in how he/she may cope with the brain 
injury, return to their work and resume family life. Because there is such scarcity of 
information on this, the results of this study may help in the future to design interventions 
that would help people to cope better with brain injury.  
 
 
 
10. What happens when the research study stops? 
The information obtained will be studied in detail and the main conclusions of the study will 
be shared with the professionals to generate new ways of helping people with brain injury.  
 
 
11. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All information that is collected about you or your relative during the course of the research 
will be kept strictly confidential.  You or your relative will not be identified in any report or 
publication. This agreement of confidentiality only will be broken in cases where the well-
being and safety of the patient is put at risk. If something like this happens, the researcher 
will report the situation to the professionals in charge of the patient (rehabilitation team or 
consultant neurologist). 
 
 
12. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
When the study is finished, you will receive a letter telling you about the results. Our findings 
will also contribute to an educational qualification, copies of which will be given to the 
7. Appendix 
358 
 
Library of the University of Wales, Bangor. The results will be published in scientific 
journals and may be presented at conferences. 
 
13. Who is organising and funding the research? 
The research project has been organised through the School of Psychology, Bangor 
University.  
 
14. Who has reviewed the study? 
The project has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology, Bangor 
University and North Wales Research Ethics Committee. 
 
15. Contact details for further information 
Mr. Christian Salas 
Chief Investigator 
School of Psychology 
Bangor University 
Bangor, Gwynedd LL57 2AS, UK. 
 
Available during the week 
Tel: 01248 38 8895 
 
16. What if something goes wrong?  
 
If you have any complaints about how this study is conducted please address these to either 
of the persons below: 
Dr Richard Bental  
Deputy Head of School 
School of Psychology 
University of Wales, Bangor 
Brigantia Building 
Bangor, ll57 2AS 
Tel: +44 (0) 1248 383624 
Fax: +44 (0) 1248 38 2599 
Dr. Rosella Roberts 
Clinical Governance Officer  
Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board 
Ysbyty Gwynedd 
Bangor, Gwynedd 
LL57 2PW 
Tel: +44 (01248) 384877 
 
 
 
1 for relative;  1 for researcher;  1 to be kept with hospital notes 
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CONSENT FORM FAMILY MEMBERS 
 
 
Study title: Emotion Regulation after acquired brain injury. 
 
 
Name of Researchers:  
Mr Christian Salas, Dr Oliver Turnbull. 
 
Name of Researchers who will obtain consent: Mr Christian Salas 
 
 
       Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated    .................. 
 (version ...............) for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time,   
 ZLWKRXWJLYLQJDQ\UHDVRQZLWKRXWP\UHODWLYHV¶PHGLFDOFDUHRUOHJDOULJKWVEHLQJDIIHFWHG 
 
 
3. I understand that all collected information during this research will be kept strictly 
FRQILGHQWLDO7KHRQO\H[FHSWLRQLVDVLWXDWLRQZKHUHP\UHODWLYH¶VZHOO-being or safety is 
compromised. I understand that in such circumstances the investigators will have  
to reporWWKHVLWXDWLRQWRWKHSURIHVVLRQDOVRQFKDUJHRIP\UHODWLYH¶VFDUH 
 
 
 
3.   I agree to take part in the above study.    
 
 
 
________________________ _________________________________ 
Name of Relative Date Signature 
 
 
_________________________ ___________________________________ 
Name of Person taking consent Date Signature 
(if different from researcher) 
 
 
_________________________ ____________________________________ 
Researcher Date Signature 
 
 
1 for relative;  1 for researcher;  1 to be kept with hospital notes 
Ysgol Seicoleg 
Prifysgol	  Cymru,	  Bangor	  
 
Adeilad Brigantia, Ffordd Penrallt 
Bangor, Gwynedd LL57 2AS 
 
Ffon:(01248) 382211 - Ffacs:(01248) 382599 
e-bost: psychology@bangor.ac.uk 
www.psychology.bangor.ac.uk 
School	  of	  Psychology	  
Bangor	  University	  
 
Adeilad Brigantia, Penrallt Road 
Bangor, Gwynedd LL57 2AS 
 
Tel:(01248) 382211 - Fax:(01248) 382599 
e-mail: psychology@bangor.ac.uk 
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Appendix 3. Vignettes from the internally generated mood induction procedure (Affective Story Recall). In 
the right column the self-report scores of the internal (ASR) and external (FC) procedures are compared. 
 
Participant Target Emotion  
ASR and FC 
Scores 
Example A 
Female, 19 
Anger The most anger SUREDEO\ZRXOGEHZHHNVDJR«RQHRIP\
younger sister is going through so much. It is the youngest 
sister, so you can imagine all the things she goes through. She 
had acne, so doctors prescribed tablets, and as a side effect 
they cause depression. She has been always really happy, one 
of those persons you actually love. She went on this tablets 
and her mood dropped completely. She is going through so 
PXFK«D IHZZHHNVDJRVKHVWDUWHG WRJHWEXOOLHGE\ WKHVH
girls at school. And is not so much the bullying, but are these 
OLWWOH WKLQJV OLNH OHDYLQJ KHU RXW PDNLQJ FDOOV«EHFDXVH KHU
ER\IULHQG LV YHU\ SRSXODU«LV RQH RI WKRVH ER\V HYHU\ JLUO
ZDQWWREHZLWK$QGP\VLVWHULVZLWKKHU«DQGWKHUHZHUHD
ORW RI FRPPHQWV RQZK\ LV VKHZLWK KLP«\RX NQRZ«KH
can do better. For a 15-year-old girl who is going through so 
PXFKDOUHDG\«LQDZD\ , UHDOO\hated those girls that hurt 
my sister. My mother told me that my sister was quite upset 
EHFDXVH,ZDVQRWDURXQG$QGZHDUHVRIDUDZD\«WKHUHLV
nothing I can do to helSKHUDQGWKDW«LWkills me. I cry a lot 
because she is going through so much and she is my baby 
VLVWHUDQG ,¶P VXSSRVHG WRSURWHFWKHU$QG WKHVHJLUOVZHUH
so cruel. She came from school crying VKHPLVVHGVFKRRO«
DQG VKH FDQ¶W PLVV VFKRRO WKLV \HDU $QG I absolute hated 
these girls who went to do that to my sister. And they just 
VHHPQRWWRFDUH«DQGWKDWLVWKHZRUVWWKLQJZKHQVRPHRQH
do something to someone and really hurt her... and not realize 
the effect that this has in my sister. I mean maybe they see my 
sister crying EXW WKH\ GRQ¶W NQRZ WKH HIIHFW RI WKLV RQ P\
family or me. Just so much rage the fact that people can be so 
FUXHO DQG GRQ¶W UHDOL]H KRZ WKH\ FDQ DIIHFW RWKHU SHRSOH
<HDK«WKLVLVSUREDEO\WKHZRUVWWLPH. 
Anger ASR 
A = 5.0 
S  = 4.3 
F  = 4.0 
J  =1.0  
 
Anger FC 
A = 2.7 
S  = 2.0 
F  = 1.0 
J  =1.0 
Example B 
Female 19 
Fear It was the first time I was in the house alone for a few 
months. I was back from reading week and my mom and dad 
ZHUH DZD\ ,W ZDV ODWH DW QLJKW« , NQRZ \RX VKRXOG WHOO
yourself that is a good neighbourhood and that nothing is 
gonna happen, but I kept hearing noises upstairs and I just 
sort of froze. And then my dog, she is quite sensitive to things 
like that, started barking and growling. So I was there frozen 
in my seat not knowing what to do just having my phone 
UHDG\« 6R , WXUQHG WKH YROXPH GRZQ RI WKH television 
WKLQNLQJµZKDWLIVRPHRQHFDQKHDUPH"¶%XWHYHU\WKLQJWKDW
was in my head at that moment was ilogical. And I knew that 
there is no possible way that someone have got upstairs. But I 
got myself into this fear like state that made me think there is 
someone upstairs and is going to come down and murder 
PH«\RX NQRZ«VRPHWKLQJ VWXSLG ,ZDVYHU\scared and 
even started to think how to get out of the house crawling 
down to the front door. But finally it was something very 
ridiculus, it was the cat playing around. But at that time I was 
MXVWO\LQJLQEHGEHFDXVH,ZDVLQWKLVVWDWH«VRZRXQGXS«
DQGWKHQ,IHOWVRUWRIFDOP«IHHOLQJELWVWXSLGDERXWP\VHOI,
think I was very, very scared of being alone at home.. 
Fear ASR 
F  = 3.7 
A = 1.3 
S  = 2.3 
J   = 2.0 
 
Fear FC  
F  = 2.7 
A = 1.0 
S  = 1.7 
J  = 2. 
 
Example C 
Female 18 
Sadness One of the sadest memories I have is one when I was very 
young. It is one of the first memories I have, so it makes it 
Sad ASR 
S  = 5.0 
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 even worst. Is my mom and my dad fighting in the kitchen 
and I was hidden behind the washing machine, looking. I 
FDQ¶WUHPHPEHUZKDWWKH\DUHVD\LQJ,FDQ¶WUHPHPHEHUDQ\
sound at all. All I can remember is the anger in their faces. 
My mom is leaning against the sink and she is screaming at 
P\GDGDQGP\GDGLVVFUHDPLQJEDFNDQG,FRXOGQ¶WKDQGOHLW
anymore, so I ran out of the kitchen and my younger brother 
was in the front room crying and he could hear everything as 
well. That moment when I saw him crying I thought well I 
FDQ¶W cry, he needs to be looked after. They carried on 
screaming so eventually I took all my brothers upstairs and 
ZHZHQWWREHGWRJHWKHU$QGWKHQDIWHUWKDW«LWZDVD\HDU
RUVRDIWHUWKDW«DQG,UHPHPEHUWKDWZDVDWXHVGD\PRUQLQJ
and my mom came and said you are not going to school. I 
KDWHG VFKRRO«VKH VWDUWHG JHWWLQJPH GUHVV ZLWKP\ QRUPDO
clothes and I ran down the stairs and bang my head into the 
KDQG UDLO RI WKH VWDLU DQG NQRFNHGP\ WRRWK RXW« VR , MXVW
thought that I was gonna EHJURXQGHG«EXWVKHVDWPHGRZQ
DQG , NQHZ WKHUH ZDV VRPHWKLQJZURQJ« DQG VKH WRRNPH
into the front room and told me that my dad had killed 
KLPVHOI 6R \HDK« WKDW ZDV D SUHWW\ FUDS GD\ $QG , GRQ¶W
remember her saying anything afterwards. I remember she sat 
there crying, and my grandma came through the door and she 
huged me and she huged my mom. Then I went upstairs to 
P\URRPDQGGLGQ¶WVSHDNWRDQ\RQHIRUWKUHHPRQWKV 
A = 5.0 
F  = 4.7 
J  = 1.0 
 
 
Sad FC 
S  = 3.0 
A = 1.3 
F  =1.0 
J  =1.0 
Example D 
Female, 18 
 
Joy I wrote an essay, my first essay ever and I got an A+ on it. So 
that was very, very exciting and it made me feel very happy 
DQGDOVR,GLGQ¶WH[SHFWLW6R,UHPHPEHUFDOOLQJP\SDUHQWV
and telling them how happy I was and the feeling of how 
proud they were of me made me even happier. Well, and at 
WKHGHSDUWPHQWWKHSURIHVVRUFDPHWRPHDQGVDLG³FDQZHXVH
\RXUHVVD\LQWKHFODVVDVDQH[DPSOH"´$QG,ZDVOLNH«RI
FRXUVH« ZRZ« WKDW PDGH PH YHU\ happy. I was a bit 
scared, but mostly happy because it just meant that they 
thought that my work was good enough to be presented as an 
H[DPSOH« RU « , GRQ¶W NQRZ LW PDGH PH YHU\ KDSS\
because it was one of the first things that I have done in the 
XQLYHUVLW\DQG,GLGQ¶WH[pect an A+. 
Joy ASR 
J  =3.7 
A = 1.0 
S  = 1.0 
F  = 2.7 
 
Joy FC  
J  = 2.3 
A = 1.0 
S  = 1.7 
F  = 1.0 
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Appendix 4. Facial expression generation. rPFC and HC mean scores for the voluntary generation of  a large 
set of AUs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
M SD M SD
12+6 1.13 0.35 1.29 0.46
4 1.63 0.91 1.21 0.47
9 1.88 0.64 1.86 0.36
10 2.75 1.58 2.29 0.99
14 2.25 1.28 1.64 0.63
20 1.63 0.74 1.93 1.07
24 1.50 0.75 1.29 0.47
26 1.13 0.35 1.07 0.27
1+2 1.50 0.53 1.57 5.14
5 2.38 0.91 2.00 0.78
15 3.50 1.41 3.36 1.39
17 2.25 1.48 1.50 0.65
rPFC HCAU
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Appendix 5. Reappraisal answers of Mrs M, non-concrete brain-injured patients and controls. 
 
 
 
 
IAPS 
Picture   
Mrs M Non-concrete brain-injured patients Controls 
 
Sick Baby                             
(3350) 
Free
Reappraisal  
Mrs M 2K 6PLOHV ZLWK VXUSULVH :KDW¶V WKH PDWWHU ZLWK
WKDW« ZKDW« ZKDW« ZKDW« RK :KDW ZKDW ZKDW DP ,
supposed to... Oh dear! (6.53s) Very sick boy (sad 
H[SUHVVLRQVWUHWFKHVGRZQWKHFRUQHUVRIWKHOLSVV,FDQ¶W
think what else to say there realO\ V« 9HU\ VLFN ER\
V$OWKRXJKWKHUHLVDKDQGWKHUHLVQ¶WLWUHDOO\" 
Examiner: Yes.                                                                                 
Mrs M+DQGWKHUHV,GRQ¶t know what you can say 
DERXWWKDWUHDOO\IURZQLQJ«He is sick.                   
(62s Total) 
P10 (Female, Bilateral medial frontal lesion): Oh gosh! (6s) 
Poor baby. He is very, very ill. He is very, very ill. Because, I 
think, he has been starved... Starving situation isn't it? (20s) 
:HOO OHW¶V WKLQN WKDW WKH EDE\ ZRXOG JHW EHWWHU LI SHRSOH
contributed towards giving money to help the situation.                                                                    
Examiner: Like charity? 
P10: Yes, yes.                                                                   
Examiner: Ok...anything else?       
P10: Oh! (10s) I'm very slow at thinking things like this, sorry. I 
can't think in anything else.                                  
(88s Total) 
C16 (Female): :HOO«6RPHFDVHEXWVRPHERG\LVWKHUH«7KHUH
is a hand behind the child, supporting him. He is getting medical 
WUHDWPHQW«IRU WKH PDOQXWULWLRQ KH LV JHWWLQJ WUHDWPHQW« 7KHUH
are monitors attached to him, so somebody is caring, which is good 
because lots of children in that situation don't have that. Mmmm! 
That he is being taken care of is good for the family... Good that he 
is there, you know, knowing that things are being done... And good 
for the child if he survives... So he has a chance. 
Examiner: Anything else?  
C16: Not really                                                                     
(82s Total) 
 
  Prompting Examiner: Can you think about the positive side of this 
situation? 
Mrs M: (3.46s) at least she is somewhere where they do him 
good (emphasis added/ raises eyebrows and the upper eyelid).                                                              
Examiner: Where they will do him good?                         
Mrs M <HV« ORWV RI WKLQJV KHUH« KHUH SRLQWLQJ WRPHGLFDO
HTXLSPHQW LQ WKH SLFWXUH« 2K LW LV D VKDPH
Examiner: Anything else you want to add?                                                                    
Mrs MVVPLOHV'RHVQ¶WKHORRNROGDOWKRXJKKHLVWLQ\"                
Examiner: Yes, that is true                                                      
0UV0,GRQ¶WNQRZ 
 
    
 
Funeral                       
(9220) 
Free
Reappraisal 
Mrs M: (5s) That is someone that has died (4s). And they are all 
YHU\«YHU\«VDGWKDWKHKDVGLHGIURZQLQJ/RRNVOLNHLW¶VDOO
IDPLO\«,VKRXOGWKLQN«'RQ¶W\RXWKLQN" 
Examiner: Probably. 
Mrs MV\HVV ,GRQ¶WNQRZVKHPRYHVDZD\IURPWKH
screen while frowning). Very sad (she sighs and frowns).                                                                                   
(57s Total) 
P34 (Female, Right dorsolateral frontal and insula lesion): (11s) 
They are mourning him (35s) At least they have somebody with 
them to look after them (26s) The women in these countries 
seem to get very excitable (15s).                                                                                
Examiner: You mean as a cultural difference?                     
P34: Yes (20s).  
Examiner: Anything else? 
P34: V+HLVFRPIRUWLQJKHU+H¶VJRWKROGRIKHUZULVW$QG
she must be comforting that one, because she is touching her.                                                                           
(140s Total) 
C17 (Female): Looks as if the gentleman has died, and I'm going 
back to what I said about the old lady in the bed (she refers to a 
picture used during the training period)... His organs can be used, 
again, who knows? One of these people around the coffin could be 
in need of a transplant one day, or even now, so he can be used. I 
have never put down death as being the end of it, and there is 
always another kind of life afterwards... But I think he can be used 
if he has agreed, and also his family.                 
Examiner: Anything else? 
C17: The grief will become less with time. We all have to do that, 
because life goes on... And we will remember him with nicer 
thoughts in the head than actually seeing him as he is in a coffin 
now.                                                                   
(74s Total) 
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  Prompting Examiner: Can you think of a positive side of this situation?                                                                              
Mrs M VKH IURZQV V 1R , FDQ¶W UHDOO\ UDLVHV ERWK
eyebrows).                                                                        
Examiner: Difficult to think in a positive aspect?             
Mrs M: Yes. (8s) Although it looks like that is the wife. And that 
LV WKH«V«$OWKRXJK ,GRQ¶WNQRZZKDW WKLV LVSRLQWV WRD
KDQGWKDWDSSHDUVIURPWKHOHIWORZHUFRUQHU«$KDQG«V«
Yes (keeps staring at the picture without saying anything).   
    
 
Car Crash                       
(9903) 
Free 
Reappraisal 
(65s) 
Mrs M: Wow! That is a big a (3s), big car there (she smiles and 
then bites the lower lip). (16s) I should think there is a lot of 
people there that didn't get out (she moves very close to the 
screen, and frowns while contemplating the picture, then she 
moves back to a straight position and stretches her lips 
horizontally, generating dimples in her face). (20s) Lots of 
people helping people there. (13s) No, I don't know.                  
(61s Total) 
P24 (Female, left dorsolateral frontal and Frontal Eye Field 
lesion): V $ FDU« 2YHUWXUQHG« 6RPHERG\ LV KXUW«
6RPHERG\LVRQWKHVWUHWFKHU«VLWLVOLNHLWZDVDFKDLQWKLQJ
because all you see are these things here but maybe they had to 
jack up everything (5s) Violent cutting out... Person is on a 
stretcher and... Hopefully he is alive.                          
Examiner: Anything else?                                                     
P24: No. 
(54s Total) 
C15 (Female): (6s) The positive thing there is that help has 
DFWXDOO\DUULYHGKDVQ
WLW"-XVWKRSHWKDWWKHSHRSOHDUHUHVFXHG«
*RVK7KHUHLVQRWPXFKOHIWRIWKDWFDU«<RXMXVWKRSHWKH\JRW
RXW LQ WLPH«%XWDW OHDVW WKHUH LVKHOS WKHILUHEULJDGHLV WKHUH
7KH SROLFHPDQ <HV VR WKH\¶YH got the best around them... 
Haven't they?            
Examiner: Anything else?                                                         
C15: No.                                                                                      
(45s Total) 
  
Prompting Examiner: Can you think of a positive side of this situation?  
Mrs M: (4s) He went too fast, he was going too fast, I would 
think (raises her eyebrows). It tripped over, fell over like that 
(makes the gesture with her hand of something hitting the table) 
So therefore lots of people got (frowning). There is nothing else 
there, is it? Not really (She moves her head trying to see the 
picture from different angles). (6s)                                                      
Examiner: So what would be a positive side of this situation?                                                                                  
Mrs M: they are looking after the people there... Whether they do 
anything... At least they are helping aren't they?  
 
 
 
Graveyard                 
(9926) 
Free 
Reappraisal 
Mrs M2KRSHQVPRXWKDQGIURZQV«,W¶VVDGV«/RRNV
at the picture from different angles) Yes (11s). Who are these 
(frowning and pointing to the people in the slide)? Does it matter 
who they are?                       
Examiner:HGRQ¶WNQRZZKRWKH\DUH 
Mrs M: Could be their relatives (4s) More like relatives than 
DQ\WKLQJ« V <HV ORRNV OLNH UHODWLYHV UHDOO\ V 7KDW¶V
John (pointing at a name in the grave stone contemplated by the 
couple)                                          
Examiner: I think it sa\V-DNH«V 
Mrs M: -DNH«9HU\VDGVDGH[SUHVVLRQVWUHWFKHVWKHFRUQHUVRI
WKHPRXWKGRZQ/RRNVOLNHLI«V9HU\VDG«V,GRQ¶W
know (moves away from the screen while frowning).                                                                  
(93s Total) 
P13 (Female, Bilateral dorsolateral frontal lesion): (5s) At least 
WKH\KDYHJRWHDFKRWKHU7KH\KDYHORVW«,WKLQNLVWKHLUFKLOG
V«0PPP $W OHDVW WKH\¶YH JRW HDFK RWKHU VR WKH\ FDQ
comfort each other (10s) The\DUHDOOWKHVDPHQDPHV«:LOFR[
Wilcox, Wilcox and Wilcox (referring to the names on the 
graves). (20s) Oh dear!                                                         
Examiner: Anything else?                                                     
P13: No.                                                                                
(55s Total) 
C3 (Female): Obviously this couple is mourning a lost person. I 
VKRXOGLPDJLQHLW¶VDFKLOGSUREDEO\%XWLWORRNVDVLIWKH\ORYH
each other, and can console each other. The child, the person had a 
really nice burial, and there is a lovely head stone and flowers. And 
the hope is that they will get over it... But otherwise they look... 
They are sad... but they look as if they are together, and in a good 
relationship. That¶V it I think.                                                
(40s Total) 
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  Prompting Examiner: Can you think about the positive side?               
 Mrs M: V7KH\¶YHJRWHDFKRWKHUKHUIURZQLQJGLVDSSHDUV
and she smiles while looking at the examiner). And they are 
sorry that this happened (moves her head from side to side while 
showing a sad expression, by frowning, and at the same time 
raising the inner corners of the eyebrows).  
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Appendix 6. Semi-structured Interview Protocol.  
 
1. Has your brain injury had an impact on your emotional life? 
a. Individually 
b. Interpersonally 
2. Has your brain injury had an impact on the way you experience your emotions? 
a. Positive or negative emotions 
b. Intensity and frequency of emotions 
3. Has your brain injury had an impact on the way you understand your emotions? 
a. Understand what you feel 
b. Capacity to name what you feel 
c. Understand why you feel in a certain way 
4. Has your brain injury had any impact on the way you regulate the emotions you feel? 
a. Capacity to distract yourself from negative thoughts or feelings  
b. Capacity to focus on a positive thought or feeling when you are feeling 
negative 
c. Capacity to supress or disconnect from negative thoughts or feelings 
d. Capacity to find a positive side on negative event as a way of feeling better 
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